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GLOBAL RISKS AND THEIR IMPACTS ON TÜRKİYE

Edited by

Hasret Çomak, Burak Şakir Şeker
Doğan Şafak Polat, Mesut Özel, Murat Koray



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GLOBAL RISKS AND THEIR IMPACTS ON TÜRKİYE

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Mesut Özel, Murat Koray

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CONTENTS

PREFACE	1
INTRODUCTION.....	5
Salim Dervişoğlu	
PART I.	
GEOPOLITICAL RISKS AND THEIR IMPACTS ON TÜRKİYE	
GLOBAL GEOPOLITICAL RISKS	15
Herbert R. Reginbogin	
THE WEAKENING OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER	21
Ozan Örmeci	
GLOBAL GEOPOLITICAL RISKS IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND THEIR REFLECTIONS ON TÜRKİYE	43
Mesut Özel	
APPROACHES OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN TÜRKİYE TO THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION: IS THERE A CONSENSUS?	59
İlhan Aras and Sami Orçun Ersay	
TURKEY'S MIDDLE EAST RISK MANAGEMENT IN LIGHT OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PALESTINE	69
Hasan Acar and Serhat Bulut	
MILITARY RISKS, EMERGING WARS AND TURKEY	89
Cihan Kazancıoğlu	
TÜRKİYE IN A WORLD UNDER THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS	107
Sibel Kavuncu	
ANALYSIS OF THE TERRORISM AS A GLOBAL CRISIS: THE CASE OF TÜRKİYE (PKK AND ISIS)	125
Burak Şakir Şeker	
RECONSTRUCTING COUNTERINTELLIGENCE THEORY THROUGH THE CONCEPTS OF RISK AND THREAT: THE ACTIVITIES OF GREEK SECRET SERVICE MEMBER SAVAS KALENTERİDİS IN TÜRKİYE	141
Hasan Mesut Önder	
POTENTIAL GLOBAL RISKS OF TÜRKİYE IN THE PROCESS OF BECOMING A REGIONAL ENERGY HUB	161
Mesut Şöhret	
PART II.	
TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC RISKS AND THEIR IMPACTS ON TÜRKİYE	
GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL RISKS: CYBER SECURITY AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI)	191
Doğan Şafak Polat	
GLOBAL TRADE DISRUPTIONS AND CHIP WARS	205
Delfin Koray, S. Süha Çubukçuoğlu, and Murat Koray	
THE DUAL ROLE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN VACCINE COMMUNICATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN FIGHTING MISINFORMATION	219
Ruken Özgül Kılanç and Cansu Arısoy Gedik	

TURKISH CYBER INSECURITY	233
Öncel Sençerman	
PART III.	
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND THEIR IMPACTS ON TÜRKİYE	
RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR'S ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ON TÜRKİYE	263
Ceren Gürseler Solak	
PROBABLE ISTANBUL EARTHQUAKE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES AS A NATIONAL RISK	295
Ali Bilgin Varlık	
EARTHQUAKE AND FRIENDSHIP CONSOLIDATION: JAPAN'S DISASTER COOPERATION EFFORTS IN TÜRKİYE.....	307
Kıvılcım Erkan	
RISKS POSED BY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES FOR TÜRKİYE DURING THE EUROPEAN UNION HARMONIZATION PROCESS	323
Pelin Yoğun	
ANALYSIS OF PLASTIC WASTE IMPORTS FOR RECYCLING ON THE EXAMPLE OF TÜRKİYE.....	333
Ali Bilgin Varlık	
PART IV.	
SOCIETAL AND DOMESTIC RISKS AND THEIR IMPACTS ON TÜRKİYE	
SOCIETAL RISKS OF GLOBALIZATION.....	349
Fazilet Ahu Özmen Akalın	
IMPACTS OF MIGRATION ON TÜRKİYE.....	365
Tolga Otabatmaz	
SPATIALIZATION OF MIGRATION, RAISING NEW WALLS, AND THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL MIGRATION AS A RISK FACTOR ON TÜRKİYE	379
Güneş Koç	
PART V.	
FAST-GROWING RISKS AND THEIR IMPACTS ON TÜRKİYE	
A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF MEDIA ENGAGEMENT IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION	403
Ahmet İlkey Ceyhan	
DIGITAL MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION PRACTICES OF GEN Z IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE.....	415
Duygu Aydın Aslaner	
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGNS IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE.....	429
Emine Kılıçaslan	

PREFACE

The war between Russia and Ukraine, the dispute between Israel and Palestine, the tension between China and Taiwan, the Covid-19 pandemic, inflation, and the rising cost of living are some of the issues facing our globe today. Rebuilding trust in the globe is now inevitable due to the several crises that have shaken it during the past four years. However, geopolitical divisions render solutions and global proposals ineffective.

Extreme weather conditions, misinformation and disinformation remain important crisis issues. Disinformation, misinformation, and extreme weather events such as temperature increases, heavy rains, floods, severe storms, forest fires and long droughts are the most important threats facing the world economy.

A worldwide accord to restore and maintain stability and confidence is difficult to achieve given the diversity of crises resulting from geopolitical differences and their increasing frequency.

Today's political leaders have to deal with various interruptions, including worldwide pandemics, supply chain disruptions, wars and conflicts, rising inflation, and many others.

Global resilience in the economy, energization, productive artificial intelligence, certification and women's health are other critical issues on which political authorities need to expand.

To ensure security and cooperation in a fragmented world;

- Fostering development and job creation for a new era,
- Effective use of artificial intelligence as a driving force for the economy and society,
- Long-term strategies for climate, nature and energy need to be developed.

During this time, the political authorities' primary goals are to:

- Enhance robustness and safety;
- Strengthen economic expansion that improves living conditions; To ensure that technology advancements are inclusive;
- To secure energy;
- To continue immediate efforts to safeguard the environment and the climate;

Preface

- To rekindle the cooperation required to invest in people and equitable possibilities.

Energy transition, globalization, productive artificial intelligence, strengthening institutions, the rise of populism and developments in technology, rapid developments in medicine transforming society, robotic developments, digitalization, industrial strategies, debt, the new reality of high interest rates, employment, income inequality, social mobility, modern supply-side economy, gender equality and sustainability maintain their importance and constitute the agenda. In addition, cyber security, geopolitical conflicts, inequality of opportunity, inflation, forced migration, economic decline and pollution are also important. Extreme weather events are the primary risk in our world in the future.

Other risks are as follows;

- Critical change in world systems,
- Loss of biodiversity,
- Problems that may occur in natural resources,
- Disinformation,
- Misinformation,
- Negative consequences that artificial intelligence may create,
- Forced migration,
- Cyber security,
- Social polarization and
- Pollution.

Notable concerns include misinformation and deception produced by artificial intelligence, which is developing quickly. It is assumed that by escalating social polarization and disrupting the information flow, misinformation and disinformation might heighten the likelihood of instability on a worldwide scale. In relation to climate change, there have been extreme weather occurrences, significant changes to global systems, losses in biodiversity, and ecological collapse. The scarcity of natural resources and pollution might also become a serious problem throughout the next few years.

Supply chains are still being significantly impacted by climate change and strained geopolitical relations.

New humanitarian crises falling under the purview of international humanitarian law are brought about by the wars between Russia and Ukraine

Preface

and Israel and Gaza. Potential threats that could obstruct the flow of food and energy resources are brought with such situations. Extreme weather events brought on by climate change may also have a detrimental impact on supply chains. When these things happen at the same time, their impacts reinforce one another.

Following the war between Israel and Gaza, attacks on ships in the Red Sea forced shipping companies to search for alternate routes, which has resulted in and will continue to lead in longer travel times and higher costs.

In addition, a drought in the Panama Canal could result in longer ship journeys, which would raise the cost of goods being delivered.

Given these interconnected breakthroughs, companies are compelled to reassess the relevance of their supply networks.

Climate change-related product losses, cyberattacks, and regional conflicts necessitate rearranging for a more cautious supply chain.

Increasing economic uncertainties and inequalities in income distribution globally continue to shape the economic structure unevenly. Inequality of economic opportunity is one of the most significant concerns in the upcoming period. It is estimated that this inequality could have a long-term detrimental impact on economic mobility and deprive a significant segment of the population of economic opportunities.

Countries that are particularly prone to conflict or vulnerable to climate change are expected to become increasingly deprived of investments, technologies, and creating employment potential. People may commit crimes or get radicalized as a result of this situation's potential to reduce stable livelihoods.

In light of worldwide threats, collaboration is becoming more and more crucial in modern times.

Global risks have a significant impact on Turkey, a significant geopolitical actor, and even constitute a threat in terms of politics, economy, commerce, society, culture, and military terms.

It was considered that it would be very useful to explore and evaluate the effects of the Global Crises on Turkey in all aspects.

In order to confront the worldwide challenges brought about by a decrease in trust, social polarization, and shifting geopolitical realities, Turkey needs to expand and strengthen its cooperation opportunities.

The introduction of our book "Global Risks and Their Impacts on Turkey" to the scientific community is deemed beneficial in light of this notion.

Preface

We express our gratitude to our colleagues who served as chapter authors for our book. We would like to express our gratitude to Transnational Press London Chief editor Prof. Dr. İbrahim Sirkeci and Ms. Nihal Yazgan, who enabled this work to be published.

ISTANBUL, SEPTEMBER 2024

EDITORS

Prof. Dr. Hasret Çomak
Assoc. Prof. Burak Şakir Şeker
Assoc. Prof. Doğan Şafak Polat
Asst. Prof. Mesut Özel
Asst. Prof. Murat Koray

INTRODUCTION¹

Salim Dervişoğlu*

Before I commence my words, I would like to offer my condolences to the families of our citizens who lost their lives in last year's earthquake disaster in February. On this occasion, I also wish to commend the management of Kent University for organising the printing of a book to examine global and regional risks and threats, especially natural disasters and climate change, and the steps taken and needed to be taken in this regard.

Security entails safeguarding an individual, society, or state from threats and ensuring the ability to sustain desired lifestyles. It evolves and acquires various dimensions. The onset of the Second Industrial Revolution in the last quarter of the 19th century and the struggle for global dominance among major powers subsequently led to worldwide economic crises, large-scale wars, the dissolution of empires, and the emergence of unitary states.

For our generation, which experienced World War II and the subsequent Cold War era, security primarily bore a military significance. Another noteworthy factor was the political struggle between the individualistic capitalist and collectivist communist ideologies championed by the Eastern and Western poles in the quest for world dominance.

In the bipolar world, where friends and foes were relatively distinct, limited proxy wars and instabilities stemming from asymmetric warfare, coupled with nuclear balance and deterrence, facilitated a more straightforward analysis of security issues and the adoption of necessary measures. However, in today's world, not only military and political but also economic, social, environmental, cultural, human rights, technological, information, and cyber security issues are encompassed within the concept of security.

Significantly, over many years, the negligence of environmental risks and delayed actions by heavily industrialised nations and partially developing countries have transformed security concerns into a global existential issue not only for nations and the human species but also for all living beings on a planetary scale.

Today, it has become imperative for the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and

¹ This is an excerpt from Admiral Salim Dervişoğlu's speech on February 21, 2024, as the speaker of honour in the First International Global and Regional Risk and Threat Assessment Workshop of Istanbul Kent University.

* Admiral, the 17th Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces.

National Defence and intelligence agencies to work in close coordination within well-structured organisational frameworks. Moreover, as global risks and threats escalate, our world increasingly faces the danger of economic recession and heightened instability.

This situation contributes to increasing internal threats by leading to social explosions. Internal instability, while negatively affecting security and life, leads to global migration events. Irregular migrants create cultural clashes, influence belief systems, and exacerbate sectarian divisions in the countries they reach.

Environmental and climate changes negatively impact ecological factors, increase food and energy needs, and alter dimensions. Rapidly developing high-technology products lead to continuous and significant changes in the world's industrial structure. It is quite common for obsolete industrial tools to become outdated quickly.

When we talk about global risks, we understand borderless dangers that can potentially affect every country. These generally include:

- Environmental risks
- Social risks
- Economic risks
- Technological risks

Especially in the last decade of the 20th century, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the bipolar world initially took on a unipolar appearance under the hegemony of the United States. Subsequently, Russia regained geopolitical importance and returned to the world stage. China's rapid economic development, paralleled by swift advancements in national power elements, particularly its armed forces, alongside the broad socio-economic, cultural, and demographic power of the European Union but with a firm yet fragmented military force, has created a multipolar worldview. Further complicating this view are emerging scientific and technological advancements and military and political conflicts occurring in various geographical regions, raising concerns about the global spread of geopolitical risks. From the 1990s to now, international armed conflicts, global crises, and disasters have turned this period into a time of concern and uncertainty for all humanity. During this period, the capacity of unitary states to maintain their existence has become fragile. Given this constantly changing global environment of uncertainty, Türkiye must take timely and adequate measures to ensure its security in all areas. Türkiye is among the countries most affected by these risks and threats due to its geopolitical and geostrategic position. In this book, distinguished academicians will elaborate on global risks and threats according to their areas of expertise.

Therefore, in the subsequent part of my introduction, I would like to focus more on Türkiye and the military dimension of its security.

Türkiye faces the following risks:

Internal Threats:

- Separatism and terrorism
- Radical belief-driven tendencies
- Environmental threats

External Threats:

- Political threats
- Military threats
- Economic threats
- Imported radical belief-driven tendencies
- Environmental threats

The widening and evolving security landscape necessitates the development of plans and programs approved by political authorities to fulfil primary and new duties, ensuring that they do not weaken national power and security elements, including but not limited to the following:

- The structure and readiness status of the armed forces,
- Logistic support requirements and capabilities,
- The profile and scale of the national defence industry in terms of quality and quantity
- Human resources in terms of number, training, education, selection, evaluation, and appointment principles,
- Other national power and security elements, particularly the economy, in a manner that does not undermine political authority's approval.

I will primarily address issues related to the armed forces, which are my area of expertise and encompass a wide range of security concerns. First and foremost, security-related institutions in Türkiye need to be organised in close coordination. Hybrid structures that enable real-time collaboration between internal security elements, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Finance, National Intelligence Organization, General Staff, Gendarmerie General Command, and General Directorate of Security (Police), are essential. Large databases should be established to support this structure, and decision-support processes should be designed with high reliability through multiple artificial intelligence

applications.

Türkiye's geographic location is within one of the world's most complex, unstable, and constantly changing regions. Many neighbouring countries, especially in the southern region of Türkiye, are in a state of chaos due to power vacuums, internal conflicts, and continuous interventions by external forces. However, this situation exposes Türkiye to various security issues.

Events such as the Russia-Ukraine war, the annexation of Crimea, NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe and the Black Sea, the previous Russia-Georgia war, uncertainties in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Armenia-Azerbaijan territorial dispute and conflicts, the interests and interventions of the European Union, America, Iran, and Türkiye in the Caucasus, the complex issues in relations with Greece in the west, and the turmoil in the Balkans necessitate a dynamic revision of the command and force structure of the Turkish Armed Forces according to changing risks and threats.

The measures to be taken require high-cost strategic decisions in the face of the broadening and deepening security landscape. Implementing these decisions is carried out within a planning, programming, budgeting, and execution system (PPBS or, shortly, a Defence Planning System) involving all stakeholders, aiming to achieve national interests and objectives determined ideally by the government, i.e., political authority. In Türkiye, this framework is partially implemented.

After the collapse of the great Ottoman empire, the Republic of Türkiye, which miraculously emerged from poverty in every field within its hundred-year existence, pursued policies in line with the motto "*Peace at Home, Peace in the World.*" The structure, location, and utilisation of the Armed Forces formed within this framework have been realised accordingly.

Today, in the global environment of uncertainty, I believe that the target and policy of "*Peace at Home, Peace in the World*" have gained much more importance from a national security perspective. In this context, our armed forces must exist within a robust, resilient, flexible, and sustainable structure, equipment, and capabilities to protect our land, maritime borders, and airspace. The command-and-control structure should be adaptable and agile by the contemporary democratic rule of law, with authority and responsibilities clearly defined by law. Ships, aircraft, tanks, ammunition, as well as war weapons and vehicles, should be allocated according to programs prepared within the framework of identified and potential force targets, considering likely threats, and should be realised on time.

Today's war weapons and vehicles are costly. Therefore, in addition to the armed forces needs for unexpected situations in peacetime, such as

intervention, exercises, and training, effective logistical measures are required to fulfil the duties assigned by the political authority against external threats to our country and internal unrest and instabilities and maintain a high state of preparedness. In this context, the sufficiency of logistical support stocks and their proximity to potential operational areas is crucial. This necessitates the timely planning and construction of facilities such as land and sea bases, alternative and reserve airfields, and supply and ammunition depots, which take time to establish.

The rapid evolution of science and technology, emerging technologies being standardised in areas such as green energy, buildings, ports, shipyards, and logistic facilities, also leads to swift developments in weapons and weapon systems, necessitating the renewal of defence measures against these new technologies. In this context, our naval forces are a unique example of MILGEM class warships designed and built with their capabilities. MILGEM is also Türkiye's most significant defence export product.²Naturally, sufficient intelligence is one of the most critical needs for the timely adoption of defence measures against the rapid impact of advancing science and technology on the armed forces.

Parallel to the diverse security threats and risks, the restructuring of the intelligence organisation is essential. This requires close cooperation among internal security forces such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Intelligence Organization (MİT), the Armed Forces, the gendarmerie, the police, and all intelligence elements. Furthermore, these activities must be institutionalised and conducted in collaboration as much as possible. In addition to all these activities, careful standardisation of counterintelligence and confidentiality matters is necessary. The armed forces will also be used to execute activities such as rescue, health, subsistence, provision, and evacuation in natural disasters. However, all nations face difficulties in this regard.

Considering the lessons learned from the recent earthquake disaster, planning, preparation, coordination, command and control, and logistic processes related to disaster response should be reviewed. The principles of using armed forces should be determined in a manner that leaves no room for doubt and reinforced with regular exercises.

The existence of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons owned or sought by some countries in our region, as well as the four major powers forming the multipolar order in the world, constitute the most significant factor that compels our government to stay within alliances, as in the Cold War era. In this regard, the NATO alliance remains extremely important for Türkiye. I

² İbrahim Sünnetçi, "A Look at Latest Status of the PN Milgem Project," Defence Turkey 14, no. 97 (2019): 42-43.

Introduction

believe that maintaining our position as a reputable and reliable country in our relations with NATO, without being swayed by various international changes and fluctuations, and continuing to be a platform where we can achieve results that are in line with our national interests in our relations with allied countries, is essential.

When listing the structural needs of our armed forces as security elements, I would like to emphasise the need for human resources. In military service, individuals should be educated and trained from an early age to fulfil their duties and responsibilities within a discipline that remains unshaken even under the threat of losing their lives and adheres to the hierarchical structure of command and obedience, which is indispensable for military service.

Military schools are academically qualified institutions that train commander candidates with superior managerial and leadership qualities. Military high schools, on the other hand, are fundamental sources that train individuals who have been given military formation through specialised education and training in military service from an early age. Therefore, I believe that military high schools should be reopened without delay. Expertise and merit are crucial in all fields, including the military. As wars of the future become increasingly complex, with rising tempo and intensity, emphasis should be placed on specialisation within the armed forces. A flexible command structure should be adopted in activities to be carried out jointly or collectively, with a force composed under the command of an expert commander in their field (task force concept).

In this complex and unique environment, human resources need to be equipped with expertise through high school, military academies, and postgraduate education to train military officers as scientists. In addition, institutions similar to high-state academies that provide training for soldiers, diplomats, bureaucrats, technocrats, and intelligence personnel tailored to today's conditions are needed.

It is vital to establish the legal framework for the preparation activities in times of war and peace, which constitute a unique working environment for the military. It is also essential to establish and implement military legal structures within its own structure and have legal experts who can defend national interests in international courts. On the other hand, military forces have unique medical peculiarities from both medical and logistic points of view. Therefore, reestablishing military medical institutions and hospitals, similar to examples in other advanced countries, is imperative.

In the time and place allotted, I have only been able to touch on a drop in the vast sea of contemporary security concepts. Quoting the words of the great Atatürk,

Dervişoğlu

"The path that guides us is our homeland, the Turkish nation that we brought forth from its womb, and the results we have achieved from the leaves of the pages of the history of nations that recorded a catastrophe and distress."³

In line with the findings and evaluations, amid the concerning uncertainties we live in, we must organise and work while always considering, above all else, a contemporary, independent, and prosperous country goal of national unity and solidarity, free from sterile internal disputes.

As I conclude my introduction, thank you for patiently reading. I strongly hope that this book will contribute positively to our country's security environment.

³ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Atatürk'ten Düşünceler, ed. Enver Ziya Karal, Atatürk Kitapları Dizisi (Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1981), 192.

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PART I.

GEOPOLITICAL RISKS AND THEIR IMPACTS ON TÜRKİYE

GLOBAL GEOPOLITICAL RISKS

Herbert R. Reginbogin*

War and Revolution disrupt the fabric of time as people attempt to recall the ordinary rules of civilization and rituals of respect and hospitality.¹ Some even disregard them in some cases as the world moves to ever greater polarization through populism. Governments pursue territorial expansion through military threats of using force in the case of China-Taiwan relations, the outright crime of aggression by violating the territorial integrity of another sovereign country referring to the Russian-Ukrainian War, or using nonstate actors in a proxy war against a state actor like the Hezbollah fighting Israel on behalf of Iran as the world faces a Global Environmental Crisis in the 21st Century. The fundamental principles of humanity and the conventions of international law are subject to endless conceptual argumentative revisions, which assume different outcomes within various historical environments and with different temporal expectations that have unsettled nations through debatable rationales, justifications, and strategies, but also because they make and unmake cultures and countries. How does the official language of diplomatic overtures of condolences vibrate following Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi's death in a helicopter accident, knowing that he was the 'Butcher of Tehran' for his role on the Tehran "death commission" during the 1988 executions of thousands of Iranian political prisoners?² These linguistic attributes and criticism lie within the paradigmatic contradictions of ontological narratives about just and unjust wars that perpetuate the conflicts of the 21st Century with an ever more substantial return to the Great Power Rivalry of the 19th-century empires.³ Will the U.S. revert to isolationism and 150 years of neutrality⁴ before the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941 or remain 'benign' during the Unipolar Era or a predatory power⁵ or even a leader in the defense of multipolarity as a guiding principle of future U.S.

* Prof. Dr., E-mail: hreginbogin@gmail.com

¹ Gabriele Jancke, *Gastfreundschaft in der frühneuzeitlichen Gesellschaft: Praktiken, Perspektiven und Normen von Gelehrte*. V&R Academic 2013

² Thomas Ribl, "Beileid für einen Massenmörder: Staaten kondolieren zu Ebrahim Raisi Tod. Wo die Grenze zwischen Protokoll und Peinlichkeit liegt," NZZ, May 23, 2024, available at https://www.nzz.ch/feuilleton/beileid-fuer-einen-massenmoerder-wie-staaten-auf-den-tod-ebrahim-raisi-reagieren-ld.1831460?mkteid=nled&mkteval=174&kid=nl174_2024-5-23&ga=1

³ Matthew Kroenig, *The Return of Great Power Rivalry*. (Oxford University Press, New York, 2020)

⁴ Herbert R. Reginbogin, "America's Experience with Neutrality," in: *Permanent Neutrality: A Model for Peace, Security, and Justice*, eds. Herbert Reginbogin and Pascal Lottaz (Lanham, MD; Lexington Press, 2020), 145-163.

⁵ Dr. Ofer Israeli, "The Unipolar Trap," in *American Diplomacy*, April 2013, available at <https://american.diplomacy.web.unc.edu/2013/04/the-unipolar-trap/>

foreign policy?⁶ Russia, China, and the USA may aspire to an international system based on sovereignty, multipolarity, multilateralism, mutual security, international law, the re-balancing and re-invigoration of global and regional institutions. Immanent in this trilogy is the vision of the future. That this contest is underway is undeniable, even if some American officials tried to deny it not so long ago. The US-led international system is threatened by authoritarian powers seeking to redraw the world geopolitical map and make the 21st Century an Age of Autocracy.⁷ “The central challenge to prosperity and security,” the 2018 national defense strategy states, “is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by... Revisionist powers”⁸

There are no 19th and 20th-century ‘spheres of interest’ in which great powers believe neighboring sovereign states must yield to their neighbor’s might. A new global order is within grasp – provided it respects the principles of the United Nations Charter and instills the enforcement to uphold those principles through mutually binding security measures to avoid the nightmare of a forever war that begets the Orwellian dystopia of a permanently divided world of warring blocs. In other words, new statecraft that has warranted the passing of time must be an agent for balancing territorial aspirations and mediating mutual security concerns. It is permanent neutrality. Is this the case for Ukraine, Taiwan, and a future Palestinian State? Time will tell what happens on the battlefields and the world of coercion and threats. However, myopic and parochial, the Great Powers need to underscore the imperative to resolve a multitude of mutually pressing problems - nuclear proliferation, cross-border crime, international terrorism, dire environmental challenges, world health threats, global poverty, and inequity.

Are the ingrained religious and ethnic conflicts of the 21st Century due to latent prejudice and the unfinished business of World War I and World War II, leaving Cold War Warriors like President of the U.S. Joe Biden to depict international politics as a confrontational world between supporting authoritarianism vs democracy avoiding the reality that some repressive and restrictive ‘democratic states’ engage with clerical religious fanaticism to expand throughout the Muslim, Hindu, and Christian world with coercion and discrimination of ethnic minorities as well as simply historical nation-state models of democracy are not always on their side? Still, the ideological effects of both eras are essential to understanding the threats to the free world. Countries, including the United States, continue to selectively engage with autocracies when it suits them, undermining the basic premise of the unified block meant to staunch the rise of autocracies. Some countries like

⁶ Stefan Mair, “In Defense of Multipolarity,” *Internationale Politik Quarterly*, Nov 17, 2023.

⁷ Hal Brands, *The Twilight Struggle*, (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2022)

⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the Military’s Competitive Edge*, available at <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>

Türkiye were excluded from the ‘Democracy Summit.’ They viewed it as a slight, undermining their relationships with the United States and pushing them into the orbit of the significant authoritarian powers from Türkiye’s perspective.

In contrast, the Biden Administration viewed this as a hallmark foreign-policy initiative meant to shore up democracies worldwide and stanch the rise of autocracies like the Republic of Türkiye and Hungary. Owing to the broadly defined nature of democracy, which is so broad that participants could not agree upon a definition, states were pushed to develop shared policies and cooperate with other states that did not support many of their interests. The results have been chiefly vague calls to action against Russia and other authoritarian rivals to U.S. foreign policy in terms of calling for sanctions against countries trading with Russia, like China, India, or even Türkiye, a member of NATO.

Today, the rise of global geopolitical risks is fundamental to challenging our existence. How will multipolarity and interstate wars in the next ten to twenty years shape our ability to cope with the greatest threat to everyone here and around the world, starting with issues like the ones below:⁹

- Wealth and Poverty
- Population
- Food
- Energy
- Climate Change
- The Environment
- Natural Resources
- Pollution
- Technology

What lies ahead? With a 10-20-year outlook, will it be business as usual, or will our environment collapse and require more significant sustainable development? Governance is deciding how to act on our choices, which will be critical to our success or downfall. In this essay, ethics, economics, and international relations play the centerpiece for a normative world order.¹⁰

Crossroads of multiparity and interstate war can best be perceived through ‘a war’ as a persistent pattern of interaction between and within states and other political organizations for thousands of years. War is ugly. Once in the 20th Century, between two world wars in 1928, there was a law referred

⁹ Kristin A. Hite and John L. Seitz, *Global Issues: An Introduction*. Wiley Blackwell 6th ed. (West Sussex, 2021)

¹⁰ Peter G. Brown, *Ethics, Economics, and International Relations: Transparent Sovereignty in the Commonwealth of Life*. Second Edition (Edinburgh University Press, 2008)

to as the Brian-Kellogg Pact, which made lawlessness be contained if only the states were prepared to enforce the law for centuries. A profound impact on the evolution of world politics in states' behavior states was generated by war over the years. It has been one of the primary mechanics for change in the international system through its impact on the distribution of military power and wealth and the structure of the world economy. The interstate war also profoundly affected the international structure and cultures of states. It has played a vital role in the birth and death of many states. It is impossible to even understand the development of the modern nation-state without considering it.

It is hard to imagine what life today would have looked like without World War I and World War II, the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, or the idea of a Magna Carta, not to forget the Ten Commandments. All have profoundly affected the global system and domestic societies. The same can be said for the Cold War. For nearly a half-century, it shaped international and domestic politics and cultures, not only in the United States and the Soviet Union but also in Western Europe and the Third World. The development of new states in contemporary times continues to be influenced by warfare and preparations for war. With the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the threat of the acquisition of atomic weapons by terrorist groups and rogue states, new threats to the security of even the most powerful states in the system have emerged.¹¹ Jim Sciutto, CNN, writes, "Exclusive report that the U.S. prepared 'rigorously' for potential Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine in late 2022, officials say."¹²

In the subsequent years, we may indeed see an end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which recently led to the horrific events of October 7, 2023, and the creation of a two-state solution with the creation of the Palestinian State living in peace with Israel, including Saudi Arabia and Israel normalizing diplomatic relations with Israel while the U.S. has agreed to a robust mutual security pact that extends in commercializing civil nuclear technology. May this vision even see the end of proxy wars and allow states to resolve their differences between them peacefully. Today, the issue of the rise of global geopolitical risks is fundamentally about our existence and how multipolarity and interstate wars will shape our ability to cope with the greatest threat to everyone here and around the world. Starting with how a war like Ukraine shapes the multipolar world, it is necessary to reflect on the historical

¹¹ The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone. <https://militaryreadinglists.com/books/2696-the-paradox-of-american-power-why-the-world-s-only-superpower-can-t-go-it-alone.html>

¹² Jim Sciutto, "US prepared 'rigorously' for potential Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine in late 2022," CNN, March 9, 2024, available at <https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/09/politics/us-prepared-rigorously-potential-russian-nuclear-strike-ukraine/index.html>

moment when there was no real clear pathway to the future.

On August 25, 1943, Franklin D. Roosevelt, following his meeting with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at another strategy meeting in Canada, spoke before the Canadian parliament and millions more through radio microphones about what the world's people were anxiously thinking about and that was the future. He said, "There is a longing in the air. It is not a longing to return to what they call 'the good old days.' I have distinct reservations as to how good 'the good old days' were. I would rather believe that we can achieve new and better days."¹³

As the war in Ukraine continues, China's potential support of Russia, similar to the E.U. backing the U.S. in the interstate war involving Ukraine, could be a tipping point for international politics, although unlikely as China pursues an entirely different agenda of non-alignment. In the worst-case scenario, Europeans and Americans, against Russians and Chinese, with Ukraine as the first battleground of a 21st-century bipolar confrontation. However, that is not what is occurring now. While China's rhetoric favors Russia, its policy is akin to non-intervention, like the non-aligned world emulating the rise of multipolarity. It certainly does not reduce its relations with Russia, but to the country, it does not do anything more to support it, while it keeps opening its channels to the E.U. in the U.S. and even Ukraine.¹⁴

The action of the various powers in Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine reaffirms our living in a multipolar world. Each power pursues its sovereign interests but not at the cost of binding principles toward greater freedom from want. This freedom comes from jointly respecting the security measures adopted to bar terrorism and suppression and mishandling of one's people. There are several powers, some of which cooperate more with each other than others, but in the end, each power pushes its course toward each of the different powers considering its interests. The risk of a return of bipolarity has not gone away, however.

Moreover, escalating tensions between the U.S., Russia, and China might worsen the situation. What can the West bring to a multicolor, multicultural, and multipolar world? What if the Ukraine war ends at a military stalemate without a peace agreement in sight? The E.U. and the U.S. will continue their sanctions against Russia, and a potential Cold War may ensue. Correspondingly, multipolarity is also about transatlantic relations, a position now adopted by some in Washington. Furthermore, a revival of a rules-based

¹³ A Decade of American Foreign Policy 1941-1949: Address by the President Before the Canadian Parliament at Ottawa, August 25, 1943 (Excerpts), available at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade07.asp

¹⁴ Sven Biscop, "How the War in Ukraine Shapes the Multipolar World," Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, (Bruxelles, June 13, 2022), <https://www.egmontinstitute.be/how-the-war-in-ukraine-shapes-the-multipolar-world/>

world order would require countries on the periphery willingness to compromise on the part of the Western liberal systems. The Biden administration's attempts to form blocks in Asia or to formally link its alliances in Europe to its partners in Asia have proactively rekindled existing organizations into new ad hoc coalitions, convening democrats and autocrats like Saudi Arabia and the USA to share interests resolving or expanding solution in the areas of trade and security.

In contrast, the benefits of embracing the world, envisioning multipolarity, and attempting to build a strategy around it are significant. Preventing a great power war should be among the most critical goals of American foreign policy. A multi-polar strategy –not entirely built around containing other Great Powers like China and Russia – also allows the United States to head against a future decline in its power or further rise in China's capabilities. U.S. strategy should instead focus on leveraging multiparity to its benefit, recognizing that putting all Washington's eggs in one basket – relying solely on the United States to provide the military force necessary to monitor and manage all the world's major regions poses a significant risk. The emergence of other capable actors, particularly in Asia and Europe, creates a backup for U.S. power. This multipolar expansion makes it less likely that one great power will dominate the world should the United States falter. The converse is also true: embracing multiparity helps the United States hedge against the future. This approach can help prepare the United States for a future where possible changes emerge by maintaining flexibility and increasing the number of available partners. This assessment suggests encouraging burden sharing to foster economic openness and maintain flexible partnerships.

In conclusion, although the balance of power in the international system is persistently analyzed, the international system's direction is shaped unlike any other era before by the existential threat of climate change and the critical need for all players on the international stage to jointly agree to formulate and verifiably implement a reliable and sustainable strategy of survival. Measuring the power of multipolarity will demonstrate whether the U.S. and the world may operate to cooperate for the sake of future generations or end all that is to come. It is certainly easy to be wise after the event, yet life is a game of blind man's buff or a horse race where the least expected to win is always the winner. This is eminently true for international politics. Will the world's powers settle the affairs of the world once and for all in a kind of omnipotent creation, or will the challenges of each day require continuous diligence to avert potentially the worst to come and the most to achieve for all to be free of want?

THE WEAKENING OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Ozan Örmeci*

Introduction

Although there might be setbacks and regressions in recent years¹, the general view and history show us clearly that with the creation of the United Nations (UN) and the emergence and development of international laws, the world has become much more stabilized and safer. It should not be a coincidence that since 1945, no World War was fought despite a long Cold War between the United States and USSR until 1991, and many regional and national wars took place in different geographies. In that sense, it would not be wrong to claim that the UN achieved progress and increased the degree of peace and stability on Earth. However, in recent years, the weakening of the UN, primarily because of its inability to find solutions to wars and other political crises, as well as the signs of collapse of the rules-based international order, gives us alarming signals for the future of the peace in the coming years and decades in case the system could not be recovered.

This chapter aims to analyze this trend using a case study method. To do that, first of all, the reasons that led to the collapse of the League of Nations system before to the Second World War will be reminded to readers who are unfamiliar with the political history. Secondly, a short history and central bodies of the UN will be explained in detail to the reader. Thirdly, the binding aspect of UN decisions will be elaborated. Lastly, the weakening of the current UN-based international political system will be assessed based on three case studies: (1) the Syrian Civil War, (2) the Russo-Ukrainian War, and (3) the Israel-Hamas War. The chapter will end with concluding remarks summarizing the main findings of the study.

How did the League of Nations system collapse?

The League of Nations (*Société des Nations* or *Völkerbund*) was established on 10 January 1920 with the participation of 37 states as the result of the first-ever serious effort to establish a worldwide intergovernmental Organization to solve diplomatic, political, and economic problems between different

* Istanbul Kent University Political Science and Public Administration (English department), Istanbul, Türkiye. E-mail: ozanormeci@kent.edu.tr / ozanormeci@gmail.com ORCID: 0000-0001-8850-6089

¹ For instance, according to the Global Peace Index 2023 report, the average level of global peacefulness deteriorated for the ninth consecutive year, with 84 countries recording an improvement and 79 a deterioration. See; IEP (2023), Global Peace Index 2023: Measuring Peace in a Complex World, Sydney, p. 2.

nations in a peaceful way and in light of some universal principles derived from the Enlightenment. It was established following the end of the First World War with the Paris Peace Conference. Based on a Covenant consisting of 26 articles, the Organization was based in Geneva, Switzerland. The League of Nations was heavily influenced by the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" and adopted English and French as official languages.² The symbol of the institution was chosen as two five-pointed stars within a blue pentagon, which symbolized the Earth's five continents and five different races.

Figure 1. Logo of the League of Nations



The Organization aimed to provide lasting peace, justice, and security, prevent another world war from emerging, and solve diplomatic problems between different states through cooperation and developing international law.³ Although the League of Nations was able to include 63 states at different times, it could not become as comprehensive as the United Nations and was dissolved in 1946 following the end of the Second World War and the emergence of the UN. The Organization's most crucial body was the Council -similar to the UN Security Council- consisting of four permanent (British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan) and four non-permanent members (elected for three-year term by the Assembly).⁴ Later, Germany, Japan, and the USSR also became permanent members of the Organization until their withdrawal (in the case of the USSR, the expelling). In the meantime, the number of non-permanent members was also increased to nine and eleven consecutively to make the Council more inclusive. However, more than these revisions were needed to protect the peace and save the League of Nations.

² Ozan Örmeci (2023), "Milletler Cemiyeti (Cemiyet-i Akvam)", Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, 14.12.2023, <https://politikaakademisi.org/2023/12/14/milletler-cemiyeti-cemiyet-i-akvam/>.

³ United Nations, "The Covenant of the League of Nations", <https://www.ungeneva.org/en/about/league-of-nations/covenant>.

⁴ United Nations, "Main Organs of the League of Nations", <https://www.ungeneva.org/en/about/league-of-nations/organs>.

According to A. Leroy Bennett and James K. Oliver, the main reasons for the failure of the Organizations were:⁵

- The lack of necessary sanctions to prevent wars and aggression,
- The incapacity of Article 10 of the Charter, which could not identify the aggressor,
- The problems related to the condition of unanimity in deciding critical issues,
- The failure of the Organization in preventing the emergence of the Second World War,
- The decision of the U.S. not to join the League of Nations,
- The Organization's double-standard approaches to some issues related to British and French interests (legitimization of mandate regimes, etc.).

A Short History and Main Bodies of the United Nations

The United Nations was established on 24 October 1945 following the San Francisco Conference convened on 25 April 1945 with the participation of 50 independent states.⁶ The UN was, from the very beginning, aimed at replacing the League of Nations and setting a new world order that would be more successful in preventing the emergence of large-scale wars. This time, the United States (U.S.) agreed to participate in the Organization and became the leading actor and biggest donor within the institution. Accordingly, the headquarters of the UN was designated as New York City. The olive branch, symbolizing peace, was chosen as the logo of the UN together with the world map. Official languages of the UN are English, French, Arabic, Chinese, Russian, and Spanish while English and French are two working languages of the UN Secretariat.⁷ Today, the UN has 193 members and two observer states, the State of Palestine and the Holy Sea (Vatican).

⁵ A. Leroy Bennett & James K. Oliver (2015), *Uluslararası Örgütler*, Translated by Nasuh Uslu, Ankara: BB101, pp. 49-69.

⁶ Ozan Örmeci (2023), "Birleşmiş Milletler", Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, 15.12.2023, <https://politikaakademisi.org/2023/12/15/birlesmis-milletler/>.

⁷ United Nations Office at Geneva, "What is the difference between the official language and the working language?", <https://www.ungeneva.org/en/faqs/what-difference-between-official-language-and-working-language#:~:text=Arabic%2C%20Chinese%2C%20English%2C%20French,%2Dto%2Dday%20professional%20exchanges>.

Figure 2. UN logo

Organized in a sense as a loose confederation, the UN Charter defends these ideals:⁸

- To protect international peace and security,
- To develop peaceful relations between states in accordance with the equality and self-determination principles,
- To encourage cooperation for the solution of international economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems and respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms,
- In line with these ideals, the UN acts based on these principles:⁹
- The UN is based on equal sovereignty of states,
- All member states should perform their obligations by goodwill,
- All member states should try to solve their problems by peaceful means,
- All member states should avoid using force or the threat of using force on other states,
- All member states should support the activities and acts of the UN that are in accordance with the UN Charter,
- All member states have a responsibility to support compelling acts of the UN and should act against states that violate UN decisions and principles,
- All member states should encourage non-member states to join the Organization by adopting its principles,
- None of the UN Charter articles gives the institution the right to

⁸ “Birleşmiş Milletler Antlaşması”, https://inhak.adalet.gov.tr/Resimler/SayfaDokuman/2212020141836bm_01.pdf.

⁹ Ozan Örmeci (2023), “Birleşmiş Milletler”, Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, 15.12.2023, <https://politikaakademisi.org/2023/12/15/birlesmis-milletler/>.

interfere in member states’ domestic affairs.

The central bodies of the UN are:¹⁰

A) General Assembly: The General Assembly (UNGA) is the primary consultative body of the Organization. It comprises all (193) member states, each with one vote. A two-thirds majority is required for decisions on important issues such as peace and security, accession of new members, and the budget. Decisions on other matters are taken by a simple majority.

The functions and powers of the General Assembly as set out in the Treaty are as follows:

- To consider and make recommendations on matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, including disarmament and arms control arrangements,
- To hold hearings and adopt recommendations on matters of world peace, not including conflicts and issues dealt with in the Security Council,
- To hold hearings and adopt recommendations on matters falling within the scope of the Charter and on topics covering the mandate and competence of the organs of the United Nations, except disputes and matters dealt with in the Security Council,
- To initiate and advise on international political cooperation, the development and codification of international law, the realization of fundamental human rights and freedoms for all, and international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields,
- To advise on the peaceful settlement of any dispute, whatever its origin, which may disturb friendly relations between nations,
- To consider reports to be submitted by the Security Council and other United Nations bodies,
- To elect non-permanent members of the Security Council, members of the Economic and Social Council and additional members of the Trusteeship Council (if necessary); to elect, together with the Security Council, the Judges of the International Court of Justice; and to appoint the Secretary-General on the recommendation of the Security Council.

¹⁰ United Nations, “Main Bodies”, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/main-bodies>.

B) Security Council: The Security Council (UN Security Council) has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security under the Charter. The Council has fifteen members, five of whom are permanent - the United States, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation - and ten of whom are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. Each member has one vote. Decisions on administrative matters are taken with the affirmative vote of nine of the fifteen members. Decisions on other matters require nine yes votes, including the yes votes of all five permanent members. Each of the five permanent members has exercised the veto in one way or another over time. A permanent member may abstain if it does not fully agree with the decision but does not wish to veto it. This allows a decision to be made if the required nine affirmative votes are present. Under Article 25 of the Charter, all members of the United Nations must accept and implement the decisions made by the Security Council. While other organs of the United Nations can only advise member states, the Council alone has the power to make decisions that member states must abide by, as set out in the Charter.

The duties and powers of the Security Council, as set out in the Treaty, include the following:

- To maintain international peace and security within the framework of the principles and purposes of the United Nations,
- Taking measures to regulate arms production,
- Inviting the parties to negotiate a peaceful settlement of their disputes,
- To investigate disputes and issues that may give rise to international conflicts and to make recommendations for the resolution of such issues or matters,
- Calling on the parties concerned to comply with these measures to avoid aggravation of the situation,
- Calling on United Nations members to comply with Security Council resolutions that do not involve direct violence, such as sanctions, in order to increase the effectiveness of Council resolutions,
- Use or authorize the use of force to establish and maintain international peace and security,
- Promote the peaceful resolution of local disputes through regional arrangements and ensure that these regional arrangements are used within the UN mandate,
- To advise the General Assembly on the appointment of the Secretary-General and, together with the Assembly, to elect the judges of the International Court of Justice,

- To request legal reports on legal matters from the International Court of Justice; to advise the General Assembly on the admission of new members to the United Nations.

The Security Council is structured to fulfill its mandate without interruption, and as such, the representatives of member states must always be present at UN Headquarters. The Council can also meet in places other than the headquarters: 1972 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; 1973 in Panama City, Panama; and 1990 in Geneva, Switzerland. When an issue threatening peace arises, the Council primarily recommends that the parties reach an agreement peacefully. The Council may set principles for a peaceful settlement. In some cases, the Council takes on the task of investigation and mediation. It may delegate tasks, appoint special envoys or call on the Secretary-General to assume a good office mandate. If disputes escalate into conflicts, the Council prioritizes the cessation of hostilities as soon as possible. To this end, it may call for a ceasefire. The Council may also deploy military observers and peacekeepers to reduce tensions, keep the parties apart and create a peaceful environment where peaceful solutions can be sought. Under Article 7 of the Treaty, the Council may various measures, including economic sanctions, military embargo, financial sanctions, travel ban or joint military action.

The sanctions option is the most important tool the Security Council has to ensure international peace and security. At present, the Sanctions System is “smart” or “targeted” in that it punishes the parties responsible for the policies that public opinion condemns, not society as a whole. After the 1991 Gulf War, the Council, together with the International Atomic Energy Agency, established the United Nations Special Commission (UNOSCOM) to verify the destruction of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. In 1999, UNOSCOM’s mandate was transferred to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). The Council established two international criminal tribunals to try crimes against humanity in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The tribunals are subsidiary organs of the Council. On September 11, 2001, following the terrorist attacks on the U.S., the Council also established the Committees on Counter-Terrorism as subsidiary bodies. A working group has been preparing the reform of the Security Council since 1993. Under the General Assembly resolution “Uniting for Peace”, adopted in November 1950, the General Assembly may take action if the Security Council is unable to fulfill its mandate because of a lack of unanimity among its members in situations of threat to international peace, breach of the peace or aggression. The Assembly is authorized to advise Member States on joint action in the event of developments, including breaches of the peace and aggression, and to immediately table the use of armed force where necessary to maintain and restore international peace and

security.

The UN Security Council's structure is recently criticized by many, including Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Erdoğan, by creating the famous slogan "*The world is bigger than five*"¹¹, became the leading critic of the permanent members, especially by focusing on the lack of a Muslim State within the Council, which could defend the rights of Muslim states and people as in the case of Palestine. In addition, more recently, the United Kingdom proposed a reform plan to include India, the world's most populous (more than 1.4 billion) country, to the UN Security Council as a permanent member.¹² Last but not least, upon the "veto initiative" led by Liechtenstein in 2020¹³, in April 2022, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution to make the UN Security Council members' efforts to paralyze the institution to decide against a humanitarian crisis. With the resolution "A/RES/76/262", the UN General Assembly decided that:¹⁴

- The President of the General Assembly shall convene a formal meeting of the General Assembly within ten working days of the casting of a veto by one or more permanent members of the Security Council to hold a debate on the situation as to which the veto was cast, provided that the Assembly does not meet in an emergency special session on the same situation;
- On an exceptional basis, to accord precedence in the list of speakers to the permanent member or permanent members of the Security Council having cast a veto;
- Invites the Security Council, by Article 24 (3) of the Charter of the United Nations, to submit a special report on the use of the veto in question to the General Assembly at least 72 hours before the relevant discussion in the Assembly;
- To include in the provisional agenda of its seventy-seventh session an item entitled "Use of the veto" and that the item should remain on the agenda of the Assembly for consideration by paragraph one of the present resolution;

¹¹ Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, "Our Motto 'the World is Bigger than Five' is the Biggest-Ever Rise against Global Injustice", 10.01.2018, <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/89052/our-motto-the-world-is-bigger-than-five-is-the-biggest-ever-rise-against-global-injustice>.

¹² Economic Times (2023), "UK calls for UN reform with permanent Security Council seat for India", 30.06.2023, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/uk-calls-for-un-reform-with-permanent-security-council-seat-for-india/articleshow/101396299.cms?from=mdr>.

¹³ UNA.uk (2022), "Liechtenstein's 'Veto Initiative' Wins Wide Approval at the UN. Will It Deter the Major Powers?", 28.04.2022, <https://una.org.uk/news/liechtensteins-veto-initiative-wins-wide-approval-un-will-it-deter-major-powers>.

¹⁴ United Nations (2022), "Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 26 April 2022", <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n22/330/37/pdf/n2233037.pdf?token=VGVDOrTFnMxUC4AQub&fe=true>.

- Should a veto be cast by one or more permanent members of the Security Council during the remainder of the seventy-sixth session of the General Assembly, the President of the General Assembly shall convene a formal meeting of the Assembly, by paragraph one of the present resolution, under the agenda item entitled "Strengthening of the United Nations system".

C) Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC): The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was established to ensure that the United Nations and the Organizations within the United Nations family work in coordination. The Council has 54 members who serve for 3-year terms. Voting in the Council is based on absolute majority principle; each member has one vote.

The duties and powers of the Economic and Social Council are as follows:

- To address international economic and social issues and to serve as the main forum for political advice to Member States of the United Nations,
- To conduct studies, prepare reports and make recommendations on international economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related issues,
- Ensure and enforce respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
- Assisting in the preparation and Organization of major international conferences in economic, social and related fields and coordinated follow-up of these conferences,
- Coordinate the work of the special agencies of the United Nations, again in consultation and advice to them and in making recommendations to the General Assembly.

During the discussion of international economic and social issues and policy recommendations, ECOSOC plays a crucial role in promoting and developing international cooperation and identifying priority work.

D) Trusteeship (Guardianship) Council: The Trusteeship or the Guardianship Council was established in 1945 by the relevant article of the Charter of the United Nations to provide oversight of the eleven regional administrations placed under the administration of the seven member states and to guarantee that adequate steps are taken to enable these regions to establish their self-government or to become independent. The Treaty empowered the Trusteeship Council to examine and discuss reports prepared by the Governing Body on the political, economic, social and educational

progress of the peoples living in territories under the administration of another country; to receive petitions from the regions; and to undertake particular tasks in the regions. By 1994, the regions in question had established their self-governments or achieved independence, either as separate states or by joining independent neighboring states. Most recently, as a result of the work of the Trusteeship Council, the Pacific island of Palu became independent and joined the Organization as the 185th member of the UN. The number of members of the Trusteeship Council, whose mandate has expired, has now been reduced to 5 permanent members of the Security Council and transformed into a structure to be consulted when deemed necessary.

E) International Court of Justice (ICJ): The International Court of Justice (ICJ), based in Hague, is the principal judicial organ of the UN. It settles legal disputes between States and provides legal advice to the UN and its specialized agencies. Its Statute is an integral part of the Charter of the United Nations. The Court is open to all state parties to its statute, including all members of the UN. Only states may be parties and present their disputes before the Court in matters in dispute. The Court is not open to private individuals and persons and international Organizations. The General Assembly and the Security Council may seek the legal opinion of the Court on any legal matter. Other organs and special agencies of the UN may seek the legal opinion of the Court on legal matters within the scope of their activities only if the General Assembly so approves.

All matters brought before the Court by States and matters referred to in the UN Charter and other international treaties and conventions, fall within its jurisdiction. States accept the binding force of the Court's decisions by signing or declaring their acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction, either by signing the treaty or convention referring to the Court or by declaring that they accept the Court's jurisdiction. In declaring their acceptance of the binding force of the Court's decisions, States may also include certain reservations in the declaration.

By its Statute, the Court adjudicates disputes by the following means:

- International treaties adopted by the disputing States,
- Generally accepted international practices,
- General provisions of law recognized by countries,
- The teachings of the most prominent scientists of various nations.

The Court comprises fifteen judges who are elected by the General Assembly and the Security Council by independent vote. Judges are selected

based on their qualifications and emphasis is placed on ensuring that the principal legal systems of the world are represented on the Court. No two judges from the same country may sit in the Court. Judges serve nine-year terms and may be re-elected for a second term. They may not engage in any other occupation during their term of office.

Other than the ICJ, there is also the International Criminal Court (ICC), which was established in 2002 under the Rome Statute as a separate court to prosecute individuals for the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Although the creation of the ICJ was welcomed by international law experts, due to its decisions solely against third-world and non-Western leaders, the Court has not been inclusive to all UN members, and so far only 124 states have accepted the authority of the Court.

F-) UN Secretariat: The General Secretariat is composed of international civil servants who work in various capacities and carry out the Organization's day-to-day work. It serves the other principal organs of the UN and implements the programs and policies announced by these organs. The Secretary-General, the head of the Organization, is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council for five years. The person elected Secretary-General may serve a maximum of two terms. The Secretary-General's mandate covers a variety of issues that the UN deals with. It ranges from managing peacekeeping operations to mediating international disputes, from monitoring economic and social trends to preparing studies on human rights and sustainable development. The staff of the General Secretariat also informs the world media about the work of the UN, organizes international conferences on issues of global concern, interprets speeches, and translates documents into the Organization's official languages. The Secretariat has around 7,500 staff from some 170 countries working on a regular budget. International officers, senior staff, and the Secretary-General are accountable to the UN alone for their work and take an oath not to take instructions from any government or authority. Under the Charter, each State is obliged to respect the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and his staff as set out in the international Charter and to refrain from actions that might interfere with them. Although the UN is headquartered in New York, it has a significant presence in Addis Ababa, Bangkok, Beirut, Geneva, Nairobi, Santiago, and Vienna and offices worldwide.

Figure 3. Current UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres

A diplomat, lawyer, administrator, and CEO, the Secretary-General is a symbol of the UN ideals and a spokesperson for the poor and vulnerable people. The 9th Secretary-General of the UN, Antonio Guterres, a Portuguese social democratic politician and former Prime Minister of Portugal, took office on January 1, 2017. The previous Secretaries-General of the UN were: Norwegian politician and diplomat Trygve Lie (1946-1952), Swedish economist and statesman Dag Hammarskjöld (1952-1961), Myanmar-Berman educator U Thant (1961-1971), Austrian diplomat and politician and former President Kurt Waldheim (1971-1981), Peruvian diplomat Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (1982-1991), Egyptian diplomat Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992-1996), Ghanaian diplomat Kofi Annan (1997-2006), and South Korean politician Ban Ki-moon (2007-2016).

The Secretary-General is described in the Charter as the “chief executive” of the Organization, who is expected to perform the functions assigned to him by the Economic and Social Council and other UN organs and to act according to his position. The Charter authorizes the Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which he or she believes to be a threat to international peace and security. These powers granted by the UN Charter give the Secretary-General a great deal of freedom of action. The Secretary-General may fail if he fails to consider the concerns of member states, but he must uphold the values and moral authority of the UN and speak and act in the name of peace, even at the risk of falling out with member states. Creative tension accompanies the Secretary-General in

his daily work: attending sessions of UN bodies; exchanging views with world leaders, government officials and representatives of civil society and the private sector; touring the world to keep in touch with the peoples of Member States and to learn about the many international issues on the Organization’s agenda. Each year, the Secretary-General publishes a report assessing the work of the Organization and outlining future priorities. One of the most critical roles of the Secretary-General is to use his independent, impartial, and unifying position to engage in “good offices” to prevent the emergence, escalation and spread of international conflicts. In this context, the Secretary-General has implemented goodwill initiatives on high-priority issues such as Iraq, the Middle East, Nigeria, and Western Sahara. In addition, each Secretary-General defines his or her mandate by the circumstances of his or her mandate.

The Binding Aspect of UN Decisions

The UN’s binding decisions are the ones the Security Council takes. As stated above, the UN Security Council comprises five permanent members: the U.S., the Russian Federation (the USSR until 1991), the United Kingdom, France, and the People’s Republic of China (Taiwan until 1971). In addition, ten temporary members are chosen by the UN General Assembly for a two-year period.¹⁵ Although decisions could be taken with only nine votes on procedural matters, for adopting substantive decisions on non-procedural matters, “concurring votes of the permanent members are required”.¹⁶ This means, in other words that, in critical political and economic decisions, permanent members have the right to block the process through their veto vote.¹⁷ According to the Article 25 of the UN Charter¹⁸, the UN Security Council decisions are binding, and all member states should act accordingly.

However, in many cases, different States have so far decided not to implement UN Security Council decisions, attributing a vital importance to their actions and daring to face sanctions. Tardy states, “*The more the war is perceived as strategic or existential, the less the country waging it is likely to accept the constraints of Security Council resolutions.*”¹⁹ Moreover, if a state that does not

¹⁵ Ozan Örmeci (2023), “Birleşmiş Milletler”, Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, 15.12.2023, <https://politikaakademisi.org/2023/12/15/birlesmis-milletler/>.

¹⁶ Security Council Report (2024), “Procedural Vote”, 03.01.2024, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/procedural-vote.php#:~:text=Article%2027%20provides%20that%20decisions,on%20%E2%80%99Call%20other%20matters%E2%80%9D>.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.” See; Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, “Charter of the United Nations”, <https://legal.un.org/repertory/art25.shtml>.

¹⁹ Thierry Tardy (2024), “OPINION- How binding are token UN Security Council resolutions?”, AA, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/opinion-how-binding-are-token-un-security-council-resolutions/3184634#:~:text=According%20to%20Article%2025%20of,Security%20Council%20are%20legally%20binding>.

implement the UN Security Council decision has a supporting member in the UN Security Council, sanction decisions might not even pass from the Council. One recent example is Israel, conducting a war against Hamas in Gaza, which causes enormous suffering to the Palestinian civilian population. However, with the U.S. backing within the UN Security Council, Israel's actions cannot be stopped or limited until now. That is why; the ICC and the ICJ reacted recently and tried to take decisions to deter Israel from causing more suffering to innocent civilians.

Another binding body of the UN is the ICJ. ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the UN, which has a responsibility to settle, by the international law, legal disputes submitted to it by States and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by authorized UN organs and specialized agencies. The Court is competent to entertain a dispute only if the States concerned have accepted its jurisdiction in one or more of the following ways:²⁰

- By entering into a special agreement to submit the dispute to the Court;
- By a jurisdictional clause, i.e., typically, when they are parties to a treaty containing a provision whereby, in the event of a dispute of a given type or disagreement over the interpretation or application of the treaty, one of them may refer the dispute to the Court;
- Through the reciprocal effect of declarations made by them under the Statute, whereby each has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory in the event of a dispute with another State having made a similar declaration. A number of these declarations, which must be deposited with the UN Secretary-General, contain reservations excluding specific dispute categories.

The sources of law that the Court must apply are international treaties and conventions in force, international custom, the general principles of law, judicial decisions, and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists.²¹

In contentious cases, the ICJ's decision is final and binding on the parties without appeal. In advisory proceedings, the ICJ verdict is not binding, and the requesting organ, agency, or organization remains free to give effect to the opinion as it sees fit or not to do so.²²

²⁰ International Court of Justice, "How the Court Works", <https://www.icj-cij.org/how-the-court-works>.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*

The Weakening of the UN and the Collapse of the Rules-Based International World Order: Three Cases

In this part, the weakening of the UN and states' growing discontent with international law will be exemplified by three contemporary cases, namely; (1) the Syrian Civil War, (2) the Russo-Ukrainian War, and (3) the Israel-Hamas War.

The Syrian Civil War

While the Arab Spring that started in late 2010 in Tunisia with the toppling down of President Bin Ali led to the strengthening of popular mass movements in the Muslim world asking for democratic elections, higher individual freedoms, and better economic conditions, due to the authoritarian and exclusionist nature of the regime in Syria, the protest movement turned quickly into a sectarian-based civil war. In time, the Syrian Civil War transformed into a global jihadist campaign with the flow of radical Islamic militants all over the world to Syria. Millions of people had to escape from Syria due to ongoing civil war, and a migration wave occurred, causing many new social and political problems and tensions in several countries, primarily Türkiye, which has been hosting around 4 million Syrian immigrants. During the civil war, Syrian regime forces actively used chemical weapons on civilian population, as proven by UN reports.²³ Moreover, radical Islamist terrorist Organizations such as IS/ISIS/DAESH, al-Qaeda, and many others carried out vicious attacks on regime forces as well as civilians on both the regime and the opposition's side.

Table 1. Vetoed resolutions at the UN Security Council in recent years (2011-2024)

Security Council - Veto List ²⁴ (in reverse chronological order)				
Date	Draft	Written Record	Agenda Item	Permanent Member Casting Negative Vote
24 April 2024	S/2024/302	S/PV.9616	Non-proliferation	Russian Federation
18 April 2024	S/2024/312	S/PV.9609	Admission of new members	United States
28 March 2024	S/2024/255	S/PV.9591	Non proliferation/ Democratic People's Republic	Russian Federation

²³ United Nations General Assembly & Security Council (2013), "Identical letters dated 13 December 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council", https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_735.pdf.

²⁴ Dag Hammarskjöld Library (2024), "UN Security Council Meetings & Outcomes Tables", <https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick>.

The Weakening of the United Nations

			of Korea	
22 March 2024	S/2024/239	S/PV.9584	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	China / Russian Federation
20 February 2024	S/2024/173	S/PV.9552	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	United States
8 December 2023	S/2023/970	S/PV.9499	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	United States
25 October 2023	S/2023/792	S/PV.9453	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	China / Russian Federation
18 October 2023	S/2023/773	S/PV.9442	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	United States
30 August 2023	S/2023/638	S/PV.9408	The situation in Mali	Russian Federation
11 July 2023	S/2023/506	S/PV.9371	The situation in the Middle East	Russian Federation
30 September 2022	S/2022/720	S/PV.9143	Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine	Russian Federation
8 July 2022	S/2022/538	S/PV.9087	The situation in the Middle East	Russian Federation
26 May 2022	S/2022/431	S/PV.9048	Non-proliferation - Democratic People's Republic of Korea	China / Russian Federation
25 February 2022	S/2022/155	S/PV.8979	Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)	Russian Federation
13 December 2021	S/2021/990	S/PV.8926	Maintenance of international peace and security	Russian Federation

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31 August 2020	S/2020/852	S/2020/870S /2020/865	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist attacks	United States
10 July 2020	S/2020/667	S/2020/693 S/2020/681	The situation in the Middle East	China / Russian Federation
7 July 2020	S/2020/654	S/2020/661 S/2020/657	The situation in the Middle East	China / Russian Federation
20 December 2019	S/2019/961	S/PV.8697	The situation in the Middle East	Russian Federation / China
19 September 2019	S/2019/756	S/PV.8623	The situation in the Middle East	Russian Federation / China
28 February 2019	S/2019/186	S/PV.8476	The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela	Russian Federation / China
1 June 2018	S/2018/516	S/PV.8274	Middle East situation, including the Palestinian question	United States
10 April 2018	S/2018/321	S/PV.8228	Middle East	Russian Federation
26 February 2018	S/2018/156	S/PV.8190	Middle East	Russian Federation
18 December 2017	S/2017/1060	S/PV.8139	Middle East situation, including the Palestinian question	United States
17 November 2017	S/2017/970	S/PV.8107	Middle East	Russian Federation
16 November 2017	S/2017/962	S/PV.8105	Middle East	Russian Federation
24 October 2017	S/2017/884	S/PV.8073	Middle East	Russian Federation
12 April 2017	S/2017/315	S/PV.7922	Middle East	Russian Federation
28 February 2017	S/2017/172	S/PV.7893	Middle East	China / Russian Federation
5 December 2016	S/2016/1026	S/PV.7825	Middle East	China / Russian Federation
8 October 2016	S/2016/846	S/PV.7785	Middle East	Russian Federation
29 July 2015	S/2015/562	S/PV.7498	Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent	Russian Federation

			Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)	
8 July 2015	S/2015/508	S/PV.7481	The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Russian Federation
22 May 2014	S/2014/348	S/PV.7180	Middle East - Syria	China / Russian Federation
15 March 2014	S/2014/189	S/PV.7138	Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)	Russian Federation
19 July 2012	S/2012/538	S/PV.6810	Middle East - Syria	China / Russian Federation
4 February 2012	S/2012/77	S/PV.6711	Middle East - Syria	China / Russian Federation
4 October 2011	S/2011/612	S/PV.6627	Middle East - Syria	China / Russian Federation
18 February 2011	S/2011/24	S/PV.6484	Middle East situation, including the Palestinian question	United States

To stop bloodshed in Syria, the UN Security Council made many decisions, including Resolution 2139 in 2014. This decision was critical because, in its Article 15, it asked for the “comprehensive implementation of the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 leading to a genuine political transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people and enables them independently and democratically to determine their own future”.²⁵ The Geneva Communiqué openly asked for the formation of a transition governing body in Syria with full executive powers in its Article 9²⁶. Moreover, the Resolution supported the

²⁵ United Nations Security Council (2014), “Resolution 2139 (2014)”, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2139.pdf.

²⁶ United Nations Security Council (2012), “Identical letters dated 5 July 2012 from the Secretary-General

Communiqué’s decision. The resolution was adopted anonymously with the Syrian regime’s close allies Russia and China’s support as well, while these two countries blocked many other resolutions about Syria. However, over the last decade since Resolution 2139, no political transition could be achieved in Syria due to Russia, Iran, and China’s backing of President Bashar al-Assad’s brutal regime in addition to the existence of armed terrorist groups on the field (Islamist groups as well as pro-Kurdish armed groups such as PYD/YPG), and Russia and Türkiye’s military incursions into Syrian soil.

The Syrian case is critical because it shows that even with a resolution adopted unanimously by the Security Council, political action and decision might not be implemented due to permanent member States’ preferences. In the Syrian case, it was security risks on the field, as well as many countries’ support to President Assad, made the UN decision void and the institution dysfunctional. In that sense, the UN Security Council’s decision did not match with the realities on the ground, and that is why it led to a massive loss of prestige for the UN.

The Russo-Ukrainian War

With the ongoing tension between Russia and Ukraine since late 2013, Russia first annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 and then started a military campaign against this country in February 2022. Russia identified this war as a “special military operation” aiming to neutralize Ukraine and destroy pro-Nazi forces within the country. While the military operation was an open attack on the territorial integrity of Ukraine that was protected by Article 2 of the UN Charter²⁷, Moscow defended itself with the “NATO expansion”

addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council”, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SY_120630_Final%20Communique%20of%20the%20Action%20Group%20for%20Syria.pdf.

²⁷The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

1. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
2. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of

argument and its vital security needs against the attacks and threats coming from the Western military alliance, which has been constantly expanding against Moscow since the end of the Cold War.

The war in Ukraine caused the death of tens of thousands of people both in Russia and Ukraine, in addition to millions of Ukrainians who were forced to leave their countries. While the Western countries openly and heavily supported Ukraine by providing weapons and financial help, due to the political disagreement between two camps (the West is composed of the U.S., France, and the UK, whereas the Eastern bloc is composed of Russia and China), the UN Security Council was unable to make a decision. On 25 February 2022, Russia blocked the resolution, while eleven members voted in favor of the resolution, and three members (China, India, and the United Arab Emirates) abstained.²⁸

In that sense, the Russo-Ukrainian War showed a second type of failure for the UN, in which one of the members of the Security Council actively engages in fight/warfare with another country and, thus, prevents the Council from making a resolution.

The Israel-Hamas War

The most recent example of the dysfunction of the UN in finding a peaceful solution to ongoing conflicts was the Israel-Hamas War. With the Hamas' unexpected attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, Israel started a vast military operation in Gaza, causing the death of more than 45,000 people, most of them women and children.²⁹ While many states initially supported Israel against a terrorist attack, in the later phase, Israel's insistence on not making any differentiation between civilians/local population and Hamas militants caused anger and despair among international observers. Israel's attacks also caused the death of many journalists and numerous UN workers³⁰, showing the brutality of the operation.

While many countries reacted to stop further killings of civilians, the UN Security Council once again was unable to pass a binding resolution, this time

enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

See; United Nations, "United Nations Charter (full text)", <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text>.

²⁸ Loraine Sievers and Sam Daws (2014), *The Procedure of the UN Security Council* 4th edition, Oxford University Press, https://www.scprocedure.org/_files/ugd/54a569_1928e9a028734c7fa4aeb1b1d840b2a7.pdf.

²⁹ Jake Horton, Shayan Sardarizadeh, and Adam Durbin (2024), "Gaza war: Why is the UN citing lower death toll for women and children?", BBC News, 16.05.2024, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-69014893>.

³⁰ CPJ (2024), "Journalist casualties in the Israel-Gaza war", 14.06.2024, <https://cpj.org/2024/06/journalist-casualties-in-the-israel-gaza-conflict/>; Serdar Dincel (2024), "Number of UNRWA workers killed in Israeli attacks rises to 188", AA, 07.05.2024, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/number-of-unrwa-workers-killed-in-israeli-attacks-rises-to-188/3212964>.

the U.S. backing its critical regional ally, Israel, against possible sanctions. In that sense, similar to China and Russia's backing of the Assad regime in Syria, the U.S. decided to support the Netanyahu government in Israel fully and to block the Security Council against a possible resolution against Israel.

The Israel-Hamas War exemplified a third type of problem within the working of the UN Security Council, in which a permanent member unconditionally supports its ally and prevents the Council from reaching a decision.

However, due to the extreme violence used by Israeli Defence Forces against civilians, in time, the ICJ and ICC also reacted, and a prosecution process was started against Israel. While Karim Khan, the Prosecutor of the ICC, announced the seeking of arrest warrants for leaders of both Israel and Hamas, the ICJ ruled that Israel must halt any military offensive in Rafah which could harm civilians.³¹

Conclusion

To conclude, in this chapter, I tried first to remind readers of the first initiative to protect international peace, the League of Nations experience, and how it failed in time due to its lack of success in preventing major scale wars (the Second World War). Later, I explained the history and the functions of the United Nations and some recent reform proposals about the UN to make it more legitimate and effective. Thirdly, I summarized the binding nature of the UN Security Council decisions and the International Court of Justice's verdicts in contentious cases.

Lastly, to show the problems within the current international system, I chose three cases: the Syrian Civil War, the Russo-Ukrainian War, and the Israel-Hamas War to show how and why the UN and the international community were unable to stop further bloodshed and find a peaceful solution. By analyzing each case, I detected three different problems with the current system:

1. UN Security Council's decision might not be implemented due to "*realpolitik*" reasons (the Syrian case),
2. A permanent member might block and paralyze the Council to decide against itself (the Russo-Ukrainian War),
3. A permanent member or members could defend their ally and block the Council to prevent a decision against their ally (the Israel-Hamas War and also the Syrian case).

³¹ Yossi Mekelberg (2024), "The ICJ and ICC put Israel on notice but cannot stop the war", Chatham House, 30.05.2024, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/05/icj-and-icc-put-israel-notice-cannot-stop-war>.

Finally, these three recent cases might still need to indicate the collapse of the rules-based international order and the UN, but they should convince us that the UN must be reformed in a way that will be more inclusive and realistic about its decisions. Since this requires a particular expertise in that field, which is above my knowledge and authority, I leave this discussion to the international law experts and independent states. However, one thing is obvious, and the choice is ours: whether we want to live in a rules-based peaceful world or would we do our best to take advantage of the weaknesses of others?

GLOBAL GEOPOLITICAL RISKS IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND THEIR REFLECTIONS ON TÜRKİYE

Mesut Özel*

"It is the eye that can see through the mountain, and the mind is such that it knows what will happen".

Anonymous

Introduction

The above phrase is an anonymous proverb emphasising the significance of predicting or forecasting the future. Every entity in the world begs to have an idea of the future, such as wage war, investing, opening a business, selecting a profession, etc. Indeed, the vagueness of the future was an issue that military strategists mainly had dealt with in the theatre. Carl von Clausewitz calls the "fog of war", which is the difficulty of mitigating uncertainty due to the general (un)reliability of information, which he phrased as "intermixed with chance, numerous imponderables, the limitations of accurate observation and the vast number of variables involved."¹ On the other hand, a commander needs to frame the operational environment, that is, to depict the reality of the current environment and all the intricate details that influence that environment.² Similarly, businesses need to conduct a risk analysis, referring "to the assessment process that identifies the potential for any adverse events that may negatively affect organisations and the environment", before deciding to launch a new project or approve a financial application.³ Another approach is trend analysis, which "involves a systematic approach to examining historical data to identify patterns, tendencies, or changes over time."⁴ Futures studies is also an emerging methodology, which could be interpreted as "the systematic study of possible, probable and preferable futures." It assists politicians and societies in managing uncertainties and increasing their resilience and innovation. Futures studies mainly help humankind solve pressing global challenges.⁵

* Assistant Professor, Department Head of Political Science and Public Administration (Eng.)

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton Paperbacks (New York: Everyman's Library, 1993), 91, <https://books.google.com.tr/books?id=DRoL0NmsrlwC>.

² Daniel L. Dods, 'Framing the Operational Environment: Insights from the Russia-Ukraine Conflict', *Small Wars Journal*, 2023, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/framing-operational-environment-insights-russia-ukraine-conflict>.

³ Adam Hayes, 'Risk Analysis: Definition, Types, Limitations, and Examples', *Investopedia*, 26 February 2024, <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/risk-analysis.asp>.

⁴ Nick Jain, 'What Is Trend Analysis? Definition, Steps, Examples, Benefits and Best Practices', *IDEASCALE*, 30 November 2023, <https://ideascale.com/blog/what-is-trend-analysis/>.

⁵ Abhinav Chugh, 'What Is "Futures Studies" and How Can It Improve Our World?', *World Economic Forum*, 26 October 2021, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/10/what-is-futures-studies-and-how-can-it-improve-our-world/>.

Furthermore, another practical tool is situation analysis. It helps determine opportunities and challenges, both exogenous and endogenous, for an organisation, service, and product for any startup and facilitates the determination of the best course of action.⁶ By applying one or more of these methods, many strategic institutions endeavour to prepare reports, outlooks, and analyses that may shed light on the uncertainty of the unknown, making it acceptable and manageable.

Our precious world is threatened by risks of increasing severity, ranging from climate events with profound global impact to escalating interstate and internal conflicts, from disruptions in the worldwide supply chain to high inflation and economic downturn. Emerging technologies not only contribute to the management of these risks but also, through their misuse, erode the perception of truth, primarily through the distortion of information, and have the potential to create negative consequences from political and social life to the individual sphere. Identifying and prioritising the risks that pose threats on a global and national scale also directs initiatives and efforts to create platforms and mechanisms for understanding and cooperation to manage these risks.

In 2024, the world faces a complex and uncertain geopolitical landscape, with various conflicts rooted in the previous year. The outcomes of the critical elections in major countries, involving more than 4 billion people, will have a significant impact globally. The political tensions between countries such as the United States, Russia, India, and Taiwan could create more chaos in the international arena. These tensions are further complicated by various challenges, such as the Russia-Ukraine war, the Taiwan dispute, Iran's nuclear program, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and climate change. Moreover, the resurgence of 78 conflicts worldwide highlights the volatility of the current global environment.⁷

In this context, all international, transnational, and national actors and individuals organise high-level meetings to promote understanding and cooperation in various forums and platforms, carrying out research and publishing reports based on large-scale surveys to serve as a reference for these meetings. They often provide the basis for discussions at international summits and conferences. A recent example is the 54th Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum (WEF) held in Davos/Switzerland on January 15-19, 2024, attended by over 3000 representatives and experts at all levels from 113 countries and themed as *“Rebuilding Trust”*. As for the Davos Summit, about 50 reports on five main areas were published before the

⁶ Georgina Guthrie, 'What Is Situation Analysis, and Why Is It So Important?', NULAB, 1 February 2022, <https://nulab.com/learn/project-management/what-is-situation-analysis-and-why-is-it-so-important/>.

⁷ SETA, '2024'te Türkiye'nin Jeopolitik Ortamı: Çatışma Dünyasında Stratejik İstikrar Arayışı' (İstanbul, 2024), 12, www.setav.org.

summit to provide the basis for discussions. The most useful one for the scope of this essay is the *“Global Risks Report”*.⁸

Following the Davos Summit, another elite activity was held in Germany: the Munich Security Conference (MSC). As its name suggests, it aimed at debating the world's most relevant security challenges. Over 450 high-profile decision-makers and thought leaders worldwide discussed international security issues and policies during the conference.⁹ Its report, *“Lose-Lose?”*, had a pessimistic title. The report delves into the lose-lose outcomes that arise when governments prioritise their interests over positive-sum collaboration and investments in the global order. Despite its imperfections, the international order can still help expand the metaphorical pie to benefit everyone.¹⁰ In sum, the use of *“Lose-Lose?”* suggests that the challenges faced in global security are becoming increasingly complex and difficult to manage, requiring innovative and collaborative approaches to address them effectively. It underscores the importance of dialogue, cooperation, and multilateralism in solving pressing global issues.

In the energy realm, another report by the International Energy Agency, *The World Energy Outlook 2023*, offers detailed analysis and strategic perspectives on all facets of the worldwide energy landscape. Amidst geopolitical tensions and unstable energy markets, this year's edition examines how changes in economies and energy consumption patterns alter how the world addresses the growing energy demand.¹¹ As for the US's intelligence community, the National Intelligence Council's *Global Trends 2040* falls into this category.¹² Moreover, it assesses the key trends and uncertainties that will shape the strategic environment of the US.

In its quest to thrive amid ongoing geopolitical complexity, the EY Parthenon's 2024 Geostrategic Outlook argues the global environment 2024, highlighting two main themes: multipolarity and de-risking. They claim that multipolarity and de-risking will influence the top 10 geopolitical developments in 2024, expected to evolve from the previous year's trends. These developments indicate a shift towards a more fragmented global economy with distinct geopolitical blocs and increased nationalist competition in economic policies.¹³

⁸ WEF, 'The Global Risks Report 2024' (Geneva, 10 January 2024), <https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-risks-report-2024/>.

⁹ MSC, 'About the Munich Security Conference', Munich Security Conference, 2024, <https://securityconference.org/en/about-us/about-the-msc/>.

¹⁰ Tobias Bunde et al., 'Lose-Lose? Munich Security Report 2024 Support', February 2024.

¹¹ IEA, 'World Energy Outlook 2023', 2023, <https://origin.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2023>.

¹² NIC, 'Global Trends 2040. A More Contested World' (Washington D. C., March 2021), <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/gt2040-home/introduction>.

¹³ Courtney Rickert McCaffrey, Oliver Jones, and Krumbmüller, '2024 Geostrategic Outlook How to Thrive amid Ongoing Geopolitical Complexity', December 2023.

On a more pessimistic analysis, the Watch List 2024 of International Crisis Group paints a global landscape fraught with conflict and uncertainty. It looks into the ongoing conflicts from 2023 that persist in Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan, and beyond while the Middle East edges closer to a regional crisis, and the Sahel to Myanmar and beyond sees no respite from longstanding conflicts. Notably, this year is marked by national elections in 64 countries, including the pivotal US election. The conflict in Gaza intensifies, raising fears of a broader Middle East war, even an Iran-US war. The breakdown in U.S.-China relations and Russia-West relations exacerbates this trend. Europe's leaders face a sobering reality: multilateral institutions are struggling, and the transatlantic partnership may not offer reliable security. They must consider investing more in defence and conflict resolution to navigate an increasingly dangerous world.¹⁴

At the domestic stage, Türkiye's think tank SETAV discusses the "strategic stability quest in the conflict world" by focusing on understanding the complexities of achieving strategic stability in a world marked by conflicts and identifying effective strategies and approaches to managing and mitigating these challenges.

In sum, each report endeavours to estimate the current, short, medium, and long-term, extending from two to twenty or more years. Instead of concretising the landscape with the findings of these reports and studies, this essay dwells on forecasting the impacts of global risks and challenges on Türkiye and how to achieve strategic stability and economic prosperity by identifying effective strategies and approaches to manage and mitigate these challenges.

Impact of Geo (Political) Risks on Türkiye

The common topics directly or indirectly related to the global geopolitical risks affecting Türkiye are but are not limited to multipolar or fragmented world order, the division of the global south and the global north, interstate armed conflict, intra-state conflicts and international intervention, interstate conflicts such as Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Palestine, China-Taiwan, containment of rogue states and change of leadership in the great powers (US, Russia, China, India are going to elections) and international governance and peacekeeping.

Rise in conflict is a standard output of the reports where 78 conflicts have resumed or heated previously "frozen" conflicts in the last 24 months. As more countries get involved in conflicts and become more widespread, they could become more dangerous and last longer. This situation could result in severe humanitarian problems. When several countries fight indirectly or even

¹⁴ ISG, 'Watch List 2024: Preventing War, Shaping Peace.' (Brussels, 2024).

directly, there may be a more incredible urge to use artificial intelligence (AI) to make decisions more quickly. However, if machines are responsible for choosing targets and objectives, there is a much higher chance of accidental or intentional escalation in the next ten years.¹⁵

Returning to the impact of ongoing conflicts surrounding Türkiye, the hottest conflict is the one which turned to massacring and slaughtering of Palestinians without any discrimination, triggered by the brutal attack of Hamas on October 7, 2024. The latest developments stemming from the untamed aggressiveness of Israel, i.e. the bombing of the Iranian consulate building in Damascus and the retaliation of Iran by drone and missile attacks, have almost brought the region to the brink of broader Middle East war. The proxies of Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, various militias in Iraq and Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, plus Palestinian militant groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad – over which Tehran exercises varying degrees of control, have already engaged in hostilities against Israel.¹⁶ Türkiye calls for prudence on non-escalation of tensions between Israel and Iran.¹⁷ Türkiye's stance on the Palestine issue is that the only way to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is to implement a two-state solution. Regional countries, including Türkiye, would act as "guarantors once both parties reach an agreement, with the responsibility to ensure its implementation" and take responsibility for forming a peacekeeping force.¹⁸

Although the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict does not make the top ten list, it still has the potential to flame up and re-escalate, considering France's recent incitements and Armenia's armament from France and India.¹⁹ The humanitarian suffering due to Azerbaijan's offensive is on the agenda of the West to press on Azerbaijan. Regarding the Zangezur Corridor and the Middle Corridor issue, Türkiye, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia are involved in the issue in different ways with aspirations to become the region's main agenda.²⁰

Right up in the north, the Russian-Ukraine war has turned out to be a struggle between the US and Russia, but what occurs on the scene has percussions and consequences for Europe's security.²¹ Despite the hope of

¹⁵ WEF, 'The Global Risks Report 2024' (Geneva, 10 January 2024), 10, <https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-risks-report-2024/>.

¹⁶ ICG, '10 Conflicts to Watch in 2024' (Brussels, 1 January 2024).

¹⁷ Milliyet, 'Saldırı Sonrası Türkiye ile İran Arasında İlk Temas!', Haberler Milliyet, 14 April 2024, <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/dunya/saldiri-sonrasi-turkiye-ile-iran-arasinda-ilk-temas-7112184>.

¹⁸ Hamdi Firat Büyük and Eleni Stamatoukou, 'Türkiye Offers Peace Plan for Israeli-Palestinian Conflict', BalkanInsight, 17 October 2023, <https://balkaninsight.com/2023/10/17/Turkiye-offers-peace-plan-for-israeli-palestinian-conflict/>.

¹⁹ Panorama.am, 'Indian Arms Supplies to Armenia Aimed at Multiple Targets, Expert Says', Panorama.am, 7 October 2023, <https://www.panorama.am/en/news/2023/10/07/India-Armenia/2908678>.

²⁰ SETA, '2024'te Türkiye'nin Jeopolitik Ortamı: Çatışma Dünyasında Stratejik İstikrar Arayışı', 54–56.

²¹ ICG, '10 Conflicts to Watch in 2024', 9.

peace not appearing on the horizon, Türkiye keeps dialogue channels with both belligerents. The only leader who talked to both Putin and Zelensky is President Erdoğan of Türkiye, who mediates and recently offered to host a peace summit.²² Türkiye's stand on this crisis is based on being a neutral mediator, supporting Ukraine's territorial integrity, maintaining economic relations with Russia, and providing aid to alleviate the suffering of those affected by the war.²³

Türkiye and Greece resumed discussions following their disagreement in mid-2020 about territorial rights in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, which led to the most protracted military standoff between them since the 1970s.²⁴ The reconciliation between Türkiye and Greece and their increased energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean will positively impact Türkiye-Europe relations. It should be noted that the ongoing normalisation efforts have transformed Türkiye's bilateral relations with Greece. Therefore, it can be safely said that Türkiye-Greece relations are no longer a matter of geopolitics but of foreign policy. In the Eastern Mediterranean energy impasse, the actions and reactions of the stakeholders need to be closely monitored to make a prudent assessment of the region's future. Regional actors have initiated or accelerated significant modernisation projects to strengthen their naval and air forces. In the last five years, significant developments in the naval power of the countries in the region and the air power that jointly operates with it have affected the regional power balance. It is evident from the modernisation programs of regional actors that there will be significant developments shortly. Therefore, Türkiye should not be complacent in the relatively peaceful environment and prioritise completing its modernisation programs promptly to maintain the balance of power, particularly in the maritime domain.

The Eastern Mediterranean quagmire eventually also included the Cyprus issue, which moved away from a solution after the Greek Cypriots rejected the 2004 Annan Plan. The fundamental theses of Turkish and Greek Cypriots are completely polarised, with Greek Cypriots denouncing the Turks as “occupiers” and rejecting all proposals. Turkish Cypriots and Türkiye, on the other hand, have begun to support a two-state solution considering the Greek Cypriots' no to (con)federation in the 2004 referendum.²⁵ The UN's efforts have drifted since the breakdown of talks between the two sides in Cras

²² Ayşe Wieting and Suzan Fraser, ‘Türkiye’s Erdogan Offers to Host a Peace Summit with Russia during a Visit from Ukraine’s Zelenskyy’, AP News, 8 March 2024, <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-zelenskyy-türkiye-erdogan-36e8666c52c0440370c96f1d02220664>.

²³ SETA, ‘2024’te Türkiye’nin Jeopolitik Ortamı: Çatışma Dünyasında Stratejik İstikrar Arayışı’.

²⁴ ICG, ‘Türkiye-Greece: From Maritime Brinkmanship to Dialogue’, International Crisis Group, 31 May 2021, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean-türkiye-cyprus/türkiye-greece-maritime-brinkmanship>.

²⁵ SETA, ‘2024’te Türkiye’nin Jeopolitik Ortamı: Çatışma Dünyasında Stratejik İstikrar Arayışı’, 60.

Montana, Switzerland, in 2017. The two sides have yet to agree on how to proceed with future discussions; therefore, Secretary-General Guterres has not appointed a special envoy to resume the talks. The UN is insistent upon the validity of past council resolutions on reunification. In contrast, the two parties have not reached an agreement on the terms of reference of the special envoy. Greek Cypriots have tried to exclude Turkish Cypriots in every solution and insisted on sustaining their stance. Only if this policy changes, then a positive agenda can be set. Türkiye will not accept Greek Cypriot efforts to dominate Cyprus. If Greek Cypriots (like Greece) send positive signals, one can hope for a new wave of positive diplomacy. Depending on the attitude of Greek Cypriots, the Cyprus issue may remain unresolved or be resolved gradually.²⁶

“Peace is the missing piece”. This sentence is taken from a speech by the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. He pointed out the lack of peace as conflicts raged, divisions grew, and polarisation deepened worldwide. Ironically, the UN was founded on pursuing peace, its *raison d’être*. His recipe for the complexities of today’s multipolar world is to strengthen and renew global peace and security frameworks, “New Agenda for Peace”, which will be the central theme of the coming general council meeting in September 2024.²⁷ On the other hand, a more dramatic panorama brushed on different occasions by the UN officials stating, “Feelings of insecurity plague six out of seven worldwide, the world is facing the highest number of violent conflicts since the Second World War and 2 billion people — a quarter of humanity — live in places affected by such conflict.” Furthermore, there are also sobering statistics and hearth-wrenching facts, such as, “An estimated 84 million people were “forcibly displaced because of conflict, violence, and human rights violations,” and an estimated 274 million people will need humanitarian assistance due to conflict.”²⁸

At the Munich Security Conference, Secretary Antonio Guterres highlighted the importance of creating a global order that benefits everyone, not just a few. He emphasised the need for cooperation, solidarity, and inclusivity to address global challenges such as climate change, inequality, and security threats. The current international order often leaves many behind, leading to growing disparities and tensions. To address this, the Secretary-General proposed a “Growing the Pie” approach focusing on creating opportunities and prosperity for all. He called for strengthened international institutions, multilateralism, and collective action to build a more equitable and sustainable world. The Secretary-General urged leaders to prioritise

²⁶ SETA, 12

²⁷ U.N. News, ‘Peace Is U.N.’s Raison d’être: Guterres’, United Nations Global Perspective Human Stories, 7 February 2024, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/02/1146322>.

²⁸ UN, ‘With Highest Number of Violent Conflicts Since Second World War, United Nations Must Rethink Efforts to Achieve, Sustain Peace, Speakers Tell Security Council’, UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 26 January 2023, <https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15184.doc.htm>.

diplomacy over conflict and to invest in education, healthcare, and sustainable development. He emphasised that a global order that works for everyone is achievable through shared commitment and collaboration among nations.²⁹

The overall atmosphere indicates a deteriorating trend in world politics. The main reasons for this trend are increasing geopolitical tensions and economic uncertainties. Globalisation's mutual interdependence exacerbates vulnerabilities in international relations and raises uncertainties about who benefits more from cooperation. This situation can lead to "lose-lose" scenarios and the fragmentation of the global order. Approaches based on zero-sum game thinking can encourage conflict over collaboration in international relations.³⁰

Russia's expansion of its sphere of influence has raised concerns globally. The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine has not only heightened insecurity but also fuelled an arms race in the region. Similarly, China's efforts to expand its influence in East Asia have increased insecurity and militarisation. This expansion has also prompted efforts to reduce dependency on China, a decrease in economic relations, and strategies of containment by other regional powers. The Israel-Palestine conflict remains a persistent source of tension and violence, complicating peace efforts in the Middle East. In sub-Saharan Africa, military juntas undermine stability and foster distrust among nations. These conflicts and power struggles have reduced cooperation and trust among countries globally.³¹

At the extremes, concerns over relative gains manifest as zero-sum beliefs, where one actor's gains are perceived to result in losses for others. This belief is particularly evident in the pursuits of autocracies for their spheres of influence. In Eastern Europe, Moscow's imperial ambitions have already culminated in warfare, undermining any vision for a cooperative security order for the near future. The result is a lose-lose situation where Ukraine's survival as an independent nation is at risk, and Putin's war inflicts significant harm on the Russian people as well. Europeans cannot reap the dividends of peace and are forced to increase defence spending and support for Ukraine.³²

Many observers fear a similar escalation of violence in the Indo-Pacific, where different order visions increasingly clash in a zero-sum fashion.

²⁹ Antonio Guterres, 'Secretary-General's Remarks to the Munich Security Conference: Growing the Pie: A Global Order That Works for Everyone', United Nations Secretary-General, accessed 15 April 2024, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2024-02-16/secretary-generals-remarks-the-munich-security-conference-growing-the-pie-global-order-works-for-everyone%C2%A0>.

³⁰ MSC, 'About the Munich Security Conference', Munich Security Conference, 2024, <https://security-conference.org/en/about-us/about-the-msc/>.

³¹ Tobias Bunde et al., 'Lose-Lose? Munich Security Report 2024 Support', February 2024.

³² Bunde et al., 47–53.

China's militarisation of its surrounding seas heightens fears that Beijing aims to turn East Asia into its exclusive sphere of influence. Consequently, many countries in the region seek closer security ties with the US and attempt to reduce their economic dependencies on China. However, a determined reduction in cooperation with China harms the region and Beijing. Moreover, everyone will lose if major power competition escalates in the region.³³

The US still plays a significant role in the ongoing systemic change and transformation process, but uncertainty persists. The country's global reputation has taken a hit in several areas. Although China is not yet a military match for the US, it can become one in specific sectors shortly, potentially leading to a shift in the balance of power in the region. Additionally, a significant offensive against the American military presence in the Middle East has weakened the country's position since October 7. Despite being one of the world's largest economies, the US faces severe challenges to its economic hegemony from regional powers. Diplomatically, the US's perceived moral superiority, particularly during the Gaza conflict, has weakened, damaging the credibility of American diplomacy. Furthermore, the failure of the Joe Biden administration to establish a rules-based international order has given other global actors justification for unruly behaviour.³⁴

The success of Türkiye's recent foreign policy strategy was partly due to utilising the convergence of interests between China and the United States. This stance allowed Türkiye to pursue an independent foreign policy without conflict with the global powers. However, the deterioration of Sino-American relations would put Türkiye in a difficult position, and pursuing balanced relations with both sides would become impossible. This stand-off is due to Sino-American attempts to pull in as many countries as possible to their own side in their great power rivalry, often leading to situations where countries are forced to take sides, as was the case during the Cold War. Failure to act upon one of the superpowers' demands or staying neutral would risk severe economic and political consequences.

Nonetheless, siding with one of the global powers also harbours its own risks and difficulties for Türkiye. An alliance with China would not be a desirable option for Türkiye. While both countries have mutual economic interests, their political differences are irreconcilable. China's current global stance is to change and realign the current global order that primarily benefits the West. This approach is a direct threat to Türkiye's interests, potentially destabilising regions where Türkiye has vital interests. An assertive and revisionist China is something that Türkiye would want to avoid being part of. Consequently, US pressure to take sides against China may not be

³³ Bunde et al., 55–61.

³⁴ SETA, '2024'te Türkiye'nin Jeopolitik Ortamı: Çatışma Dünyasında Stratejik İstikrar Arayışı', 12–13.

something that US policymakers would like to see happening, being well aware that the Türkiye-China alliance could be a potential political power in the Middle East and beyond. The US would also weigh whether trying too hard to force Türkiye away from China would damage its relations with Türkiye, with Türkiye's partnership being valuable in various US interests.³⁵

Lately, China and Türkiye developed bilateral relations based on economics. Türkiye's application to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a vital indicator of this. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has spearheaded this ambition. However, Sino-US competition will limit the potential fruits that the Türkiye-China relationship can bear. This situation is because China has to spend more time and resources than planned on the US to ensure their regional influence is not compromised. Such policy, in turn, gives them less time for Türkiye and comes when the US has a vested interest in Türkiye remaining in its sphere of influence instead of moving closer to Russia, another Sino-U.S. competitor. This dilemma may cause frustrations from Ankara as they may expect more Chinese attention given the friendly conditions created by the tension between the US and Türkiye.³⁶

Global cooperation versus global competition represents a fundamental tension in today's international landscape. The idea of "*winning against war*" underscores the belief that global governance can effectively address humanity's challenges. The solution lies in a "global liberal order" characterised by open markets, individual rights, equality among sovereign states, and cooperation through rule-based multilateralism. This multipolar, multilayered, and multi-regime worldview aligns with the 2040 vision of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces.³⁷ There is a push to reduce economic dependencies to counteract China and other autocratic states. China, however, seeks to increase asymmetric dependencies under the banner of "*global harmony*," leading to a spiral of insecurity and protectionism. Trump's election raised questions about the end of reliable cooperation among democratic states. Interpreting the "rules" of the rules-based international order based on self-interest signals the weakening of the West's moral

superiority, often resulting in double standards in international relations.³⁸ The global order is changing from being Western-centric to multiple and complex relationships. Due to increasing interdependence and ongoing globalisation, managing many problems will be more complex than ever, even though it will not become a global power.³⁹

Exploiting economic dependency and geo-economic fragmentation driven by politics are becoming increasingly significant issues.⁴⁰ This tension is reflected in the dichotomy between market-driven globalisation and securitised globalisation. Cost-effectiveness is often prioritised over resilience and security, as seen in various policy approaches. China is pursuing a geopolitically oriented political economy, emphasising self-sufficiency in critical technologies through initiatives like "*Made in China 2025*" and fostering comprehensive national security to withstand sanctions and reduce import dependency. In contrast, the US focuses on economic security policies, including reducing Chinese investments, reshaping supply chains, lowering inflation, and controlling essential technologies. The Global Infrastructure and Investment Partnership (G7 - \$600 billion) is a significant initiative. While the EU is reluctant, it adopts similar policies, engaging in e-commerce and investment with friendly countries. Tensions and fragmentation could reduce global GDP by 7 per cent.⁴¹

The rivalry between China and the US has escalated, particularly in technology, trade, and regional influence. Tensions between Beijing and Washington are further exacerbated by their statements in Taiwan and reciprocal actions across different sectors. The US strengthens alliance and partnership ties in Asia-Pacific to counterbalance China's growing influence. Disputes over sovereignty in the South China Sea are pushing regional countries closer to the US due to China's increasing military presence and interventionist stance. Technological competition is another area of contention between the two countries, especially regarding chip production. Washington has restricted China's access to chips and related equipment, citing national security concerns.⁴² "*Corridor wars in global geopolitics*" is a contested topic that explores the increasing geopolitical competition over strategic transportation corridors. The G-20 summit saw several countries

³⁵ Mustafa Cüneyt Özşahin, Federico Donelli, and Riccardo Gasco, 'China-Turkey Relations from the Perspective of Neoclassical Realism', n.d., accessed 21 April 2024, <https://doi.org/10.1177/23477989211062659>; Şuay Nilhan AÇIKALIN, 'China and Turkey Relations from Complexity Theory Perspective', *Atatürk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* 25, no. 2 (2021): 775–89.

³⁶ Mustafa Kutlay and Ziya Öniş, 'Turkish Foreign Policy in a Post-Western Order: Strategic Autonomy or New Forms of Dependence?', *International Affairs* 97 (2021): 1085–1104, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab094>; Enver Gülseven, 'Identity, Nationalism and the Response of Turkey to COVID-19 Pandemic', *Chinese Political Science Review* 6, no. 1 (1 March 2021): 40–62, <https://doi.org/10.1007/S41111-020-00166-X/METRICS>.

³⁷ MoDJapan, 'Achieving the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)" Vision Japan Ministry of Defense's Approach', Ministry of Defense, 2024, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/exc/india_pacific/india_pacific-en.html.

³⁸ UN, 'Today's Challenges Require More Effective and Inclusive Global Cooperation, Secretary-General Tells Security Council Debate on Multilateralism | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases', UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 14 December 2022, <https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc15140.doc.htm>.

³⁹ Paul B Stares, 'Perspectives on Changing World Order', *Council on Foreign Relations*, no. 1 (2020): 38, <https://www.cfr.org/report/perspectives-changing-world-order>.

⁴⁰ Okonjo-Iweala, 'Global Health Equity and the Role of Trade', WTO | News - Speech - DG Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala -, 3 October 2023, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spno_e/spno40_e.htm?ref=news.summarizely.ai.

⁴¹ Bunde et al., 'Lose-Lose? Munich Security Report 2024 Support', 21–25.

⁴² Mustafa Deveci, "'Corridor Wars' in Global Geopolitics", *Anadolu Agency*, 12 September 2023, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/corridor-wars-in-global-geopolitics/2989608>.

agree to create a new corridor linking the Indo-Pacific region to the Middle East and Europe, intensifying competition among various transportation corridors led by China and other major powers.

Türkiye's alternative to the initiative brought forward by India is the Iraq Development Road Project, which aims to create a railway line that starts from the Gulf of Basra and traverses Iraq from south to north and terminates in southeastern Türkiye. President Erdoğan emphasised the importance of this project and the collaboration with Gulf countries like Iraq, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi, aiming to connect Türkiye to Europe. Mohammed Bin Zayed urged quick progress, suggesting finalising talks in 60 days and laying foundations immediately. The United Arab Emirates and Qatar are ready to move forward, and Türkiye is also prepared for this initiative.⁴³ President Erdoğan's recent visit to Iraq can be considered a clear indication that Turkey is conducting active and effective diplomacy in the region and intends to increase its strategic interaction, focusing on the realisation of this project.⁴⁴

The warming atmosphere has intensified the race for leadership in green technologies between the US and China, driving both countries to innovate and invest heavily in sustainable solutions. This competition is shaping their domestic policies and influencing the global green agenda. China's significant dependency on critical raw materials further underscores the urgency and complexity of this race. Amidst these challenges, the importance of international cooperation has never been greater, as collaboration is essential to address climate change and achieve sustainable development goals effectively.⁴⁵

Technology has transitioned from driving global prosperity to becoming a focal point of geopolitical competition. States are increasingly managing and weaponising semiconductor supply chains, advocating conflicting approaches to global tech governance, and vying for supremacy in AI technology. This heightened competition brings about economic setbacks and new security challenges. A lack of international cooperation leads to inefficient technology chains and no unified global risk management.⁴⁶ Fully disentangling semiconductor supply chains is nearly impossible. Many countries in the Global South prioritise digital development over aligning

⁴³ İbrahim Karataş, 'İrak'ın Kalkınma Yolu Projesi: Riskler ve Avantajlar', in Ortadoğu ve Afrika Araştırmaları Derneği, 2023, <https://ordaf.org/irakin-kalkinma-yolu-projesi-riskler-ve-avantajlar/>; Barış Kaygusuz, 'Hindistan'ı Avrupa'ya Bağlayacak Koridor Hakkında Bilinenler', Independent Türkçe, 12 September 2023, <https://www.indyurk.com/node/660456/d%C3%BCny%C4%B1-hindistan%C4%B1-avrupaya-ba%C4%B1-flayacak-koridor-hakk%C4%B1nda-bilinenler>.

⁴⁴ Murat Yeşiltaş, 'Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'ın Irak Ziyaretinin Çıktıları Neler?', Anadolu Ajansı, 23 April 2022, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/analiz/gorus-cumhurbaskani-erdogan-in-irak-ziyaretinin-ciktilari-neler/3199762>.

⁴⁵ Bunde et al., 'Lose-Lose? Munich Security Report 2024 Support', 71–82.

⁴⁶ Bunde et al., 95–10.

with geopolitical blocs, and there is a moral obligation to international cooperation in AI regulation. Thus, nations globally must identify areas where cooperative tech initiatives can flourish, even amidst geopolitical tensions.⁴⁷

The competition between China and the U.S. has started shaping the geopolitical struggle in Asia. Türkiye needs to position itself so that it will not be involved in the struggle but can benefit from the opportunities that arise from it. In this respect, the Asia Anew Initiative is Türkiye's way of aligning its multilayered and multi-dimensional foreign policy approach with the dynamics of a multipolar world despite the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative being in a decline of interest and power. This initiative might allow Türkiye to focus more on the Asian continent and strengthen its role as a central, unifying force that bridges the West and the East.⁴⁸

On the other hand, Türkiye's current outreach and aspirations in the Indian Ocean and neighbouring geography create concerns with the other regional actors despite being seen as opportunistic rather than a new Pax Ottoman dream. India closely monitors Türkiye's moves in its periphery and counteracts them by improving its defence industrial ties and political relations, notably with Greece and Armenia.⁴⁹ Furthermore, Türkiye's improving relations with regional countries concerns China, given its recent leaning towards the West.⁵⁰

To Conclude on the Impact of Important Geopolitical and Geostrategic Developments That Will Shape Türkiye's Foreign and Security Policy in 2024

Türkiye's multifaceted foreign policy approach is poised to amplify its impact on the international agenda in a multipolar global order. Türkiye is set to persist with its normalisation initiatives, particularly with regional nations, emphasising economic considerations with a focus on Gulf countries. Furthermore, Türkiye should harmonise its economic, foreign, and national security policies, accentuating the promotion of domestic production in critical technological sectors.

The pursuit of counterterrorism measures is anticipated to result in a nuanced approach by Türkiye towards its relations with the United States. Simultaneously, Türkiye aims to prioritise dialogue and cooperative

⁴⁷ Courtney Rickert McCaffrey, Oliver Jones, and Krumbmüller, '2024 Geostrategic Outlook How to Thrive amid Ongoing Geopolitical Complexity', December 2023, 30–33.

⁴⁸ Nuh Yılmaz, 'Asia Anew Initiative: Main Aspects of Türkiye's Asia Opening', Insight Turkey 26, no. 1 (1 December 2024): 11–21, <https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2024261.1>.

⁴⁹ Saha Rushali and J. Cannon Brendon, 'Answering Big Questions about Türkiye in the Indian Ocean', Observer Research Foundation, 18 April 2024, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/answering-big-questions-about-turkiye-in-the-indian-ocean>.

⁵⁰ Cheuk Yui Kwong, 'Turkey's Influence Grows Eastwards. That is Welcome | The Strategist', The Strategist, 22 April 2024, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/turkeys-influence-grows-eastwards-thats-welcome/>.

engagements with Greece. Following periods of conflict, Türkiye underscores the significance of inclusively incorporating Russia into the broader international architecture. In the aftermath of the Gaza crisis, Türkiye will vigilantly observe any reductions in the US military footprint in the region. Furthermore, avenues for deepening ties within a tailored partnership arrangement with the European Union are being explored.

The fight against terrorism is a top priority for Türkiye, both within and beyond its borders. Specifically targeting groups like the PKK/YPG, Türkiye is committed to safeguarding its national security and preventing cross-border threats. This commitment underscores Türkiye's proactive stance in regional security dynamics. The normalisation of relations with the Syrian regime remains elusive for Türkiye. Given the complexities of the Syrian conflict and diverging interests, Ankara's engagement with Damascus will unlikely witness any significant thaw shortly. Instead, Türkiye's approach leans towards leveraging diplomacy to open the Zangezur corridor, potentially reshaping regional trade and connectivity. The geopolitical landscape in the South Caucasus presents its own set of challenges. Armenia's armament efforts have escalated tensions, raising concerns about the possibility of conflict in the region. Türkiye remains vigilant, emphasising the need for stability and peace to prevent further escalation. The Gaza Crisis has cast a shadow over Turkish-Israeli relations, particularly impacting flourishing energy cooperation initiatives between the two countries. This strain highlights the intricate balance Türkiye must maintain between its regional commitments and broader international engagements. On the global stage, Türkiye has the potential to lead initiatives combating terrorism, especially in Africa. Given its strategic position and experience in counterterrorism operations, Türkiye aims to spearhead efforts to protect trade routes and bolster security in the region. In conclusion, Türkiye's geopolitical agenda is multifaceted, balancing security imperatives with diplomatic engagements. Whether it is the fight against terrorism, relations with neighbouring countries, or international initiatives, Türkiye's approach reflects its strategic interests and commitment to regional stability.

The Development Road project, often compared to the historic Silk Road, reflects Türkiye's desire to boost connectivity and trade between regions. The successful implementation of this project would improve Türkiye's economic prospects and cement its position as a vital transit hub linking Asia and Europe. As the global trade landscape evolves, Türkiye recognises the need to strengthen ties with friendly and allied nations, especially in critical technologies. Working together in cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and renewable energy can pave the way for mutual growth and innovation.

In a region with rising political tensions and militarisation, Türkiye must maintain a balance of power to safeguard its strategic interests and national

security. Türkiye has identified the need to accelerate platform projects that include tanks, aircraft, and warships to achieve this objective. Türkiye aims to strengthen its military power, promote self-reliance, and increase flexibility in responding to evolving security threats by investing in these defence capabilities. The production of alternative intermediate solutions is also essential to Türkiye's defence strategy. By developing alternative solutions, Türkiye can ensure that it remains agile and adaptive to emerging security challenges. This approach enables Türkiye's defence forces to respond quickly to changing scenarios while reducing reliance on foreign technology and equipment. Overall, the continued investment in platform projects and the development of alternative solutions is critical to maintaining Türkiye's military strength and ensuring its preparedness to address regional security threats.

As part of its strategic efforts, diplomacy remains a crucial aspect of Türkiye's foreign policy. Maintaining open channels of dialogue and engagement is essential to prevent any unexpected developments and protect Türkiye's interests. Türkiye aims to create a climate of trust and mutual benefit with its neighbouring countries and partners by prioritising the development of regional cooperation initiatives. As Türkiye continues pursuing a multifaceted foreign policy in a world with multiple powers, its influence on the global agenda will likely increase. Türkiye will continue to pursue its normalisation policy with its neighbouring countries, particularly the Gulf nations, focusing on the economy. Türkiye should prioritise promoting domestic production, especially in critical technologies, to align economic policy with foreign and national security policies.

APPROACHES OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN TÜRKİYE
TO THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION: IS
THERE A CONSENSUS?

İlhan Aras* and Sami Orçun Ersay**

Introduction

Since its establishment in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has continued to expand and has become an increasingly important organization with many countries joining as observers and dialogue partners. Türkiye has continued to develop its relations with the organization with a status that cooperates with the SCO on many issues. In this framework, the SCO membership debates, which have been on the agenda in certain periods in Türkiye and presented as an alternative to the EU, will be the subject of the study. For this reason, the discourses of political parties in Türkiye towards the SCO will be presented in the study.

In the study, an analysis was made on three parties in Türkiye: Justice and Development Party (AK Party/ Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), Nationalist Movement Party (NMP/ Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi), Republican People's Party (CHP/ Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi). The subject was discussed based on the statements of the leaders of these three parties in question and relevant publications. In this regard, the study will first briefly discuss the historical process of SCO-Türkiye relations. In the following sections, the explanations of the three parties will be given respectively. Thus, the study will show the extent of the SCO membership discussions and the political impact of these discussions.

A Brief Overview of SCO-Türkiye Relations

The SCO was established in 2001 with Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and was known as the Shanghai Five. With the SCO Charter, which was signed in 2002 and came into force in 2003, issues such as the purpose and structure of the organization were determined. It is possible to summarize the objectives of the SCO as follows: creating strong cooperation between member states; cooperation in many fields such as trade, science and energy; ensuring peace in the region and creating a new international order. The SCO, whose official languages are Russian and Chinese, has become an organization with 9 members with the participation of the Republic of India,

* Prof. Dr., Nevşehir Hacı Bektaş Veli University, Department of International Relations, Türkiye.

** Arş. Gör. Dr. Nevşehir Hacı Bektaş Veli University, Department of Public Administration, Türkiye.

the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the People's Republic of China, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan in 2023. In addition, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Republic of Belarus, Mongolia have become "Observer States"; the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the State of Qatar, the State of Kuwait, the Republic of Maldives, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Türkiye, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka have become "Dialogue Partners". Thus, it is necessary to evaluate the SCO as an organization that continues to expand after its establishment.¹

With the "SCO Dialogue Partnership Status" established within the SCO in 2008, it was aimed for countries that don't have observer status to develop an institutional relationship with the SCO. Türkiye also applied to the organization in 2011 to obtain this status. As a result of this request, which was accepted in 2012, a "Memorandum of Understanding" was signed between Türkiye and the SCO in 2013. This agreement aims to cooperate on many issues, from the fight against terrorism to drug trafficking. Türkiye's close interest continued in the following period. It is possible to give an example of this close interest that Türkiye assumed the term presidency of the Shanghai Energy Club as a non-member state for the first time in 2017.² As Gezer stated, Türkiye was accepted into the "Dialogue Partnership" at the SCO Leaders Summit in 2012. The Dialogue Partnership status, which provides limited cooperation of third countries with the SCO, is at a point between "guest participant" and "observer country". On the other hand, relations with the SCO have progressed in a way that is not an alternative to decades-old relations with Euro-Atlantic institutions, especially the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization.³ At this point, according to Doğan, the dialogue ground in the SCO will contribute to "strong diplomacy", which is Türkiye's priority. In addition, with the "Asia Anew Initiative" announced in 2019, Türkiye aimed to further strengthen its ties with countries in Asia. For this purpose, relations with the SCO and discussions on membership in the SCO have also been a reflection of a more

¹ Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2024, General Information, <https://eng.sectsc.org/20170109/192193.html> (Access 22.03.2024).

² Dünya, "Şanghay Beşlisi ile yeni ortaklık arayışı", 2021, <https://www.dunya.com/gundem/sanghay-beslisi-ile-yeni-ortaklik-arayisi-haberi-339468> (Access 07.02.2024).

³ Gülrü Gezer, "Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü ve Türkiye", 2022, <https://www.indyturk.com/node/549186/t%C3%BCrki%C3%87yeden-sesler/%C5%9Fanghay-i%C3%87%C5%9Fbirligi-%C3%B6rg%C3%BCt%C3%BC-ve-t%C3%BCrkiye> (Access 03.03.2024).

general policy.⁴

Türkiye, the only NATO member country that has established ties with the SCO, has been able to simultaneously establish cooperation with rival institutions between East and West. The reason why Türkiye has become more interested in the East and Eastern institutions over time is not because of sympathy for the oppressive/authoritarian governments of SCO members. The main reason is that Western countries and institutions support Türkiye by imposing conditions and intervene intensively in its internal affairs. However, Eastern countries and their institutions don't approach Türkiye in this way. In addition, Türkiye emphasizes its cultural, ethnic and religious ties with the Central Asian countries, which are member states of the SCO. Thus, Türkiye can produce alternatives to its foreign policy.⁵

Approaches of Political Parties

AK Party

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then Prime Minister, showed signs of his interest in the SCO during his visit to Kazakhstan in 2005, strengthened relations with the organization over time and made important statements about the organization. During his meeting with Russian President Putin in Moscow on July 18, 2012, Erdoğan explained that "From time to time you lark on us and say what business do we have being in the EU. Well then I may lark on you right now and say come and include us in the Shanghai Five and we will be prepared to sacrifice the EU."⁶ Erdoğan responded to the questions of whether the SCO is seen as an alternative to the EU or whether there is an axis shift in foreign policy as follows: "Let me say it very clearly and sincerely, for us, there is no such thing as forgetting or losing the EU process. But we think Turkey should have a place at every table in line with its interests."⁷ In an interview conducted with him in 2013, Erdoğan made a comparison between the EU and the SCO and made the following statements:

"We have a strong economy. I told Russian President Mr. Putin, 'You should include us in the Shanghai Five and we will say farewell to the European Union.' The Shanghai Five is much better off economic-wise. It is much more powerful. We told them if you say come, we will. Pakistan wants to join as does India. They have also made requests. We

⁴ Diren Doğan, "Küresel Sistemin Dönüşümü Ekseninde Şangay İşbirliği Örgütü ve Türkiye", *Kriter*, Yıl 7, Sayı 73, 2022.

⁵ Figen Aydın, "Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü: Türkiye'nin Kazakistan ve Orta Asya Politikalarında Bağlayıcı Unsur mu?", *SDE Akademi Dergisi*, Cilt 4, Sayı 1, 2024, p. 162.; Hüsrev Tabak, Muharrem Doğan, "Aktör-Merkezli Sosyalleşme ve Batı-Dışı Normatiflik Üzerine Bir İnceleme: Türkiye'nin ŞİÖ Üyelliğini Tartışmak", *Bölgesel Araştırmalar Dergisi*, Cilt 1, Sayı 3, 2017, p. 97-140.

⁶ Daily Sabah, "PM Erdoğan delivers a Shanghai message to Europe", <https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2012/07/26/pm-erdogan-delivers-a-shanghai-message-to-europe> (Access 09.02.2024).

⁷ Ahmet Yeşiltepe, "Türkiye Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü'nün Neresinde?", https://www.ntv.com.tr/dunya/turkiye-sanghay-isbirligi-orgutunun-neresinde,CW3YgxZmb0K_-OMz-yuHpg (Access 02.03.2024).

could all join together. In terms of population and markets, this organization significantly surpasses the European Union in every way,”⁸

Another statement on the subject was made by then Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım as follows:

“This is not a threat, nor is it a challenge to Europe. [...] Far Eastern countries, China, Russia, Central Asian countries, they want to develop our relations both politically and economically, and we also want to develop them. That’s all there is to it. [...] Otherwise, we are not pursuing a forced choice such as ‘If there is no EU, there will be an Asian union’”⁹

The points underlined by President Erdoğan in his speech at the SCO in 2022 were as follows:

“... [We] see the SCO as the present representative of Asia’s climate of tolerance and its ancient culture based on the understanding of finding common solutions to problems. [We] attach importance to developing relations with the organization. Thanks to our ‘dialogue partner’ status that we have had for the last 10 years, this place has become one of our windows to Asia. We assumed the term presidency of the energy club senior group of the organization in 2017. We held the 3rd high-level group meeting in this context in Ankara. It was a first for the organization to carry out a task. The responsibility we assume has also shown how much the relations between the organization and Türkiye have developed. I believe that we will further increase our cooperation with our joint efforts from now on,”¹⁰

At the SCO 22nd Heads of State Summit held in Uzbekistan in September 2022, President Erdoğan stated the goal of membership in the SCO as “of course, that is the target” and made the following statements on the subject:

“[...] First of all, this organization started as the ‘Shanghai Five’, but it is no longer a quintet. Currently the number of members has reached 9. It has 3 observer members. There are also 9 countries that are dialogue partners like us. Almost all the leaders I met thanked us for the role we played in reducing tensions, especially in the Russia-Ukraine war. They said, ‘We really appreciate and congratulate you for the role you played here. [...] Of course, we are not the members of the Shanghai Five. We are currently here as a special guest upon the invitation of the host Uzbekistan. [...] Now the next process is a step towards the most advanced stage of this work. This step, of course, will perhaps come to

⁸ Daily Sabah, “Erdoğan: If we could enter Shanghai Five we would say goodbye to EU”, <https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2013/01/26/erdogan-if-we-could-enter-shanghai-five-we-would-say-goodbye-to-eu> (Access 13.02.2024).

⁹ BBC News Türkçe, “Başbakan Yıldırım: AP’nin kararının bizim için hiçbir önemi yok”, 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-38090536> (Access 05.02.2024).

¹⁰ Daily Sabah, “Türkiye aims to end Russia-Ukraine war through diplomacy: Erdoğan”, 2022 <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkiye-aims-to-end-russia-ukraine-war-through-diplomacy-erdogan> (Access 01.02.2024).

the fore at a more advanced level during the talks in India, which will be the host country of the next period. Apart from being a member or not, our relations with these countries will be moved to a much different position with this step.”¹¹

In an interview, President Erdoğan evaluated a question about SCO membership in terms of EU membership as follows:

“I must say this very clearly, we are part of the world, neither East nor West... For us, most of our country geographically belongs to the East. And other part belongs to the West. But the European Union has kept us waiting for admission to its organization for 52 years. Unfortunately, EU still has not joined Turkey the ranks of a member. They are still meditating. However, we are a NATO country and this circumstance forces us to be engaged in the European political process. We are among the five military leaders of NATO. Inevitably, we may find ourselves in a situation where we start doing other things until the European Union has not let us in for 52 years. And if the European Union asks “why Erdogan is going to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, why he met with the leaders of the SCO?”, then we will answer: “See you soon!” While we are negotiating with the SCO, we will not be accountable to the European Union. We meet with all countries of the world. I have meeting with Mr. Xi, I have meeting with Mr. Putin, I have also meeting with Mr. Modi. I am negotiating with all countries. Because we are all part of our Big World. At present, we mainly maintain contacts with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.”¹²

In another statement during the same period, President Erdoğan showed his perspective on the SCO as follows: “In the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, with which we have been a dialogue partner since 2012, 3.2 billion people live and 20 trillion dollars of income is generated. We want to further deepen our relations with the organization.”¹³

In the AK Party’s 2023 Election Declaration, it was stated that the relationship with the SCO would be maintained: “We will systematize our institutional contacts with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which has increased its influence in Asian politics. [...] We will deepen our cooperation with many regional and global organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, Arab League, African Union, ASEAN, BRICS,

¹¹ Zafer Fatih Beyaz, Esin Işık, “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: (Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü üyeliği) Bundan sonraki süreç en ileri kademeye atılacak adımdır”, 2022, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/cumhurbaşkanı-erdogan-sanghay-isbirligi-orgutu-uyelig-bundan-sonraki-surec-en-ileri-kademeye-atilacak-adimdir/2687699> (Access 09.02.2024).

¹² The International Affairs, “Erdogan told American TV channel PBS: ‘We can meet with whoever we want, we will not report to the EU’”, 2022, <https://en.interaffairs.ru/article/erdogan-told-american-tv-channel-pbs-we-can-meet-with-whomever-we-want-we-will-not-report-to-the-e/> (Access 12.03.2024).

¹³ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı, “Kabine Toplantısı’nın Ardından Yaptıkları Konuşma”, 2022, <https://www.tcgb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/139857/kabine-toplantisi-nin-ardindan-yaptiklari-konusma> (Access 12.03.2024).

Shanghai Cooperation Organization.”¹⁴

NMP

According to the search results for the keywords “Şangay” and “Şanghay” on the NMP website, Devlet Bahçeli’s -the leader of the party-, statement in 2012 drew attention as follows: “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization should be followed closely in this context”.¹⁵ He also made a broader statement about the SCO as follows:

“[...] The USA sees that the most important opposition to its own power in the future is China, which is claiming world economic leadership with its 1.5 billion population and wide geography. In particular, USA thinks that there is a Shanghai Cooperation Organization that includes China and Russia, because it knows that almost more than half of the world’s population and a significant part of the income generated at the global level belongs to the countries within this organization. At the summit held in Bishkek in 2007, Russian President Putin said, ‘The unipolar world is unacceptable.’ The statement also reveals the mission of the organization. The first serious anti-US step in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was taken in 2005. At this meeting, a call was made to end the US military presence in Central Asia. At the end of this call, US soldiers in Uzbekistan left the country. After that, the story that everyone knows is that the region was confused and confused; the events have cost the lives of hundreds of people and the peace of the countries. [...]”¹⁶

Bahçeli’s statement in 2013, in the context of the purpose of establishing the SCO and its impact on the Turkish World, was as follows:

“[...] On the other hand, [the Prime Minister’s] contradictory statements regarding the EU and his unfounded [statements] regarding the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have become among the main agenda topics of recent days. It is a well-known fact that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization embodies China’s strategic goals, serves as a lever to meet its increasing energy needs, and uses the Turkic world as a stepping stone for this purpose. The basis of this unity is the persecution of East Turkestan. [...]”¹⁷

¹⁴ AK Parti, “Türkiye için Doğru Adımlar, 2023 Seçim Beyannamesi”, p. 427. <https://www.akparti.org.tr/media/dwyd05pu/tu-rkiye-yu-zy%C4%B1%C4%B1-ic-in-dog-ru-ad%C4%B1mlar-2023-sec-im.pdf> (Access 02.02.2024).

¹⁵ MHP, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Arasında İkili Ticari ve Ekonomik İşbirliğinin Geliştirilmesi ve Derinleştirilmesine İlişkin Çerçeve Anlaşmasının Onaylanmasının Uygun Bulunduğuna Dair Kanun Tasarısı, 2012, <https://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/mhp/1699/mhp/index.html> (Access 17.02.2024).

¹⁶ MHP, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Arasında İkili Ticari ve Ekonomik İşbirliğinin Geliştirilmesi ve Derinleştirilmesine İlişkin Çerçeve Anlaşmasının Onaylanmasının Uygun Bulunduğuna Dair Kanun Tasarısı, 2012 <https://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/mhp/1618/mhp/index.html> (Access 17.02.2024).

¹⁷ MHP, “Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Genel Başkanı Sayın Devlet BAHÇELİ’nin, TBMM Grup

In 2014, Bahçeli criticized the changing foreign policy of the government as “pro-Buddha when he goes to the East, pro-Pope when he goes to the West, pro-Shanghai in the North, pro-Ikhwan in the South”.¹⁸ In 2015, he similarly mentioned the SCO as a subject of criticism, saying “pro-Shanghai in Moscow”.¹⁹

It is seen that in his speech in 2016, Bahçeli criticized for the first time the SCO as an alternative to the EU:

“[...] Presenting the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an alternative to the EU and balancing [the EU] [with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization] is a classic and old tactic. We don’t need the EU, nor are we interested in Shanghai. [...]Neither the European Union nor the Shanghai Cooperation, we say Turkish Unity until the end. [...]”²⁰

When we look at the party’s 2018 General Elections Manifesto, it is noteworthy that it doesn’t criticize the SCO and the government, and shows the SCO as a target in which Türkiye should be more strongly involved: “[...] We should participate more in the activities of regional organizations such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Türkiye’s role and influence should be increased to the level we deserve. [...]”²¹

RPP

RPP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who attended the Socialist International meeting held in Cascais, Portugal in February 2013, answered the question about the Shanghai Five as follows:

“[...] I don’t find it correct to suggest that we should join the Shanghai Five. We have turned our direction not to the East but to the West. Moreover, this goal is not new. Since 1071, our target has been towards the West. When we say West, we don’t mean geography. When we say West, we mean modernity and civilization. [...]”²²

Öztürk Yılmaz, then RPP Deputy Chairman, stated in his assessment in

Toplantısında yapmış oldukları konuşma”, 2013, <https://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/mhp/2586/mhp/index.html> (Access 15.02.2024).

¹⁸ MHP, “Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Genel Başkanı Sayın Devlet BAHÇELİ’nin, TBMM Grup Toplantısında yapmış oldukları konuşma metni”, 2014, <https://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/mhp/3185/mhp/index.html> (Access 15.02.2024).

¹⁹ MHP, “Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Genel Başkanı Sayın Devlet Bahçeli’nin 11. Olağan Büyük Kurultay açılışında yapmış oldukları konuşma metni”, 2015, <https://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/mhp/3773/mhp/index.html> (Access 15.02.2024).

²⁰ MHP, “Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Genel Başkanı Sayın Devlet BAHÇELİ’nin, TBMM Grup Toplantısında yapmış oldukları konuşma”, 2016, <https://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/mhp/4158/mhp/index.html> (Access 14.02.2024).

²¹ MHP, “24 Haziran 2018 Milletvekili Genel Seçimi Seçim Beyannamesi”, p. 106, https://www.mhp.org.tr/usr_img/_mhp2007/kitaplar/24haziran2018_secim_beyannamesi_tam_web.pdf (Access 14.02.2024).

²² İHA, “Sağlıklı bulmuyorum”, 2013, <https://www.iha.com.tr/haber-saglikli-bulmuyorum-261952/> (Access 01.03.2024).

December 2016 that the SCO is not an EU or NATO and that it does not have mechanisms similar to the EU's mechanisms. He stated that the SCO member states are not democratic and that it is difficult to be in power in these states and even more difficult to change the government.²³ A similar statement was made by then RPP Deputy Chairman Selin Sayek Böke as follows:

"[...] The economic integration in the EU, and therefore the development and prosperity opportunities it will create in its partner countries, don't exist in the structure called Shanghai. [...] Türkiye now needs a government that does not chase dreams, wants to build the truth, and understands the world correctly while building the truth. Türkiye's direction is clear. [the West] [...]"²⁴

Kılıçdaroğlu evaluated the issue as follows in a statement in 2016:

"[...] Europe can't give up on Türkiye, but Türkiye can't give up on Europe either. The Ottoman Empire is actually a European state. It is a part of Western civilization. We've always turned our face to the west. This doesn't mean that; Let's turn our backs to the Middle East, Russia. [...] Shanghai 5... Will they drag Türkiye into a process of dictatorial rule? We won't allow this even if there is only one person left. No one can stop Türkiye from the civilized world to which it is heading. [...]"²⁵

Kılıçdaroğlu evaluated President Erdoğan's goal of SCO membership in September 2022 as follows:

"[...] The world is politically divided into two. Those who are in favor of democracy and those who are in favor of authoritarian regimes. We have always been a party that defends democracy, and we have to be in a world that defends democracy. Human rights, development, scientific development, justice, respect for people, the necessity of being a social state, freedom of thought, university autonomy are in this world [...] We have to strengthen democracy. Democracy is a constantly evolving concept. As RPP, we have always had an understanding that defends democracy. [...] Of course, we will have economic and cultural relations with those countries. We have no objection to this. [...] If we are a member of the Council of Europe today, if we want to become a member of the European Union, we have to [implement] all the democratic

²³ Alper Atalay, "CHP Genel Başkan Yardımcısı Yılmaz: Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü bir Avrupa Birliği değildir", 2016, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/chp-genel-baskan-yardimcisi-yilmaz-sanghay-isbirligi-orgutu-bir-avrupa-birligi-degidir/693040> (Access 12.02.2024).

²⁴ Ulusal Kanal, "CHP, Şangay İşbirliği Örgütü'ne karşı", 2016, <https://www.ulusal.com.tr/video/8592370/chp-sangay-isbirligi-orgutune-karsi> (Access 24.02.2024).

²⁵ Haber Türk, "Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu'ndan Şangay 5'lisi yorumu: "Hayal peşinde koşuyorlar", 2016, <https://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1328357-kemal-kilicdaroglundan-sangay-5lisi-yorumu-hayal-pesinde-kosuyorlar> (Access 07.02.2024).

standards recommended by the EU in our country. [...]"²⁶

Ünal Çeviköz, then RPP Chief Advisor to the Chairman Responsible for Foreign Relations, evaluated the President's statement as follows:

"[...] Currently, Türkiye is a dialogue partner for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and, in my opinion, it is right for it to remain so. [...] Because if this relationship evolves towards membership, then it will be perceived as progress towards breaking away from the West. Some other countries, especially Russia and China, within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, are seen as 'enemies' by NATO and the European Union, which are the institutions and organizations we are currently in. [...] I think that if there is progress in Türkiye's membership process to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, its relations with the West will deteriorate further, and that taking such a step at a time when we are going through a very critical period would be a big mistake. [...]"²⁷

In the "Common Policies Memorandum of Understanding" jointly prepared and accepted by six parties for the 2023 Presidential and General elections, the organization was mentioned: "We will evaluate our relations with organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and ASEAN on a realistic and sustainable basis."²⁸

Conclusion

When we look at the discourses of the political parties, different uses such as "Şangay" and "Şanghay" (in Turkish) attract attention. There appears to be no standard in the use of the word. When comparing the approaches of the three parties discussed in the study to the SCO, it is possible to reach some conclusions: First of all, it is seen that the AK Party, which has been in power throughout the whole process, has brought up the issue of SCO membership for the first time. It is observed that the issue of SCO membership, which is presented as an alternative to the EU process, is frequently discussed during periods of strained relations with the EU. Uncertainties in the EU process have led Türkiye to different pursuits, and one of them, deepening relations with the SCO, has been kept on the agenda as a goal. When we examine NMP, it can be seen that there was a critical approach to the SCO and the government's SCO discourses until the general elections in 2018, but since then, there have been no critical discourses on the subject, only a brief mention of improving relations with the SCO. When

²⁶ Gerçek Gündem, "Erdoğan 'Şanghay' hedefini açıkladı, Kılıçdaroğlu'ndan yanıt geldi: Özenmememiz gerekiyor", 2022, <https://www.gercekgundem.com/dunya/357350/erdogan-sanghay-hedefini-acikladi-kilicdaroglundan-yanit-geldi-ozenmememiz-gerekliyor> (Access 11.02.2024).

²⁷ Uygur Haber, "CHP'li Çeviköz: 'Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü'ne üyelik, Türkiye'nin Batı'yla arasını açar", 2022, <https://www.uygurhaber.com/chpli-cevikoz-sanghay-isbirligi-orgutune-uyelik-turkiyenin-batiyla-arasini-acar/> (Access 11.02.2024).

²⁸ Ortak Politikalar Mutabakat Metni, 2023, p. 232, <https://chp.org.tr/yayin/ortak-politikalar-mutabakat-metni/Open> (Access 28.04.2024).

we look at the RPP, we see that it criticizes the ruling party for its SCO membership target, argues that Türkiye should prioritize its relations with the West and that it can't be an alternative to the EU due to the structure of the SCO. It is especially noteworthy that RPP evaluates the SCO through democracy.

As a result, it is seen that the AK Party was the decisive party in the SCO membership discussions, and other parties participated in the discussions later. It appears that there is no consensus among political parties in Türkiye regarding membership in the SCO. It is also possible to point out that since SCO membership is presented as an alternative to the EU, it is not a permanent agenda in Türkiye and is an issue discussed only at certain periods.

TURKEY'S MIDDLE EAST RISK MANAGEMENT IN LIGHT OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PALESTINE

Hasan Acar* and Serhat Bulut**

Introduction

States have advantages and disadvantages with their locations and characteristics. The geopolitical characteristics of the region in which Turkey is located and its location among important transit routes offer advantages and disadvantages. With the impact of the bipolar world order after the Cold War, Turkey, located at the center of the Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East triangle, is directly or indirectly affected by threats, risks and developments arising from these regions. Its geostrategic location requires Turkey to use national power elements more effectively and carefully in order to achieve its national goals while protecting its national interests.

Considering the Middle East through the eyes of the Ottoman legacy, Turkey has turned its foreign policy towards the Middle East and third world countries over time, and is making geostrategic and geopolitical breakthroughs in the Middle East within the framework of the Palestine issue. As a matter of fact, Palestine has played a role in many sovereignty conflicts throughout history due to its regional geopolitical importance. Palestine's role as a bridge between Africa and Asia also played a critical role in the emergence and development of three major religions. The fact that Palestine is located in the sacred lands of Judaism, Christianity and Islam religions further increases the importance of Palestine in the international arena.

Purpose of the study; Starting from the Palestine issue, it is to evaluate Turkey's risk management in the Middle East and to address it in its entirety within the scope of foreign policy strategies that change over time. To examine regional security and economic cooperation with the influence of Turkey's economic and political situations as well as events and facts that develop over time, to examine Turkey's periodically changing foreign policies due to its geostrategic position, to examine Turkey's recent developments as a result of current developments in the Middle East region. Its active role in the Middle East over the years has been evaluated.

The importance of the issue stems from the idea that the survival of the Republic of Turkey and its ability to become a regional actor is through a

* Assoc. Prof. Dr., Gendarmerie and Coast Guard Academy.

** Kırıkkale University, International Relations, Türkiye.

good evaluation of the developments in the Middle East.

Historical Background of the Palestine Problem

Due to its regional geopolitical importance, Palestine has played a role in many sovereignty conflicts throughout history. The reason for this is that Palestine served as a bridge between the African and Asian regions and also played a critical role in the emergence and development of three major religions. In addition, the fact that the places containing the sanctities of the Jewish, Christian and Muslim religions are located in Palestinian territory further increases the importance of the region in International Politics.¹

came under Ottoman rule after the ²Mercidabık War between the Ottoman Empire and the Mamluk State between 1512 and 1520. Significant problems began to occur with the Jews during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. With the spread of nationalism in this period, Jews in Europe began to have difficult times. ³For this reason, Jews attempted to seek refuge in different regions of Europe. The Ottoman Empire was among the countries where Jews sought asylum. During the reign of Abdulhamid II, the Jews wanted to acquire land in the Palestine region and dominate it. For this reason, Abdulhamid II took the necessary precautions and passed a law in 1881 stating that he would not allow any Jews to settle in Ottoman lands, ⁴and the sale of property and land to Jews was prohibited. Despite these measures, thousands of Jews were settled in Palestine by the Zionist forces. While the First World War continued, Jewish immigration to Palestinian territories continued. During the war, ⁵9 Jewish colonies with a population of around 85,000 were established in Palestine.⁵

During the First World War, on May 16, 1916,⁶ a secret agreement was made between France and England to share the Ottoman lands in the Middle East.

The Skyes-Picot⁷ agreement was signed and the lands of the Ottoman

¹ Çağlar Özer, "Uluslararası Politika Açısından Filistin Sorunu", Külliye, [Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin 100. Yılı Özel Sayısı], Cilt 1, Sayı 1, 2023, pp. 586-587.

² Ozer, op. cit., p.586.

³ Mim Kemal Öke, Kutsal Topraklarda Siyonistler ve Masonlar, İstanbul, Çağ Yayınları, 1990, p.30.

⁴ Ahmet Akgündüz, Osmanlı Devletinde Gayrimüslimlerin Yönetimi, Timaş Yayınları, 2017, p.9.

⁵ Fahir Armaoğlu, Filistin Meselesi ve Arap-İsrail Savaşları, Kronik Kitap, 2017, pp .22-23.

⁶ In October 1916, the agreement was ratified by Russia. David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of The Ottoman Empire and the Creation of The Modern Middle East, Henry Holt and Company, 2009, pp. 286-288.

⁷ The Skyes-Picot Agreement was signed at Kut'ul on 29 April 1916. It is an agreement between England and France on May 16, 1916, after the Ottoman Empire defeated the British after the Siege of Amare, envisaging the sharing of the Ottoman Empire's lands in the Middle East. According to the agreement, France will take over the Eastern Mediterranean, Adana, Antep, Urfa, Mardin, Diyarbakır, Mosul and the Syrian coast, while England will take over Hafıa and Akka ports, Baghdad and Basra, and Southern Mesopotamia. An international administration will be established in Palestine, as it is the center of three major religions. Peter Furtado, 1001 Days that shaped the World, Cassell Illustrated, 2008, p. 648.

Empire in the Middle East were divided between the two countries.

Map 1. Map of territorial division according to the Sykes - Picot Agreement⁸



At the beginning of the First World War, Zionist administrators managed to convince the British administrators that the establishment of a Jewish colony in Palestine would increase Britain's dominance in the region and protect its interests more. ⁹As a matter of fact, British Prime Minister of the time, David Lloyd George gave greater importance to increasing British rule in Palestine, protecting British interests in the region, and also increasing the British presence in the region. As a matter of fact, the Balfour Declaration was published by British Foreign Secretary Arthur J. Balfour on 2 November 1917.¹⁰

Arthur J. Balfour, Lord Zionist Movement leader He makes such statements in the letter he sent to Rothschild. "The British Government views with desire and joy the establishment of a state for the Jews in Palestine and will provide all kinds of support to achieve this common goal." As can be understood from the statement made by Arthur J. Balfour in the letter,¹¹ the British Government promised to establish a Jewish state in Palestinian lands. In International Politics, the Balfour declaration is described as the founding document of the

⁸ <https://www.milligazete.com.tr/haber/1438135/sykes-picot-antlasmasi> (Access 15.12.2017)

⁹ Necmi Uyanık and Havva Yavuz, "Balfour Deklarasyonu'nun İlanı, Tepki ve Destekler", Kastamonu İnsan ve Toplum Dergisi, Cilt 1, Sayı 2, 2023, p.209.

¹⁰ On June 4, 1917, 6 months before the Balfour Declaration was announced, Jules Cambon published the Cambon Declaration, and in the declaration Cambon dedicated France to "the rebirth of the Israeli people, who were exiled centuries ago, in the lands of Palestine". Jacob De Hass, History of Palestine: The Last Two Thousand Years, Macmillan Company, 1934, p. 485.

¹¹ Özer, *ibid.* p.587.

political branch of the Zionist movement. As a matter of fact, with the signing of the Treaty of Sevres in the following years, the British Government¹² took over the Mandate in Palestine. Jewish immigration began to Palestine, which was under British Mandate.

After the start of Jewish immigration to Palestinian lands, the Arabs who tried to prevent the immigration failed and started the “Great Arab Revolt” on April 15, 1936. They formed an Arab Committee to manage the Great Revolt. The committee had three main objectives. “Stopping Jewish immigration, stopping land sales to Jews, and establishing a national committee responsible to the people’s assembly.”¹³ As a matter of fact, it was decided to continue the rebellions until these three demands were realized. If we look at the reason why the Arabs reacted so much in terms of mathematical data, the number of Jews, which was 84,000 against 590,000 Arabs in 1922, became 181,000 Jews against 770,000 Arabs in 1932. Between 1933 and 1935, 134,540 Jews immigrated to Palestine.¹⁴ Since the Great Arab Revolt, the Palestinian-Jewish disputes continue to increase in intensity today.

The conflicts between Arabs and Jews continued to increase in intensity in the following periods, the number of dead and injured in the region increased significantly, and important and strategic places were destroyed and devastated. The British were helpless in the face of conflicts and had to take the situation to the United Nations. A commission was established¹⁵ by the United Nations on 15 May 1947 in response to the Palestine problem.¹⁶

The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine prepared two separate plans, the minority plan and the majority plan, as a result of the research and examinations carried out in Palestine. The Partition Plan, supported by the majority, proposed the establishment of an independent Jewish State and an independent Arab State in Palestine, as well as the establishment of an international zone in Jerusalem under the supervision of the United Nations. The plan supported by the minority proposed the establishment of a Palestinian State consisting of Arab and Jewish communities with Jerusalem as its capital.

¹² The League of Nations withdrew from Palestinian territory on 24 July 1922, leaving Palestine to the British Mandate.


¹³ Sedat Kızıloğlu, “İsrail Devleti’nin Kuruluşuna Kadar Geçen Süreçte Yahudiler ve Siyonizm’in Gelişimi”, *Kırıkkale Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Cilt 2, Sayı 1, 2012 p.55.

¹⁴ Kadir Kasalak, “İngilizlerin Filistin Politikası ve Filistin Mandası”, *Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Cilt 1, Sayı 25, 2016, p.72.

¹⁵ The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) is an 11-member commission consisting of Canada, Australia, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.

¹⁶ Kızıloğlu, *op. cit.*, p.57.

Map 2. United Nations Special Committee on Palestine “Partition Plan” Map¹⁷



As a result of the vote of the United Nations General Assembly on 29 November 1947, the Partition Plan, supported by the majority, was accepted with 10 abstentions, 13 rejection and 33 acceptance votes.¹⁸ According to the

¹⁷ https://maps.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/israel_hist_1973.jpg (Access 10.06.2024).

¹⁸ Kızıloğlu, *ibid.*, p.57.

Partition Plan, the Arab State, 42.88% of which is allocated to Palestine, will have a population distribution of 725,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews, while 56.47% will be allocated to Jews, 498,000 of whom are Jews and 407,000 of them. It will consist of Arab population.¹⁹

The Arabs, who were one side of the Partition Plan, had a negative attitude towards this decision of the United Nations and declared that they would declare war in order to stop the implementation of this plan.²⁰ In this context, with the support of the United Nations, the years-long struggle of the Jews has come to an end by legally adapting to the international system, and the difficult state struggle in international relations has come to an end. With the support of global actors, the State of Israel²¹ declared its establishment as an independent state to the international community on May 14, 1948.

Arab-Israeli wars and uprisings broke out in the years following the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.²² Four important Arab-Israeli wars occurred in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973, as well as the 1st Intifada in 1987 and the 2nd Intifada in 2000. As a matter of fact, as a result of these wars and uprisings, as a result of the strategic mistakes of the Arab side as well as the silence of international actors against these wars and uprisings, the State of Israel acquired more territory than the area allocated to them by the United Nations. In addition, these events did not offer any solution to the Arab-Israeli problem and did not take any positive steps towards signing any peace agreement.

The Palestine problem, as explained above, based on the events and facts that occurred according to its development in the historical process, as well as with the reference of the maps above, as a realistic indicator, Palestinians have experienced material and spiritual poverty, as well as loss of life, vital needs, and refugee and migration problems in the process. They were faced with. Today, there are 499,189 Palestinian refugees in Syria, 2,034,641 in Jordan, 448,599 in Lebanon, 741,409 in the West Bank refugee camp, and 1,221,110 in the Gaza Strip refugee camp.²³ The Palestine Problem, which extends from 1917 to the present day, still continues without losing its

¹⁹ Armanoğlu, op. cit., pp. 84-85.

²⁰ Süleyman Özmen, *İsrail ve Etnik Dini Çatışmalar*, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2006, pp. 57-58.

²¹ Minutes after the State of Israel addressed the international community as an independent state, the United States became the first state to recognize Israel. This attitude of the United States paved the way for Israel to be recognized in the international arena. On May 15, 1948, Guatemala recognized Israel, and on May 18, the Soviet Union recognized Israel. Arab League countries Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq have decided to declare war to eliminate Israel. Alan R. Taylor, Çev. Mesut Kardeşan, *İsrail'in Doğuşu*, Pınar Yayınları, 2001, pp. 144-145.

²² Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel on March 28, 1949.

²³ <https://web.archive.org/web/20130920022714/http://www.unrwa.org/who-we-are> (Access 19.06.2024)

destructiveness.

Map 3. Distribution of Palestinian and Jewish lands by years²⁴



Turkey's Palestine Policy and Its Attitude towards Recent Developments

Due to its geographical location, Palestine is a region considered sacred by three major divine religions. The fact that Jerusalem houses places considered sacred by Muslims, Christians and Judaism, and is also considered a spiritual city for three major religions, changes the approaches and attitudes of states towards the Palestine problem in the eyes of the international community. For this reason, Turkey's attitudes towards Palestine and Middle East policy have changed over the years.

Nations approved the Partition Plan on November 29, 1947, Turkey was one of the first countries to oppose this plan and displayed the same attitude along with the Arab states. However, despite the declaration of the State of Israel as an independent state, it became the first Muslim state to recognize Israel on March 28, 1949. During the ongoing process, an embassy agreement was reached between Turkey and Israel and the Turkish Embassy was opened in Israel on January 7, 1957.²⁵ At that time, Turkey's opening of its embassy in Israel was an important and big step for Israel. Surrounded by Muslim and Arab states, the State of Israel is left alone in the Middle East. The only

²⁴ https://www.reddit.com/r/geopolitics/comments/175au9w/is_this_palestineisrael_map_history_accurate/ (Access 14.10.2024)

²⁵ <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-israil-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa> (Access 19.06.2024).

country with which it can take a step towards the Islamic world and maintain diplomatic relations is Turkey. For this reason, Israel pays attention to establishing good relations with Turkey in terms of strengthening its relations and making diplomatic agreements. As a matter of fact, there has been an increase in commercial and economic relations between Turkey and Israel since January 7, 1957.²⁶

Turkey wanted to take a stance that would soften the atmosphere by recalling the Israeli Ambassador in 1956, as a result of the reactions and condemnations of the Middle Eastern States and the public due to the wars and riots launched by the Arab states against Israel due to the establishment of the State of Israel. However, for both Israel and the Arab states, this attitude did not have the expected effect and did not create a soft environment. In a secret meeting between David Ben-Gurion, the first president of the State of Israel, and Adnan Menderes, held in Turkey on May 29, 1958, it was decided that both countries would establish covert cooperation in the military, diplomatic and security fields.²⁷ It is possible to say that Turkey's attitude towards Palestine Policy from 1947 onwards was Western-oriented until the 1960s.

In the 1960s, Turkey's pro-Western line was questioned, as public opinion was able to influence Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East and Palestine Policy, and the constitution of the period was more open to participation. Reasons such as the Cuban Crisis on October 16, 1962, the removal of Jupiter Missiles from Turkey on October 28, 1962, the Johnson letter on June 5, 1964, and the fact that only Muslim countries supported Turkey in response to the Cyprus Problem at the United Nations, led to Turkey's pro-Western policy. played a major role in changing direction.²⁸

When Arab-Israeli tensions increased in 1967 and the third Arab-Israeli War broke out, Turkey supported the Arab States in the region. As a matter of fact, during the war, it supported the decision of Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories, which was accepted with 58% unanimous vote by the United Nations Security Council during the war, but also supported the United Nations' resolution No. 242, which requested Israel to continue its presence in the region.²⁹

The Masjid al-Aqsa fire that occurred on August 21, 1969 was met with great reaction in Turkey, as in other Muslim countries. As a result of the incident, Türkiye attended the Islamic Union Conference and clearly stated

²⁶ Zuhul Çelik, *Filistin-İsrail Barış Süreci ve Türkiye*, (Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi), Trabzon, Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi, 2010, p.55.

²⁷ Siyasal ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Vakfı, *Orta Doğu ve Geleceği*, 1992, İstanbul, Sisav Yayınları, p.33.

²⁸ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik*, 2001, İstanbul, Küre Yayınları, p.70.

²⁹ Melek Fırat, *Orta Doğu'ya İlişkin Gizli Anlaşmalar, Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, 2002, İletişim Yayınları, pp.243-244.

that it was on the side of the Arab countries. As a matter of fact, the Arab countries in the region thought that although Turkey's participation in the Islamic Union Conference was welcomed by the Arab countries, it was because Turkey was left alone in the face of the Cyprus Problem.³⁰

Kippur War on October 6, 1973, Turkey's pro-Arab policy continued and the United States responded negatively to the request to use Incirlik Base to help Israel, as well as Syria and Egypt. Turkey's political attitude was revealed by allowing Soviet planes to use its airspace when they came to the region to refuel their planes.³¹ On 22 November 1974, the United Nations General Assembly declared that "Sovereignty and independence are the rights of Palestinians living in Palestine", accepted the Palestine Liberation Organization as an observer to the United Nations General Assembly, and Yasser Arafat attended the General Assembly. His speech in was approved by Turkey. In 1976, Turkey became a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference, and on October 5, 1979, it accepted Yasser Arafat's opening of the Palestine Liberation Organization's representative office in Ankara.³² As a matter of fact, Turkey's Middle East policy has become more evident.

The 1980s were a period of tension in Türkiye-Israel relations. Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem on July 30, 1980 and its declaration³³ of Jerusalem as the eternal capital of Israel caused Turkey to react strongly against Israel. As a matter of fact, on August 28, 1980, Turkey announced that it would close its consulate general in Jerusalem and reduce its consulate in Tel Aviv to the level of second secretary on December 2, 1980.³⁴ Although the relations between Turkey and Israel became tense due to Israel's harsh stance against Palestine's first Intifada in 1987, diplomatic relations were not completely severed and continued to be maintained.³⁵ In the following process, Turkey recognized the State of Palestine, which was established as a result of Jordan transferring its sovereign rights over East Jerusalem and the West Bank to Palestine. At the same time, he tried to keep his relations with Israel moderate by voting no to the proposal of the Arab states not to represent Israel in the United Nations.³⁶

Turkey's Palestine policy was clarified in the 2000s. As a matter of fact, as

³⁰ Hasan Duran ve Ahmet Karaca, "1950-1980 Döneminde Türkiye Ortadoğu İlişkileri" *C.Ü İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi*, Cilt 14, Sayı 1, 2023, pp.128-131.

³¹ Zuhul Çelik, *op. cit.*, p.59.

³² Mesut Özcan, *Filistin-İsrail Barış Süreci ve Türkiye*, *Filistin Çıkılmazdan Çözümü*, 2003, İstanbul, Küre Yayınları, p.165.

³³ The United Nations Security Council condemned resolution 478 and asked countries with diplomatic representations in Jerusalem to move their representations to Tel Aviv.

³⁴ Şule Kut, *Türkiye ve Filistin Sorunu, Ortadoğu Sorunları ve Türkiye*, 1991, İstanbul, Türkiye Sosyal, Ekonomik ve Siyasal Araştırmalar Vakfı Yayınları, p.23.

³⁵ Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular Belgeler Yorumlar*, Cilt 2, 2002, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, p.568.

³⁶ Zuhul Çelik, *ibid.*, p. 60.

a result of events such as the Davos Summit and Mavi Marmara, Türkiye-Israel relations have come to the breaking point. Ahmet Davutoğlu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the period, said, “Your pain is our pain, your future is our future.” He made statements like this and revealed that the state policy was on the Palestinian side.³⁷ After this period, Türkiye provided aid to Palestine and the Palestinian people in economic, political and cultural terms. As a matter of fact, a free trade agreement was signed between Palestine and Türkiye.

In his speech at the YTB held in the United States, said: “*The Jerusalem cause is not only the cause of Muslims in Palestine, but the honor of the Islamic world, which numbers 1.7 billion. That's why we say the Jerusalem issue is our red line. “We defend the Jerusalem Issue in this way because defending Jerusalem means defending humanity, defending peace, justice and independence.”*³⁸ With his statements, he evaluated the Palestine Problem as a matter of honor.

In 2021, a Security Cooperation Agreement was signed between Türkiye and the State of Palestine. With the entry into force of the agreement, security practices in the Palestinian region have reached a new stage. According to the terms of the agreement, Palestinian forces will be able to receive training in Turkey, and technical, vehicle and material grants to the Palestinian police and coast guard institutions will be expanded. As a matter of fact, Türkiye has committed to providing appropriate support for this purpose.³⁹ This agreement was actually an important step for Turkey to assume responsibility for regional security. At the same time, Türkiye has clearly shown that it is on the side of Palestine in the region against Israel.

Hamas launched a comprehensive attack called “Flood Accent” against Israel as of 2023, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan responded to Israel’s inhumane harsh attitude towards the region at the Open Participation Executive Committee Meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on 18 October 2023. In response to the Palestine-Israel issue, “*Turkey’s opinion is that a new guarantee mechanism should be designed and implemented. Muslim countries in the region must guarantee the well-being of the Palestinian people and act as guarantors of a lasting peace.*” he made a statement as follows.⁴⁰

Considering the latest developments at the Cairo Peace Summit on

³⁷ <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-ahmet-davutoglu-acimiz-acimizdir-gelecegimiz-gelecegimizdir.tr.mfa> (Access 19.06.2024).

³⁸ https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/son-dakika-erdogandan-abdye-silah-tepkisi,qvVxNrckJ0_6U7Rao_dQ5s0w# (Access 19.06.2024)

³⁹ Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Tekirdağ Milletvekili Mustafa Şentop’ın Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Filistin Devleti Hükümeti Arasındaki Kolluk Eğitim İş Birliği Mutabakat Zaptının Onaylanmasının Uygun Bulunduğuna Dair Kanun Teklifinin (2/4737) ve Dışişleri Komisyonunun Raporu, Ankara, Sıra Sayısı: 415

⁴⁰ <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/turk-dis-politikasinda-yilin-ikinci-yarisinda-filistin-meselesi-one-cikti/3093476#> (Access 19.06.2024)

October 21, 2023, Minister Fidan said, “*A guarantee mechanism should be designed and implemented in Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. “The steps taken by the parties for a just peace must be guaranteed.”* 41

As a matter of fact, as can be seen from here, it seems that Turkey is ready to take steps for Palestine and do its part for a fair and safe future. In this context, Turkey’s Palestine Policy abandoned its Western-oriented attitude and evolved into a frugal policy in the Middle East since the 1960s.

The years when Turkey literally turned its face to the Middle East are considered to be the 2000s. Recently, Turkey, which sees the Palestine issue as its own issue, expresses that Turkey stands by Palestine in the eyes of the international community at every opportunity. We can say that the reason for this is that Turkey wants to have a say in the region by creating security and balance of power.

Turkey’s Risk Management in the Middle East

We can actually characterize Turkey’s Foreign Policy with the West in 1950-1960, the half-hearted West in 1960-1980, the half-hearted Middle East in 1980-1999, and the Middle East in the 2000s. In fact, based on the issues mentioned above, based on the example of Palestine, Turkey has turned its direction towards the Third African countries and the Middle East since the 2000s. The reason for this can be evaluated as changing and developing geopolitical calculations, balance of power, efforts to combat terrorism and provide stability, and economic and social risks. It would be better to re-evaluate Turkey’s Middle East policy and risk management in detail through the Palestine Issue.

Turkey’s Geopolitical Calculations and Balance of Power in the Middle East

The end of World War II allowed for the geopolitical reshaping of both the international system and the Middle East region. As a matter of fact, during this period, the countries in the region gained their independence. However, with the beginning of the Cold War, the Middle East regions came under the influence of the Cold War regionally in a short time. As a matter of fact, the emergence of the Soviet Union as a power threatening Turkey’s security during this period allowed Turkey to enter into relations with the West. Turkey’s accession to NATO on February 18, 1952 led to a military alliance between Türkiye and the West. During this period, Turkey needed the West’s economic and technical assistants in order to recover economically, which led Turkey to adopt a westernizing policy attitude. During this period, security interests, economic relations and ideologies

⁴¹ <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/turk-dis-politikasinda-yilin-ikinci-yarisinda-filistin-meselesi-one-cikti/3093476#> (Access 19.06.2024)

aligned with the West also supported Turkey's Westernism. As a matter of fact, Türkiye has followed policies parallel to the West in the Middle East.⁴²

Three main items are effective in the West's Middle East policy. The first of these is to prevent the spread of Soviet domination in the region, the second is to facilitate access to oil reserves in the Middle East, and the last is to ensure the security of Israel.

Turkey also developed close relations with Iran, which followed a Westernization policy immediately after the overthrow of the Mossadegh government. During this period, Iran's pro-American policy allowed Iran to become a member of the Baghdad Pact.⁴³

Turkey's pro-Western policy also included developing good relations with Israel, which was newly established in the region. As a matter of fact, as we mentioned above, Türkiye was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel. However, this situation was seriously criticized by Arab nationalist states in the region. Therefore, the relations that Turkey developed with Israel also negatively affected its relations with the Middle Eastern countries for a long time.

Turkey wanted to take a stance that would soften the atmosphere by recalling the Israeli Ambassador in 1956, as a result of the reactions and condemnations of the Middle Eastern States and the public due to the wars and riots launched by the Arab states against Israel due to the establishment of the State of Israel. However, for both Israel and the Arab states, this attitude did not have the expected effect and did not create a soft environment.⁴⁴

During this period, the rising nationalist movement among the Arab states caused Turkey to be excluded by the regional states due to its westernizing attitudes. Likewise, Arab nationalists did not fulfill the promises of independence promised by the West to the Arabs for a long time and established the State of Israel under the auspices of the West, which fueled anti-Western sentiments in the Arab world.

In the same period, Syria's claims over Hatay and Turkey's good relations with both Israel and Western countries led to an anti-Turkish reaction among the Arab states. As a matter of fact, no Arab country except Iraq participated in the Baghdad Pact during this period.

As we mentioned above, within the framework of the Cyprus Problem,

⁴² Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Arap Ortadoğusuna Karşı Politikası, 1945-1970*, Ankara, 2010, Barış Kitap, p. 34.

⁴³ İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Siyasal Bağlıları (1945-1990)*, Cilt 2, 2000, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu p.501.

⁴⁴ Siyasal ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Vakfı, *Orta Doğu ve Geleceği*, 1992, İstanbul, Sisav Yayınları, p.33.

United States President Johnson stated that he was against Turkey's struggle for Cyprus in the letter he sent on June 5, 1964, and that only Muslim countries supported Turkey against the Cyprus Problem at the United Nations. By improving its relations with the states in the region that it had previously neglected, it caused it to seek multi-faceted policies equivalent to its western-oriented policy.

As a matter of fact, the first reflection of Turkey's multifaceted policy on the Middle East emerged from the Arab-Israeli problem, which we explained in detail above. In 1967, during the third Arab-Israeli war, the United States opposed the use of Incirlik Base to prevent aid to Israel and provided social aid to Palestine. As a matter of fact, at the United Nations, Türkiye voted in favor of Palestine. In this context, United Nations Security Council resolution 242 forms the basis of Turkey's Palestine policy.

In the following process, Turkey started to side with the Arabs in the Palestine Question and reduced its relations with Israel to the level of second secretary. It also allowed the Palestine Liberation Organization to open a representative office in Ankara in 1979. In 1980, Israel declared Jerusalem as its eternal capital, allowing Turkey to turn its foreign policy not only to Arab countries but to the entire Islamic world.

The Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean Region gained a new dimension with the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States after the attacks of September 11, 2001; The change of influential leaders in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen and the crisis in Syria, regional impotence affecting Turkey as of 2001, international terrorism and migration issues, as well as new energy sources discovered, have paved the way for the intervention of global actors in the region. During this period, Turkey turned its attention completely to the Middle East and the Third World Countries and wanted to have a say in the region due to its geopolitical importance. This discourse emerges more clearly in the following years.

As a matter of fact, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the period, İsmail Cem, said that "the revision in Turkish Foreign Policy has been continuing at an accelerated pace since the 2000s." Recep Tayyip Erdoğan claimed that Turkish Foreign Policy is based on a certain vision and emphasized that Turkey should have a central role in the international system due to its historical, geopolitical and economic structure.

Erdoğan made the following statement in February 2005. "Türkiye cannot be left behind in this geography, it is a central country. It can no longer be defined only as a regional power, it must move towards becoming a global power. We have to consciously develop our current route with a global vision, taking into account the new world realities." Türkiye sees the Middle East as one of the areas of cultural, economic and political interaction due to its

geographical and historical location. Turkish administrators think that Turkey cannot remain indifferent to this region because the developments in this region directly or indirectly affect Turkey. Turkey aims to transform the region under Turkish leadership by playing a more active role in this region.

As a result of the geopolitical importance of this region, Turkey frequently utters the phrase “zero problems with neighbors, unlimited trade” in order to re-establish the balance of power in the region. Indeed, this situation gives enough clues about Turkey’s regional policy.

As a matter of fact, the Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, who came together in Istanbul on June 10, 2010, signed the “Joint Political Declaration on the Establishment of the High-Level Quadrilateral Cooperation Council” between their countries. Within the scope of this declaration, it was decided to establish the Quadrilateral Cooperation Council and to establish a free trade and circulation area between these countries in order ⁴⁵to develop partnership and solidarity among the mentioned countries and to move towards economic integration.

Finally, in April 2011, Turkey first opposed NATO’s intervention in Libya and then reluctantly supported it. Finally, Prime Minister Erdogan’s accusation of Western countries such as England, France, Italy and the USA, which played a leading role in the NATO intervention, of acting with imperialist and colonialist ambitions, clearly revealed how the Western influence has changed in Turkey’s Middle East policy.

Finally, changes in the geopolitical structure of the region and the international system have enabled Turkey to pursue a more active policy in the Middle East.

Counterterrorism and Stability Efforts

In the 1980s, Turkey’s Middle East policy was affected in two ways. The fight against the PKK terrorist organization that emerged in Turkey during this period is one of the most important reasons affecting Turkish politics, both domestic and foreign policies. The fact that Syria and Iraq from the Middle East region supported the PKK at that time caused Turkey’s relations with these countries to be damaged. On the other hand, Turkey’s economic opening up in this period and its export-oriented economic growth strategy pushed Turkey to establish good relations with other countries in the Middle East region. As a matter of fact, the Prime Minister of the period, Turgut Özal, followed a policy that the development of economic relations would be

⁴⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, 10 June 2010.

effective in solving problems for the region and ensuring peace.⁴⁶

In this context, establishing good relations with Middle Eastern ideals will pave the way for Turkey both to prevent the support of these countries to PKK terrorism and to develop economic relations with southern countries such as Syria and Iraq. In this context, a hot pursuit agreement was made between Turkey and Iraq to neutralize terrorism in the region, and a water sharing agreement was made with Syria.⁴⁷ Despite the agreements, Turkey’s regional policy has been towards a security-centered perspective due to the fact that the problems between Turkey and the countries have not been fully resolved and the PKK’s activities continue.

The Gulf War and the uprisings of the Iraqi Kurds against the central government caused Turkey to pursue a security-centered foreign policy. As the 1st Gulf War continued, the increase in the activities of PKK terrorism in Turkey continued to direct Turkey’s security-centered perspective within the framework of its Middle East policy. As a matter of fact, although Turkey signed a security cooperation agreement with Iran and Syria, Turkey came face to face with these countries as a result of Syria, Iraq and Iran’s continued support for the PKK.

This strategy was aimed at hardening relations with countries that it saw as sources of threat from one side. While relations with Syria and Iran hardened during this period, there were frequent interventions in the northern side of Iraq within the scope of the military struggle against the PKK. As a matter of fact, it was envisaged to improve relations with Israel during this period. In parallel with the Middle East Peace Process in 1991, Türkiye-Israel relations progressed in a short time.⁴⁸

In the 1990s, Turkey’s Middle East Policy developed in the context of security strategies due to terrorist activities that threatened its territorial integrity. As a matter of fact, relations with this country have become even more strained due to the support of its Middle Eastern border neighbors to the PKK and even the fact that PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan has been hiding in Syria for years. During this process, Turkey’s increasing pressure on Syria yielded results in 1998, and Syria expelled Abdullah Öcalan from its territory. After Syria took this step, Turkey turned to security cooperation with Syria within the framework of the Adana Agreement.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Ramazan Gözen, *Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu Politikası: Gelişimi ve Etkenleri*, Ankara, 2002, Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, p. 127.

⁴⁷ Eray Acar, “Avrupa Birliği’nin GAP ve Su Sorununa Yaklaşımı Çerçevesinde Fırat ve Dicle Nehirlerinin Yönetimi Üzerine Tartışmalar”, *Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi*, Cilt 2, Sayı 4, 2006, pp. 74-75.

⁴⁸ Mustafa Albayrak, “Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu Politikaları (1920-1960)”, *Fırat Üniversitesi Ortadoğu Araştırmaları Merkezi Dergisi*, Cilt 3, Sayı 2, 2005, pp. 181-215.

⁴⁹ Özlem Tür, *Türkiye ve Ortadoğu: Gelirimden İşbirliğine*, 2006, Ankara, Orion, pp.141-166.

After the capture of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, PKK's terrorist activities gradually decreased. Subsequently, Turkey's security concerns towards the region have also decreased to this extent. As a result of the decrease in Turkey's security concerns in the region, Turkey began to follow a "region-centered foreign policy" and take steps to normalize and develop both political and economic relations with the countries in the region. As a matter of fact, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the period, İsmail Cem, said, "Turkey should make peace with its Ottoman past and establish good relations with its neighbors by using all historical, cultural and economic opportunities."⁵⁰

Within the scope of this policy followed by Turkey, Turkey has improved its political relations with Syria, Iraq and Iran and has developed trade and economic relations with these countries. In this context, although Turkey supported the military intervention of the United States of America to overthrow the regime in Iraq, the military forces of the United States were not allowed to enter Iraq through Turkey. As a matter of fact, as a result of these events, the confrontation between Turkish Special Forces and American soldiers in Iraq led to a development in which Turkish-American relations turned into a crisis.

As a result of the increased terrorist activities of the PKK during this period, and as a result of the strained Turkish-American relations, the United States did not allow Turkey to enter Northern Iraq to prevent terrorist activities and did not take action against the PKK, which ignited anti-Americanism in the Turkish public.⁵¹

In this context, Turkey has tried to improve its relations with Iran, Iran and Syria within the framework of the zero problem discourse with neighbors, which is called the "de-securitization" strategy in the opinion of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and to increase their cooperation by resolving security-oriented problems.⁵² Within the framework of this new strategy, Turkey established the "High Level Strategic Cooperation Council" with Syria and Iraq in 2009.

The demonstrations that started in Syria in 2011 and the DAESH terrorist organization gaining power and territory caused Syria to appear as a failed state in the region. As a matter of fact, as a result of the growing problem in Syria, Turkey has organized two operations within the scope of border security, humanitarian intervention and protection responsibility. While these

⁵⁰ <https://www.uikpanorama.com/blog/2024/01/02/zaman-kapsulu/> (Access 20.06.2024)

⁵¹ Bayram Sinkaya, "Geçmişten Günümüze Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Politikası ve Batı Etkisi", Adam Akademi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Cilt 1, Sayı 1, 2011, p.91.

⁵² Bülent Aras and Rabia Polat, "From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey's relationships with Syria and Iran", Security Dialogue, Volume 39, Issue 5, 2008, p. 84.

operations prevented PYD/YPG terrorist organizations from settling permanently on Turkey's borders, a safe zone was created for the local population and at the same time, migration to our country was prevented.

Iran, which has been operating in Lebanon and threatens Israel with organizations such as Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad, sees Turkey as a rival for regional leadership in the past. Iran: It supports the central government in cooperation with the DAESH terrorist organization in Iraq and Syria and wants to increase the effectiveness of its regional presence. As a matter of fact, the Turkey-Iran cooperation process continues with the aim of ensuring stability and security in Syria. At the same time, the United States' announcement that it will withdraw from the Nuclear Agreement in 2015 is one of the factors that will make the cooperation between Iran and Turkey in the region even more important.

Again, Turkey and Egypt, which are actually the two major representatives of the Middle East region, show similar characteristics due to their geopolitical locations, advanced manpower and natural resources. Both countries aim to contribute to regional and world peace within the framework of international law and develop foreign policy strategies with this vision. In this context, after Egyptian President Morsi was dismissed by a military coup in July 2013, Turkey-Egypt relations became tense, but today, considering the mutual statements of both sides, it can be said that the relations have entered a healing process.

Cooperation between Turkey and Egypt should be developed in order to solve the Palestine-Israel problem in line with the United Nations decisions and to economically offer the natural gas resources of the Eastern Mediterranean to the European market.

the transit route of regional energy routes and markets due to its geopolitical location, will be the winner in the energy game by working integrated with other countries' energy markets and taking part in alternative energy projects. As a matter of fact, with Turkey turning its face to the Middle East, European energy integration with Iraq-Turkey Petroleum, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Petroleum, Trans Anatolian natural gas, Turkish Stream Natural Gas Transit Baru Line and ENTSO-E connection and Ceyhan becoming the energy center. Its arrival will make Turkey an active actor in the energy market. As a matter of fact, Turkey's steps, which want to have a say in the Middle East, are in this direction.

Turkey has once again shown that it will contribute to both its own security and the energy security of the region with its multifaceted energy policies.

Conclusion

When the risk management of the Republic of Turkey in the Middle East region is examined within the framework of the Palestine events, it is seen that Turkey's foreign policy has undergone periodic changes.

When Turkish foreign policy is examined, it is seen that Turkey followed a Westernist policy between 1950 and 1960. As a matter of fact, considering the conjuncture required by the period and Turkey's level of development, it was considered normal to follow a western-oriented foreign policy in these periods. As a matter of fact, although Turkey's attitude towards the Cyprus Problem, the Cuban Crisis and the Arab-Israeli Problems in the 1950s and 1960s was western-oriented, its policy was Western-oriented due to its own territorial integrity and regional security, and Israel's actions against the Masjid al-Aqsa fire and Declaring Jerusalem as the capital was a breaking point in Turkey's Western-oriented policy. However, it should be noted that the real breaking point of Turkey's western policy was the Johnson Letter incident of the United States within the framework of the Cyprus Problem.

Within the framework of these events, Turkey tried to develop new foreign policy strategies between 1980 and 1999 and the concept of regional sovereignty came to light again. In this context, between 1980 and 1999, Turkey pursued a Middle East policy based on economic-based security concerns. Turkey, which started to turn its face to the Middle East, followed a policy that sometimes deepened and sometimes became tense with the regional states of Iraq, Iran and Syria, as a result of the PKK terrorism that developed in this period. As a matter of fact, the reason for this is that Turkey provides border security due to the support given to the PKK by these neighboring states in the region. However, in this period, Turkey still wants to have good bilateral relations with neighboring states through security cooperation and economic breakthroughs, even though its relations with the regional states are tense due to security concerns.

Between 1999 and today, there seems to be a complete turn towards the Middle East in Turkey's foreign policy. As a matter of fact, the Republic of Turkey, which has regional security and border security concerns, started to resolve its problems with its border neighbors Iraq, Syria and Iran, and engage in economic and military cooperation, within the framework of the policy of zero problems and multi-cooperation with its neighbors, during the AK Party period. In this context, Turkey wants to come to the fore as a dominant and dominant country with its new political and political strategies in the Middle East, which it sees as an Ottoman legacy. As a result of the Arab Spring crisis in the Middle East and the new energy basins in the Mediterranean, Turkey's initiatives and strategies in this process also help Turkey emerge as an active actor in the Middle East.

Finally, when described in general terms, Turkey's Risk Management in the Middle East region is in the direction of giving up its westernist policies, making the Middle East the Ottoman legacy, and Turkey's geopolitical position in favor of taking security-oriented socio-economic breakthroughs in the Middle East region.

MILITARY RISKS, EMERGING WARS AND TURKEY

Cihan Kazancıoğlu*

Introduction

The concept of security has been used since the past periods to define the one-to-one security of people. This concept has prepared the ground for the formation of the concept of military service, especially with the established states, and has become very important. The concepts of military service and security, which became even more important with the establishment of regular armies, have become very important and dangerous, especially with the First World War and the Second World War. The destruction caused by the First World War and the military technologies developed in the Second World War, especially the atomic bomb, as well as the concepts of security and military service, have emerged as areas that need to be paid considerable attention and importance. The security areas that states are trying to create with security concerns have further increased military risks, prepared the ground for the formation of new battlefields and the emergence of new military measures. This situation has been a point that every state, especially Turkey, has been leaning on with importance and caution.

Although attempts are being made to overcome the climate of insecurity, especially after the Cold War, through established organizations and cooperation, tensions in the international arena are increasing more and more. After the 2001 Twin Towers attacks, the military movements of the United States towards the Middle East and Asia, the inadequate attempts of international organizations to maintain peace and security, led the states to draw their own military borders and ensure their security. Although the idea that limiting security only to military space is inappropriate today is obvious, all the vulnerabilities that may occur are quite threatening and unsettling for every state, especially with nuclear power threats and cyberattacks, one-on-one military attacks and the army are still the most important tools today. In this case, it has revealed the Ukrainian War, which took place in the recent past and is still ongoing, and the Palestinian War, which is the most crucial genocidal war of today. Although these two ongoing wars affect all world states, they directly and indirectly concern and affect Turkey quite closely.

Accordingly, in this study, the military risks and situations posed by changing global events and risks, especially after the 2001 Twin Towers attacks, were discussed. At the same time, the changes in the army and

* Doktora Öğrencisi, Trakya Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Uluslararası İlişkiler ABD,
E-mail: cihankazancioglu@hotmail.com, ORCID: 0000-0001-5849-6078.

military structures were examined, the changes in the wars after the September 11 attacks, classical warfare, proxy wars and hybrid wars were discussed. In particular, Russia's interventions in Georgia, Crimea, Ukraine, which are new era battlegrounds, and the hybrid war in Palestine at the same time were considered within the framework of the hybrid war, and Turkey's developments around these events were examined. The aim of the study is to examine the military developments and risks experienced in the light of global developments, to detail the hybrid warfare, which is a new generation military combat system, and to explain Turkey's perspective on this issue.

The Causes of Armies And Military Change

Since the first periods of its establishment, the main purpose of armies has been based on ensuring the security of states and the continuation of their survival. When it comes to armies, the first thing that comes to mind is that the structures that are closed and resistant to change have been. However, armies have also been one of the most important elements of the state, which is most affected by national and international developments and has to adapt. Technological, political, cultural, economic and many similar developments and changes have also been the reasons that have led newly formed alliances and organizations to change armies.

As for the organizational structures, the army structures of all countries have become standard and almost the same features. Barry R. as the reasons for the military change. Pasen stated in 1984 that the changes were related to three situations. The first of these is defined as the self-renewal of the institution in the event of its collapse, the second is the situation of external pressure for innovation and or change, or the third is that institutions change in order to grow and expand. Stephen Peter Rosen examined the new movements of the American and British armies in 1991 and rejected the three-point reason for the change that we discussed above.¹ According to Rosen, the movements of change are examined as peacetime, wartime and technological developments. However, there are also experts who criticize the Rosen theory. It has also been emphasized that the theory, ideas and cultural structure are ignored.² In Adam Grissom's 2006 study of military changes, he suggests that there should be a direct impact on combat troops as the most important element in triggering change. Aynı zamanda değişimlerin kapsam ve etkisinin de önemi vurgu yapmıştır. In the study of the influence of cultural factors on the change of armies conducted by Dima Adamsky in 2010, the American, Russian and Israeli armies were examined. As a result of this examination Deca emphasized the view that military changes depend on political, social and technological factors, but none of

¹ Barış Ateş, "Askeri Değişim: Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönem Üzerine Bir İnceleme", Çankırı Karatekin Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt 10, Sayı 1, 2020, s. 19.

² Barış Ateş, age. , s. 20.

them are enough on their own, the intermediate variable is cultural factors. It has come to the fore in leadership as one of the influential factors in the army structure and military changes. Tom Dyson examined the German army reform in 2005 and emphasized the role of the leader. According to Dyson, leaders are divided into three; entrepreneurial leader, intermediary leader and finally inhibitory leader. The entrepreneurial leader signs radical changes for the reform to come to life and assumes a Decisional role, the mediator leader tries to achieve a consensus between different points of view, while the inhibitory leader vetoes reform efforts.³ According to some experts, the process of change has been exaggerated. It has been stated that the process called change has evolved to soften the deadly effects, and its name has been changed. The new name is modern systems, and the modern system is a complex system consisting of cover, concealment, spreading, pressure, independent maneuvering throughout a small unit, joint operations at the tactical level, depth, vigilance and duplication of force at the operative level to different points.⁴ In fact, what happens is not change, but continuity, and it has been called finding a new and holster.

When we look at the studies considered, there is no general, clear and single answer on why the armies and the military system have changed. There are inferences and examples for each period and event. In particular, both the differences in certain characteristics, economic structures, political faces, technological developments and traditional structures of countries, as well as their geopolitical positions, have had a direct impact on change and innovation. Especially in the post-Cold War period, radical changes in security policies, the spread of globalization and rapid advances in technology have necessitated changes in the army and military structure.

The Change of The Military Structure and Charles Moskos

Charles Moskos tried to clarify the military changes with his work 'The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War', which deals with the changes that armies have undergone in history in 2000. In this work, he has dealt with the military system and the army structure in three different time periods; modern, young modern and port-modern. He started the traditional military system with Westphalia and dealt with its arrival until 1945. The modern period is 19. he claimed that the century began with the nation-state system. During this period, he defined the military structure as compulsory military service, a male-dominated structure, a hierarchical order in which there is a lower-upper relationship, and a structure in which the civilian and military structure are completely separate. The modern period, on the other hand, started with 1945 and dealt with the Cold War Period. He

³ Barış Ateş, age. , s. 24.

⁴ Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2004.

considered this period as the period when compulsory military service was abolished, the education levels of officers increased, technological weapons were included in the army.

The post-modern period, on the other hand, has been processed as a period that began with the end of the Cold War and continued. During this period, American-oriented developments were included in the center. It has been considered as a structure in which the civil-military distinction has decreased, the male-dominated structure has been broken, military forces are called to maintain peace rather than war, armies are used by international structures rather than nation-states, and military forces have acquired an international character. It was also emphasized that the nation-state system lost its influence during this period. Increasing peacekeeping operations in the post-modern period have necessitated various changes and developments in issues such as training, exercises, doctrine, equipment and manpower resources of armies.⁵ Another important feature of this period was the emergence of private security companies and their rapid expansion. The first example of these companies was seen in Angola in 1993 and spread rapidly, going as far as training armies and replacing them.⁶ Moskos described this period with three main features: heterogeneous, pluralistic structure and uncertainty. One of the most important steps of the post-modern period has been the concept of globalization. The concept of globalization has taken an important place in the field of military service, as it has been encountered in all areas of life since the 1990s. With globalization, the field of the concept of the nation-state has become even narrower. The names, meanings and dimensions of the threats to national security have changed. New threat parameters have been formed, emerging as asymmetric threats such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, international organized crime, ethnic and religious conflicts, and cybercrime.⁷ The belief that all these developments will bring an increase in the number of soldiers has been replaced by technological development. A larger number of manpower has been replaced by professionalized, superior-capable and technologically equipped people and machines.

In this period, also called the Information Age, these developments in the military field have turned into both an advantage and a disadvantage for the army. Advanced manpower and weapons have emerged both as tools and as a direct target and threat. In addition, since this development is directly related to the economy, developed countries have always benefited more

⁵ Barış Ateş, Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde Askeri Değişim: NATO Orduları ve Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Üzerine Karşılaştırmalı Bir Analiz, (Yayınlanmış Doktora Tezi), Ankara, Gazi Üniversitesi, 2014, s. 35.

⁶ Barış Ateş, age., s. 35.

⁷ Unsal Sığırı, "Geleceğin Askeri Liderliğine Dair Değerlendirmeler", Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi, Cilt 2, Sayı 3, 2006, s. 104.

from the cake, while developing and underdeveloped countries have had to make do with what remains to them, as has always been encountered on the historical stage.

Global Developments and Military Transformations after September 11

New security problems have emerged in the international arena with the steps taken by the United States after the September 11 attacks with the declaration of a war on terror strategy – the invasion of Iraq. With the great contributions of globalization, wars are no longer fought on the frontlines, but at diplomatic tables, political seats, with doctrines and technology. Now the war has ceased to be state-centered and has turned into a system in which society is included in its civilians. One-on-one conflicts have been replaced by hybrid wars, bringing with them political events such as the creation of a civil war within the targeted country. Thus, the army began to be used in its own country and against people responsible for ensuring their security. At the same time, with the rapid spread of private security companies, countries have also been at war through these companies instead of using their own armies.

In the National Security Strategy Documents published by the United States after the events of September 11, the nuclear threat, non-state actors that possess and use weapons of mass destruction, that is, terrorist organizations, and the states that support them, described as bandits and failures, were perceived by America as the primary threat. The fight against terrorism has been placed at the basis of the understanding of security and has identified organizations such as Al Qaeda, Taliban, Hezbollah and Muslim states such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria and Somalia as enemies.⁸ Thus, America has replaced the threat of communism with Islam. In the theses put forward in the post-Cold War period, called the victory of America, it has actually remained insufficient or even incorrect to express the distortion in the system. One of them, the theses of the victory of Liberalism, the ultimate continuation of peace and peace, which Fukuyama defended in his Historical End Thesis, have been replaced by an environment of chaos and conflict. At the same time, Huntington's Clash of Civilizations Thesis, which is still one of the most important theses of the period and today, has also become an important resource for western countries to bring economically and politically powerless countries under their control with the collapse of the Soviet Union. This thesis has revealed anti-Islamism as a new path and China as new target planks. Thus, the attacks on Asia, Africa and the Middle East were based on a ground and this method was supported militarily, politically

⁸ Cemal Çoban, Yeni Dünya Düzeni Bağlamında Terör, Vekâlet Savaşları ve Türkiye, (Yayınlanmış Yüksek Lisans Tezi), Gaziantep, Gaziantep Üniversitesi, 2018, s. 23.

and economically. A method called proxy wars has been developed in Western literature. In general terms, the purpose of the method is defined as sending the soldiers of a state affiliated to it to the zone of interest without using the country's own soldiers.⁹ As we discussed above, today's post-modern wars are also being carried on with private companies, mercenaries, secret services and non-state actors. The best examples of this situation are in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia; It is possible to show the policies implemented in the form of Arab Spring, Color Revolutions.

Especially with the September 11 attacks, the idea that terrorist attacks can occur anywhere in the world and at any time has been embodied with the placement of the fight against terrorism at the center of international relations. After the Cold War, the fact that many states restricted military spending and reduced the number of soldiers led them to the employment of mercenaries or private military companies with relatively low costs. Private Military Companies lease their military services under a contract while; mercenaries serve in the army of a country other than their own country in exchange for wages, it would not be wrong to call mercenary military service "war contracting" in Yalçınkaya's words.¹⁰ The modernization of both private and mercenary military systems with rapidly developing technology has also increased the need for specialized personnel in this field. Advanced technology weapons and similar products used in the military sense, engineers, technicians, information technology and logistics specialists who have knowledge in these areas are needed because systematic knowledge of new methods and techniques of warfare is needed.¹¹

In the post-Cold War period, in the new world order that the United States is trying to establish under its own leadership, China, India, Japan have become new global competitors of the United States as new competitors instead of the Russian Federation, which is mainly due to the unsuccessful Middle East and Central Asian geostartegies and focuses on its own domestic policies. This situation has been one of the important indicators of the shift of the geoeconomic, geopolitical and geostrategic center from West to East, especially in the field of energy.

Proxy Wars

The concept of Proxy Wars has been defined by Andrew Mumford's definition as 'An indirect war waged by third parties to achieve the desired strategic result'. Although Description of Proxy Wars was generally used to

⁹ Hüsme Akdeniz, "Değişen Güvenlik Konsepti ve Güvenliğin Yeniden Kavramsallaştırılması", TASAM, 2020, s. 72, https://tasam.org/tr-TR/Icerik/54637/degisen_guvenlik_konsepti_ve_guvenligin_yeniden_kavramsallaştirilmesi.

¹⁰ Haldun Yalçınkaya, Savaş: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Güç Kullanımı, Ankara, İmge Kitabevi, 2008, s. 340.

¹¹ Bedri Şahin, "Değişen Dünya Düzenine Bağlı Olarak Değişen Uluslararası Güvenlik Algısı", İmgelem, Cilt 4, Sayı 6, 2020, s.198.

explain the conflicts that emerged during the power struggle between the USA and the Soviets during the Cold War, it was also used in the Middle East interventions of the USA in the post-September 11 period, in Lebanon, Syria, Libya and Africa, in Central Asia. Proxy wars have become clearer as a result of the fact that the two superpowers avoided entering into a direct conflict with nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Dwight D. Decker, who served as the President of the United States during the Cold War period from 1953 to 1961. Eisenhower described proxy wars as "the cheapest insurance in the world".¹² Proxy Wars are armed struggles carried out by legal and illegal organizations that have many complex relationships.

The Proxy War approach, by its most general definition, is that an actor can use a local war without personally intervening, without using his own armies, in order to keep certain global, regional, economic or political interests at the highest level. The main purpose of the proxy war; it is aimed to create international or regional political pressure on the target country and shape politics by arming non-state actors, creating internal instability with sectarian or ethnic-based low-intensity conflicts, destroying state authority, disrupting public order, transforming residential neighborhoods into uncontrolled and unsystematic areas, preparing the ground for the formation of regions that should be, creating international or regional political pressure on the target country.¹³ Surrogates are used in Proxy Wars, and the main fronts try to realize their interests in a regional and national sense through them. There are many examples to be given to the Proxy War approach in history; the Cuban Crisis, the Suez Crisis, the Vietnam War in part, the Arab-Israeli Wars, the civil war in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya Crises are listed among the examples. There are multiple factors involved in the emergence of Proxy Wars, the most important of which are the increasing costs of wars and the risk of suffering great damage and injury from all angles, even if the war is won. For these and similar reasons, it has become commonplace for regional and global powers to achieve the goal by driving terrorist organizations, non-state actors and different interest groups into the field during these periods when it has become difficult to understand even who the parties are in wars. The interests to be obtained from Proxy Wars do not differ greatly from the actual wars; expansion of the regional sphere of influence, protection of social groups, economic interests, political or military interests, ideological reasons, regional power balances, the possibility of possible success and gains that will arise without increasing tension and conflict.¹⁴ In addition to the fact that the main states use another

¹² Andrew Mumford, "Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict", The RUSI Journal, Cilt 158, Sayı 2, 2013, s. 40.

¹³ Cemal Çoban, age. , s. 46.

¹⁴ Ali Gök, "Suriye ve Libya'da Meydana Gelen Çatışmaların Vekâlet Savaşı Teorisi Kapsamında Karşılaştırılması", Güvenlik Bilimleri Dergisi, Cilt 10, Sayı 1, 2021, s. 124.

state or non-state actor as a proxy, they can also use another state or non-state actor as a proxy with the power or autonomous status they have gained in some powerful non-state actors in their regions.

In the Proxy Wars approach, there is a proxy power relationship with the main power. In addition to using proxy power, the main power has the obligation to support the proxy power in military, economic and political terms. In particular, the political support and propaganda provided are very important. Thus, the proxy power is able to use diplomatic channels, international forums and legitimize its activities through the media. In addition to this situation, the goals of the proxy forces are also important. Proxy forces may sometimes choose to become proxies for their political interests, economic reasons or ideologies by drawing the main force into their conflicts.

Hybrid Wars

With the rapid development of globalization, there has also been an increase in proxy wars and the number of regional and global actors using them. With the spread of multinational companies, developments in transportation, information technology, military technology and communication technologies, the concept of proxy wars has been used in connection with the concepts of hybrid war, asymmetric war, hybrid war. Hybrid Warfare has been defined as a war strategy that refers to the combination of conventional and non-conventional methods of warfare with its most general definition. Dec. The concept of Hybrid Warfare was first used by Robert Walker in his master's thesis entitled "SPEC FI: United States Navy and Special Operations", but the concept was accelerated by William J. Walker. Nemeth's master's thesis, "The Future War and Chechnya: A Hybrid State of War", and Frank Hoffman's articles published in 2005 and 2007, won.¹⁵

The definition of Hybrid Warfare, defined by Hoffman, is non-regular wars in which terror, smuggling, discrimination and guerrilla actions are used together with classical military methods and modern warfare technologies, and at least one side of the conflict is formed by the state, and in these wars the local population has chosen the path of comfortable cooperation with paramilitary groups that promise to protect themselves.¹⁶ According to Hoffman, classical wars between states have been replaced by hybrid wars, in which there are no precise distinctions between the concepts of civilian, military, organized violence, terrorism, crime and war. Decatur Hoffman, Decatur Hoffman, Decatur Hoffman, Decatur Hoffman

¹⁵ Gaffar Türkoğlu, "Yeni Bir Savaş Konsepti Olarak: Hibrit Savaşlar", 2022, s. 55 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/361440806_Yeni_Bir_Savas_Konsepti_Olarak_Hibrit_Savaslar.

¹⁶ Frank Hoffman, "The Rise of Hybrid Wars", Potomac Institute for Political Studies, 2007, s. 17-34.

and Decatur Hoffman. The academic literature is also mostly identified with the activities that Russia has applied to Ukraine. The concept clearly emerged as the Gerasimov Doctrine, with the statement of the Chief of the General Staff of Russia Valery Gerasimov in his article dated February 26, 2013 that "There are important lessons that can be learned from the Arab Spring and the Color Revolutions, emphasizing that the nature of war changes every day".¹⁷ Hybrid warfare is a military activity that forms a successful combination of symmetrical and asymmetrical, as well as traditional and modern combat practices.¹⁸ Hybrid warfare is a type of warfare practiced by non-state actors alongside nation-states, involving conventional military capabilities and tactics, as well as elements that will create non-conventional conflict, such as terrorism, creating violence and chaos, cyber warfare, media and economic practices. Hybrid threats are an umbrella concept that includes many threats such as global terrorism, low-intensity asymmetric conflicts, migration, maritime banditry, organized crime across borders, demographic problems, corruption, ethnic conflicts, technology, failed states.¹⁹ Looking at all these definitions, it has been emphasized that hybrid warfare has an offensive strategy, not a defensive one.

According to Dayspring, there are three main characteristics of hybrid warfare that indicate hybrid; it is the aggressive nature of states, the maturation of conditions, and the combination of traditional military practices and modern practices. The characteristics that distinguish hybrid wars from classical front-line wars are that hybrid warfare combines terrorism, nonlinear warfare, unified warfare, non-regular warfare, unlimited warfare, identity and religious politics and related issues such as the erosion of the state's monopoly on the use of force within its own structure.²⁰ The most basic characteristic features of Hybrid Warfare are as follows: It is with non-regular warfare and tactical levels are high, the concept of time and space have disappeared in these wars, the actors in hybrid wars are dominant not only states but non-state actors, it is difficult to talk about classical victories as there are no exact start and end dates in these wars, in hybrid wars, the battlefields have shifted from enemy centers to people-centered areas, these wars have mostly evolved into civil war rather than breaking the state monopoly, the importance of information, information and perception management has increased in these wars.²¹ By its most general definition, there are two actors in hybrid wars; states and non-state actors. It is divided

¹⁷ Erol Işıkçı, Erman Kırız, "Hibrit Savaş Kavramının Yeni Savaşlar Perspektifinden İncelenmesi", SAVSAD Savunma ve Savaş Araştırmaları Dergisi, Cilt 30, Sayı 2, 2020, s. 256.

¹⁸ Gaffar Türkoğlu, age. , s. 55.

¹⁹ Yusuf Özer, "Savaşın Değişen Karakteri: Teori ve Uygulamada Hibrit Savaş", Güvenlik Bilimleri Dergisi, Cilt 7, Sayı 1, 2018, s. 40

²⁰ Gaffar Türkoğlu, age. , s. 56.

²¹ Gaffar Türkoğlu, Hibrit Savaşlar ve Suriye Örneği, Konya, Selçuk Üniversitesi, (Yayınlanmamış Yüksek lisans Tezi), 2018, s. 123.

into two from non-state actors; military and civilian actors. Military actors in war zones are mercenaries of regional, national and international organization (United Nations) coalition forces and war companies, while civilian actors are terrorist groups, local militias, criminal organizations and supranational media organizations, especially the civilian population in the region, the effectiveness of non-state elements in hybrid wars is quite high.²² The states are classified into three categories within the hybrid wars. Failed states are rising global states and states that use hybrid threats to regain their power status.²³ Failed states are states that cannot maintain order in their internal public order, have weak governance, and have unstable relations with their neighbors. The rising global states are the ones that have increased their power in terms of economic, political and military power over the past decade. As an example, countries such as China and Japan are shown as examples. States that use hybrid threats to regain their power status, these states whose power and effectiveness are declining regionally or internationally, can use hybrid threats to regain power.²⁴

According to Batyuk, the process of conflict; State Conflict; large-scale military power and advanced military technology are used to defeat the enemy. The use of weapons of mass destruction includes means such as land, sea and air power, submarine platforms, unmanned systems, advanced cyber systems and satellite systems. Hybrid Conflict is a mixture of conventional forces and irregular forces. It is aimed at creating confusion, taking the initiative and making the other side unable to act. It includes the use of both conventional military systems and asymmetric systems. Non-State Conflict; in this conflict environment, networks and small units are used to gain control over society and overthrow governments. Handmade explosives, light weapons, propaganda and terrorism are the main tools.²⁵ And this cycle is indicated as an intertwined process.

New Era Battlefields

As an example of hybrid wars, Russia, one of the most important of the new era battlefields, is shown as the main actor. Before touching on the issue related to Russia, Afghanistan, especially located in South Asia, has been one of the regions where the hybrid war has been most intense. The war started with the Continuous Freedom Operation of the United States in 2001 and continued to grow. Although many actors were involved in this war, the most well-known of them was the Taliban. The Taliban has grown rapidly with both military and economic assistance and has become one of the most

²² Yusuf Özer, age. , s. 45.

²³ Kaspars Galkins, "NATO and Hybrid Conflict: Unresolved Issues from the Past or Unresolvable Threats of the Present?", Naval Postgraduate School, 2012, ss.14-15. (Erişim Tarihi: 22.03.2024)

²⁴ Yusuf Özer, age. , s. 44.

²⁵ Yusuf Özer, age. , s. 42.

important actors in the hybrid war to overthrow the central authority.²⁶ Another important example was the Deconfliction between the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli Army in 2006. Hezbollah has used all its forces such as modern weapons, combat techniques, guerrilla tactics, perception management – media use- in these conflicts.²⁷

Technological developments in the time that has passed over these wars, which can be taken as an example of Hybrid Wars, have made the techniques of hybrid warfare much more usable in the field of both weapons and information and communication. As an example of this situation, the exchange of security experts, Internet-based propaganda, encrypted communication, cyber attacks, economic pressures in a positive or negative direction, espionage and similar initiatives have enabled to achieve political interests without the need for major wars.²⁸ 21 Along with developments in the light of all these events. the most influential actor who has applied this concept in practice in the century has been Russia. Russia's first operation in this direction was the Russia – Georgia war, which took place in 2008. This has also been seen as Russia's response to the color revolutions that indirectly brought the United States and Russia into confrontation in the 2000s. Russia started this war with hybrid warfare techniques. Russia first began counter-operations against Georgia with cyberspace and social media tools. The entire cyber infrastructure of Georgia has been disabled. Later, the army was activated, the instability in the region, economic problems, poverty, lack of resources, ideological radicalization, demographic structure, failure of the state and social polarization were the most critical points that focused on the hybrid war and led to the success of operations.²⁹ In 2013, the Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov emphasized that asymmetric warfare is won not only by military methods, but also by political, economic, humanitarian, communication and similar fields. In addition, another important Russian figure, Lieutenant General Alexander Vladimirov, defined war as psychological and information warfare before military power.

The Ukraine–Russia war, which ended with Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, has also been evaluated at this point. Rather than the main causes and progress of the war, the tactics that Russia has applied to the scope of hybrid warfare have been touched upon. Firstly, it is possible to list the operations used by Russia in the annexation attempt of Crimea as follows: failure to declare a state of war, use of activist civilians, use of indirect and asymmetric methods, organizing simultaneous operations in land, sea, air and

²⁶ Jan Angstrom, "Escalation, Emulation, and the Failure of Hybrid Warfare in Afghanistan", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Cilt 40, Sayı 10, 2017, s. 840.

²⁷ Jan Angstrom, age. , s. 841.

²⁸ Yusuf Özer, age. , s. 48.

²⁹ Betül Yaren Özer, "Rusya'nın Hibrit Savaş Stratejisi: Gürcistan Örneği", <https://sahipkiran.org/2021/09/20/rusyanin-hibrit-savas-stratejisi-gurcistan-ornegi/>, (Erişim Tarihi: 15.04.2024).

cyberspace, and effective use of the media.³⁰ To elaborate on the hybrid war tactics that Russia has put forward in Ukraine; information warfare and propaganda have been the first step, the Russian-speaking minority has been provoked using pro-Russian sentiments, at the same time, the media has been censored, most Ukrainian channels have been blocked and Russian channels have broadcast instead. At the same time, Crimea was made independent from the outside world by taking control of the Internet. The second step is indicated as cyber attacks and sabotage. Although no conclusive evidence has been obtained, it has been discussed that Russia has blocked the Ukrainian cyber infrastructure.³¹ In another case, it is a proxy war, favorable conditions were provided by the anti-government protests of pro-Russian separatists, which were later determined to be pro-Russian people referred to as the little green men.³² Finally, the last strike was carried out with irregular troops. The most effective hybrid warfare technique used by Russia in the Crimean invasion is that it carried out effective propaganda with information warfare.

The strategies that Russia has implemented in a military sense have been determined by its past experiences. Asymmetric elements, which are important characteristic features of today's hybrid warfare, are based on the concepts of Active Measures, Deep Combat and Reflexive Control, which have been used since the origins of information warfare and covert operations in Tsarist Russia.³³ It continued to develop and use these active concepts in the events of the annexation of Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. According to many researchers, the annexation of Crimea has been considered as the first step of Russia's attacks on Ukrainian territory in 2022. The first step of Russia before the invasion of Ukraine began as a period of concealment. During this period, Russia was primarily considered as preparing the ground for the occupation of important buildings and places with separatist groups and individuals in the region and collecting information. As a second step of the Hybrid War, Russia has carried out cyber attacks on Ukraine's information infrastructure in October in addition to separatist names.³⁴ However, inadequate initiatives during the period of Russia's cover-up and familiar with hybrid warfare tactics in 2014, Ukrainian society has fully mobilized, social media has been actively used and cyber defense systems have been strengthened.³⁵ Russia has surrounded Ukraine

³⁰ Andrei Josan & Cristina Voicu, "Hybrid Wars in the Age of Asymmetric Conflicts", Review of the Air Force Academy, Cilt 1, Sayı 49, 2015, s. 51.

³¹ Harun Aras & Yusuf Yıldırım, "Rusya'nın 2014 Ukrayna Krizi'ndeki Hibrit Savaş Stratejisi", Yönetim ve Ekonomi Dergisi, Cilt 29, Sayı 3, 2022, s. 508.

³² Fırat Kaplan, "Hibrit Savaş" Teriminin İkinci Lübnan Savaşı ve Rusya'nın Kırım'ı İlhakı Kapsamında İncelenmesi", Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi, Cilt 19, Sayı 45, 2023, s. 408.

³³ Hasan Arslan, "Hibrit Savaş Perspektifinden Rusya'nın 2022 Yılı Ukrayna Müdahalesi", Savunma Bilimleri Dergisi, Cilt 43, Sayı 2, 2023, s. 340.

³⁴ Microsoft Special Report, "An overview of Russia's cyberattack activity in Ukraine", 2022.

³⁵ Hasan Arslan, age. , s. 345.

with 150 thousand Russian troops. At the same time, non-conventional separatist forces and private military companies have also carried out off-the-cuff attacks. In addition, Russia has taken economic, political and social steps to divert resources and undermine confidence in the Ukrainian government in order to prevent economic investments and aid that may come to Ukraine since 2014. At the same time, Russia has used manipulation and disinformation campaigns within the country's borders in order not to lose the support of its own people. During the war, Ukraine used the Internet and social media more effectively and thus was able to create an awareness of the war around the world. Another dimension of information warfare is the provision of support or prevention of reactions in the international arena. As an example of this situation, Russia used Ukraine by giving information and images of an attack on a hospital to the media. After the beginning of the occupation, the entire communication infrastructure was first disconnected from the Ukrainian system in the newly captured regions. However, as we have already discussed, Ukraine has strengthened its infrastructure with non-state actors, and non-state actors such as interrupted satellite broadcasts, Microsoft and SpaceX are also supporting the Ukrainian army in cyber warfare with the expert and equipment support they provide.³⁶ In this war, which is still ongoing, Ukraine is trying to make the best use of social media platforms and the support it receives from the international arena. The reasons he shows in Russia are that he is trying to achieve his goal with a strong army system, economic and geopolitical power sources, and hybrid warfare techniques from the past and adapted to the present.

The bloodiest and most painful battlefield of the year 2024, where all combat techniques are used, has undoubtedly been the Israeli– Palestinian war. Palestine, which does not have the classical means of war and where the civilian population is being slaughtered every day, has been involved in the war with the military wing of Hamas, called a group of indigenous guerrillas or freedom fighters. Israel has established superiority in the region both thanks to its military systems and technologies, as well as information technologies. In addition, although it has not been based on the legal, moral or even humanitarian foundations required at the international level, Israel has received the support of some states both publicly and militarily and technologically. All the elements of hybrid, proxy and classical warfare, even nazi genocide, are included in Israel's attacks, which it claims to be mutual, but which have reached genocidal dimensions. The Palestinian people are being deprived of their right to food, shelter, water and even breathing in their humanitarian needs. Although the cyber infrastructure has almost completely collapsed, many country organizations that have not collapsed humanely are providing humanitarian assistance and technological support to

³⁶ Hasan Arslan, age. , s. 348.

the region. However, this situation does not stop a child dying every day or the massacre. Many more of the methods used in Hybrid Wars are applied by cauterizing religious support on the Palestinian people. Although there are many civil and organizational verbal support in the international arena, no steps are being taken that save lives. Countries, but more importantly, the whole humanity has raised its voice to the massacre in Palestine. The information pillar of the Hybrid War, the social media pillar, has been the only heart for Palestine. All media platforms contain ideas that the massacre and the silence on this situation will make Israel go even further. War is a bad situation for everyone. But in order for an event to be a war, reciprocity is required. A massacre is not a war.

As can be seen in the new generation battlefields, classic battles are being replaced by proxy, hybrid and similar types of warfare. The old era of one-on-one fighting or the use of weapons has been replaced by more technological weapons, biological weapons, information wars. States are trying to use local forces instead of their own soldiers and to wear down or even overthrow the countries they are trying to benefit by the method of civil war. The ranking made as strong, weak and strengthening states, as well as the influence of strong states on other states in an economic sense, and efforts to weaken them by leaving them in a difficult situation, have also been other important factors. He is also 21. the most important means of attack and defense of the century has been the Internet and social media. Today's et effective tools have been mobile phones and communication. With the satellite facilities provided by both government satellites and private companies, communication and social media have now become the most important and effective means of warfare.

Turkey's Position in Response to The New Generation Battlefields and Methods

Turkey's security approach comes out as a product of a holistic assessment of its history, geography, population, ethnic identity, religious structure, norms, military structure, power balances and relationship system revealed by periodic factors. Turkey is located in the middle of three unstable regions such as the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East. Demographically, there are a wide variety of ethnic elements in the country. At the same time, it is a bridge between the West and the East in many areas such as cultural, trade, energy and Dec. Unlike many other countries, Turkey is a country that has to face more than one threat at the same time and feels a significant part of it on its borders.

There are more than one reasons why Turkey is facing more than one threat. Turkey is located in the Middle East and the Caspian Basin, where the world's most important oil reserves are located due to its geopolitical and

geostrategic position. It is estimated that the value given to this substance will increase even more with the decrease in oil production today and in the future period and, on the contrary, the predicted increase in demand. This importance is increasing even more with the pipelines passing through the territory of Turkey and the pipelines planned to pass through. At the same time, the source points and transit routes of energy lines are important in order to prevent the territorial, economic and political expansion of the United States and the European Union, Russia. At the same time, the increasing political influence of Turkey on the countries of the region has also emerged as a separate source of threat for developed countries and a different threat element has been formed for Turkey. Another important reason is that it is located in the Mediterranean Basin, which is the crossroads of sea transportation routes. Especially with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the distance between Europe and Asia had Decently decreased and the importance of Mediterranean sea transportation routes had increased even more.³⁷ Another important reason has always been the Black Sea Basin and the Straits, which have always maintained their importance. The Black Sea is at a crossroads both in terms of its location, the natural resources it has and the transportation of oil and natural gas surrounding the Black Sea to the international market. At the same time, the Turkish straits, which provide access to the warm seas and other continents of the countries located in the Black Sea basin, especially Russia, are of great importance. The fact that it has a stable position as a country in the new Balkan geography formed by the dissolution of the Soviets and Yugoslavia has also made Turkey important for the region and other states.

After the Cold War, Turkey has faced many crises and tensions near its borders, such as Karabakh, Iraq, Georgia, Syria. 21. although social and humanitarian security comes first in the security approach of the century, a holistic understanding of security has been put forward, in which the fields of economy, energy, environment, health, socio-culture and education are also included.³⁸ However, after the September 11 attacks, there was a breakdown in security and military areas, and the fight against international-global terrorism became a priority. After this period, the threat perception for NATO and Europe, especially for the United States, consists of terrorism, nuclear-biological-chemical weapons, cyber attacks, regional conflicts, failed states, as well as ethnic conflict, global migrations, energy security, environmental problems and organized crime organizations.³⁹ Turkey has been dealing with terrorism and regional conflicts since long ago due to the

³⁷ Cemal Çoban, age. , s. 90.

³⁸ Murat Gül, "Güvenlikteki Kavramsal Değişim ve Türkiye'nin Güvenlik Yaklaşımı ve Politikalarına Etkisi", Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt 21, Sayı 1, 2016, s. 315.

³⁹ Barış Ateş, age. , s. 112.

reputation of the establishment region and its neighbors. If a country that is important geopolitically and geostrategically is not strong politically, economically, technologically and militarily, the values it has cause new problems. Due to its geopolitical and geostrategic importance in Turkey, it is constantly facing renewed and changing threats. In the post-Cold War period, new concepts such as Asymmetric Warfare, Informal Warfare, Irregular Warfare, Proxy Warfare, Biological and Cyber Warfare have emerged instead of classical struggles, and in these concepts they have been collected under the name of Hybrid Warfare.⁴⁰

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, according to the Ministry of National Defense White Paper of 1993, Turkey has ceased to be a wing country of NATO and has become a frontline country. This period has been a period when the threats and risks for Turkey have become unclear and differentiated. Now not only the military of countries, but also political, economic and social instability in countries, class disputes, religious, national and ethnic conflicts, power and influence struggles within the country and in the region, religious extremism are also included. Defense policies during this period were stated as ensuring peace at home and in the world and taking the necessary measures for this, contributing to the reduction of all kinds of international tensions, ensuring a just and permanent peace with all their means; protecting the independence and integrity of the nation, the indivisibility of the country.⁴¹ In addition to being in the middle of three instability regions such as the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus, the 1998 threat assessment identified threats of spreading radical religious movements, especially terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles as a result of ultranationalist, expansionist and aggressive tendencies.⁴² In the last White Paper published in 2000, the traditional concept of threat is no longer; it is stated that regional and ethnic conflicts, political and economic instabilities and uncertainties in countries, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range weapons, fundamentalism, drug and arms trafficking and international terrorism have begun to include.⁴³ For this reason, taking an active role in preventing crises and conflicts and making a military contribution to crisis management were considered a priority in the measures taken. In addition, in the developing and renewed world, the procurement of new technological weapons and systems and the issues of training properly equipped people for their use have become a priority.

Due to its geographical location, Turkey is located in a region where state

⁴⁰ Cemal Çoban, age. , s. 94.

⁴¹ Barış Ateş, age. , s. 113.

⁴² Barış Ateş, age. , s. 113.

⁴³ Barış Ateş, age. , s. 114.

and non-state actors are fighting each other the most with proxy and similar tools. The war and chaos in Syria and Iraq, chaos instead of the planned peace and democracy environment with the Arab Spring, states drifting into chaos, wars and terrorism, the increasing NATO presence in the Black Sea, the Russian invasion of Crimea and the Ukrainian war that started in 2022 and is still ongoing, the Azerbaijan and Armenia hot contact, events such as the transformation into a new playground due to the oil and gas reserves in the Haza Sea affect Turkey directly and indirectly. In this case, Turkey is developing and renewing itself in every field in terms of weapons, weapon technologies, training of equipped military personnel, both defense and attack. Examples of upgrades and developments include Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aircraft, ANKA-S unmanned aircraft, aksungur UAV, hisar-A low altitude air defense missile, TCG bayraktar amphibious tank landing vehicle, amphibious assault ship, military floating pier, seismic research ship ORUÇ REIS, submarine rescue and towing ship, offshore patrol ship.⁴⁴ The first flights of HÜRJET, Turkey's first jet-powered training aircraft, were carried out.

Result

Throughout history, interstate struggles have continued to develop, change and increase. The chest-to-chest collisions of the past have been replaced by non-state actors, civil wars, terrorism, cyber attacks. At the same time, the methods and strategies used have changed. New concepts such as Asymmetric Warfare, Informal Warfare, Irregular Warfare, Proxy Warfare, Biological and Cyber Warfare have become new definitions of war. Especially in the post-Cold War period, with the rapidly developing technology and weapons technologies, the scope and scope of war, military structures and security have changed with the new anti-terrorism trend initiated by the United States after the September 11 attacks. Environment, Economy, Technology, Law, Media, etc. the areas are emerging as new battle fronts. Instead of fighting one-on-one, armies continued with actors or private military pennies to fight on their behalf. The facilities provided by technological advances have made remote access possible. Thanks to globalization and the latest point reached in communication, intercontinental transportation provides communication with sad Decrees. With cyber attacks, economic systems are being destroyed or political crises are being created in countries without anyone's nose bleeding. With the development of Hybrid Warfare, satellites and wars are started and finished with a single button in a military sense.

Due to its geopolitical and geostarategic importance, Turkey is in a position to continuously invest and develop in areas such as its military

⁴⁴ <https://ayam.com.tr/arastirma/turkiyede-son-5-yilda-yasanan-gelismeler-savunma-sanayi-2015-2020/>.

resources, technologies, structure and similar areas, technological infrastructure, systems, communication facilities, training of equipped manpower and so on. The geographical location and the chaotic environment experienced in the neighbors push Turkey to a state of constant defense and vigilance against new threats. For this reason, infrastructure systems in terms of defense and attack are being developed and constantly renewed. In particular, it is very important for states to develop themselves in the cyber field today. In this direction, significant investments are also being made in Turkey.

TÜRKİYE IN A WORLD UNDER THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Sibel Kavuncu*

Introduction

What is meant by a world under the threat of nuclear weapons? And how can Türkiye's position be evaluated in such a world? In search of answers to these questions, it can be said that, first to evaluate the fact that nuclear weapons pose a global threat to the world in a historical chronological perspective will provide clarity to understand the issue. At this point, what is a nuclear weapon? How can it pose a global threat to the whole world? There is a need to answer these questions. Only then, in a world where nuclear weapons pose a threat to the whole world, Türkiye's attitude towards the threat of these weapons and the policies it has adopted in the process can be evaluated with their whys and wherefores.

It can be said that the beginning of the perception of nuclear weapons as a source of fear and anxiety for the whole world was occurred after the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, by the United States (US) on August 6, 1945.¹ What happened that day with the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima shocked the whole world.² Not long after the fearful shock caused by the Uranium- type atomic bomb (Little Boy) dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, another attack was carried out this time on Nagasaki, with a Plutonium- type atomic bomb (Fat Man) on August 9, 1945 by the US.³ It can be said that this second nuclear attack, on the one hand, showed the world once again that how can nuclear weapons be vital threat on living things, and on the other hand, it also reinforced the fear and anxiety which was already caused after the Hiroshima nuclear explosion.

Three weeks later after world's first nuclear explosion test by the US in

* Prof. Dr., Trakya University, Faculty of Economics & Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations, E-mail: skavuncu@trakya.edu.tr, ORCID: 0000-0002-9465-3648

¹ "The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 75 years ago", **Reuters**, 06 August 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/news/picture/the-atomic-bombings-of-hiroshima-and-nag-idUSRTX7NI7P/> (Access 17.03.2024).

² "Bütün Dünyada Heyecan ve Korku", **Cumhuriyet**, 08 Ağustos 1945, p.1.

³ "The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 75 years ago", **Reuters**, 06 August 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/news/picture/the-atomic-bombings-of-hiroshima-and-nag-idUSRTX7NI7P/> (Access 17.03.2024) ; "The Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima (Hiroshima, Japan August 6, 1945)", **US Department of Energy-Office of History and Heritage Resources**, <https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan-project-history/Events/1945/hiroshima.htm> (Access 05.04.2024) ; "The Atomic Bombing of Nagasaki (Nagasaki, Japan, August 9, 1945)", **US Department of Energy-Office of History and Heritage Resources**, <https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan-project-history/Events/1945/nagasaki.htm> (Access 05.04.2024).

the New Mexico desert on July 16, 1945,⁴ the one after another atomic bombings, first on Hiroshima, then on Nagasaki had been the main topic of the international agenda. Thus, in the very first month of the “Nuclear Age”, which can be said to have begun when the US detonated a 20-kiloton atomic bomb codenamed “Trinity” in Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 16, 1945,⁵ nuclear weapons had become the main source of fear and anxiety of almost the entire world. And so, with the detonation of the atomic bombs over Hiroshima on 6th and Nagasaki on 9th August 1945, just 3 weeks after the Trinity atomic bomb test, world met with the nuclear weapons that have been one of the greatest threats of the international security since that day till today. It can be stated very clearly that although many years have passed since the Trinity nuclear test, nuclear weapons still remain one of the greatest threats to world security today.

Here, it should be noted that, today in line with international concerns about nuclear weapons, it is seen that international cooperation is being formed against nuclear weapons threat. In this direction, it can be said that on the issue of nuclear weapons, which can be said to pose one of the greatest threats to the World security, intensive efforts are being made internationally within the framework of the control, reduction, non-proliferation and elimination of these weapons.

In this context, the study will try to discuss Türkiye’s attitude towards the threat and risk of nuclear weapons pose to world security in today’s world. In evaluating Türkiye’s attitude towards the risk that nuclear weapons pose to world security, an evaluation will be made in the context of Türkiye’s position and role in international cooperation against the threat of nuclear weapons. In the global threat and risk environment posed by nuclear weapons, Türkiye’s attitude and approach against the global security risk arising from these weapons will be discussed in the study in a historical chronological perspective.

Before this assessment, first of all evaluations will be carried out within the scope of the questions as: What is a nuclear weapon and how does it pose a security threat to the whole world? what has been done in the process within the framework of the need for international cooperation in the face of these weapons? what steps have been taken in the international collaborations that have been created? In a world where there are security risks and threats

⁴ “The Trinity Test (Trinity Test Site, July 16, 1945)”, **US Department of Energy-Office of History and Heritage Resources**, <https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan-project-history/Events/1945/trinity.htm> (Access, 08.04.2024); “Remembering Trinity, The World’s First Nuclear Test, **CTBTO Preparatory Commission**, <https://www.ctbto.org/news-and-events/news/remembering-trinity-worlds-first-nuclear-test> (Access 09.04.2024).

⁵ “International Day Against Nuclear Tests”, **CTBTO Preparatory Commission**, <https://www.ctbto.org/news-and-events/international-day-against-nuclear-tests> (Access 09.04.2024).

caused by nuclear weapons, what do the threats and risks caused by nuclear weapons mean for Türkiye? And so what kind of approach has Türkiye whom hosted US nuclear weapons on its territory in the framework of “nuclear sharing”⁶ in line with NATO membership at the beginning of the 1960s⁷ taken throughout the process from past to present process against nuclear weapons?

Nuclear Weapons: A Constant Threat to World Security

Today, the world is facing a lot of risks, some of which are new and some of which are familiar, aimed at global security. One of these continuing risks to global security from past to present is nuclear weapons. These weapons, which the world met with towards the end of the Second World War, are a source of great concern for the world today, just as they were used for the first time on August 6, 1945, and perhaps even more so.

It can be said that nuclear weapons posed the most vital threat to world security during the Cold War years. As stated by SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) in those years:

“Although the bulk of military spending goes towards the upkeep of conventional weapons and forces, nuclear weapons are by far the greatest threat to the survival of mankind.”⁸

Approximately 40 years after this assessment was made and almost eight decades after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it can be seen in the mid-2020s that; “... nuclear weapons still represent a clear danger to global peace and security, ...”⁹

Although there are many definitions of what kind of weapon type is mentioned when nuclear weapons are mentioned, the following definition can be given as a general definition that all these definitions can be said to overlap on the subject of nuclear weapons:

“A nuclear weapon is a device that uses a nuclear reaction to create an explosion. This explosion is much more powerful than that of conventional explosives (like TNT). When a nuclear weapon explodes, it gives off four types of energy: a blast wave, intense

⁶ Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight, “Nuclear weapons sharing, 2023”, **Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists**, Vol.79, No.6, 2023, p. 393-394.

2023, VOL. 79, NO. 6,

⁷ “Türkiye and NATO”, **NATO**, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_191048.htm (Access 27.04.2024).

⁸ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Arms race indicators”, **Armaments, arms control and disarmament, A Unesco reader for disarmament education**, Ed. Marek Thee, Unesco, 1982, p.17.

⁹ “Nuclear Warfare Risk at Highest Point in Decades, Secretary-General Warns Security Council, Urging Largest Arsenal Holders to Find Way Back to Negotiating Table Delegates Stress Non-proliferation Architecture Must Be Strengthened”, 9579th Meeting (AM), SC/15630, 18 March 2024, **United Nations, Meetings Coverage and Press Releases**, <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15630.doc.htm> (Access 10.05.2024).

*light, heat, and radiation. Nuclear weapons can be in the form of bombs or missiles.*¹⁰

When looking at the historical process of nuclear weapons and their threat to world security, it can be said that, with the first and only wartime use of atomic weapons at the end of World War II,¹¹ the world has met the terrible face of nuclear weapons.

Looking at Kelvin Spencer's assessment in this context, Spencer states that:

*"From the time the two bombs were dropped on Japan and their devastating effects disclosed by aerial photography and later from detailed surveys of the physical damage, mortality and morbidity, it became abundantly clear that rigorous control of atomic energy was essential..."*¹²

The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, demonstrated to world the devastating power of nuclear weapons which were the only instances of atomic bombs used in conflict.¹³

The first ever gun-type atomic bomb which had been used a simple design by firing one piece of uranium 235 into another, triggering a powerful explosion with about 15 kilotons of force named Little Boy was dropped on the centre of Hiroshima on 6 August 1945.¹⁴ 3 days after this explosion, on August 9, a second US aircraft carrying a more advanced plutonium-based bomb compared to the one dropped on Hiroshima codenamed Fat Man took off from Tinian Island in the Pacific Ocean. This time, the city where the bomb dropped from the plane exploded was Nagasaki.¹⁵

It can be said that the explosions of the nuclear bombs over two cities of Japan caused great fear not only in Japan but, throughout the world. Because there are vital effects that occur after the use of a nuclear weapon. For example:

"A nuclear weapon would cause great destruction, death, and injury and have a wide area of impact. People close to the blast site could experience:

- *Injury or death (from the blast wave)*

¹⁰ "Nuclear Weapon", **CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention**, https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/multimedia/infographics/nuclear_weapon.html#:~:text=A%20nuclear%20weapon%20is%20a,light%2C%20heat%2C%20and%20radiation. (Access 05.05.2024).

¹¹ "Featured Document Display: The Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki", **National Archives Museum**, <https://museum.archives.gov/featured-document-display-atomic-bombing-hiroshima-and-nagasaki> (Access 27.04.2024).

¹² Kelvin Spencer, "Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power Stations: What is the Connection?", **Medicine and War**, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Jan-Apr 1985), p.42.

¹³ "6 And 9 August 1945 Hiroshima And Nagasaki", **CTBTO Preparatory Commission**, <https://www.ctbto.org/news-and-events/news/6-and-9-august-1945-hiroshima-and-nagasaki> (Access 28.04.2024).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

- *Moderate to severe burns (from heat and fires)*
- *Blindness (from the intense light)*
- *Radiation sickness, also known as acute radiation syndrome or ARS (caused by the radiation released)*¹⁶

And perhaps it can be said that what further reinforces this fear are other main dangers, such as:

"People farther away from the blast, but in the path of fallout, could experience health effects from:

- *Fallout on the outside of the body or clothes (external contamination) or on the inside of the body (internal contamination)*
- *Radiation sickness*
- *Contaminated food and water sources"*¹⁷

While the world was confronted with the terrible face of nuclear weapons with the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it was seen in the process after the explosions that the destruction and deadly effects of these weapons were at the top of the international agenda. While concerns and responses about nuclear weapons have been placed at the top of the agenda, what can be done against the threat posed by these weapons has also begun to be evaluated internationally. As Lawrence S. Wittner stated:

*"Following the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a movement against the Bomb rapidly took shape in dozens of countries throughout the world."*¹⁸

So much so that the issue of nuclear disarmament has started to be on the agenda.¹⁹ As Mike Sewell noted: *"Ordinary citizens and policy makers alike shared a dread of nuclear war."*²⁰ But even so the nuclear arms race between the superpowers (the United States(US) and the Soviet Union (USSR)) continued throughout the Cold War process. In this context Sewell states: *"After 1951 both sides developed thermonuclear weapons and raced to develop intercontinental delivery systems..."*²¹

¹⁶ "Nuclear Weapon", **CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention**, https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/multimedia/infographics/nuclear_weapon.html#:~:text=A%20nuclear%20weapon%20is%20a,light%2C%20heat%2C%20and%20radiation. (Access 05.05.2024).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Lawrence S. Wittner, **The Struggle Against The Bomb, One World, Nuclear Disarmament Movement Through 1953**, Vol.1, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1993, p.39.

¹⁹ Lawrence S. Wittner, "The Worldwide Movement Against Nuclear Arms: Building An Effective Transnational Organization", **Peace Research**, Vol. 31, No. 4, (November 1999), pp. 18-19; Lawrence S. Wittner, "Nuclear Disarmament Movements", **Contemporanea**, Vol. 18, No. 4 (October-December 2015), p.635.

²⁰ Mike Sewell, **The Cold War**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.59.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p.56.

An assessment can be made that during the Cold War years, there was a nuclear arms race among the superpowers on one side, and a contrasting search for nuclear disarmament on the other. In this regard, it can be said that Sewell's following words about the Cold War period can be evaluated in this context:

*"Although there were crises that threatened nuclear war, the nuclear powers were cautious not to escalate them beyond the brink. Efforts began to limit nuclear testing even as bigger bombs and missiles were developed."*²²

It can be said that the nuclear arms race between the US and the USSR during the Cold War years was the most concerned feature of the period. In this regard, during the process, the US and the USSR have signed various nuclear arms control agreements in order to limit the risk of nuclear war in the face of the rivalry between them.²³ So much so, it can be said that these agreement process which continued between the US and Russia in the post-Cold War period²⁴ played a very important role in relieving the concern from nuclear weapons.

However, the tensions between the US and Russia in recent years have once again brought the nuclear arms race between the two sides to the agenda after all these years.²⁵

Especially with Russia's reject a formal U.S. proposal to resume talks "*without preconditions*" on a new arms control framework to succeed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) which will expire on 5 February 2026,²⁶ once again showed the disagreement between the US and Russia on the issue of nuclear disarmament. And can be said that the dispute between Russia and the US on the New START, the only remaining bilateral nuclear arms control agreement that limits the world's largest nuclear weapons arsenals,²⁷ brought to mind what happened during the INF process, and reinforced the already existing concerns about a similar end to INF Treaty in terms of the New START Treaty.

It can be said that the most serious indication of the disagreement between the US and Russia regarding nuclear disarmament in the 2000s was the termination of the Treaty as a result of the parties not being able to reach

²² *Ibid.*, p.56.

²³ "1949-2021 U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms Control", **Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)**, <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-russia-nuclear-arms-control> (Access 12.05.2024).

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Daryl Kimball, "U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agreements at a Glance", Arms Control Association, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USRussiaNuclearAgreements> (Access 13.05.2024).

²⁵ "1949-2021 U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms Control", **Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)**, *op.cit.*

²⁶ Libby Flatoff, Darly G. Kimball, "Russia Rejects New Nuclear Arms Talks", March 2024, **Arms Control Today**, Arms Control Association, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-03/news/russia-rejects-new-nuclear-arms-talks> (Access 13.05.2024).

²⁷ *Ibid.*

an agreement on the INF issue.²⁸

The following can be briefly stated about INF Treaty which signed December 8, 1987 without going into detail:

*"The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly referred to as the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty, requires destruction of the Parties' ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, their launchers and associated support structures and support equipment within three years after the Treaty enters into force."*²⁹

And the importance of the INF Treaty can be evaluated as Daryl Kimball stated:

*"The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty required the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate and permanently forswear all of their nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. The treaty marked the first time the superpowers had agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals, eliminate an entire category of nuclear weapons, and employ extensive on-site inspections for verification. ..."*³⁰

In a sense, it can be said that the INF Treaty has been an indicator of the compromise reached between the US and Russia within the framework of nuclear arms control. However, especially with the 2000s, both the US and Russia began to express a number of complaints about the agreement. Starting from July 2014 the US brought the allegations that Russia was in violation of its INF Treaty obligations³¹ and in this direction, a mutual assertion process which reinforced the already existing disagreement over the treaty began between the parties. And, in this context it was seen that the US and Russia's suspended compliance with the INF Treaty in an escalating standoff about nuclear weapons between them prompted fears of a new arms race over nuclear weapons in the international area.³² And by 2019, as a result of lack of dialogue and disagreement between the US and Russia, the INF

²⁸ Shannon Bugos, "U.S. Completes INF Treaty Withdrawal", **Arms Control Today**, September 2019, Arms Control Association, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-09/news/us-completes-inf-treaty-withdrawal> (Access 14.05.2024).

²⁹ "Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)", **U.S. Department of State**, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm> (Access 16.05.2024).

³⁰ Daryl Kimball, "The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance", **Arms Control Association**, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty> (Access 26.05.2024).

³¹ *Ibid.*, Jeff Seldin, "Russia Joins US, Will Suspend INF Nuclear Treaty", **VOA**, 02 February 2019, <https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-joins-us-will-suspend-inf-nuclear-treaty/4769746.html> (Access 26.05.2024).

³² "Huge mistake": Fears of arms race as US, Russia suspend INF pact", **Aljazeera**, 03 February 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/2/3/huge-mistake-fears-of-arms-race-as-us-russia-suspend-inf-pact> (Access 27.05.2024).

useful to go back to the 1950s to understand the issue.

As Nasuh Uslu stated, in 1957, when the Soviet Union (USSR) launched its first Sputnik⁴⁸, the US administration of the period; the Eisenhower administration was concerned that the Soviets were outpacing the US in nuclear armament and that there was a confidence gap in deterring the USSR.⁴⁹

As Mehmet Gönlübol and Haluk Ülman have pointed out; the USSR's launched of its first artificial satellite, Sputnik in 1957,⁵⁰ caused great concern among NATO states, particularly the US, whom has no long-range missiles at that time, which as it showed that the USSR had succeeded in building and deploying long-range intercontinental missiles (ICBM).⁵¹

And in this case, as Ayşegül Sever stated; in 1957, the Eisenhower administration decided to deploy medium-range missiles (Jupiter and Thor) in Europe to counterbalance the Soviet technological advances made by launching the first artificial satellite Sputnik into Space and acquiring intercontinental missiles (ICBMs).⁵² Thus, the US administration, with a sense of balancing the Soviet superiority in Sputnik and intercontinental missiles without wasting time, preferred to fill the missile gap with medium-range missiles that it would place in Europe until it had long-range missiles.⁵³ And with Barton J. Bernstein's words: "In 1957 the Eisenhower administration decided to arrange to send missiles to Europe, largely to strengthen NATO, both militarily and psychologically."⁵⁴

This issue has been important at the NATO Council meeting of heads of government held in Paris on December 16-19 of the same year.⁵⁵ At this summit, the US brought up the decision to deploy intermediate-range missiles (IRBMs) in Europe.⁵⁶ In a statement to the North Atlantic Council on 16 December 1957, then US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made

⁴⁸ "Sputnik and the Dawn of the Space Age", NASA, <https://history.nasa.gov/sputnik.html> (Access 16.04.2024).

⁴⁹ Nasuh Uslu, **Türk- Amerikan İlişkileri**, 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, Ankara, Ekim 2000, p.137.

⁵⁰ "Sputnik and the Dawn of the Space Age", **op.cit.**

⁵¹ Mehmet Gönlübol vd., **Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1995)**, 9. Baskı, Siyasal Kitabevi, Ankara, 1996, p.316.

⁵² Ayşegül Sever, "Yeni Bulgular Işığında 1962 Küba Krizi ve Türkiye", **Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi**, Cilt:52, Sayı:1, Ocak 1997, p.648.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Barton J. Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?", **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol. 95, No. 1, Spring, 1980, p.98.

⁵⁵ "75. Telegram From the United States Delegation at the NATO Heads of Government Meeting to the Department of State", Foreign Relations of The United States, 1955-1957, Western European Security And Integration, Volume IV, **Office Of The Historian**, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v04/d75> (Access 16.05.2024).

⁵⁶ Sever, **op.cit.**, p.649.

this offer.⁵⁷

Dulles said the following in his statement on the subject:

"...The major deterrent to Soviet aggression against NATO is the maintenance of a retaliatory power of such capacity as to convince the Soviets that such aggression would result in their own destruction. This power rests in the United States Strategic Air Command and in other nuclear striking forces. In this respect we have superiority over the Soviet Union. As long-range missiles become available, they will play their part in maintaining the deterrent.

The shield of NATO ground, sea, and air forces is also an integral part of the deterrent. Therefore, NATO should continue its efforts to strengthen the shield, which should increasingly include a nuclear capability. United States forces in Europe ground, sea, and air-now have such a capability, and this capability is being extended to other NATO forces.

The United States has already programed approximately three-quarters of a billion dollars for modern weapons -most short-range missiles and aircraft -for forces of our NATO allies. Personnel of several NATO countries are increasingly being trained in the maintenance, operation, and deployment of these weapons systems. In this connection we endorse the NATO Missile Training Center Project.

It remains to assure that nuclear warheads will be readily available to NATO forces in event of hostilities. ...

The United States is prepared, if this Council so wishes, to participate in a NATO atomic stockpile. Within this stockpile system, nuclear warheads would be deployed under United States custody in accordance with NATO defensive planning and in agreement with the nations directly concerned. In the event of hostilities, nuclear warheads would be released to the appropriate NATO Supreme Allied Commander for employment by nuclear-capable NATO forces.

We believe that this arrangement meets NATO military requirements and insures that nuclear weapons can be employed promptly when needed.

...

If this Council so desires, and in order to strengthen NATO's deterrent power, the United States is prepared to make available to other NATO countries intermediate -range ballistic missiles, for deployment in accordance with the plans of SACEUR. Nuclear warheads for these IRBM's will become a part of the NATO atomic stockpile system.

Such IRBM deployment would be subject to agreement between SACEUR and the countries directly concerned and to agreement between each such country and the United States with respect to materiel, training, and other necessary arrangements.

We expect to be able to deliver intermediaterange missiles as soon as the NATO

⁵⁷ "Statement By Secretary Dulles, December 16", **The Department of State Bulletin**, Vol. XXXVIII, No:967, January 6, 1958, pp.8-9.

nations in which they would be deployed are ready to receive them. ...”⁵⁸

As Robert J. Watson wrote:

“When the heads of governments of NATO nations met in Paris in December 1957, Secretary Dulles announced to the North Atlantic Council on the 16th that the United States stood prepared to participate in an arrangement whereby nuclear warheads would be deployed to Europe under U.S. custody, in accord with NATO defense plans.”⁵⁹

In his speech at the meeting of the NATO Council on December 18, Adnan Menderes, the then prime minister of Türkiye, made statements indicating a positive approach to the US proposal.⁶⁰ Stating that most NATO countries required nuclear weapons, Menderes also stated that the IRBM proposal was extremely important and “favored” by Türkiye.⁶¹

At the same speech Menderes stated that:

“... At present, most of the NATO countries are completely deprived of atomic bombs of any kind. In this situation, they have no means of counter-attacking in the face of a sudden attack. It is necessary to build up stockpiles of weapons of all types in all NATO countries and in the most appropriate areas in quantities appropriate to strategic and tactical requirements.”⁶²

It can be said that with this speech, in which Menderes said that IRBMs and other nuclear weapons should be stationed “in as great numbers as possible in all NATO countries”,⁶³ he also showed Türkiye’s view of the US offer.

As a result of the meeting where long and detailed discussions were held on the subject,⁶⁴ the NATO Council agreed to stockpile nuclear warheads in Europe.⁶⁵ This is expressed in the Final Communiqué as follows:

“... 20. To this end, NATO has decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads, which will be readily available for the defence of the Alliance in case of need. In view of the present Soviet policies in the field of new weapons, the Council has also decided that intermediate range ballistic missiles will have to be put at the disposal of the

⁵⁸ “Statement By Secretary Dulles, December 16”, **The Department of State Bulletin**, Vol. XXXVIII, No:967, January 6, 1958, pp.8-9.

⁵⁹ Robert J. Watson, **History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Into the Missile Age, 1956-1960**, Vol. IV, Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C., 1997, p.465, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/secretaryofdefense/OSDSeries_Vol4.pdf (Access 16.05.2024).

⁶⁰ “Menderes’in yaptığı konuşma”, **Cumhuriyet**, 18 Aralık 1957, p.1,5.

⁶¹ “75. Telegram From the United States Delegation at the NATO Heads of Government Meeting to the Department of State”, **op.cit.**

⁶² “Menderes’in yaptığı konuşma”, **Cumhuriyet**, 18 Aralık 1957, p.1,5.

⁶³ Mehmet Gönülöbol vd., **op.cit.**, p.316.

⁶⁴ Nadir Nadi, “Paris Toplantısı”, **Cumhuriyet**, 19 Aralık 1957, s.1,3; “NATO’da yapılan çetin tartışmaların iç yüzü nedir? (Paris Hususi Muhabirimiz Aydemir Balkan Bildiriyor)”, **Cumhuriyet**, 18 Aralık 1957, p.1,2.

⁶⁵ “Final Communiqué”, **NATO**, Paris, 16th-19th December 1957, <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c571219a.htm> (Access 12.05.2024).

Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

21. The deployment of these stocks and missiles and arrangements for their use will accordingly be decided in conformity with NATO defence plans and in agreement with the states directly concerned. ...”⁶⁶

So, as Raymond L. Garthoff put it:

“... NATO had decided late in 1957, when Soviet primacy in missilery first seemed to portend a missile gap, to station American-made intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Great Britain and the United States had concluded an arrangement that had provided sixty Thor IRBM missiles to Britain. Italy agreed in 1959 to take thirty Jupiter IRBM missiles, and Turkey, fifteen. The whole process of negotiation, training, constructing facilities, and the like took several years. ...”⁶⁷

The agreement with Türkiye (whom became a member of NATO on February 18, 1952⁶⁸), which “completed in October 1959, provided for fifteen Jupiter missiles (IRBMs)”⁶⁹

On October 20, 1959, according to the press, it was officially reported from Washington that the missile defense of Western Europe would rely on 3 NATO countries; Türkiye, Italy and the Britain.⁷⁰

And on October 31, another news report stated that the US State Department had officially announced that Türkiye had agreed to the deployment of a intermediate-range ballistic missile base on its territory, and that the ballistic missiles to be sent to Türkiye would be of the 500-mile Jupiter class, capable of carrying nuclear warheads.⁷¹

An agreement between the US and Türkiye, which’s notes were exchanged on 18 September 1959 and 28 October 1959, named “*Agreement relating to the introduction of modern weapons into NATO defense forces in Turkey.*” entered into force on 28 October 1959.⁷²

And so, as Ayşegül Sever points out, agreement between Türkiye and the US on the deployment of 15 Jupiter missiles in Türkiye has been signed on October 28, 1959.⁷³

Regarding the content of the agreement, Barton J. Bernstein makes the

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ Raymond L. Garthoff, **Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis**, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1989, p.71.

⁶⁸ “Atlantik Pakına eşit haklarla iltihakımız”, **Cumhuriyet**, 18 Şubat 1952, s.1; “Millet Meclisinin Dünkü Tarihi Kararı”, **Cumhuriyet**, 19 Şubat 1952, p.1.

⁶⁹ Barton J. Bernstein, “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?”, **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol. 95, No. 1, Spring, 1980, p.99.

⁷⁰ “Türkiye’de kurulacak füze üslerine dair bir açıklama”, **Cumhuriyet**, 20 Ekim 1959, p.1.

⁷¹ “Türkiye’de kurulacak füze üssüne dair bir Amerikan açıklaması”, **Cumhuriyet**, 31 Ekim 1959, p.1.

⁷² “Bilateral Treaties in Force as of November 1, 2007”, **U.S. Department of State**, p.9, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/83042.pdf> (Access 21.04.2024).

⁷³ Sever, **op.cit.**, p.648.

following assessment:

“The agreement with Turkey, completed in October 1959, provided for fifteen Jupiter missiles (IRBMs). The arrangements of ownership and custody were cumbersome: The missiles would be owned by Turkey; the nuclear warheads would be owned by the United States and in the custody of its forces; the weapons could be launched only on the order of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (an American) on the approval of both the American and Turkish governments; and the sites would be manned by soldiers of both nations. ...”⁷⁴

When the Cuban October Missile Crisis of 1962 erupted,⁷⁵ bringing the then superpowers, the US and the USSR, to the brink of a nuclear war,⁷⁶ Jupiter missiles that were deployed in Türkiye had been an important issue during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.⁷⁷ Finally, the issue of the Jupiter missiles culminated with removing of them from Türkiye in April 1963.⁷⁸

Can be said that, as Sever and also as Bernstein stated; Türkiye, whom approved the Eisenhower administration’s decision to place intermediate-range missiles in Europe in 1957, along with Britain and Italy, thought that these missiles would generally emphasize its importance within NATO, demonstrate the closeness of US-Türkiye relations, and more importantly, that these missiles would increase its own security.⁷⁹

At the point of evaluating what kind of attitude Türkiye adopted towards nuclear weapons in the process, when the 1950s are evaluated, the following inference can be made that Türkiye’s attitude towards nuclear weapons in those years was based on geosecurity.

Türkiye’s membership in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)⁸⁰ is also of great importance in order to see the orientation of Türkiye’s attitude towards nuclear weapons in the process.

The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs states the importance and functioning of the NPT Treaty as;

“The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread

⁷⁴ Bernstein, *op.cit.*, p.99.

⁷⁵ “The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962”, **Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute United States Department of State**, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis> (Access 21.04.2024).

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ “Sovyet Rusya Küba Meselesine Nihayet Türkiye’yi de Karıştırdı, Kruçef Küba ve Türkiye’deki üslerin 2-3 hafta içinde tahliyesini istedi”, *Cumhuriyet*, 28 Ekim 1962, p.1,7.

⁷⁸ “The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962”, Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute United States Department of State, *op.cit.*

⁷⁹ Sever, *op.cit.*, p.654; Bernstein, *op.cit.*, pp.99-100.

⁸⁰ “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, Vol.729, No:10485, 1970, pp. 169-299, <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20729/volume-729-I-10485-English.pdf> (Access 05.04.2024) ; “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, **United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Treaties Database**, <https://treaties.unoda.org/t/npt> (Access 05.04.2024).

of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. ...

The Treaty is regarded as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. It was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to further the goals of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament, and to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building measure between States parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through inspections conducted by the IAEA. The Treaty promotes cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technology for all States parties, while safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons use.”⁸¹

Based on this assessment, it can be said, the NPT is so important in the search for solutions and efforts in the international area against nuclear weapons.

Türkiye signed the NPT treaty on 28 January 1969 and ratified it on 17 April 1980,⁸² which aims to achieve:

“... to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. ...”⁸³

It can be said that, Türkiye’s participation to NPT and role in the NPT can be considered as a window to understand Türkiye’s policies against the threat posed by nuclear weapons in a world where nuclear weapons exist.

When an evaluation is made in this direction Mustafa Kibaroglu’s points are important. Thus, as Mustafa Kibaroglu mentioned:

“... the fundamental thrust of Turkish foreign and security policy has been to become a state party to international nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements.”⁸⁴

Considering Türkiye’s role in international initiatives and efforts towards

⁸¹ “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)”, **United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs**, <https://disarmament.unoda.org/wmd/nuclear/npt/> (Access 21.05.2024).

⁸² “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, <https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002801d56c5> (Access 05.04.2024).

⁸³ “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)”, **United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs**, <https://disarmament.unoda.org/wmd/nuclear/npt/> (Access 21.05.2024).

⁸⁴ Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Isn’t it Time to Say Farewell to Nukes in Turkey?”, **European Security**, Vol. 14, No. 4, (443-457), December 2005, p. 446, DOI: 10.1080/09662830500528294 .

nuclear arms control and disarmament in the process, it can be seen that, since becoming a state party to the NPT, Türkiye has been supportive of international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in addition to its commitment to the NPT.⁸⁵

It can be said that, in a world where it is undeniable that nuclear weapons continue to exist and pose a great threat to world security, it is possible to see Türkiye's current attitude from the expressions as follows on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye:

"Türkiye attaches particular importance to the efforts in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation as factors that strengthen the stability. ... Türkiye hopes the international community will share the goals of disarmament and non-proliferation and collectively work towards a safer and more stable world. ... Türkiye believes that such agreements and treaties, which were agreed upon through long and painstaking diplomatic negotiations, should be fully implemented and strengthened. Türkiye also believes that this trend can only be reversed by investing more in dialogue, transparency, confidence building measures and strengthening the existing treaties and regimes.

*Active participation in international efforts in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, adherence to relevant international instruments and their full implementation are important elements of Türkiye's national policy in these areas. ..."*⁸⁶

Conclusion

It can be said that nuclear weapons, which were the primary instruments of competition in the power race between the superpowers of the Cold War period, the US and the USSR, constitute the primary element of power of the great powers of the international area in today's world the US and Russia. However, beyond being a sign of power, nuclear weapons have also been one of the world's main sources of concern since they were used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. So much so that it would not be an exaggeration to say that anxiety and fear arising from nuclear weapons have always existed in the international area throughout the process. In the international area, where it can be said that this concern still remains, it can also be said that the searches for a solution to the threat posed by these weapons also continues.

In this study, which aims to evaluate how Türkiye, has adopted an attitude towards nuclear weapons, both during the Cold War period when the nuclear arms race was dominant among the superpowers in the international area and in the following period, it has been seen that, throughout all these years Türkiye has primarily adopted a security-oriented stance towards nuclear

⁸⁵ "Arms Control and Disarmament", Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa> (Access 16.05.2024).

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

weapons. In this context, it can be said that Türkiye has prioritized the nuclear arms control, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, initiatives and cooperations that try to find a solution to the threat of nuclear weapons in the international area.

As a statement in support of this assessment, the report submitted by Türkiye on the "Implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" in "2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons"⁸⁷ can be stated.

In this respect, it can be said that some statements in this report, such as the following, shed light on Türkiye's attitude and stance regarding nuclear weapons:

"... The present report contains a summary of the activities and work done by Turkey, as a non-nuclear weapon State, to contribute to the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, namely, nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology. Turkey deems all three pillars of the Treaty to be equally important.

3. Turkey follows an international security policy with regard to non-proliferation measures and supports the incremental reduction and eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons, consistent with its obligations stemming from its being a North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally.

4. Turkey regards the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation of the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. As a country that is a party to all international non-proliferation instruments and regimes, Turkey remains committed to the full implementation and further strengthening of the Treaty with its three pillars.

5. Turkey's priority is to uphold the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a major instrument for reinforcing international peace, security and stability and to promote its universalization. ...

6. Turkey is firmly committed to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons and is working actively towards this goal. Turkey has demonstrated its continuing commitment to the principle of comprehensive, irreversible and verifiable disarmament through statements and support for resolutions on various international platforms that include this Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle, the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament.

*..."*⁸⁸

⁸⁷ "Implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Report submitted by Turkey", "2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", New York, 4-28 January 2022, pp.1-7, United Nations Digital Library, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3950513?ln=en&v=pdf#files> (Access 12.05.2024).

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.1-2.

ANALYSIS OF THE TERRORISM AS A GLOBAL CRISIS: THE
CASE OF TÜRKİYE (PKK AND ISIS)

Burak Şakir Şeker*

Introduction

In the modern era, security issues have become the primary concern for all states. The increase in terrorism can be identified as the main reason why security has become such a pressing problem. Terrorism has complicated theoretical concepts and a deep historical background. It can be far more complex to define terrorism than it initially appears. One of the hardest things to deal with while addressing terrorism is the cliché: a terrorist to one guy is a freedom warrior to another.¹ Before delving into the problem of defining terrorism, it is essential to acknowledge that every writer who has tackled this topic acknowledges the immense challenge involved. Additionally, some experts strive to avoid problems by keeping their definitions as brief as possible. Most terrorist organizations have different motivations for their activities. Many terrorists do not consider themselves as such. Even some governments define groups declared as terrorists by other states differently, looking at them from an alternative perspective. This article examines terrorism, its historical background, the identification of terrorists, and how Türkiye is affected by terrorism. Additionally, it explores the effects of terrorism on other states through Türkiye.

Definition of Terrorism in Chronological

Chronologically, the first definition of terrorism was made in 1937, beginning with the definition of the League of Nations. The term “acts of terrorism” in the current Convention refers to illegal acts committed against a state with the intent or calculation to instill fear in the minds of an individual, a group of individuals, or the broader public.² Raymond Aron defines it as it is; when a violent act has psychological repercussions that outweigh its purely physical effects, it is labeled as terroristic behavior. This makes the alleged indiscriminate actions of revolutionaries, as well as the Anglo-American zone bombings during World War II, terrorist crimes. Fear spreads easier when there is no discrimination since no one can be safe if they

* Assoc.Prof., Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Türkiye. E-mail: buraksakirseker@gmail.com, ORCID: 0000-0002-8536-1790

¹ Ganor, Boaz, “Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?” *Police Practice and Research*, 2002, 3 (4): 287–304.

² League of Nations, *Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism*, 1937, p.6 https://www.loc.gov/resource/gdcwdl.wdl_11579/?sp=6&tr=-0.057,0.298,1.577,0.754,0 (Retrieved: 06.04.2024)

are not a target.³ Brian M. Jenkins said in 1974 that terrorist attacks target bystanders instead of the actual victims, so terrorism is a theater.⁴

The act of using random or symbolic victims as convenient targets for violence is known as terrorism, according to Alex P. Schmid's written in 1984 at Academic Consensus Definition. Terrorism is the act of using random or symbolic victims as convenient targets for violence. These victims are chosen based on shared traits within their group or class. This causes other members of the group or class to live in a state of fear (terror) due to the credible threat of violence.⁵

When terror is aimed at a particular group, it deliberately undermines the sense of security for the other members of potential victims. Most people watching see the violence against the target as abnormal due to the brutality of the act, the non-warlike setting or timing of the violence, or the disregard for the rules of conventional warfare.⁶

Beyond the terror target, the norm breach generates an attentive audience, segments of which may become the primary object of manipulation. This covert tactic seeks to either mobilize secondary targets of attention or paralyze the terror target to induce bewilderment or acquiescence.⁷

Walter Laqueur argued that terrorism's primary instrument is the use of violence or the threat of violence. It is a tactic for fighting or achieving specific goals, which defies humanitarian law and aims to overthrow the government. Terrorism also aims to instill fear in the victim.⁸

Acts of violence carried out repeatedly by individuals, groups, or state actors for illegal or political purposes are known as terrorism. Unlike assassination, the direct targets of violence are not always the main targets. Terrorists typically select their victims either randomly (targets of opportunity) or carefully (representative or symbolic targets) from a specific demographic. Terrorist organizations use threats and violence to manipulate their audience, making it the target of terror, demands, or attention, depending on their goals of intimidation, coercion, or propaganda.⁹

The intentional use of violence against people or civilian targets, or the

³ R. Aron, *Peace and War*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966, p. 170.

⁴ Brian M. Jenkins, *International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare*. St. Monica: RAND, 1974, p. 4

⁵ Alex P. Schmid, *Political Terrorism. A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature. With a Bibliography by the Author and a World Directory of "Terrorist" Organizations by A.J. Jongman*. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1984, p. 76-77

⁶ Sophio Barbakadze, *Concept of Terrorism in International Relations*. *Caucasus Journal of Social Sciences*, 2023, 2, p. 164.

⁷ Schmid, *Ibid.*, p. 111.

⁸ Walter Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism*, Little, Brown, 1987.

⁹ Alex P. Schmid ; *Political Terrorism*. Revised, expanded, and updated edition. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1988, p. 28.

threat of using such violence to further political objectives, is referred to as terrorism.¹⁰ According to the US Department of State, terrorism refers to planned, politically motivated acts of violence carried out by subnational organizations or covert operatives against civilian targets with the primary goal of influencing a target audience. Terrorism involving nationals or the territory of multiple nations is referred to as "international terrorism." Any group that engages in international terrorism or that has a sizable subgroup engaged in it is considered an international terrorist group.¹¹ Terrorism is the intentional death of non-combatants for political reasons through random selection. Its goal is to demoralize and instill fear in a population to advance a political outcome.¹²

According to Judith Tinnes, terrorism is a communication strategy in which sub-state actors use asymmetrical, well-planned, unpredictable violence against targets chosen at random or because of their symbolic significance, including civilians, to instill a deep sense of fear or insecurity in the populace. Maximum pressure is intended to be established by psychological manipulation to elicit the desired response. Terrorist violence violates established military and social norms for conducting opposition and waging war to secure the broadest possible audience. Because of the psychological impact of this fantastic communication, messages are meant to be sent.¹³

Terrorism might appear in many ways, including criminal, emotional, cultural, political, religious, and intellectual manifestations. It employs a versatile targeting approach that equally targets combatants, law enforcement personnel, and civilians. Establishing a transparent system of governance is its ultimate goal to obtain unchallenged societal control and political power.¹⁴

Theoretical Background of Terrorism and Concepts of Terrorism

The concept of terrorism is hard to define and impossible to put in a frame because terrorism is a famous term; all people use this term for all kinds of situations. However, many scholars could not develop a standard definition among themselves. Though there isn't a single accepted definition for the term, terrorism may be roughly defined as a kind of coercion that uses or threatens to use violence to instill fear and thereby achieve political or

¹⁰ Ganor, *Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹¹ The Department of State, 22 USC 2656: Management of foreign affairs. [https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=\(title:22%20section:2656%20edition:prelim\)&req=07.04.2024](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:22%20section:2656%20edition:prelim)&req=07.04.2024)

¹² Michael J. Jordan, *Terrorism's Slippery Definition Eludes UN Diplomats*, *Christian Science Monitor*, February 4, 2002, p. 7.

¹³ Judith Tinnes, *Internetbenutzung islamistischer Terror- und Insurgentengruppen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von medialen Geiselnahmen in Irak, Afghanistan, Pakistan und Saudi-Arabien*. Ph.D. Dissertation, Saarbrücken: Universität des Saarlandes, 2010, p. 28.

¹⁴ Feyyaz, Muhammad, "Terrorism Can and Should Be Defined. But How?" *Strategic Analysis*, 2019, 43 (4): 310–27.

ideological objectives. The typical terrorist triangle consists of A attacking B to persuade or compel C to modify its stance on a desired action or policy. This sets contemporary terrorist violence apart from ordinary violence in legal terms. Because the violence is abruptly focused on innocent victims, the assault increases terror, which in turn exerts pressure on governments and other third parties to alter their positions or policies. Modern terrorists employ a variety of violent tactics, randomly attacking state leaders, military installations, and civilians alike. So, the international community has struggled for years to define terrorism.¹⁵

The UN General Assembly has repeatedly planned international conferences with the specific goal of resolving this issue. However, there are still differences of opinion. In this process, it is tough to put terrorism into a complete framework because it develops within itself, and new collectives emerge. For example, in the past, when terrorism was mentioned, only armed attacks came to mind, but now, since there are new concepts such as cyber-terrorism, all terrorist activities remain separate from each other. Thanks to new technologies, terrorism remained alive and found a place for itself in the new digital world. This situation also made the struggle against terrorism difficult. Press freedom promotes terrorism by spreading fear and anxiety through disturbing images and information. But the media could make terrorism irrelevant.

When arguing about terrorism, we must understand that terrorism has many factors contributing to the confusion of the subject, such as motivation, religion, and the nature of issues. While it is difficult to find a definition of terrorism that does not involve violence, the use of violence is often associated with certain groups and specific types of conflicts. It is a concept that can be applied by almost anyone in almost any conflict situation.¹⁶

There are several theories out there that attempt to describe terrorism. For instance, acts of terrorism are different than war crimes. It can be defined as the willful use of force against non-combatants to further ideological, political, or religious objectives. And it is clear that political violence and terrorism are inextricably linked, despite differences in other areas.¹⁷

Despite being a global issue, terrorism has notable geographical variations. It is a significant security danger high on the political agenda, which is its commonality. There isn't a widely agreed-upon definition due to several factors, such as disputed terminology, criminalization and

¹⁵ UNODC, Introduction to International Terrorism, 2018. https://www.unodc.org/documents/e4j/18-04932_CT_Mod_01_ebook_FINAL.pdf (Retrieved: 07.04.2024).

¹⁶ Dragana Petrović, General characteristics of the basic concept of terrorism, *Strani pravni život*, 64/2020, p. 153.

¹⁷ Vaishnavi Narreddy, A Critical Analysis on Terrorism, *International Journal of Recent Scientific Research*, Vol. 14, Issue, 09, p. 4186-4190.

delegitimization, various applications, and ongoing changes to the existing definitions. Additionally, a misleading comparison between terrorists and liberation fighters is made. Governments deliberately employ the term “terrorism” to denounce particular types of political violence and further their agendas.

There are two aspects to terrorism: actors and actions. Because terrorists may adopt non-terrorist behaviors and non-terrorists can adopt terrorist behaviors, these senses are ambiguous.¹⁸ The closest relatives of terrorism are hate crimes. The targets are selected primarily based on their group's identity without considering their economic circumstances. For instance, violence against Turks in Germany or the lynching of African Americans or Latinos in the USA.¹⁹ Two common forms of terrorism that help us better understand the phenomenon are racial and pyro-terrorism. Racial terrorism involves violence committed against racial minorities by organized groups in the name of white nationalist and Aryan goals. It essentially represents resistance without a leader.²⁰ The term “agroterrorism” refers to the use of arson or incendiary attacks to intimidate governments, the public, or other groups for political and social motives. On the other hand, pyrotechnics is distinguished from arson in its psychological and political aspects.²¹

Understanding terrorism's origins and causes is crucial to combating it successfully. Many specialists are interested in this topic and are working to develop a theoretical framework to explain terrorism. International relations scholars have mainly used structural, psychological, and rational choice theories to define terrorism. Other, less well-known hypotheses include the conspiracy hypothesis, the communication theory, etc.”

The structural hypothesis holds that different civilizations' unique social, political, economic, and cultural environments lead to terrorism. Conversely, the psychological approach looks for the triggers that might cause a regular person to become a terrorist. The latter theory similarly focuses on the relationships between the three components of a terror act: the terrorists, the direct target, and the indirect target (the public). It also examines the internal dynamics of the terrorist organizations. Lastly, the cost-benefit analysis of joining a terrorist group is reviewed under the rational choice theory.²²

¹⁸ Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio & de la Calle, Luis, What We Talk About When We Talk About Terrorism. *Politics and Society*, 2011 39 (3):451-472.

¹⁹ Krueger, Alan B., and Jitka Malečková. “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, vol. 17, no. 4, 2003, p. 119–44.

²⁰ Blee, Kathleen M, “Women and Organized Racial Terrorism in the United States.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 2005, 28 (5): 421–33.

²¹ Baird R. Pyro-terrorism - The threat of arson-induced forest fires as a future terrorist weapon of mass destruction. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 2006, 29(5), p. 415-428.

²² Caplan, Bryan. “Terrorism: The Relevance of the Rational Choice Model.” *Public Choice*, vol. 128, no. 1/2, 2006, pp. 91–107.

The following are ten structural causes of terrorism and the factors that may influence an event:

1. Location
2. Type of political system
3. Level of modernization
4. Social, cultural, and historical context
5. Organizational structure and unequal development in different societal sectors
6. Existence of other types of instability
7. Support
8. Ineffective attempts to stop acts of terror
9. Accessibility to weapons and explosives
10. Sentiments of demonstrative opposition to injustice.²³

In conclusion, terrorism is closely linked to the coercive fear and threat paradigm.²⁴ In comparison to dictatorships, terrorist action is more common in democracies. The primary driving force is the intergroups' relation dynamics of democracy, where different ideologies vie for a restricted amount of political sway and a shortage of avenues for voicing political complaints.²⁵ The connection is not linear. Although it is difficult to define terrorism theoretically, the common denominator of the definitions becomes clear that terrorism is committed knowingly and deliberately to shake or destroy the economic, social, political, and constitutional structures of a country.

Historical Background of Terrorism

Contrary to what it is called, terrorism is not a very new term. Throughout history, there have been organizations that could be considered terrorists, even if they do not fit the exact definition. The Sicarii, a Jewish group during the Roman period in the 1st century, was a group that carried out assassinations in a sort of organized manner, and some people see this group as the first terrorist group. The Sicarii Zealots, dubbed "terrorists dedicated to inciting a revolt against Roman rule in Judea," were the first documented

²³ Ross, Jeffrey Ian. "Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model." *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 30, no. 3, 1993, pp. 317–29.

²⁴ Gadarian, Shana Kushner. "The Politics of Threat: How Terrorism News Shapes Foreign Policy Attitudes." *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 72, no. 2, 2010, pp. 469–83.

²⁵ Chenoweth, Erica. "Democratic Competition and Terrorist Activity." *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 72, no. 1, 2010, pp. 16–30.

organization to employ violence to effect political change.²⁶ On the other hand, many different groups, such as the ninjas in Japan, can be interpreted as terrorist groups.²⁷

Between the 11th and 13th centuries, under the leadership of Hasan Sabbah, an organization called Assassins (Hashshashin) in today's Iran, Iraq, and Syria had a structure similar to modern terrorism. Assassins have a self-sacrificial (fedayeen) mentality. Similar to modern terrorist organizations, members prioritize the group's goals over themselves, willing to sacrifice for the collective cause. Just like today's terrorist organizations, they have become a threat to every state in the Middle East geography where they are located.²⁸

Modern terrorism emerged around the close of the last quarter of the 18th century, sparked by the French Revolution. For the first time in French history, the 1795 attempts of the new republican government to suppress counterrevolutionaries were referred to as acts of terror. Due to the policies of the French governments of this era, a climate of fear was created throughout France, and therefore, the term terrorist regime emerged, and the use of the term terrorism became widespread worldwide.²⁹

Terrorism has always functioned as a continuum, symbolizing enduring power struggles and long-standing conflicts between factions inside countries. Beginning in the late 1800s, about a century after the French Revolution, two essential elements gave rise to the concept of terrorism. The first was the change in modes of transportation and communication. By lowering the time and distance needed for people and information to travel, these developments contributed to the opening up of the world.³⁰

A wave of terrorism is a series of events that occur within a specific time frame, consisting of periods of expansion and contraction. Its transnational nature is crucial; similar actions occur across borders, driven by a shared dominant ideology that shapes participating groups' characteristics and interpersonal dynamics. The first global or multinational wave in history was the anarchist wave, from 1870 to 1910, aimed at eliminating government

²⁶ Richard A. Horsley. "The Sicarii: Ancient Jewish 'Terrorists.'" *The Journal of Religion*, vol. 59, no. 4, 1979, pp. 435–58.

²⁷ Thufail, Fadjar I. "Ninjas in Narratives of Local and National Violence in Post-Suharto Indonesia." *Beginning to Remember: The Past in the Indonesian Present*, edited by Mary S. Zurbuchen, University of Washington Press, 2005, pp. 150–67.

²⁸ Fine, Jonathan. "Political and Philological Origins of the Term 'Terrorism' from the Ancient Near East to Our Times." *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 46, no. 2, 2010, pp. 271–88.

²⁹ Chaliand, Gérard, and Arnaud Blin. "The Invention of Modern Terror." *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to ISIS*, edited by Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, 1st ed., University of California Press, 2016, pp. 95–112.

³⁰ Rapoport, David C. *Waves of Global Terrorism: From 1879 to the Present*. Columbia University Press, 2022.

oppression. The 1920s began the anti-colonial wave, which lasted for almost 40 years. This was followed by the new left wave in 1960, reaching its peak at the end of the twentieth century and declining rapidly, with only a few organizations still active. A religious wave has continued from 1979 to the present and may fade by this decade, at which point a new wave may emerge.³¹

The anarchist movement in Russia in the late 19th century marked the beginning of the first wave of contemporary terrorism that eventually extended throughout Europe and the Balkan republics. To bring Russia closer to Western norms, Czar Alexander II carried out several significant reforms in 1861, including abolishing the death penalty, limiting local self-government, and releasing serfs, or one-third of the Russian population, to provide them with the means to purchase land.³²

But preventing the rising unhappiness and hunger didn't help so much. The first known nationalist rebel group of the anarchist wave that employed calculated violence against Russian government officials was Narodnaya Volya, or The People's Will. After years of government harassment, many Russian anarchists had left their native country by the end of the 19th century, seeking safety in anarchist-friendly diaspora networks that shared their hostility against the czarist rule.³³

The 1901 killing of US President McKinley bolstered global attempts to disband anarchist organizations both domestically and overseas. In 1904, European states signed an anti-anarchist convention requiring more international police collaboration and intelligence sharing. This and other initiatives maintained tremendous pressure on anarchist groups, causing the wave to lose the impetus to carry out assaults and continue its campaign. The anarchist wave was ultimately suppressed by the 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the outbreak of World War I, which changed Europe's political agenda.³⁴

The quest for autonomy was the driving force behind the second wave's anti-colonial wave. At this point, terrorists and freedom fighters faced off, with the latter using hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. It was sparked by the cataclysmic international events of the Versailles Peace Treaty and the end of

³¹ Auger, Vincent A. "Right-Wing Terror: A Fifth Global Wave?" *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 14, no. 3, 2020, pp. 87–97.

³² Cross, Anthony. "Reign of Alexander II (1855–1881)." In *The Lands of the Romanovs: An Annotated Bibliography of First-Hand English-Language Accounts of the Russian Empire (1613-1917)*, 1st ed., Open Book Publishers, 2014, pp. 227–71.

³³ Hilbrenner, Anke, and Frithjof Benjamin Schenk. "Introduction: Modern Times? Terrorism in Late Tsarist Russia." *Jahrbücher Für Geschichte Osteuropas*, vol. 58, no. 2, 2010, pp. 161–71.

³⁴ Jensen, Richard Bach, *The United States, International Policing and the War against Anarchist Terrorism, 1900–1914*, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 2001, 13 (1): 15–46.

World War I, which caused the anarchist movement to lose pace throughout the first quarter of the 20th century. The winners of World War I employed the notion of national self-determination to dismantle the empires of the vanquished governments, primarily those in Europe, and establish new areas for independence. The non-European regions were deemed unsuitable for independence and were placed under League of Nations mandates. Eventually, they moved toward independence and were ruled directly by the victorious nations until they were considered capable of self-governance.

The anti-colonial wave brought about a change in terrorist methods. The new organizations created a more intricate structure by extending targets and carefully timing their attacks since they thought the first wave tactic of assassinating high-profile government leaders was futile. The goal of the second wave approach was to kill police officers and their families to destroy the police as a government's eyes and ears. Terrorists believed that when military personnel took the place of law enforcement, they would eventually resort to employing violence against the populace, resulting in counter-atrocities and increasing popular support for their causes.³⁵

The new left wave of the 1960s blended nationalism and radicalism as the third wave. A fresh face was given to international conflict by strategies like plane hijackings and hostage-taking. Terrorist organizations concentrated on attempting to overthrow the current capitalist system in the 1960s by promoting concepts associated with the Marxist socialist revolution. Radical hopes that the repressive Western system could be overthrown were sparked by the Viet Cong's effectiveness against American troops. Following the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, third-wave terrorist organizations emerged throughout the West: the Italian Red Brigades, the American Weather Underground, the West German Red Army Faction, and the French Action Directe. National boundaries were not a barrier to the revolutionary spirit of the new left wave, which united previously autonomous terrorist groups. The pooling of resources contributed to the resuscitation of the phrase international terrorism which was previously used to characterize a new mode of operation and set cooperative groupings apart from terrorists of the previous century. With the conclusion of the Cold War at the end of the 1980s, the new left wave began to wane. The incapacity of the terrorist groups involved to reconcile divergent demands from the multiple international actors at play undermined their efficacy. Trying to meet the conflicting demands of various groups led to a disregard for their home bases. The new left movements eventually faded away as a result of the international community's unwillingness to compromise and its unwavering resistance to

³⁵ Shughart, William F. "An Analytical History of Terrorism, 1945-2000." *Public Choice*, vol. 128, no. 1/2, 2006, pp. 7–39.

terrorist demands.³⁶

Religion is a strong foundation of the fourth wave, transcending into the state bond. The Islamic revolution in Iran and the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union are important dates to be noted in this wave. LTTE³⁷, Aum Shinrikyo³⁸, a radical Christian cult known as the Lord's Resistance Army³⁹, and Al-Qaeda are popular events in the religious wave.⁴⁰ This wave differs from its predecessors in several ways, chief among them being that participating groups are motivated by religious views rather than political goals for the first time. It seems that religiously driven violence is still prevalent and may be the main engine of international terrorism for some time to come, given the history of Al-Qaeda and the more recent rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Daesh⁴¹ during the fourth wave.

Al-Qaeda launched attacks on American military and civilian facilities in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Lebanon in the 1990s. The first successful terrorist attack by foreign perpetrators on American soil took place in 1993 with the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. Al-Qaeda saw American troops in the Middle East as an insult to the sacred regions and a barrier to the unification of the Muslim world, in addition to targeting the United States. As a result, American troops were forced to either abandon their mission and leave the area or use force to repel the attacks. The USS Cole was struck in 2000 while refueling in Yemen, marking the first terrorist attack against a naval vessel. When the year was 1998, US embassies in African countries such as Tanzania and Kenya were also targeted by bombs. The world was not prepared for the September 11 attacks, which were a cataclysmic event that resulted in the international fight against terror. After the September 11 attack, the problem of religious terrorism became the main agenda of the world, and as a result, the USA intervened in Afghanistan. This terrorist attack even changed airline security procedures and maritime regulations.⁴²

The hatred of the West by the Taliban and Al Qaeda leads people to believe that these menaces are confined to a particular area or culture. However, the attacks that have occurred in Indo-China, Europe, and other

³⁶ Norris, Jesse J. "Entrapment and Terrorism on The Left: An Analysis Of Post-9/11 Cases." *New Criminal Law Review: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal*, vol. 19, no. 2, 2016, pp. 236–78.

³⁷ Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Waged a violent struggle against the government to establish an independent state in northwestern Sri Lanka.

³⁸ Sarin nerve gas attack on Tokyo subway by this Buddhist Japanese group

³⁹ Operates in Africa and is known for killing entire villages and kidnapping children to be used as soldiers while ignoring the rights of civilians

⁴⁰ Sarvananthan, Muttukrishna. "Terrorism' or 'Liberation'? Towards a Distinction: A Case Study of the Armed Struggle of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)." *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 12, no. 2, 2018, pp. 1–18.

⁴¹ al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa al-Sham

⁴² Cordesman, Anthony H. "Terrorism and U.S. Wars: Afghanistan, Pakistan." *Global Trends in Terrorism: 1970-2016*, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2017, pp. 259–90.

parts of the world demonstrate that religious terrorism is a contemporary threat to civilization. The inability to accurately forecast the scope of the attacks was due to differences in the terrorists' modus operandi (MO) and the gaps between academia and policymakers. Some Americans showed signs of extreme ethnocentrism and decreased support for Arabs and Muslims following the events of 9/11. Increased surveillance, security checks, and incidences of anti-Islamic hate crimes resulted from this.⁴³

The idea of pyroterrorism gained popularity after the 9/11 attacks. Terrorists employ catalysts to force the target to unleash its destructive energy rather than deliver explosives to the location. This was the primary way the fire produced heat, weakening the building's steel supports and causing it to collapse completely.⁴⁴

The radical nationalist movement, which originated in Europe and has spread globally in recent years, could potentially add to the existing wave of religious extremism or even supplant it with a new fifth wave. Following the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, al Qaeda suffered significant losses in its leadership. Despite the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011, al Qaeda has remained a considerable security threat for the past decade. The emergence of ISIS in 2014 calls into question the idea that violent religious extremism is waning and may be reaching its peak, signaling the onset of a new wave in the coming years.⁴⁵

Terrorism in Türkiye: Incidents involving PKK and ISIS

The impact of terrorism in Turkish history is quite old. Numerous nationalist organizations saw a sharp drop after turning to violence to overthrow the Ottoman Empire. Among them was the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun), a terrorist movement of Armenians that was established in Tbilisi in 1890 by C. Mikaelian. In an attempt to gain European assistance to pressure the Ottoman Empire into relinquishing control of some territories, the group published newsletters, smuggled firearms, and seized buildings. These actions led to an unsuccessful assassination attempt on the Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II in 1905 using a bomb.⁴⁶

The global rise of left and right-wing movements coincided with the initial

⁴³ Kam, Cindy D., and Donald R. Kinder. "Terror and Ethnocentrism: Foundations of American Support for the War on Terrorism." *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 69, no. 2, 2007, pp. 320–38.

⁴⁴ Bakker, Edwin. "Forecasting Terrorism: The Need for a More Systematic Approach." *Journal of Strategic Security*, vol. 5, no. 4, 2012, pp. 69–84.

⁴⁵ Minkenberg, Michael. "The Rise of the Radical Right in Eastern Europe: Between Mainstreaming and Radicalization." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 18, no. 1, 2017, pp. 27–35.

⁴⁶ Stephanov, Darin N. "The Second Shift in (Modern) Ruler Visibility: The Reign of Abdülhamid II (1876–1909)." *Ruler Visibility and Popular Belonging in the Ottoman Empire, 1808-1908*, vol. 1, Edinburgh University Press, 2019, pp. 127–98.

increase in terrorism in Türkiye. These movements significantly impacted university students in the 1970s, leading to an unstable environment in the country. Terrorist acts by leftists in these years were a significant contributing factor to the Turkish democracy crisis and the military's political involvement in March 1971. Under the general auspices of the armed forces, a significant anti-terrorist effort was initiated during the military takeover of politics in 1971–1973. Nearly all of the Turkish People's Liberation Army (TPLA) / Turkish People's Liberation Front's (TPLF) or DHKP-C⁴⁷ Top cadres were either killed or captured by the security forces.⁴⁸

When discussing terrorism in Türkiye, the first thing that comes to mind is the PKK terrorist organization led by Abdullah Öcalan. The PKK⁴⁹ aims to establish a socialist Kurdish state in the southeastern region of Türkiye. It has conflicted with the Turkish Armed Forces for almost half a century. The PKK is a complete terrorist organization, as it aligns with most of the definitions mentioned in the previous parts, whether by killing innocent people, causing material and moral damage, or directly harming civilians or soldiers in various regions. The other left-wing terrorist organization in Türkiye is DHKP-C, and there are other smaller terrorist organizations weaker than them.⁵⁰

These actions by the PKK started with village raids in the southeastern region of Türkiye and continued with bomb attacks in big cities. Due to its violent tactics, the PKK has not gained much popularity among Kurds. PKK frequently alters its strategy and attacks Turkish troops to show the world that they are an independent group that exclusively targets the Turkish army and not the civilian population. As a result, they try to get attention through mainstream media, alerting the world to the existence of a significant political rather than military Kurdish issue.⁵¹

Since Türkiye is geographically in the middle of most ideologies, there are also right-wing radical terrorist organizations other than socialist groups. Even though we see these right-wing radical groups in the first Sheikh Said rebellion, the most important radical organization in recent history is Daesh. The Syrian civil war, which started in 2011, significantly damaged the Syrian government's sovereignty over its territory. Radical groups in Syria turned this authority gap into an opportunity and established the ISIS terrorist

⁴⁷ Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front

⁴⁸ Margaret Krahenbuh, Political Kidnappings in Türkiye 1971-1972, Department of State and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1977.

⁴⁹ Kurdistan Workers' Party

⁵⁰ Freedman, Benjamin. "Officially Blacklisted Extremist/Terrorist (Support) Organizations: A Comparison of Lists from Six Countries and Two International Organizations." *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 4, no. 2, 2010, pp. 46–52.

⁵¹ Stanton, Jessica A. "Terrorism in the Context of Civil War." *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 75, no. 4, 2013, pp. 1009–22.

organization, which is the most popular one after Al-Qaeda. Although ISIS was primarily active in Syria, armed and bomb suicide attacks were carried out on European states due to the religious mentality within the organization. Türkiye was also greatly affected by these attacks. At that time, Türkiye also engaged in an armed conflict with ISIS because it organized an armed intervention in Syrian territory for its security. The Turkish Armed Forces fought these conflicts together with the Free Syrian Army and played an important role in weakening ISIS.⁵²

PKK has been viewed as the primary danger to the national unity and defense of the Turkish state both inside Türkiye and by several analysts outside of it. When ISIS was added to all these terrorist organizations in 2013, a climate of terrorism began in Türkiye. There were countless attacks, including the Reina nightclub and Kızılay province, as a centrum to frighten the society and make them afraid of crowded places.

The activities of the PKK have significantly impacted Türkiye's security and political landscape. The ongoing conflict has destabilized southeastern Türkiye, resulting in prolonged violence that has drained the country's resources and increased tensions. The Turkish military has conducted numerous operations to neutralize the PKK, both within Türkiye and in northern Iraq, where the group has established bases. Politically, the PKK has complicated Türkiye's efforts to resolve the Kurdish issue through peaceful means. Several peace processes, particularly in the early 2000s, have collapsed due to renewed violence. The Turkish government has designated the PKK as a terrorist organization, and international entities like the United States and the European Union have echoed this classification.

The rise of ISIS presented a significant security threat to Türkiye, both domestically and from outside its borders. The influx of refugees from Syria, along with ISIS's recruitment efforts, strained Türkiye's internal stability. The group's attacks on Turkish territory heightened fears of radicalization and homegrown terrorism. In response, Türkiye tightened border security, conducted military operations in Syria, and collaborated with international coalitions to combat ISIS. The Turkish government also intensified its crackdown on ISIS cells within the country, arresting suspected militants and dismantling their networks. However, the threat from ISIS persists, especially as the group transitions from territorial control to conducting underground terrorist activities.

The terrorism crisis in Türkiye is closely linked to regional and global geopolitics. For example, the activities of the PKK affect Türkiye's relations

⁵² van Veen, Erwin, et al. "Tracing the Evolution of the Syrian Civil War (2011-2020)." *Band-Aids, Not Bullets: EU Policies and Interventions in the Syrian and Iraqi Civil Wars*, Clingendael Institute, 2021, pp. 15–22.

with Iraq and Syria, as the group operates across these borders. Türkiye's military interventions in northern Iraq, which aim to eliminate PKK bases, have created tensions with both the Iraqi government and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). Additionally, Türkiye's involvement in the fight against ISIS has significant geopolitical implications. Its military operations in Syria, intended to combat ISIS, have faced criticism for also targeting the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which is an extension of the PKK. This situation has complicated Türkiye's relationship with the United States, which supports the SDF in the battle against ISIS.

Türkiye's counterterrorism strategy has evolved in response to the dual threats of the PKK and ISIS. Domestically, the Turkish government has implemented a combination of military, political, and legal measures to combat these terrorist groups. Military operations have been central to Türkiye's approach, including frequent cross-border raids targeting PKK positions in northern Iraq and northern Syria. In the fight against ISIS, Türkiye has increasingly collaborated with international coalitions. Turkish forces have participated in joint operations with NATO and other allies, focusing on ISIS strongholds in Syria and Iraq. Additionally, intelligence sharing, and border security measures have been strengthened to prevent the flow of foreign fighters and to track potential ISIS cells within Türkiye.

Conclusion

The analysis above delves into the complexities of defining terrorism, citing various historical definitions and perspectives on the subject. It highlights the challenges in defining terrorism, particularly in the context of differing motivations and varying viewpoints held by different actors. The article also focuses on the historical background of terrorism and how it affects Türkiye, shedding light on the impact of terrorism within the nation and on the global stage. Additionally, the piece examines the influence of terrorism on other states through the lens of Türkiye. The chronological progression of the definition of terrorism is discussed, starting from the League of Nations' definition in 1937 and moving through various interpretations by notable figures such as Raymond Aron, Brian M. Jenkins, Alex P. Schmid, Walter Laqueur, and the US Department of State. These interpretations encompass the psychological and physical impacts of terrorism, the selection of victims, the use of violence, and the political motivations behind terrorist acts. The article also explores how terrorism aims to instill fear and demoralize non-combatants for political reasons. The analysis emphasizes the need for a nuanced approach to counterterrorism efforts that considers the diverse factors and motivations driving terrorist activities. The study contributes to a deeper comprehension of terrorism as a global crisis and its far-reaching implications for states and societies.

The concept of terrorism is quite complex and does not have an exact definition. However, when we talk about terrorism, the idea of creating fear to achieve specific goals comes to mind. Throughout history, terrorism has been categorized into four waves: the anarchist wave, the anti-colonial wave, the new left wave, and the religious wave. These waves serve as a framework for understanding modern terrorism. The new left wave and religious wave have had a global impact, significantly influencing countries' security policies over the past century. When people think of terrorism, they often associate it with religious terrorist organizations. This association is primarily due to the substantial influence of the spiritual wave. Radical religious groups like Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS have posed serious security threats worldwide through their terrorist activities.

Acts of terrorism in Türkiye began with the new wave of the left led by the PKK, and later, religious terrorist organizations such as Daesh were influenced by the religious wave and became a menace in Türkiye. However, Türkiye's secular state structure has not been as influenced by the religious wave as the people of other Islamic states. The Turkish Armed Forces, which also conducts military interventions outside the border, are fighting against ISIS and PYD, the Syrian branch of the PKK. Türkiye's interactions with terrorist organizations have caused economic and sociological damage. Terrorism in Türkiye not only aims to spread fear or oppose the state for a specific purpose but also aims to hinder the development of the country, destabilize it, and create polarization. In short, the main goal of terrorist groups in Türkiye is to disrupt the country's internal balance. In other words, we can say that foreign states support the terrorist groups in Türkiye.

RECONSTRUCTING COUNTERINTELLIGENCE THEORY
THROUGH THE CONCEPTS OF RISK AND THREAT: THE
ACTIVITIES OF GREEK SECRET SERVICE MEMBER SAVAS
KALETERIDIS IN TÜRKİYE

Hasan Mesut Önder*

Introduction

Counterintelligence includes protecting state secrets, counter-espionage and countering covert / clandestine / subversive activities.¹ In this respect, it can be said that a conceptualization that covers all functions of counterintelligence will pave the way for the development of descriptive theories. In its assessment of counterintelligence, the CIA emphasizes three conceptual foundations: information, action and organization.² In order to develop a theory of counterintelligence, it is necessary to develop concept sets based on knowledge and action and to conceptualize in this context. Loch Johnson divides counterintelligence into security and counterespionage, classifying security as defensive and counterespionage as offensive. This classification focuses on the action dimension of counterintelligence and ignores the information that emerges as a result of counterintelligence activities.³

Articles on counterintelligence that focus on the organizational dimension emphasize the study of the organization and behavior of foreign intelligence organizations and the application of the information obtained.⁴ In the assessments that emphasize the action aspect, counterintelligence is considered as an activity against active enemy intelligence organizations and enemy spies.⁵ The common feature of all these assessments is that they do not emphasize the information aspect of counterintelligence. In order to develop a general theory of counterintelligence, new concept sets need to be created to cover the information and action dimensions. This study focuses on the question of how the general theory of counterintelligence should be constructed. In this respect, it is argued that the counterintelligence theory

* Dr., Independent Researcher, E-mail: hasanmesutonder@gmail.com ORCID: 0000-0002-0175-634X
¹ Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence*, Routledge, New York, 2000.
² Central Intelligence Agency, *Counterintelligence for National Security*, CIA Historical Review Program, Washington, DC, 1993.
³ Loch Johnson, *Essential of Strategic Intelligence*, Praeger, Santa Barbara 2014, p.15.
⁴ John Ehrman, *Toward a Theory of CI What are We Talking About When We Talk about Counterintelligence?* *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 53 No. 2, 2009, pp.1-27.
⁵ William R. Johnson, *Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad: How to Be a Counterintelligence Officer*, Georgetown University Press, Washington, 2009, p.2

should be determined according to the threat diagram.

In order to create the concept sets that will build the theory, it is necessary to reveal how the threats faced by intelligence organizations are formed and how these threats turn into concrete damages. Intelligence organizations may sometimes remain in a state of uncertainty due to lack of information, and when sufficient information is gathered, this uncertainty is transformed into measurable risks. In the process, risks are transformed into concrete threats, which include intention, opportunity and capacity components. It can be said that the next process is the transformation of the threat into tangible damage.

Considering the threat diagram, it is considered that all information gathering, analysis and action processes of intelligence organizations until the concrete threat is revealed should be called proactive counterintelligence. It can be said that all activities carried out when the concrete threat moves to the stage of causing harm should be considered as reactive counterintelligence. It can be argued that the production model of proactive and reactive counterintelligence approaches is different from the strategic intelligence cycle and consists of the process of activity detection, penetration, taking the activity under control, finalizing the operation and reporting.

Savvas Kalenteridis, a member of the Greek secret service, is an important example in terms of revealing all the functions of counterintelligence, as he was involved not only in espionage but also in special and subversive activities in Türkiye. Savvas Kalenteridis was present when Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, which Türkiye considers a terrorist organization, was captured in Kenya. An adversarial intelligence service officer is usually thought to be engaged in espionage activities and to seek only to steal secrets of the target state. However, at times, adversarial intelligence officers may engage in both espionage and covert/ clandestine/ special and subversive activities. This determines the level of relations between the two countries. Since Savvas Kalenteridis' operations against Türkiye include all activities that fall within the scope of counterintelligence, this case study is considered to add a new dimension to the theory of counterintelligence.

This study examines how a counterintelligence case has influenced the current understanding of counterintelligence. The study consists of two parts. The first part presents proactive and reactive counterintelligence approaches and discusses the counterintelligence production model of these approaches. The second part analyzes Savvas Kalenteridis' activities against Türkiye in the light of this framework.

Proactive and Reactive Counterintelligence

Counterintelligence is an intelligence discipline that requires protecting state secrets, countering espionage, preventing clandestine / special / covert

and subversive activities, and is more focused on the action aspect, as it is an intelligence discipline with an overriding policing aspect in terms of its powers such as arrest, ensuring trial, etc., which are given to intelligence organizations by law enforcement agencies.

It can be said that the action aspect of counterintelligence consists of counter-espionage and resisting special / covert / clandestine / subversive activities. Detection of the activities of an adversary intelligence organization, penetration operation, arrest of a spy network, arrests and counter-operations in the prevention of special / covert / clandestine / subversive activities can be exemplified as the action aspect of counterintelligence.

In terms of information, counterintelligence can be considered as an intelligence organization's preparation for its own consumption of intelligence on all past and present activities of the adversary's intelligence service, and the strategic purposes for which these activities are carried out are made available to political customers.

In order to understand what areas the practice of counterintelligence covers, it is necessary to consider the official definition. *The term "counterintelligence" means information gathered and activities carried out to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage or assassination, or international terrorist activities carried out by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations or foreign persons.*⁶ While the main objective in strategic intelligence production is to obtain information, in counterintelligence, after the information is obtained, counter-action begins accordingly.⁷

It is stated that counterintelligence has four basic principles: deter⁸, detect, deceive and neutralize, regardless of why the information was collected, and that these principles have two foci: offensive counterintelligence and defensive counterintelligence.⁹ While the action dimension of counterintelligence can be classified as defensive and offensive, other sets of concepts are needed to cover the information dimension. For example, penetrating an adversary service may be aimed at learning and preventing the activities of that service, or it may be aimed at ensuring the security of espionage activities carried out in that country. In this respect, it can be said that ensuring the security of all activities carried out against a target country should be considered as proactive counterintelligence. In this respect, the concepts of proactive and reactive counterintelligence should be used for a conceptualization that will cover both the information and action aspects of

⁶ The provisions of Executive Order 12333 of Dec. 4, 1981, appear at 46 FR 59941, 3 CFR, 1981.

⁷ Godson, op.cit, p. 54

⁸ William B. Breuer, *Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception*, Praeger, Westport, CT, 1993.

⁹ Hank Prunckun, *A Grounded Theory of Counterintelligence*, *American Intelligence Journal*, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2011, pp. 6-15

counterintelligence.

In order to ground proactive and reactive counterintelligence, it is necessary to examine how counterintelligence threats are formed. Counterintelligence threats go through the following stages and are considered to harm national security.

Uncertainty - Risk - Threat – Harm

Due to a lack of information, intelligence organizations may not always be able to detect the enemy's activities and thus face uncertainty. Based on the information gathered, uncertainty is transformed into measurable risks, which are then translated into concrete threats. Any adversarial intelligence organization can pose a risk to a country's national security. But for a risk to become a threat, the adversary intelligence organization must have the intent, capacity and opportunity multiplier. An adversary intelligence organization exploits the vulnerabilities of the targeted actor as it moves from threat to harm to the national security of the target country. This threat diagram illustrates how counterintelligence can be fundamentally categorized. In the field of risk and threat, all kinds of actions and information gathering activities against an adversary intelligence organization can be called proactive counterintelligence. In addition, in the context of basic and predictive counterintelligence, predicting the possible activities of an adversary intelligence organization and protecting state secrets can also be said to fall within the scope of proactive counterintelligence.

When the threat posed by an adversary intelligence organization moves to the damage phase, all actions and information gathering activities against it can be considered as reactive counterintelligence. In other words, reactive counterintelligence is activated when the threat posed by an adversary intelligence organization begins to enter the damage phase. In this context, it can be said that counterespionage is a part of reactive counterintelligence. It can be argued that proactive counterintelligence is the predecessor of reactive counterintelligence and covers all activities carried out by intelligence organizations before the threat occurs, in addition to research and eliminating potential vulnerabilities.

The production model of these two counterintelligence approaches, whether they are cycle-type or linear, needs to be emphasized. There are different approaches to the stages through which counterintelligence is produced. Van Cleave argues that the counterintelligence production process consists of identification, access, neutralization and exploitation.¹⁰ Lukoff, on the other hand, argues that the process starts with the mapping phase,

¹⁰ Michelle K. Van Cleave, What is Counterintelligence? A Guide to Thinking and Teaching about CI, *The Intelligence: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2013, pp.57-65

consists of the observation phase, the end and the reporting phase.¹¹ Instead of these classifications, it can be said that the proactive and reactive intelligence production process consists of activity detection, penetration, taking control of the activity, operation finalization and reporting.¹²

Detection

The detection of espionage/special/ clandestine/ covert/subversive activities of the hostile intelligence organization within the country and the detection of the attempts of the hostile service towards espionage and special/ covert/subversive activities carried out against the target country initiates the reactive counterintelligence production process. The activity detection phase is the first stage in the counterintelligence production process. In the context of basic counterintelligence and estimative counterintelligence¹³, it is necessary to anticipate the possible activities of the adversary intelligence organization.

In order to predict what activities the adversary service will conduct, it is necessary to have all the basic counterintelligence information, such as the capacity of the intelligence organization, the way it operates, its intelligence needs and the way it manages resources. In addition, it is necessary to determine whether the adversary service is a threat or not. For an intelligence service to be considered a threat, the components of intent, capability and opportunity must be present. For example, when evaluating whether MI6 is a threat to the CIA, it can be said that although MI6 is a strong service in terms of capacity, it will not be considered as a threat because it has no intention to conduct espionage activities from US soil. Once possible activities are foreseen, an early warning network¹⁴ is established in the area where the adversary intelligence service operates, and the scope and size of the activity is tried to be determined. All intelligence organizations can easily

¹¹ Lee A. Lukoff, More CI: A Grand Theory of Counterintelligence for Intelligence Scholars and Practitioners in the United States, *American Intelligence Journal*, Vol 35, No 2, 2018, pp26-32

¹² Hasan Mesut Önder, MIT Mossad'ın HUMINT Operasyonunu Nasıl Engelledi? –(MIT Emekli İbrahim ÇEVİK ile röportaj), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NfT6W9XrRc0&ct=3017s>, (Access 26.05.2023)

¹³ Estimative counterintelligence can be considered as an analysis of what, how and by what means the adversary intelligence organization can target in the context of its intelligence needs. In order to do this, the capacity and modus operandi of the target intelligence organization must be well known.

¹⁴ In Turkish intelligence terminology, an Early Warning Network (Erken İhbar Ağı) can be defined as a network of agents that the adversary intelligence service establishes in advance around individuals or groups that are likely to be approached as targets, and that the adversary intelligence service keeps in place until the start of its activities. For example, MIT established a strong early warning network within the Palestinian groups targeted by Mossad in Türkiye, and these attempts were detected by MIT as soon as Mossad started its activities within these groups. For example, MIT established a strong early warning network within the Palestinian groups targeted by Mossad in Türkiye, and these attempts were detected by MIT as soon as Mossad started its activities within these groups. See, An investigation into the Mossad's activities in Türkiye, Al Jazeera World Documentary, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3IE6F92wAOo>, (Access 28.05.2024).

identify which of the representatives serving in foreign diplomatic missions in their country is an intelligence officer. However, it is important that the target intelligence officer conceals his or her activities and does not reveal them in such a way as to leave evidence.

Intelligence organizations can employ intelligence officers conducting espionage activities in target countries with diplomatic cover¹⁵, or they can employ them under deep cover without diplomatic immunity under professions such as journalists, members of non-governmental organizations or businessmen. The intelligence officers of the hostile state with diplomatic cover are monitored by technical and physical means on a 24-hour basis. Illegals, on the other hand, are tried to be detected by monitoring the intelligence infrastructures¹⁶ used by the hostile intelligence organization in the country, and the financial movements of possible targets are monitored to reveal their contacts and network of relations.¹⁷ After the activities of the hostile service are identified, the penetration phase begins.

Penetration

Proactive and Reactive The second stage of the counterintelligence production process consists of penetrating the information gathering network of a target service or an adversary intelligence service. The targeted agent network can be penetrated using technical tools, or it can be infiltrated using the human element.

The second stage of the counterintelligence production process consists of penetrating the information gathering network of a target service or an adversary intelligence service. In order to penetrate a service's information gathering network, double agents¹⁸, walk in¹⁹ type agents and, in Turkish

intelligence terminology, internal penetration²⁰ and external penetration agents²¹ are used. In addition, defection operations are also conducted against the intelligence officer of the adversary's intelligence service. Defection²² operations can be defined as the recruitment of an intelligence officer of the adversary service. When historical examples are analyzed, it is seen that the intelligence officers who switched sides were usually walk-ins, ideologically and financially motivated to enter the service of another intelligence service. The level of infiltration into the adversary's intelligence service creates the possibility of controlling all of the enemy's intelligence activities. Examples include Kim Philby's²³ work for the KGB and Oleg Gordievskiy's²⁴ activities for MI6. As the level of penetration increases, it becomes possible to gain absolute control over the intelligence activities conducted by the adversary intelligence organization. A mid-level penetration provides information on what the target intelligence organization is doing, how it is doing it and for what purpose, but it may not be able to control the entire activity. In this respect, high-level infiltration can be said to be the most important goal of an intelligence organization.

The second method used to penetrate the information gathering network of the adversary intelligence service is double agent operations. Double agent operations are difficult to conduct because it is difficult to determine exactly which service is in control and to maintain control of the agent.²⁵ However, the benefits of double agent operations to an intelligence organization are as follows:

- They provide the opportunity to deceive the enemy with fabricated information,
- The modus operandi of the Adversary Intelligence service can be determined,
- Legal and illegal intelligence officers working for hostile intelligence can be identified,
- The intelligence needs of the hostile intelligence organization can be

¹⁵ In Turkish intelligence terminology, the cover story is divided into two parts: the activity cover and the local cover. The activity cover includes information about the intelligence officer's profession, while the local cover includes information about his/her nationality and life story. For example, an intelligence officer's profession as a journalist is referred to as an activity mask, while fictionalized information about the person's life, such as being a German citizen, the trainings received, etc., is referred to as a local cover.

¹⁶ Intelligence infrastructures are structures such as non-governmental organizations, press agencies, companies, religious structures and political parties that are established by an intelligence organization to use the human resources of the target country for intelligence activities. These intelligence infrastructures can be used for espionage and special/ covert/subversive activities.

¹⁷ Hasan Mesut Önder, Kürt Sorunu Mu Yoksa Örtülü Operasyon Mu? (Milli Güvenlik Uzmanı İbrahim ÇEVİK röportajı), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z5i3mEF8g9o&t=1541s>, (Access 29.05.2024).

¹⁸ In Turkish intelligence terminology, double agents are called dubbing agent and double agent operations are called dubbing operations. They appear to be engaged by the secret service with which they are subsequently connected, but remain loyal to the intelligence organization that sent them on the mission. In Turkish intelligence terminology, a double agent is called a dubbing agent because the agent speaks and does voice-over work on behalf of the intelligence service to which he or she is loyal. See, Robert Cowden, "OSS Double-Agent Operations in World War II", *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol.56, No.2,2014, pp.35-45.

¹⁹ F.M. Begoum, "You and Your Walk -In", *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol.6, 1962, pp.53-69

²⁰ Internal penetration agent (İç Hulus Elemanı) is used to refer to a member of the target organization who is engaged by the intelligence community.

²¹ External penetration agents (dış hulus elemanı) is a person who penetrates a target structure in accordance with the plans of an intelligence organization.

²² Mehmet Eymür, *Analiz Bir MİT Mensubunun Anıları*, Milliyet Yayınları, İstanbul, 1991, p.121.

²³ When the story of Kim Philby is analyzed, it is known that Philby was recruited by the KGB during his university years and that he entered the British secret service on the instructions of the KGB. In this respect, see, Philby can be called an agent of external penetration. Kim Philby, *Sessiz Savaş, İlgî Kültür Sanat Yayınları*, İstanbul, 2008.

²⁴ Oleg Gorgievskiy, while working for the Russian secret service, entered the service of the British intelligence organization. In this respect, Gorgievskiy can be called an internal infiltration agent. See, Ben Macintyre, *Casus ve Hain: Soğuk Savaşın En büyük Casusluk Hikâyesi*, çev. Nurdan Sosyal Say Yayınları, İstanbul, 2021.

²⁵ John P. Dimmer, "Observations on the Double Agent", *Studies in Intelligence*, 1962 Vol.6, pp.57-72.

determined,

- Positive intelligence can be obtained,
- It is possible to sabotage the intelligence operations of the hostile intelligence organization
- It can create conditions for the engagement of an adversary intelligence officer.²⁶

Once the adversary's intelligence organization has been penetrated, the process of taking control of the activity begins.

Taking Control of the Activity

The level of penetration determines the level of control over the activities of the adversary's intelligence organization. If the level of penetration is high, that is, if there is a high-level agent within the adversary intelligence organization, it becomes possible to deceive, neutralize and disrupt the adversary intelligence organization. For example, the FBI conducted a 23-year long deception campaign against Soviet Intelligence called Operation Solo.²⁷ Depending on the extent to which adversary intelligence activity is controlled, defensive and offensive courses of action can be determined. In the case of a low-level infiltration, since there is no absolute control over the overall activity, options such as arresting the spy network to mitigate the damage, harassment surveillance to stop its activities can be used. However, the political context is taken into account when deciding how to deal with the activities of an adversarial intelligence organization.

Finalization of the Operation

Since counterintelligence activities are usually ex officio operations carried out by intelligence agencies without waiting for a customer request, the political context is often ignored. The outcome of a penetrated and controlled intelligence activity depends on the policy and perception of the political decision-maker towards the target country. For example, spies of a country with which one has bad relations may be arrested, and if intelligence officers have diplomatic immunity, they may be declared persona non grata.²⁸ Since every step taken has a cost, the cost-benefit calculus is calculated in detail when making such decisions. At times, political decision-makers may decide to keep the process quiet. In interaction with political decision-makers, intelligence agencies may decide to disrupt, neutralize or deceptively control

²⁶ James M. Olson, *To Catch a Spy: The Art of Counterintelligence*, Georgetown University Press, Washington, p.144.

²⁷ John Barron, *Operation Solo: The FBI's Man in the Kremlin*, Regney History, New York, 1997.

²⁸ Hasan Mesut Önder, *Kontrespiyonaj Teorisi: Mossad'ın Türkiye'de Afişe Olan Espiyonaj Faaliyetinin Analizi- (Metin ERSÖZ röportajı)* <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8O-49BNhSj8&t=3170s>, (Access.02.06.2024)

the adversary's intelligence activity. Neutralization can be defined as the deciphering of the operational elements of an adversary intelligence activity that cannot be fully controlled and prevented, as well as the people who manage this process.

Reporting

By compiling all the technical information such as what the intelligence needs of the adversary intelligence organization are, what vulnerabilities it uses to infiltrate, what its working methods are, its secret communication channels, etc., the intelligence organization prepares it for its own use. Information on the strategic purpose of the operation carried out by the target intelligence organization is presented to political decision-makers for use in the process of making national security policies.

In the light of all this information, in order to understand the Kalenteridis case, it is necessary to examine the problematic areas in Turkish-Greek relations at the time.

Turkish-Greek Relations and the PKK

As a result of the First World War, Türkiye was invaded by Greece and defeated the Greek army and established the new Turkish Republic. Since the establishment of the Republic of Türkiye, there have been ongoing disputes with Greece. The Cyprus problem²⁹ the continental shelf issue³⁰, the problem of islands with unclear status³¹, the Kardak Crisis³² and Greece's support for the PKK terrorist organization³³ have created frictions between the two countries. The unresolved nature of the disputed issues between Greece and Türkiye makes it imperative for the two countries to monitor each other's intentions and capacities. In 1995, the Kardak Crisis brought the two countries to the brink of war, but the problem was temporarily frozen with the intervention of the United States. Greece trains the PKK terrorist organization, which threatens Türkiye, in the Lavrion camp and terrorists who commit terrorist acts in Türkiye enter Türkiye through Greece.³⁴

Greece's relations with the PKK began in 1993 when Costas Badovas, Andonis Naksakis and a delegation of journalists visited Abdullah Öcalan in

²⁹ Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı, *Türk-Yunan İlişkileri ve Megali İdea, Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları*, Ankara, 1985.

³⁰ A. Oğuz Çelikkol, Sibel Karabel, *Türkiye-Yunanistan İlişkileri ve Denizden Kaynaklanan Uluslararası Sorunlar*, Bilge Strateji, Cilt. 9, Sayı.16, 2017, pp.13-31

³¹ Başlıca Ege Denizi Sorunları, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/baslica-ege-denizi-sorunlari.tr.mfa>, (Access 03.06.2024)

³² Aydın Şihmantepe, *Kardak Krizi Sürecinin Kriz Yönetim Prensipleri Açısından İncelenmesi*, *Güvenlik Stratejileri*, Cilt.18, Sayı.9,2013, pp.127-155.

³³ Lale Sarıbrahimoğlu, "Ankara, Yunanistan'ı Teşhir Edecek" *Cumhuriyet*, 5 Temmuz 1995, p. 10

³⁴ Ankara 2 No.lu DGM "Abdullah Öcalan Davası" Gerekçeli Kararı, Esas No: 1999/21, Karar No: 1999/73, "PKK Terror örgütünün diğer ülkelerle ilişkileri" başlıklı kısım);

his camp in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.³⁵ After this contact was established in 1994, Greece allowed the PKK to open armed training camps. In the Lavrion camp, PKK members received ideological training, while in the Dimitri Elen camp, bomb training was provided. In addition, houses were provided for PKK members to live in. In addition, financial aid was provided to the PKK terrorist organization from Greece. This financial aid was mostly received from civilian institutions. Churches, trade unions and donations were made to the PKK.

Öcalan expresses Greece's support for the PKK as follows: ...These donations are in the form of, for example, selling a 100 lira magazine for 1000 lira. The bomb training, camp training and the organization of small groups in Greece are also helped by Greek intelligence, which we call our friends. The Greek intelligence is mostly provided by one of our men with the code name Rojhad. Greece's aim in cooperating with us is to use us against Türkiye, to use us as a trump card in its conflicts with Türkiye. In fact, it has made efforts for our militants trained in Greece to carry out actions against Türkiye. The PKK's representative in Greece, Afyer Kaya, code-named Rozerin, bought 20 Strella missiles from Serbia for 18 thousand dollars each with the money collected from churches, Greek people, and the sale of magazines and newspapers as a result of the charity campaigns organized in Greece.³⁶ These missiles were delivered to the PKK in Northern Iraq. It is known that the training of the people who would use these missiles took place in Kosovo and that Greek Intelligence played a role in the delivery of the missiles in Northern Iraq.

In the context of this tension in Turkish-Greek relations and Greece's policies to destabilize Türkiye, Savvas Kalenteridis' activities against Türkiye gain meaning. As can be seen in the case of Kalenteridis, if he could have been identified by Turkish Intelligence during the period when he entered Türkiye as a tourist and held meetings in Istanbul, he might not have been allowed to be appointed as the Greek Consul in Izmir. In this respect, it was only a year after he was appointed to Türkiye under the cover of a diplomat that Kalenteridis realized that he was a member of the Greek secret service and tried to identify his activities. It is seen that Turkish intelligence worked to prevent the activities of Kalenteridis after he was appointed to Türkiye and started to harm Türkiye's national security. In this respect, Kalenteridis' activities in Türkiye should be analyzed in the context of reactive counterintelligence.

³⁵ Atilla, Uğur, Abdullah Öcalan'ı Nasıl Sorguladım: İşte Gerçekler, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 2011, p.45.

³⁶ Güneri Civaoglu, "PKK'ya 80 Füze", Milliyet, 11.04. 1999, p. 17.

An Analysis of the Activities of Greek Secret Service Officer Savvas Kalenteridis in Türkiye in the Context of Reactive Counterintelligence

Savvas Kalenteridis, a member of the Greek secret service (EYP), is the son of a family who immigrated to Greece with the population exchange from Amasya, Türkiye. It is alleged that he brought his father to Amasya to see his old village during the period he was on duty.³⁷ It is stated that Kalenteridis was an intelligent and assertive intelligence officer who spoke Turkish and Kurdish with an accent and used the code name Savaş Kalender as his Turkish name. It is stated that Kalenteridis was an intelligent and assertive intelligence officer who spoke Turkish and Kurdish with an accent and used the code name Savaş Kalender as his Turkish name. He entered Istanbul as a tourist before being assigned to the Greek Consulate in Izmir. After establishing various contacts in Istanbul, he took office at the Greek Consulate General in Izmir on February 20, 1993 with a cover story of administrative firing and continued his duty until the spring of 1997.³⁸

Another interesting feature of Savaş Kalenteridis is his relationship with the PKK terrorist organization. It is known that Kalenteridis was in charge of relations with the PKK in the Greek secret service. Kalenteridis' grandfather migrated from Amasya province in Türkiye with the population exchange and rebelled against the Ottomans during the First World War to establish a Pontic Greek state. He also sees the cadres of the PKK terrorist organization in Türkiye as a group fighting for independence. The reason for this perspective can be said to be an identification between the PKK and the family story.

When the whole story of Kalenteridis is analyzed, it can be concluded that in his relationship with the PKK, he supported the PKK for emotional reasons beyond the defense of Greek national interests.³⁹ There are accusations within Greek intelligence that he was overly involved with the PKK. After leaving Türkiye in 1997, he established relations with PKK representatives in Europe and Greece. He developed close relations with the PKK's representatives in Greece and worked in cooperation with the organization's leadership to prevent possible external infiltration of the PKK presence there. After Öcalan left Syria on October 9, 1998, his first stop was Greece. On behalf of the Greek secret service, he played a role in welcoming Öcalan in Greece and taking him to Russia.⁴⁰ Moreover, when Öcalan

³⁷ Hasan Mesut Önder, Yunan Ajansı Kalenteridis Atak Bir Personeldi (İstihbarat Uzmanı Alp TUFAN Röportajı) 2023.

³⁸ Savvas Kalenteridis, Öcalan'ın Teslim Gerçeği ve Tarihi Tanıklık, Pencere Yayınları, İstanbul 2007, p.35

³⁹ Miron Varouhakis, Greek Intelligence and the Capture of PKK Leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, Studies in Intelligence Vol.53, No.1, pp.1-8.

⁴⁰ Abdullah Öcalan, Sümer Rahip Devletinden Demokratik Uyarılığa AİHM Savunmaları, Cilt II, Mezopotamya Yayınları, Diyarbakır, 2011, p.269.

crossed from Russia to Italy, he visited Italy together with a Greek delegation. During Öcalan's second visit to Greece, he accompanied him and made various attempts to arrange a country where Öcalan could stay.

It is known that he made plans for Öcalan to be smuggled into Italy and to stay there illegally. After the Greek government and intelligence decided to take Öcalan to Kenya, Kalenteridis was with Öcalan throughout the whole process.⁴¹ He played an important role in hosting Öcalan at the Greek embassy and ensuring his safety. However, the Greek government and intelligence of the time, in cooperation with the CIA, played a role in the handover of Öcalan to Türkiye.⁴²

According to Kalenteridis, Greece's relations with the PKK are a necessity for Greek foreign policy. In this context, the more Türkiye deals with PKK terrorism, the more it will lose blood and will not be interested in issues that create problems in Turkish-Greek relations such as Cyprus, Aegean, etc. He insisted that the PKK should be used as a subcontractor by Greece. Although it is not possible to access all the information about Kalenteridis, it can be argued that he wanted to settle his unfinished score with the Turks by establishing a link between his ancestors' rebellion against the Ottoman Empire and the PKK's rebellion against the Turkish Republic. During Öcalan's stay in Kenya, he did not listen to the Greek government's demands to remove Öcalan from the Greek embassy and acted autonomously, insisting on this until the Kenyan government threatened to use force against the Greek ambassador and Öcalan.⁴³ This suggests that Kalenteridis fits the profile of an emotionally motivated soldier who believed in a cause rather than an intelligence officer motivated by protecting Greek national interests.

Detection of Kalenteridis' Activity

It can be said that the main success of a good espionage expert is to conduct his activities in secrecy, to be cold-blooded, disciplined and sensitive. Kalenteridis was detected by Turkish intelligence because of his highly emotionally motivated, unconventional and hyper-aggressive personality and because he engaged in activities beyond his reach. Espionage operatives are considered successful when they are not deciphered and their activities are not detected.

There are advantages as well as disadvantages for an intelligence officer to have rigid ideological convictions. Intelligence professionals gather information to contribute to their country's national security or carry out

⁴¹ Hulusi Turgut, 130 günlük Kovalamaca, Abdullah Öcalan'ı Yakalamak için Üç Kıtada Sürdürülen Büyük Takibin Belgeseli, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2009, pp.79-86.

⁴² Nur Batur, Yürekten Gelerekten Yürüdüm, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul 2004, pp.288-292.

⁴³ Tuncay Özkan, Operasyon, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2000, p.287.

operations to achieve their country's political objectives. Ideological obsessions pose both cognitive barriers to assessing reality and hostility towards the target, which affects the nature of espionage activity. Beliefs and ideologies make it difficult to perceive the threat and facilitate unnecessary risk-taking. In this respect, it can be said that Kalenteridis' ideological obsessions and his overly aggressive activities against Türkiye due to his views that bordered on hostility were one of the most important reasons why he was exposed.

Looking at Kalenteridis' activities in Türkiye, it is stated that he was detected by Turkish intelligence one year after he took office. It was determined by MİT that Savvas Kalerenderis was involved in activities that were incompatible with his cover story, i.e. his identity as a diplomat, which could create a basis for negative propaganda against Türkiye. Furthermore, his extremely aggressive activities, which were incompatible with the cover story, attracted the attention of the MIT. It is stated that Kalenteridis was detected by Turkish Intelligence one year after he took office in Türkiye. It was determined by MİT that Savvas Kalerenderis was involved in activities that could create a basis for negative propaganda against Türkiye, which did not match with his cover story, that is, his diplomatic identity. Furthermore, his extremely aggressive activities, which were incompatible with the cover story, attracted the attention of the MIT. Therefore, Kalenteridis was regularly kept under control since the beginning of 1994. Since Kalenteridis was a Greek immigrant from Türkiye to Greece, it can be said that he harbored an extra hostility towards Türkiye. For this reason, it can be said that Kalenteridis acted with excessive assertiveness, abandoned caution and composure, and was overly eager to reach everyone he could reach and establish a network of agents. When operating in a target country, an intelligence officer should try to establish contacts that do not exceed his or her reach, in line with the mask story. However, it can be stated that the National Intelligence Organization's domestic surveillance and monitoring system is more advanced than the working methods of the world's most powerful services, and that it has the technical and human resources to monitor even the breathing of the target.

One of the issues Savvas Kalenteridis was interested in while he was in Türkiye was the Pontic Greeks.⁴⁴ Pontic Greeks were Orthodox Greeks living in the Black Sea region of Türkiye during the Ottoman period. The name Pontus is known to be the name given by the Greeks in ancient times for the Black Sea coastal regions.⁴⁵ Pontic Greeks attempted to establish an

⁴⁴ Mehmet Bilgin, Karadeniz'de Postmodern Pontusculuk, Doğu Kütüphanesi, İstanbul, 2018.

⁴⁵ Mehmet Okur, Pontus Meselesinin Ortaya Çıkışı ve Karadeniz Bölgesindeki Pontuşçu Faaliyetler, Karadeniz Araştırmaları Dergisi, Sayı.27, 2007, pp.1-28

independent state during the First World War⁴⁶, which was the process of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and after the establishment of the Republic, this population was enabled to migrate to Greece with the exchange agreement.⁴⁷

Today, in some parts of the Black Sea region, there are Muslimized groups who speak the Greek language within their families. Strengthening the Greek identity among Greek-speaking Muslim Greeks in Türkiye and supporting separatist activities has been a top priority for Greek intelligence. In this context, Savvas Kalenteridis frequently visited the provinces of Trabzon, Rize, Giresun, Artvin and Sinop during his time in Türkiye, took the young people he came into contact with back to Greece and arranged a monthly salary of 500 dollars. He wrote books on the origin and history of the Pontian Greeks and supported and financed the creation of this cultural awareness. One of the reasons why Savvas Kalenteridis traveled to the provinces on the Black Sea coast of Türkiye was to study the geographical features of this region and to prepare the ground for the PKK to carry out actions in this region. It is known that he shared information about the transit routes, possible logistics areas and the geographical characteristics of the region with the PKK and in this context, the PKK carried out its first terrorist act in the Black Sea region.⁴⁸

Kalenteridis established close relations with Greek-speaking people in the Black Sea region, strengthening cultural ties and gifting satellite dishes, books and cassettes so that his contacts could watch Greek television. It is also known that he sent selected individuals to Greece under the pretext of education and work. Kalenteridis, who had relations with Pontic associations in Greece, provided books, magazines, films, information, documents and photographs of cultural events for his agents of influence. It can be said that the main purpose of these activities was to strengthen the Greek identity among the Greek-speaking Muslim Turkish citizens living in the Black Sea region and to prepare the ground for separatist activities. It can also be said that Kalenteridis' main objective was to establish an espionage network from Pontic Greeks when needed, to create agents of influence to prepare the ground for separatist activities in the Black Sea region and to utilize these elements in fifth column activities. It is seen that Kalenteridis tried to organize subversive activities and establish a terrorist organization in the Black Sea region of Türkiye through Pontic activities. Savvas Kalenteridis stated in an interview that in 1997, the then Greek Foreign Minister

⁴⁶ Tuğba Eray Biber, *Milli Mücadele Döneminde Pontus Cumhuriyeti Kurma Çalışmaları*, Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Dergisi, Cilt.124 Sayı.245,2020, pp.421-434.

⁴⁷ Edwards M. Baldwin, "Migration between Greece and Türkiye: From the 'Exchange of Populations' to the NonRecognition of Borders", *SouthEast Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs*, No.3,2006, pp. 115-122.

⁴⁸ PKK V'nci Kongre Kararları, *Weşanên Serxwebûn* 72, 2'nci baskı, 1995, 66.

Theodoros Pangalos decided to support the demands of young people from Trabzon villages who wanted to study in Greek universities. The aim was for Black Sea children to learn the Greek language, study at Greek universities and then research their origins and culture. In this context, 20 students were taken to Greece in 1997-98. He stated that Yorgos Papandreou, who became Foreign Minister after the Öcalan scandal, abandoned the program.⁴⁹

Fethi Gültepe, one of the people trained by Savvas Kalenteridis in Greece, was caught when he entered Türkiye in 2002 and gave important information during his interrogations.⁵⁰ Gültepe stated that in 1998, when he was living in the Tonya district of Trabzon, he was taken to Greece by Feodoros Poartopulos for his university education and was met by Savvas Kalenteridis.

Gültepe stated that in 1998, when he was living in the Tonya district of Trabzon, he was taken to Greece by Feodoros Poartopulos for his university education and was met by Savvas Kalenteridis. He stated that he enrolled in the political science department at Pandia University in Athens and was paid a monthly salary of 500 dollars. He admitted that he received training to establish the so-called Greek Pontus State in the region covering Sinop, Samsun, Trabzon, Ordu, Giresun, Giresun, Gümüşhane, Bayburt, Merzifon district of Amasya and Suşehri district of Sivas.⁵¹

In his testimony, Gültepe also stated that Gümüşhane, which they called "Argeopolis" due to its abundant mineral reserves, was chosen as the capital of the planned state.⁵² After the Gültepe incident, it was also revealed that the efforts to establish a Pontic state were financed by Greek businessman Konstantinos Konstantinidis and Professor Dr. Yorgo Adreadis in Marseille, France. In 2002, it was also recorded that 8 more Turkish citizens were trained in Greece for this purpose.

Savvas Kalenteridis also established relations with American officers of Greek origin in Izmir and tried to develop his relations with them by hiding his identity as an intelligence officer. There is also information that he tried to obtain Türkiye's military secrets through the relationship he established with the Greek-American soldier who was in Türkiye on a NATO mission. The then CIA station chief in Türkiye detected this situation and was warned to stop Kalenteridis' attempts.⁵³ All these activities of Kalenteridis were followed step by step by Turkish intelligence, documented and recorded.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ *Turquie Diplomatique*, 15.02. 2011, p.24

⁵⁰ Taki Berbarakis, *Atina'da Pontus Planı*, *Milliyet Gazetesi*, 22.11. 2005, p.8

⁵¹ İstanbul'da Pontus Operasyonu, *Radikal Gazetesi*, 15.10.2002, p.6

⁵² Dokuz İlimizde Pontus Devleti Kurma Hayali, 16.10.2002, *Hürriyet Gazetesi*, p.12

⁵³ Kalenteridis, *op.cit*, pp.174-176.

⁵⁴ Polat Safi, *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilâtı (1826-2023)*, Kronik Kitap, İstanbul, 2023, p.270.

Penetration and Control of Kalenteridis Network and Conclusion of the Operation

It is seen that Kalenteridis carried out not only espionage activities in Türkiye, but also subversive activities with Pontic activities, and special activities with the geographical information he collected from his Black Sea trips. It can be said that it is possible that Turkish Intelligence created an early warning network around Savvas Kalenteridis in order to detect his activities. In addition, it is highly probable that Kalenteridis' financial movements and the intelligence infrastructure of Greek intelligence in Türkiye were under surveillance. After Kalenteridis' activities were identified, he was kept under intense surveillance and the second phase, the infiltration phase, was initiated.

Kalenteridis recruited three officers in the Turkish Armed Forces, an Air Lieutenant, an Air Captain and a Land Non-Commissioned Officer, as spies, using their weaknesses for women and money.⁵⁵ Once in Izmir, Savvas Kalenteridis began to conduct surveillance of military bases in Izmir in order to spot potential agents. In these surveillance processes, he used ordinary and inconspicuous Turkish citizens as surveillance and access agents. The psychological profile of the First Lieutenant of the Turkish Air Force, who was marked as a potential target, was revealed and it was determined that he had a weakness for blonde women.

An approach was planned and a blonde female diplomat working at the Greek consulate in Izmir stopped on the road on the target lieutenant's transit route with the scenario of a flat tire. The Air First Lieutenant noticed the Greek female diplomat and went to help her. The female Greek diplomat took the lieutenant's phone number to thank him for his help and invited him for coffee.

During this meeting, Savas Kalenderis was involved in the conversation, creating the impression of coincidence. In order to test the lieutenant's credibility and whether he was a double agent, he was taken on a yacht to an island where a Greek air base was located, where he was tested as a pilot and on his military skills. The first recruit, an air force first lieutenant, was instructed to contact an intelligence captain stationed at the main jet base in Çiğli, and approached him with information on the number of airplanes at the air base and information on deployments. In exchange for this information, the lieutenant received a large sum of money from Kalenteridis. The lieutenant then recruited a naval non-commissioned officer from the navy and gathered information about the navy. Through the Air Force lieutenant, Savas Kalenderidis created a three-person espionage network

⁵⁵ Yılmaz Özgül, Sinkaf, *Sözcü Gazetesi*, <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2020/yazarlar/yilmaz-ozgul/sinkaf-6050053/>, (Access 07.06. 2024).

consisting of a captain and a non-commissioned officer.

The fact that the First Lieutenant, a member of the Air Force, was married and neglected his family life was effective in unraveling this espionage network. The first lieutenant's late arrival home, absenteeism on military shifts and spending more than his salary drew the attention of his wife. The first lieutenant's wife followed her husband and found out that he had rented a house in Karşıyaka, Izmir for his girlfriend and shared information about his excessive spending and irregular family life with the first lieutenant's commander. One point should be emphasized here. When an agent starts spying, he/she creates a new alter identity and this alter identity has erosive negative effects on the first identity.⁵⁶ The First Lieutenant's wife recognized this alter identity, i.e. the changes and hidden aspects of her husband's life, and contributed to the detection of the activity by reporting it to the authorities. Considering that MİT had been keeping Savvas Kalenteridis under control since 1994, it is highly probable that the identification of Kalenderidis' contacts led the first lieutenant's wife to be recruited by MİT and assigned to follow her husband's activities. In other words, it can be said that the MİT penetrated this three-person network through the first lieutenant's wife. Once the activity was penetrated, control was taken and Kalenteridis' spy network was arrested in order to avoid a political crisis between Türkiye and Greece, but Kalenteridis was not declared *persona non grata*. Once the scope of the espionage activities and the individuals involved in these activities were identified, three members of the Turkish armed forces working on behalf of Savvas Kalenteridis were arrested.

As seen in this counterintelligence operation, the activity was first detected, infiltration was carried out, and after taking control of the activity, a disruption operation was carried out. MİT infiltrated Kalenteridis' espionage activity against the Turkish Armed Forces in Izmir through the wife of the first lieutenant and obtained positive intelligence about the information he collected, his working methods⁵⁷ and the recruitment processes. After the agents used by Kalenteridis were caught by MİT, he was asked to return to his country by the Greek Secret Service in the fall of 1997, without being declared a *persona non grata*.⁵⁸

Damage Report on Kalenteridis

The Kalenteridis case shows that Greek intelligence needs information about the Aegean Army command. It is also seen that he was involved in subversive activities against Türkiye, supporting the terrorist organization

⁵⁶ Ursula M. Wilder, *The Psychology of Espionage*, *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2017, pp.19-36.

⁵⁷ For a study on the working method of intelligence organizations, see Wayne Lambridge, *A Note on KGB Style*, *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol 15, No. 1, 1994, pp.115-121.

⁵⁸ Polat Safi, *op.cit*, p.269.

PKK and attempting to provoke Greek-speaking Muslims in the Black Sea region.

From this three-person spy network, Kalenderidesdis obtained information and documents on the military exercises organized by Türkiye, specific information on the airports located in many cities in Türkiye. He also compiled information on the take-off and landing traffic of military aircraft using these airports and the locations where Türkiye deployed Nike missiles. The Turkish Armed Forces' analysis of the Parmenion and Nikiforos exercises conducted by Greece gathered information on the location of the units of Türkiye's Aegean Army Command and the readiness plans of the Turkish Air and Naval Forces. Lieutenant Colonel Kalenteridis was implicated in the sabotage of an arms factory in Kırıkkale⁵⁹, Türkiye, and in the burning of Turkish forests in the Aegean region, but no action was taken due to lack of evidence.⁶⁰

Considering all the activities of Lieutenant Colonel Kalenteridis, it can be said that the Greek Secret Service has always had intelligence needs about Türkiye's military power and strategic priorities. It is also seen that he was involved in every attempt to destabilize Türkiye and supported the PKK, which Türkiye considers a terrorist organization, politically, economically and in intelligence terms.

Conclusion

Intelligence culture and theories may differ from country to country. Although the intelligence discipline has its own universal concepts, practical applications can change and transform the concept sets. It can be said that the main factor determining the institutional culture and practices of an intelligence organization is the threat environment in which it operates. This is because intelligence organizations create working styles and methods according to this threat environment and diversity.

Working styles and methods are developed through the internal training system of intelligence organizations and in the context of the operations carried out, and the weaknesses and deficiencies that emerge are tried to be eliminated. Intelligence theories also provide a framework for practitioners of this profession on how to explain the problems they face from a broad perspective.

In this respect, it is considered that the counterintelligence theory can be formed according to the threat diagram, and all information gathering,

⁵⁹ Kırıkkale'yi havaya Yunanlı mı uçurdu? <https://www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/470420-kirikaleyi-havaya-yunanli-mi-ucurdu>, (Access 09.06.2024).

⁶⁰ Zeliha Mangırcıoğlu, Yunan 28 yıldır ormanlarımızı yakıyor, <https://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/gundem/yunan-28-yildir-ormanlarimizi-yakiyor-884787>, (Access 10.06.2024).

analysis and operations carried out in the process until the concrete threat occurs should be categorized as proactive counterintelligence. All activities carried out from the moment the threat actor starts to cause harm should be considered as reactive counterintelligence. In this respect, the Kalenteridis case shows that counterintelligence has two main components: proactive and reactive counterintelligence, and proactive counterintelligence is all actions and information gathering activities carried out in the area between risk and threat. It is seen that reactive counterintelligence comes into play when the adversary intelligence organization moves from posing a threat to causing harm.

Reactive counterintelligence is considered to cover all actions and information gathering activities carried out in the area between threat and harm. It can be said that offensive and defensive approaches in the literature are types of operations and counterintelligence cannot be classified in this way. Proactive counterintelligence involves the process of developing measures regarding the vulnerabilities of the country in the context of the working style and needs of the adversary intelligence organization. In this respect, proactive counterintelligence is the predecessor of reactive counterintelligence and consists of the research and actions needed prior to the detection of activities.

It can be said that the Proactive Counterintelligence and Reactive Counterintelligence production process is different from the strategic intelligence wheel and the counterintelligence production model consists of the detection of the activity, penetration, controlling the activity, finalization and reporting. This production model includes counterespionage and all special/ clandestine/ covert/subversive activities. In the literature, counterintelligence is categorized as defensive and offensive. It can be said that categorizing counterintelligence in this way cannot clearly explain the practice of counterintelligence activities. A counterintelligence operation can be both defensive and offensive. However, it can be argued that the main factor determining whether counterintelligence is defensive or offensive is the level of control of the activity.

Deception and disruption operations can be carried out if the activities of the adversary intelligence organization are fully under control through a high-level penetration. Collapse operations can be said to be the dismantling of an organization whose entire activity is under control and whose logistics, human element and activities are known. If a medium and low level infiltration has been carried out and the entire activity is not under control, and only the content of some of the activities is known, the targets of the operation and the hostile intelligence officers involved in this operation are deciphered and the activity is prevented in order to reduce the damage.

The instructions of political decision-makers are important in the process of deciding how to conclude the activities of the adversary intelligence organization under control. The political priorities of the decision-maker and the way he or she perceives the target country and its government affect the decision to be made. For example, an intelligence officer from a country with poor political relations may be declared *persona non grata* and deported, and his/her spies may be arrested, whereas sanctions against intelligence officers from a country with good relations may be lighter.

As a result of the counterintelligence activity, which is finalized in line with the guidance of political decision-makers, the reporting process begins. The intelligence organization prepares intelligence on the capacity and working method of the adversary intelligence service, which vulnerabilities and weaknesses the adversary intelligence organization uses and how it infiltrates, for its own consumption. The intelligence that emerges as a result of analyzing the activities of the adversary service at the strategic level is used in national security and foreign policy-making processes.

Turkish intelligence was able to detect Savvas Kalenteridis one year after he started his mission in Türkiye, during which time Kalenteridis caused significant damage to Türkiye's national security. During the escalation of the damage, Turkish intelligence detected Kalenteridis' activities, albeit late. If Turkish intelligence had a source within Greek intelligence, or if Greek intelligence had identified which institutions and issues in Türkiye would be targeted by Greek intelligence, Kalenteridis could have been stopped before he started to harm Türkiye. In this respect, it can be said that MIT's activities against Kalenteridis fit the reactive counterintelligence approach. After Kalenteridis' activities were detected, his spy network was infiltrated and the necessary information was gathered. After Kalenteridis' activities were brought under control, considering the political relations between Türkiye and Greece, he was not declared a *persona non grata*, but his agent network was deciphered and he was arrested.

Considering the activities of Kalenteridis, it is seen that he not only conducted espionage activities, but also organized special and subversive activities. Kalenteridis was involved in obtaining Türkiye's military secrets, supporting the PKK terrorist organization and encouraging Greek Muslims living in Türkiye to engage in separatist activities. This case shows that detecting and preventing a threat while it poses a risk is proactive counterintelligence, while all activities to mitigate the damage once the threat begins to cause harm is reactive counterintelligence. It is seen that the production model of these two approaches starts with detecting the activity and consists of penetration, controlling the activity, finalization of the operation and reporting.

POTENTIAL GLOBAL RISKS OF TÜRKİYE IN THE PROCESS OF BECOMING A REGIONAL ENERGY HUB

Mesut Şöhret*

Introduction

Türkiye's geographical location has positioned it as an important player in the global energy environment. Türkiye has become an important transit route for fossil fuels, especially natural gas, between the energy-rich Middle East and the Caucasus and energy-consuming Europe. In the last decade, Türkiye aimed to transform itself into a regional energy hub where energy resources are transferred in transit and traded by international sellers and buyers. Under the current conditions, Türkiye is seen as the most promising transit country candidate in energy chess. While it will enable it to meet its energy demand more easily, it will also carry one-fifth of the EU's energy demand in the medium and long term and will also contribute to the socialization process of the Caspian and Middle Eastern regions by integrating them into the global energy transportation network. Türkiye's pragmatic energy policy, on which the impact of daily political tensions and regional changes is limited, is an important indicator of its determination to become an energy transition and distribution center. This goal was first brought to the agenda right after the Cold War, based on the rich energy resources of the Central Asian and Caucasian countries with which Türkiye has strong cultural ties, but the fact is that Türkiye's performance in the region was well below expectations in the first half of the 90s. However, due to geopolitical ruptures and tensions in international relations, it is not surprising that "Türkiye has become a vital transit corridor for energy resources"¹ especially natural gas, as a critical supplier in meeting Europe's basic energy needs, especially in the last decade."²

Recent geopolitical events, especially Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2013, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the European Union's clear intention to finally eliminate its dependence on Russian energy resources, have led to Türkiye's It has shown that it can potentially play an important role in ensuring energy security for Europe. Despite the European Union's

* Assoc. Prof. Dr. Gaziantep University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations, Türkiye. E-mail: sohretmesut@yahoo.com, ORCID: 0000-0003-4052-9286

¹ Meltem Müftüleri-Baç and Deniz Başkan, *The Future of Energy Security for Europe: Turkey's Role as an Energy Corridor*. Middle Eastern Studies, 2011, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 361–378. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2010.481176>

² Mert Bilgin, *Geopolitics of European natural gas demand: supplies from Russia, Caspian and the Middle East*, Energy Policy, 2009 Vol. 37, pp. 4482–4492, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.05.070>

exploration of various energy supply options and efforts to reduce dependence on fossil fuels, Türkiye remains a critical factor in European energy security due to its unique geographical location.

In global energy geopolitics, Türkiye is a complementary link in the chain as a natural route between supply and demand geographies. In addition, Türkiye is a major market for source countries as it is an important consumer of oil and natural gas. However, being in a strong geographical location is insufficient to enable Türkiye to become the energy hub it targets. Türkiye's physical qualities must be integrated with human opportunities (such as an active population, military power, and a growing economy).³ However, Türkiye has never seen itself as a simple energy transit corridor country. In this context, Türkiye has actively continued to strategically benefit from its geopolitical advantages to protect its internal energy security and achieve broader geopolitical goals. At the core of this strategy is the vision of becoming a major regional energy hub, positioning Türkiye as a critical geographic corridor for energy resources and a vibrant trading hub where international buyers and sellers exchange energy resources.⁴

However, a country's ability to become an energy center depends on many factors beyond being a transit country. For this transformation, it is not enough to have a natural geographical position as a transit country. In this context, there are some obstacles to Türkiye's transformation into an energy center. Türkiye does not have sufficient energy resources, its energy production is quite limited, and it is significantly dependent on natural gas imports and supplier countries. Therefore, it has a high risk of energy supply security; it does not have a developed energy infrastructure, and a free energy market is open to competition. It stands out among the factors that prevent it from becoming an energy center.⁵

Although the idea of turning Türkiye into an energy center and an energy trading point has become very popular in recent years, this approach brings some global risks. This study aims to examine the potential global risks that Türkiye may face in the process of becoming a regional energy center.

Main Features of Transit or Energy Hub Countries

In energy trade, transit countries are as important as producer and consumer countries. Transit countries play a key role in ensuring energy security on the transportation route between producer and consumer

countries. It is important in energy transportation due to the opportunities it provides in terms of basic issues such as geographical conditions, political stability, transportation distance, and security in ensuring energy security. While transit countries provide supplies to consumer countries, they also supply their own energy needs. Energy transfer between energy-producing and energy-consuming countries is carried out by pipelines on land and tankers at sea. Pipelines, the most economical of these methods, consist of long-distance structures that enable transportation between countries and continents. Pipelines, which can reach thousands of kilometers in length, can pass through the land and sea borders of one or more countries, depending on the preferred route. These countries through which energy transmission lines pass are defined as transit countries.

In Today's world, transit countries play different roles depending on their geographical location, the development of their energy infrastructure, and their positions in energy trade between producer and consumer countries. One of these roles attributed to transit countries is transit country. Transit countries provide energy flow in exchange for a certain transit fee by making agreements with countries that produce oil or natural gas passing through their lands. Pipelines passing through transit countries are constructed by a contract between the owners or operator of the pipeline and the transit country, in which transit conditions are determined, and consumer countries can also be parties to these agreements.⁶ In this business model, the control of the pipeline is provided by the transit country. At the same time, the price of the transported energy is determined by bargaining between the producer and consumer countries. The transit country does not influence determining energy prices.⁷

Transit countries are available for pipeline transportation as well as tanker transportation. The points that serve as transit points in tanker transportation are straits and water channels. For transit countries, pipeline and tanker transportation is an important issue. In this context, transit countries that provide continuity of energy transportation through pipelines and sea tankers, as well as being close to producer and consumer countries, are more advantageous.⁸

Another role attributed to transit countries is their position as energy centers, where comprehensive activities are carried out more

³ Muhammed Oral and Ünal Özdemir, The Position of Turkey in Global Energy Geopolitics: Opportunities and Risks. *Journal of History Culture and Art Research*, 2017, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 948-959. <http://dx.doi.org/10.7596/taksad.v6i4.1054>

⁴ John Roberts, Turkey as a Regional Energy Hub, *Insight Turkey*, 2010, Vol. 12, p.42, pp. 39-48

⁵ Cemal Kakışım, Turkey's Potential to Turn into a Regional Natural Gas Hub, *Avrasya Uluslararası Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 2020, Vol. 8, No. 24, p.256, pp.255 - 280

⁶ Paul Stevens, Transit Troubles Pipelines as a Source of Conflict, A Chatham House Report, London, 2009, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/108992>, p.1


⁷ Volkan Özdemir, "Türk Dış Enerji Politikası (TANAP Örneği): Koridor Olamazsın Demedik Merkez Olamazsın Dedik!", *Enerji Piyasaları ve Politikaları Enstitüsü*, (March 26, 2015), <http://www.eppen.org/index.php?sayfa=Yorumlar&link=&makale=183>, (Access 01.07.2024)

⁸ Aşlıhan Anlar, "Farklı Bakış Açılımları İle Enerji Güvenliği Üretici, Tüketici ve Transit Ülkeler: Türkiye Örneği", *Uluslararası İktisadi ve İdari İncelemeler Dergisi*, 2017, No.19, p. 69

comprehensively than in transit countries. Energy centers, also called Energy Hubs, are defined as trade centers where consumer and supplier countries meet and trade in an open, transparent market.⁹ Countries that are energy centers have the right to re-sell (re-export) the energy resources they purchase from supplier countries within their national borders to third countries, and in this context, they determine the sales conditions independently of producers and consumers.¹⁰

It is important to have energy storage and transmission facilities for natural gas and oil-like resources in transit countries. These facilities, defined as “energy hubs,” are important in energy trade. The Energy Hub concept is a place where energy is processed rather than a country in transit on the energy transfer route. In the energy hub, resources must meet certain stages. In this context, “collecting and processing the resource, ensuring transmission, availability of storage capacity, availability of market and trade opportunities and width of the distribution network” refers to the stages that must be present in the energy hub.

Figure 1. Working Mechanism of an Energy Hub



Source: Bayod-Rüjula, Angel A., Yue Yuan, Amaya Martínez-Gracia, Jiangyu Wang, Javier Uche, and Huanxin Chen. 2018. “Modelling and Simulation of a Building Energy Hub” Proceedings 2, No. 23: 1431. <https://doi.org/10.3390/proceedings2231431> p.1

Essentially, a country that is an energy hub is a production/conversion facility and an important energy consumer to carry out these operations. The Energy hub converts the incoming energy into electricity, heating, and cooling energy by physical and virtual processing, and this converted energy

⁹ Gareth Winrow, “Turkey: An Emerging Energy Transit State and Possible Energy Hub”, The International Spectator, 2011, Vol. 46, No. 3, p.82, pp.79-91.

¹⁰ Ksenia Krauer Pacheco, “Turkey as a Transit Country and Energy Hub: The Link to Its Foreign Policy Aims”, Working Papers of the Research Centre for East European Studies, University of Bremen, 2011, No. 18, pp. 27-28, pp.1-66.

also forms the center of the distribution network.¹¹

It seems that energy hubs, which appear as physical or virtual formations, are starting to come to the fore within the scope of the natural gas trade. In this context, we can say that the idea of becoming more of a natural gas trade center lies at the basis of the countries’ aim to become an energy hub. In this respect, a natural gas hub is generally a distribution center that comes into play during the production and post-production transportation of natural gas, its liquefaction, if not transferred through pipes, and its sale, and it functions as a kind of stock exchange. Within the scope of these formations, natural gas prices are determined either by bilateral agreements between the source country and the buyer country or in a market we call the spot market, where the price is determined depending on many variables. Therefore, countries can meet their natural gas needs with two methods. In a functioning hub, there are a sufficient number of buyers and sellers, and natural gas is bought and sold in a reliable environment. It is very important for natural gas buyers and sellers to find a fair price level in order to maintain a long-term sustainable and profitable commercial activity, and hubs are expected to provide this advantage. In addition, in a well-functioning hub, producers and consumers, as well as other investors related to natural gas, including technology and service companies, and all elements of the energy finance sector come together.¹²

An energy hub enables the re-export of resources imported from a country. In this way, the energy hub becomes effective in determining the price of energy. In other words, countries that are energy hubs have the opportunity to store energy products such as oil and natural gas collected from the surrounding source countries on their territory for a certain period and then sell these products to countries in need of energy at prices they determine under energy market conditions. However, it is not possible for a country to become an energy hub or to turn into an energy hub country in the short term. First of all, this country needs to make structural arrangements in the oil and natural gas market. It is thought that the market’s trust in the created energy hub and its operation will be achieved within 15-20 years. In other words, to establish energy hubs, a certain period must be waited as well, and technical investments must be made.¹³

On the other hand, some factors affect the formation of an energy hub. These are listed below:

¹¹ Shalika Walker, vd., “A Review Study of the Current Research on Energy Hub for Energy Positive Neighborhoods”, Energy Procedia, No. 122 (2017), p.728-729, pp. 727-732

¹² Göktuğ Şahin, Türkiye, doğalgaz ticaretinin merkezi olabilir mi?, <https://fikirturu.com/jeopolitika/turkiye-dogalgaz-ticaretinin-merkezi-olabilir-mi/> (Access July 25, 2024)

¹³ Alper Yılmaz, Enerji Hub Türkiye, Ankara: İmaj Yayınevi, 2019, p.239

Potential Global Risks of Türkiye in the Process of Becoming A Regional Energy Hub

- ✓ Ensuring the reliability of the energy hub
- ✓ Supply and demand balance
- ✓ Crisis management in the face of price shocks
- ✓ Important characteristics of the transit country (having a sea area and such as the smoothness of the geographical structure)
- ✓ Energy regulations
- ✓ Not having much external dependence on consumption
- ✓ Infrastructure level
- ✓ Ensuring stability in management and sharing market data transparently¹⁴

The presence of these basic elements is effective in the formation of the energy hub structure. Energy centers must have a developed energy infrastructure to ensure uninterrupted regional energy trade. This infrastructure consists of a developed pipeline network, storage facilities, refineries, natural gas conversion terminals, and petrochemical units.¹⁵

One of the best examples in the world in terms of storage and pipeline networks is the Henry Hub in America. Henry Hub, which connects 12 pipelines and has three storage facilities, is considered the most liquid energy center and reference point in the world with this infrastructure.¹⁶ Developed natural gas centers are also located in Europe. Among European countries, Austria and Germany stand out in particular. Both countries can provide depth and flexibility in their energy markets by providing more natural gas than their national consumption. For example, despite consuming 85 billion cubic meters of natural gas in 2016, Germany imported 160 billion cubic meters of natural gas and re-exported 65 billion cubic meters of this import to other consumer countries. Austria, on the other hand, imported 47 billion cubic meters of natural gas in response to its consumption of 8 billion cubic meters of natural gas and re-exported the remaining 39 billion cubic meters of natural gas from its consumption.¹⁷

Countries that have an important transit position in terms of consumer and producer countries are effective in determining energy prices with their effectiveness in the energy exchange. This situation includes Henry Hub in the USA, NBP in the UK, and TTF in the Netherlands. However, Türkiye

¹⁴ Doğanay Yılmaz, Enerji Güvenliği Açısından Bir Transit Ülke Olarak Türkiye, Bursa Uludağ Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Unpublished Master Thesis, Bursa: 2021, p.47-48

¹⁵ Winrow, *Ibid*, p. 81

¹⁶ Peter, Seve, "The Importance of Gas Trading Hubs for Slovakia", *Despite Borders*, 2008, Vol. 5, No.1, p.502, pp. 499-510.

¹⁷ Dünya Enerji Konseyi 2018, Türkiye Enerji Piyasaları Araştırma Raporu, p. 26, Ankara, <https://www.dunyaenerji.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/TEPG1.pdf> (Access 02.07.2024).

Şöbret

appears to be a transit country due to its current location. However, it also has the potential to become an energy center.¹⁸

Geopolitical Importance of Türkiye's Role in Energy

The rapid increase in the world population has brought about rapid industrialization and urbanization. This situation has increased the importance of having energy and supplying it safely. In this case, energy supply, demand, and transit geographies have gained strategic value. In this context, due to its location, Türkiye has begun to become a decisive actor in energy geopolitics.

Indeed, "Türkiye lies at the crossroads between the world's energy-rich region and energy-poor consumers. Türkiye's vast region contains 73% of proven global oil reserves and 72% of natural gas. On the other hand, Europe consumes almost 20 percent of worldwide oil and nearly 30 percent of natural gas."¹⁹

Map 1. Oil and Natural Gas Reserves in Türkiye's Nearby Area



Source: Muhammed Oral and Ünal Özdemir (2017), *Ibid*, p. 953

"In addition to land routes, Türkiye also controls sea routes through which energy products are transported. The most logical and cheap transportation route for oil and gas to Europe passes through Turkish territory. All other route types that would bypass Türkiye are much more

¹⁸ Doğanay Yılmaz, (2021) *Ibid*, p. 49

¹⁹ Mert Bilgin, (2010) Turkey's energy strategy: what difference does it make to become an energy transit corridor, hub or center? *Revista UNISCI*, p. 114, pp. 113-128

expensive, and the feasibility of these options is seriously questioned.”²⁰

Türkiye is located in an energy network between resource and supply regions: energy resources production and consumption geographies. This feature provides Türkiye with the advantage of being an energy distribution center/junction (hub) beyond its transit role. Safe and stable transportation of oil and natural gas to Europe, and the rich reserves in the resource geography (in regions such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Eastern Mediterranean) taking on a much more active role in global energy trade, can be realized with the projects in which Türkiye is involved. Therefore, Türkiye is included in the policies regarding energy investments/investment plans in the region. In addition, Türkiye itself is a major energy market, with 93% dependence on oil and 99% on natural gas. In this sense, the main elements of Türkiye’s energy policies are sourcing country diversity in oil and natural gas, increasing the share of renewable resources in electricity production, including nuclear power in the energy portfolio, and becoming an energy hub internationally by using the advantages of its geographical location.²¹

Türkiye’s foreign dependence on energy contributes to the current account deficit of the state budget and exposes the country to external shocks and fluctuations in international energy prices. For these reasons, “Turkish policymakers have designed policies to diversify the country’s energy basket over the years. They sought to develop a local energy production base in the country by exploring options for natural gas extraction in the Black Sea and establishing a civil nuclear program. Abroad, they have strengthened their relationships with a wide range of supplier countries near Türkiye and further afield to ensure a steady flow of resources. Türkiye’s geographical location is important in this respect. Today, the country is connected to energy-rich Azerbaijan and Iraq by a series of oil pipelines and to Azerbaijan, Iran, and Russia by natural gas pipelines. Türkiye, which is the gateway to Southern Europe for many of these countries, has long developed the goal of becoming a regional center for energy trade. Ankara is also active in new gas markets, building terminals to import liquefied natural gas (LNG), giving it access to markets from Algeria and Egypt to Nigeria and the United States.”²²

Türkiye aims to become the central country in energy trade in its region. Toward this goal, Türkiye has implemented or pioneered the implementation of important natural gas and oil pipeline projects in the region. “Baku-Tbilisi-

Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline (BTC), South Caucasus Natural Gas Pipeline (SCP), Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) Natural Gas Pipeline, Türkiye-Greece Natural Gas Interconnector (ITG), Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and Turk Stream are among the projects in this scope. Türkiye’s contribution to Europe’s energy supply security for years reached a new level in 2020: The Southern Gas Corridor, Europe’s 4th natural gas artery, came to life thanks to the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which was completed at the end of 2020. The backbone of the Southern Gas Corridor is the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) passing through Türkiye. TANAP is aimed to reach an annual capacity of 31 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2026. Another project that has recently contributed to strengthening our country’s natural gas supply security is the TurkStream Natural Gas Pipeline project. This project consists of two pipelines, each with a capacity of 15.75 bcm, laid under the Black Sea. The first line delivers natural gas to our country, and the second line delivers natural gas to European countries. Since approximately 3% of the world’s oil demand is transported through the Turkish Straits, the Turkish Straits have a special importance in terms of global energy security.”²³

The developments in Türkiye’s near surroundings, especially the insecurity following the war that broke out between Russia and Ukraine in February 2022, are seen as an excellent geopolitical opportunity for Türkiye to become an energy center. Although a lot of gas passes through Ukrainian territory, Russia has long seen the potential risks of this corridor. This was so much so that even before the 2014 war, there were two serious energy crises in Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 due to price disputes; all of this created uncertainty for Russia as an exporter and the EU as a consumer.²⁴ “One of the reasons why so much energy is invested in the Turkish Stream, Nord Stream 1, and Nord Stream 2 lies in this fact.”²⁵ Since both Nord Streams are currently non-functional, Türkiye has become an important link for the export of Russian gas to Europe, including non-EU countries.²⁶ Every crisis that inevitably affects the energy transition in Russia-Ukraine relations has increased Türkiye’s chances of establishing itself as an alternative route by using its geographical potential and diplomatic balances, and it has been partially successful in this.

²³ Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Enerji Stratejisi 2022, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_nin-enerji-stratejisi.tr.mfa (Access August 16, 2024)

²⁴ Yusin Lee, Interdependence, Issue Importance, and The 2009 Russia-Ukraine Gas Conflict, *Energy Pol.* 2017, No.102, 199–209, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.11.038>

²⁵ Andreas Goldthau and Tim Boersma, The 2014 Ukraine-Russia Crisis: Implications For Energy Markets and Scholarship, *Energy Res. Social Sci.* 2014, No. 3, pp. 13–15, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2014.05.001>

²⁶ Eric Pardo Sauvageot, Energy Security, *Energy Policy* 2020, No. 145, 111699, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111699>

²⁰ Mert Bilgin, Turkey’s Energy Strategy: Synchronizing Geopolitics And Foreign Policy With Energy Security, *Insight Turkey*, 2015, No. 17, pp. 67–81.

²¹ Oral and Özdemir (2017), *Ibid.* p. 954

²² Francesco Siccardi (2024). Understanding the Energy Drivers of Turkey’s Foreign Policy, Brussels: Carnegie Europe, p.4-5, https://carnegie-production-ssets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/Siccardi_Turkey_Energy_draft-1.pdf (Access 17 / 07 / 2024)

Türkiye's Geopolitical Opportunities in The Global Energy Equation

Every geography in the world creates potential value and power. The geographical location of a country is a feature based on the physical geography of that country, while its geopolitical position refers to a feature and sensitivity that includes the evaluation of physical geography and human power elements.²⁷ The geographical location of a country can direct the formation, development, and efficiency level of “infrastructure elements of power,” that is, “strategic advanced technology,” “market and natural resources,” on behalf of that country. Concerning all these, a country's geographical location directs that country's development strategy. Proximity to oil basins makes the production of energy technology a priority.²⁸

Türkiye is located in the temperate zone, which is considered the most suitable climatic zone for human life in terms of its mathematical location. The whole of this field, undoubtedly, is not equally convenient in terms of economic activities and human life. The fact that Türkiye is located in the southern half of the temperate zone and that orographic features and altitude differences greatly affect the climate characteristics has enabled the wide diversification of agricultural production and other economic activities dependent on land. This difference from the natural environment throughout the country has also affected economic and financial activities.²⁹ At this point, especially in recent years, transit countries are among the main components of energy security. ³⁰In the context of energy security, these countries' main role is to ensure that the transmission of energy resources is not interrupted. It is undisputed that all transit countries play a key role in ensuring energy security on the transportation route between producer and consumer countries. Transporting basic components such as geographical conditions, political stability, transportation distance, and security to ensure energy security makes transit countries important in energy transportation and eliminating security threats. In this context, transit countries, which have become one of the vital elements of energy supply-demand security, supply the energy they need while supplying consumer countries. Therefore, in such an environment, it is inevitable that transit countries will become one of the

²⁷ Suat İlhan, *Jeopolitik Duyarlılık*. İstanbul: Ötügen Neşriyat, 2003, p.20-21

²⁸ Muazzez Harunoğulları, *Enerji Dağıtım Merkezi Perspektifinden Türkiye'nin Enerji Jeopolitiği*, *Mukaddime*, 2020, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 183, pp.177-211. <https://doi.org/10.19059/mukaddime.550689>

²⁹ Muhammed Oral and Ünal Özdemir, *Küresel Enerji Jeopolitiğinde Türkiye: Fırsatlar ve Riskler*. *Journal of History Culture and Art Research*, 2017, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 948-959. <http://dx.doi.org/10.7596/taksad.v6i4.1054>

³⁰ Doğanay Yılmaz, *Türkiye'nin Enerji Politikası Ve Altyapısı Bağlamında Enerji Hub Potansiyeli*. *Ulusal Türkiye Politik Çalışmalar Dergisi*, 2021, Vol. 1, No.1, pp. 33-48.

main actors in the global energy equation.³¹

Regarding its special location, Türkiye corresponds to the intersection of the Old World (Asia-Europe-Africa). It is also in a strategic position in maritime transportation as seas surround it on three sides. Because the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits are the only routes through which countries neighboring the Black Sea can reach the high seas. The Mediterranean, Black Sea, and Aegean Sea are connected to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, respectively, by Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. Due to these mathematical and special location characteristics, the Anatolian peninsula has always been a very valuable piece of land throughout history.

In today's global geopolitical equation, the control of geographical locations that control energy resources and energy routes gains importance and priority. This situation directs energy policies and creates great struggles between great powers. Türkiye is located in the Middle East; it is a “buffer zone” country that is considered a potential crisis area. According to Brzezinski, Türkiye is a geostrategic player trying to establish influence in the Caspian basin and Central Asia, and at the same time, it is the first-degree important geopolitical axis.³² Türkiye, a member of NATO, ensures stability in the Black Sea region and controls passage in the Mediterranean.³³

Türkiye, which is located in the middle of regions with all kinds of foreign policy objectives, such as the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans, has become the target and starting point of all policies at the global and regional levels, with the geopolitical importance its geographical location gives it.³⁴ Türkiye is in a strategic geography located at the center of three continents, among the rich oil and natural gas production regions of the Middle East, Caspian, and Central Asia, which has the potential to be a terminal and center on both the north-south and east-west axis.³⁵ Countries with a geographical location like Türkiye are very important in terms of influencing the outside world and being sensitive.³⁶

Türkiye's geography stands out with its proximity to energy resources, its ability to create energy routes in the east-west and north-south directions, its ability to support and prevent expansion into energy resources, its ability to enable geostrategic expansions in the west, north, east and south directions,

³¹ Anıl Çağlar Erkan, *The Changes in Global Energy Equation and the Rise of Turkey*, *Novus Orbis*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2023, p.53, pp.46-74.

³² Bilal Karabulut, *Strateji jeostrateji jeopolitik*. Ankara: Platin Yayınları, 2005, p.156

³³ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Büyük Satranç Tahtası, -Amerika'nın Küresel Üstünlüğü Ve Bunun Jeostratejik Gereklilikleri*, İstanbul: İnkılap Kitapevi, 2005, p.45.

³⁴ Suat İlhan, *Türkiye'nin Zorlaşan Konumu (Uygurluklar Savaşı-Küreselleşme-Petrol)*. İstanbul: Ötügen Neşriyat, 2004, p.218

³⁵ 35 Muhammed Oral and Ünal Özdemir (2017), *Ibid*, p.953

³⁶ Suat İlhan, (2003). *Ibid*, p.21

and its water resources. Its importance in global and regional geopolitics is increasing. Türkiye, one of the important energy markets in the world energy market, is both a center and a bridge country, with strategic value due to its feature as a transit country in the transportation of energy resources from the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus to Europe.³⁷ Türkiye is a state in the meeting zone between the Islamic world and the Christian West and also forms the southern wing of NATO. Türkiye is located very close to the Middle East and the Caspian basin, which are the world's largest oil reserve areas, and also to the Central Asian countries that hold strategic materials. This position carries Türkiye to an extremely important place in the global balance of power.³⁸

Türkiye's geopolitical significance in the energy sector is shaped by its strategic location, energy transit infrastructure, and diplomatic engagements. As Türkiye continues to develop its energy capabilities and navigate complex geopolitical landscapes, its role in regional and global energy dynamics will remain crucial. This positioning offers both opportunities and challenges, influencing Türkiye's broader geopolitical strategy and regional influence.

Türkiye's Regional Energy Ambitions

Türkiye's regional energy ambitions are shaped by its strategic location, bridging Europe and Asia, and its aim to become a major energy hub. Türkiye's energy strategy focuses on diversifying its energy sources, enhancing energy security, and leveraging its geographic position to influence regional energy dynamics.

Although many countries put trade in energy resources at the center of their national strategies, this is typically only typical for energy-rich exporters such as the Persian Gulf countries or Russia.³⁹ However, unlike these countries, "Türkiye has relatively modest energy reserves that do not even meet the needs of its growing economy. Türkiye must import most of its total energy needs, including more than half of the coal it uses and almost all of its oil and natural gas."⁴⁰ Therefore, the country's energy targets are entirely based on the use of foreign energy resources. Although many countries in the world have become major energy transit actors due to their geographical

location, such as Ukraine⁴¹ or Belarus,⁴² Türkiye is unique in terms of energy policy in placing being a transit country as a key priority in its national strategy and foreign policy.

The origins of the energy hub idea date back to the 1990s, when the first cross-border energy projects were completed. Türkiye's energy-based discourse began to develop during this period simultaneously with the development of transboundary energy projects. "At this point, for example, the USA has implemented the idea of an "East-West energy corridor" based on pipelines extending from Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East to Europe to prevent Europe from being caught in the shackles of the Russian energy monopoly. Therefore, both domestic and foreign actors undoubtedly began to see Türkiye as a transit energy corridor immediately after the Cold War."⁴³

Map 2. Türkiye's Energy Network Natural Gas and Oil Pipelines around Türkiye



Source: Francesco Siccardi (2024), p. 5

³⁷ Türkan Budak, Türkiye'nin Enerji Politikasında TANAP ve Türk Akımı, BİLGESAM Analiz/Enerji, 2017, No: 1364.p.1

³⁸ Türel Yılmaz, Uluslararası Politikada Orta Doğu, Ankara: Barış Platin Yayınları, 2009, p.9

³⁹ Aliaksandr Novikau, What Does Energy Security Mean For Energy-Exporting Countries? A Closer Look At The Russian Energy Security Strategy, Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, 2021, No. 39, pp. 105–123, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02646811.2020.1794108>

⁴⁰ Ole Gunnar Austvik and Gülmira Rzayeva, Turkey in The Geopolitics Of Energy, Energy Policy, 2017, No. 107, pp. 539–547, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.05.008>

⁴¹ Volkan Ş. Ediger, John V. Bowlus, Mustafa Aydın, Geopolitics and gas-transit security through pipelines, in: André Dorsman, "Özgür Arslan-Ayaydin, James Thewissen (Eds.), Regulations in the Energy Industry, Springer International Publishing, 202, Cham, pp. 85–106, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32296-0_6

⁴² Margarita M. Balmaceda, Energy policy in Belarus: authoritarian resilience, social contracts, and patronage in a post-Soviet environment, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2014, No. 55, pp. 514–536, <https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2015.1028083>

⁴³ Mert Bilgin, Turkey's Energy Strategy: What Difference Does It Make to Become an Energy Transit Corridor, Hub Or Center? Revista UNISCI, 2010, p.120, pp. 113–128.

However, it is possible to say that towards the end of the 2000s, there was almost no discourse that Türkiye was a real energy trading center where energy was bought and sold rather than an energy corridor where energy was simply transported. Although the idea of maximizing Türkiye's geographical position dates back to the early 20th century, one of the first to put forward the idea of Türkiye's geopolitical potential was former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, author of the famous book *Strategic Depth*. He aims to integrate it with the wider region, which was once part of the Ottoman Empire and, in his view, will now serve as Türkiye's "strategic depth."⁴⁴ "In his article on "Türkiye's foreign policy vision in 2008, Davutoğlu emphasized that Türkiye should use its unique geographical location to develop transportation routes, including energy transition, from neighboring countries, including Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Iraq. In addition to that, Davutoğlu clearly expressed the idea of making Türkiye a global energy center in 2009: Türkiye has taken great steps towards becoming a global energy center. Being the intersection point of East-West and North-South energy corridors is a natural result of Türkiye's geography where East and West, North and South intersect."⁴⁵

One of the main goals of the energy transition is stated in some official documents, such as Türkiye's International Energy Strategy, which is "becoming a strategy trade center in energy." Accordingly, ensuring route and source diversification to strengthen energy supply security is one of the main goals of Türkiye's energy strategy. "Türkiye also aims to contribute to regional and global energy security and become a regional trade center in energy. The basic elements that make up the international dimension of Türkiye's energy strategy are:

1. To ensure route and source diversification in the supply of oil and natural gas, taking into account the increasing demand and foreign dependency,
2. Contributing to regional and global energy security,
3. To be a regional trade center in energy,
4. Taking into account social and environmental impacts in the context of sustainable development at every stage of the energy chain,
5. Increasing the share of domestic and renewable energy in electricity production,

⁴⁴ Ahmet Davutoglu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu* [Strategic Depth: Turkey's Position in the International Arena, Aksaray: Küre Yayınları, 2008.

⁴⁵ Ahmet Davutoglu, *Turkey Has Made Strides towards Becoming a Global Energy Hub*, (August, 10 2009) <https://www.dunya.com/gundem/davutoglu-quotturkey-has-madestrides-towards-becoming-a-global-energy-haber-86279> (Access August, 16, 2024)

6. Incorporating nuclear energy into our energy basket."⁴⁶

In parallel with this approach, in his meeting with Russian President Putin in October 2022, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan once again expressed his intention to make Türkiye an energy base. Turkish and Russian energy authorities have been instructed to begin technical studies on Russia's proposal to turn Türkiye into a gas hub for Europe.⁴⁷ As can be seen, Türkiye aims to become a regional energy center by facilitating the transportation of oil and natural gas from the Caspian Region, the Middle East, and Central Asia to Europe. Türkiye wishes to implement infrastructure development projects such as alternative pipelines, ports, and storage facilities to achieve this goal. Türkiye's regional energy goals are multifaceted and aim to make the country a major energy transition hub while ensuring energy security and diversification. Thanks to strategic projects, regional collaborations, and investments in renewable and nuclear energy, Türkiye is positioning itself as a central player in the regional and global energy environment.

Türkiye is trying to realize its desire to become an energy center through pipeline agreements with the countries in the region. If it wants to take an assertive place in this field, it needs to evaluate both physical and human geographical features holistically and effectively use all the advantages of its geographical features when developing energy policies. However, achieving these goals will require overcoming complex geopolitical challenges and securing significant investments. Essentially, the idea of Türkiye serving as an energy trading center may be realistic and feasible in the coming years if cyclical developments are read correctly and rational policies are followed.

Global Risks Associated with Türkiye's Energy Hub Status

Türkiye, which has various energy resources, depends on source countries for energy, like many countries, due to the low reserve and production rates of these resources. Türkiye is a country of extremely strategic importance regarding its location and proximity to global energy markets. Thanks to its geographical location, it has the potential to strategically make significant contributions to global energy supply security while connecting energy supply and demand countries. In this context, the projects carried out in Türkiye and the country's energy policy are closely followed by both regional and global actors. In that case, Türkiye is in a very important position in terms of geopolitics, as it is adjacent to the Central Asia, Middle East, Eurasia, and Caucasus regions, which host various energy resources and where a large proportion of these energy resources are located. Being adjacent to countries

⁴⁶ Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Enerji Stratejisi 2022, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_nin-enerji-stratejisi.tr.mfa (Access August, 16, 2024)

⁴⁷ Al Jazeera, *Erdogan Says Turkey and Russia to Study Putin's Gas Hub Proposal*, 2022. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/14/erdogan-says-turkeyand-russia-to-study-putins-gas-hub-proposal> (Access August, 17 2024).

rich in energy resources and being an intercontinental connection point, it has taken an active role in energy projects implemented especially for import and export and has caused Türkiye to become an energy corridor.

Türkiye plays a key role in energy security both regionally and internationally, as it acts as an energy corridor and accommodates transit passages between the oil and natural gas-rich Middle East and Central Asia-Caucasus region and the European countries that demand these resources. Especially political, social, or economic problems occurring in source countries cause energy supply and demand security problems between buyer and seller countries. This situation brings some geopolitical risks to Türkiye.

Geopolitical Tensions and Conflicts

Geopolitical tensions and conflicts arising from Türkiye's ambitions to become an energy hub are multifaceted and involve a range of regional and international actors. These tensions could significantly impact not only Türkiye's energy strategies but also broader regional stability and global energy markets.

The Eastern Mediterranean has been on the world's agenda with the discovery and production of significant amounts of natural gas in the Leviathan, Tamar, and Zohr fields located off the coast of Egypt and Israel⁴⁸ and the Aphrodite field in Southern Cyprus, have significantly increased the region's position as a potential natural gas exporter. It attracted great attention and sparked debate about the feasibility of building a gas pipeline from Israel to Cyprus and ending in Türkiye. Such a pipeline route would be inherently shorter compared to alternative options and would, therefore, offer potential advantages to Türkiye, particularly in terms of its desire to diversify its natural gas supply sources.

In the study conducted by the Geological Survey for the Levant region, it was estimated that there are an average of 1.7 billion barrels of oil and 122 trillion meters of gas reserves. Additionally, rich natural gas discoveries have been made in the Dalit (2009/500 bcf), Tamar (2009/8.4 tcf), and Leviathan (2010/16 tcf) fields off the northern coast of Israel. It is thought that there are still rich, undiscovered deposits in areas outside the coasts of Syria and Lebanon.⁴⁹ Currently determined reserves; "Although they are small compared to those in the Persian Gulf, Russia, or the Caspian Sea basin, they are large enough to have a significant impact on the energy security of the states in the Eastern Mediterranean, making some countries more

⁴⁸ Volkan Özdemir and Barış Hasan, Uluslararası Ekonomi Politik Bir Değerlendirme: Karadeniz ve Doğu Akdeniz Deniz Alanları Sorunu, Turkish Studies Economics, Finance and Politics, 2018, Vol.13, No. 22, p.410, pp. 401-416,

⁴⁹ Yurdagül Atun and Ata Atun, Doğu Akdeniz'de Yeni Siyasi Dengeler, TURAN-SAM, 2018, Vol.10, No. 39, p. 7, pp.7-14

influential."⁵⁰ (Mankoff, 2013:1).

Türkiye's exploration and drilling activities for hydrocarbon resources in the Eastern Mediterranean lead to disputes over maritime borders with Greece and Southern Cyprus. These disputes center on the definition of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and the right to exploit underwater hydrocarbon resources. The tension that rises from time to time has the potential to bring two countries to the brink of war. The discovery of significant gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean is increasing tensions as not only Greece and Southern Cyprus but also many countries, including Israel, Egypt, and Cyprus, have conflicting claims and interests over the region's energy resources. To gain an advantageous position in this regard, Türkiye signed memorandums of understanding with Libya on "Limitation of Maritime Jurisdiction Areas in the Mediterranean" and "Security and Military Cooperation" on 27 November 2019. The agreement, signed following the principle of equity and international law rules and registered by the United Nations in October 2020, aims to protect the rights and interests of the two countries in the Eastern Mediterranean. With the agreement in question, Türkiye made one of the biggest diplomatic attacks in the history of the Republic and officially revealed its borders in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁵¹

Map 3. Türkiye-Libya Maritime Jurisdictions and Türkiye's Exclusive Economic Zone Borders



Source: Giancarlo Elia Varoli, (2020). The Exclusive Economic Zone between Libya and Türkiye, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2019/12/20/the-exclusive-economic-zone-between-libya-and-türkiye/> (Access, 25.07.2024)

⁵⁰ Jeffrey Mankoff, Eastern Mediterranean Energy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington DC, 2013, p. 1, pp. 1-4. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep37439>

⁵¹ Muhammet Tarhan, Türkiye-Libya deniz yetki anlaşması Doğu Akdeniz'de hak ve dengeleri güvenceye aldı, (November 26, 2021), <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/turkiye-libya-deniz-yetki-anlasmasi-dogu-akdenizde-hak-ve-dengeleri-guvenceye-aldi/2431239> (Access, 24.07.2024)

Unlike “territorial waters, establishing continental shelf boundaries and exclusive economic zones (EEZs) within overlapping maritime areas has been particularly problematic. Technically, “maritime zone declarations” are unilateral declarations of contiguous areas, EEZ boundaries, or coastal state territorial areas within maritime zones that are not connected to other neighboring states. In contrast, “maritime border limitations” refer to restrictions established through an agreement to determine the relevant boundaries between states in the case of overlapping maritime zones or multiple claims to the area. There is no such comprehensive agreement among the coastal states in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Greek Cypriot administration sees itself as the sole authority of the island; Greece, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel declared EEZ in the Eastern Mediterranean region. However, it is also worth noting that the EEZ agreements between the EU and the US-backed Greek Cypriot duo and the coastal states have no legitimacy due to the illegal nature of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which disregards Türkiye’s rights.”⁵²

Greece, Egypt, Israel, and the Greek Cypriot Administration had previously signed maritime agreements, excluding Türkiye, to create their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean and start exploration activities. These moves of Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean made a big impact in the world after Libya signed a maritime agreement with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA). The Treaty in question was seen as a clear signal to other coastal states in the region that the gas game would not be played without Ankara’s permission. The agreement made between Türkiye and Libya was partly a result of the countries in the region excluding Türkiye from the energy geopolitics. Accordingly, the three powers of the Mediterranean wanted to keep Türkiye out of the game by establishing a consortium in which they developed the EastMed pipeline project, which aims to carry the newly discovered gas reserves from the Eastern Mediterranean to Southern Europe. While the pipeline’s route passes through Türkiye’s EEZs, Ankara’s failure to consult on the implementation of the project angered the Turkish state. The Turkish state eventually blocked the EastMed project by reaching an agreement with Libya’s UN-recognised Tripoli government. This project died before it was born because it was currently expensive and not feasible to implement.

Relations with Regional Powers

Türkiye has started to gain a new position in energy geopolitics, as it is both a transit country and a hub country with the projects it has developed

⁵² Mesut Hakkı Çaşın, Strategic, legal Aspects of Turkey-Libya Deal, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/analysis-strategic-legal-aspects-of-turkey-libya-deal/1673079> (Accessed July 23, 2024)

recently. This new position of Türkiye has occurred both with the changes in energy geopolitics and with the influence of the regional and global consequences of new geopolitical conditions. Türkiye’s terrestrial geographic neighborhood, which is located in the largest global energy resource, continues to strengthen its role in global energy geopolitics. In addition, the efforts of Western countries and Russia to control the energy resource reserve areas and energy transport geography both offer Türkiye an opportunity and expose it to the risk of falling under the economic and political pressure of these countries. Countries such as the EU, Russia, the USA, and China can often enter into threatening positions for Türkiye with the policies they implement in the Middle East energy basin, and this situation can cause many negativities for Türkiye.⁵³ On the other hand, Türkiye’s energy goals and desire to become a regional energy center significantly affect its relations with regional powers.

The EU’s energy demand over time increases Brussels’ political and economic interests in the region. The EU also supports the unfair claims of Southern Cyprus and Greece in the EEZ. On the other hand, the political impotence caused by the Syrian civil war and the Arab Spring and the newly formed blocs among countries within the current competition of global powers triggered an arms race and increased tension in the region. It enables economic cooperation. Israel, Greece, and Southern Cyprus are taking steps towards cooperation in economy, energy, defense, and foreign policy. Especially considering the possible contribution of the discovery of energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean to the economies and geopolitical positions of these countries, it seems that the “gunboat diplomacy” option will remain at the forefront instead of respecting international law in the Eastern Mediterranean. The efforts of the USA and the EU to balance Russia’s access to the Mediterranean and China’s improvement of relations with Mediterranean countries through the “Modern Silk Road Project” further increased the pressure on the Island of Cyprus. In addition, “the Mediterranean Region is drifting towards the center of an “undeclared war” as the USA and the EU conduct more exercises with the Gulf countries and the Israel-Greece-Southern Cyprus trio to balance Russia, China, and Iran. In other words, the competition for dominance in the region has the potential to turn into a Cold War-like conflict between countries.”⁵⁴ This situation, of course, creates a major handicap for Türkiye in becoming an energy hub.

Russia


Russia is an important energy partner for Türkiye, especially natural gas. Projects such as the Turk Stream pipeline and the South Stream pipeline

⁵³ Muazzez Harunoğulları, (2020) Enerji Dağıtım Merkezi Perspektifinden Türkiye’nin Enerji Jeopolitiği, *Mukaddime*, 2020, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 188, pp.177-211. <https://doi.org/10.19059/mukaddime.550689>

⁵⁴ Mesut Hakkı Çaşın, *Ibid.*

project, which carries Russian gas to Türkiye and Southern Europe, and the Blue Stream show how important the strategic energy partnership between the two countries is.

Map 4. Southeastern European Gas Infrastructure



Source: TurkStream: Russia's Southern Pipeline to Europe, Congressional Research Service, Updated May 6, 2021, p.1, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF11177.pdf>

Although energy cooperation is strong, Türkiye and Russia also have conflicting interests in regions such as Syria and Libya. This geopolitical balancing act requires careful diplomacy to avoid conflicts that could disrupt energy ties. Türkiye's dependence on Russian gas makes it vulnerable to Moscow's political and economic pressures. Diversification of energy sources and routes is of great importance in reducing this dependence. For this reason, a possible crisis with Russia may cause Türkiye to experience serious energy supply problems.

Iran

Iran is an important natural gas supplier to Türkiye. Despite international sanctions imposed on Iran, Türkiye maintains energy ties to ensure supply diversification. This situation sometimes pits Türkiye against the Western world and causes Türkiye to be accused of violating sanctions. In addition, relations with Iran are affected by regional dynamics, including the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Türkiye's balance between maintaining energy ties and adapting to Western policies on Iran presents ongoing challenges.

Iraq

Iraq is another important energy partner of Türkiye, especially regarding oil imports. The Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline is a critical infrastructure connecting Iraqi oil fields to Turkish ports.

Iraq's political instability and security problems threaten energy cooperation, especially in the Northern Region. Türkiye's military presence and political influence in Northern Iraq complicate this relationship. Especially recently, the declaration of the PKK as a banned organization has been an important development within the scope of the steps taken by Türkiye in agreement with the central government to expel the PKK from the region.

Map 5. Türkiye-Iraq Development Road Project



Source: Mehmet Alaca and Haydar Karaalp, (2023). Türkiye-Iraq Development Road Project: Enhancing regional connectivity, trade, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkiye-iraq-development-road-project-enhancing-regional-connectivity-trade/2993555> (Access 26.07.2024)

The Development Road Project that Iraq wants to develop aims at a commercial corridor extending from the sea to Basra via the Gulf, and from Basra to Türkiye and Europe via highways or railways. The project, whose final point is Türkiye, will have a wide area of influence from Europe to the Gulf countries.⁵⁵ However, to develop this project, the security environment needs to be strengthened. For this, cooperation between Türkiye and Baghdad regarding the PKK is required.

Israel

Türkiye and Israel explored energy cooperation opportunities, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean. Potential projects include transporting Israeli


⁵⁵ Mehmet Alaca and Haydar Karaalp, (2023) Türkiye-Iraq Development Road Project: Enhancing regional connectivity, trade, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkiye-iraq-development-road-project-enhancing-regional-connectivity-trade/2993555> (Access 26.07.2024)

gas to Europe via Türkiye. Historical political tensions between the two countries could hinder energy cooperation. Recent diplomatic efforts to normalize relations could pave the way for stronger energy ties. However, due to Israel's ongoing attacks and genocide in Gaza, Türkiye cut off its economic and commercial relations with Israel and subsequently became a party to the case filed at the International Court of Justice, reducing the possibility of the two countries cooperating soon.⁵⁶

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan is a vital partner for Türkiye in its quest to diversify its energy sources and routes. The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) is an important component of the Southern Gas Corridor, which carries Azerbaijani gas to Türkiye and Europe. The energy partnership with Azerbaijan strengthens Türkiye's role as an energy transit hub and increases mutual economic and strategic interests by providing Azerbaijan's access to European markets.

Map 6. Trans Anatolia Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) Project



TANAP is a branch of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) project. The line, which is 1850 km long, joins the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) on the Türkiye-Georgia border. TANAP will join the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) at the Türkiye-Greece border, transporting natural gas to Italy and activating the working system of the Southern Gas Corridor. "Azerbaijan, a member of the Turkic Council, owes primarily to Türkiye for returning the Nagorno-Karabakh lands to its territory. Increasing pressure on Baku from other Turkish countries, as well as from the strongest ally, may pave the way for the formation of a "Turkish energy corridor" that will carry gas and other energy resources from the depths of the Asian continent to the heart of Türkiye."⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Dilara Aslan Özer, (2024). The process of Türkiye joining ICJ case against Israel, <https://www.daily-sabah.com/politics/news-analysis/the-process-of-turkiye-joining-icj-case-against-israel> (Accessed 22.07.2024)

⁵⁷ Aliaksandr Novikau and Jahja Muhasilovic, Turkey's Quest To Become A Regional Energy Hub:

Domestic Political Implications

The energy policies of the Justice and Development Party (JDP), which has been in sole power in Türkiye since 2002, and its successes in securing energy agreements or discoveries are often used to build political capital. For example, discovering natural gas in the Black Sea was heavily publicized as a national achievement. Türkiye's energy goals, especially its assertive stance in the Eastern Mediterranean, are often framed by nationalist discourses. This approach can garner support within the country by appealing to Türkiye's national pride and sovereignty.

For Türkiye, reducing dependence on imported energy is a fundamental goal that has strong domestic political appeal. Efforts to develop domestic energy resources, such as renewable energy projects and Black Sea gas exploration, as well as steps towards energy independence, are seen in this context. Moreover, infrastructure projects such as pipeline construction and LNG terminals have the potential to stimulate local economies.

On the other hand, the need to protect critical energy infrastructure, such as pipelines and drilling sites, has implications for national security policies. Increased military presence and security measures have the potential to affect domestic politics and budget allocations. In addition to that, security issues protecting energy infrastructure from cyber-attacks are a growing concern. To protect energy assets, it is necessary to invest in cybersecurity and develop a solid cyber-defense strategy.

Energy policy may become a controversial issue in domestic political debates. If opposition parties or NGOs perceive the government's energy policies as risky or harmful to the environment, they may criticize the government's energy policies. As a result, the domestic political consequences of Türkiye's energy goals are multifaceted, affecting nationalism, economic stability, public opinion, regional inequalities, security, governance, and external influence. Balancing these factors requires careful and strategic policymaking. The government's ability to effectively manage these domestic impacts is vital in maintaining public support in domestic policy and achieving the goal of becoming a regional energy hub.

Challenges and opportunities, *Heliyon*, 2023, Vol.9, No.11, p. 7, pp.1-11, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e21535>

Reduction of Energy Demand from Europe

Thanks to its strategic geography, Türkiye makes significant contributions to the EU's energy supply security. First, Türkiye helps the EU reach new energy resources by offering oil and natural gas resources in Central Asia, the Caspian Region, the Middle East, and Africa to the European energy market. Apart from this, and more importantly, Türkiye is a country that can transport Russian energy resources to the EU energy market by providing an alternative transit route to Ukraine. The Caspian region and Central Asia are considered by the European Commission to be the main suppliers of alternative energy, paving the way for Türkiye to emerge as a key actor as the center of the East-West energy corridor.

Following Russia's military intervention in Ukraine, Europe reacted by banning the Union from importing goods and services from Russia in almost every sector, especially oil, natural gas, and coal. "In June 2022, the EU Council adopted the sixth sanctions package, which, among other things, prohibits the purchase, import, or transfer of seaborne crude oil and certain petroleum products from Russia to the EU. Restrictions began to apply for crude oil as of December 5, 2022, and for other refined petroleum products as of February 5, 2023. A temporary exception is foreseen for imports of crude oil by pipeline into those EU member states that, due to their geographical situation, suffer from a specific dependence on Russian supplies and have no viable alternative options. Moreover, Bulgaria and Croatia will specifically benefit from temporary derogations concerning the import of Russian seaborne crude oil and vacuum gas oil. The import ban covers 90% of EU current oil imports from Russia and has significantly reduced Russia's trade profits."⁵⁸ Similarly, in response to Russia's actions in Ukraine and the resulting increase in energy prices, the European Union has experienced a significant decrease in natural gas demand, to 55 billion cubic meters, or 13% in 2022; this is the lowest level in history in terms of reduced consumption. The European Union imported an average of over 380 million cubic meters (mcm) of gas per day from Russia via pipeline in 2021, that is, approximately 140 billion cubic meters (bcm) for the entire year. Additionally, approximately 15 billion cubic meters of natural gas were shipped in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG). A total of 155 billion cubic meters imported from Russia accounted for approximately 45% of the EU's gas imports in 2021 and almost 40% of its total gas consumption.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Council of the European Union (2022), EU Sanctions Against Russia Explained, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia/sanctions-against-russia-explained/> (Access 22.07.2024)

⁵⁹ International Energy Agency 2022, A 10-Point Plan to Reduce the European Union's Reliance on Russian Natural Gas, (March 3, 2022), [https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/1af70a5f-9059-47b4-](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/1af70a5f-9059-47b4-a2dd-1b479918f3cb/A10-PointPlanToReduceTheEuropeanUnionsRelianceonRussianNaturalGas.pdf)

In addition to the political and economic crises seen, the permanence of the decreases in the EU's oil and natural gas demand due to reasons such as preventing climate change remains uncertain. Policy-driven changes, characterized in particular by the significant increase in wind and solar energy capacity, are having a crucial impact on this transformative change in Europe's energy landscape. This situation poses a serious potential risk for Türkiye, which claims to be a hub in energy. So much so that it will mean that the EU will turn to renewable energy sources using the Zero Carbon Emission target as an excuse and that the investments made in oil and natural gas pipelines will be wasted.

EU Turning to Alternative Suppliers

The European Union is the second largest energy consumer and largest energy importer in the global energy market. However, almost half of the total energy demand comes from outside member countries such as Russia, the Middle East, North Africa, and the Caspian Basin. The European Union is increasingly turning to alternative suppliers to reduce its dependence on single sources for critical goods and energy. This strategy is driven by several factors, including geopolitical tensions, economic security, and the need for sustainability. This approach not only reduces risks from over-dependence on a few suppliers but also aligns with the EU's broader goals on sustainability and ethical trading practices.

Although "Türkiye's geographical location is suitable for gas and oil transit to Europe, the EU's priority is the implementation of energy regulations in supplier and transit countries through the Energy Community. As a result, this has a complicating effect on the EU's relationship with Türkiye as an important energy transit partner."⁶⁰ The European Union's decision to reduce its dependence on Russian natural gas after the Ukraine Crisis has the potential to negatively affect Türkiye's goal of becoming a regional energy center. Because the EU has already started to turn to countries such as Norway, Algeria, and the USA instead of Russian oil and natural gas to diversify its resources after the Ukraine War. For example, "although the EU's natural gas import dependence rate is 97 percent in 2022, almost a quarter of the EU's imports came from Norway. Russia came in second with 15.3%, almost 9% lower than in 2021, followed by the USA with nearly 10%."⁶¹ If relations with Russia deteriorate further or if a war breaks

[a2dd-1b479918f3cb/A10-PointPlanToReduceTheEuropeanUnionsRelianceonRussianNaturalGas.pdf](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/1af70a5f-9059-47b4-a2dd-1b479918f3cb/A10-PointPlanToReduceTheEuropeanUnionsRelianceonRussianNaturalGas.pdf) (Access 25.07.2024)

⁶⁰ Dicle Korkmaz, Turkey and the EU in an Energy Security Society: the Case of Natural Gas, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2021.

⁶¹ Aliaksandr Novikau and Jahja Muhasilovic, Turkey's quest to become a regional energy hub: Challenges and opportunities, *Heliyon*, 2023, Vol.9, No.11, p. 7, pp.1-11, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e21535>

out, EU countries' reliance on non-Russian energy sources, such as Norway, Algeria, and the USA, whose transit passes do not pass through Turkish territory, will permanently reduce Türkiye's potential as an energy hub. In addition, if there is a transition in global energy from natural gas to LNG and shale gas or a switch to renewable energy projects, the decrease or danger of a reduction in the oil and natural gas demand of EU countries coming from Türkiye will pose a great risk for Türkiye.

Conclusion

The demand for energy has been increasing rapidly day by day as a result of technological and economic developments in the world. The increase in the global population and the increasing demand for the energy needed by the population are undoubtedly the most important factors in this increase. At this point, the increasing volumes in the Global Energy equation, especially within the scope of the transfer of oil and natural gas, the introduction of new transmission methods, and the expansion in transportation networks have brought about important roles of countries in transit position in the transportation of energy resources, even if they do not have the resources. Therefore, although these transition countries, which are described as transit, do not have energy resources, they have become actors of great importance in the functioning equation of the global energy market due to the transit of energy resources.

The main role of transit countries in the context of energy security is to ensure that the transmission of energy resources is not interrupted. At this point, while energy prices are determined by the buyer and seller, transportation in the geography between them is carried out through the network of the transit country, which is a prerequisite for being an energy transit country. Thus, although the transit country does not have the opportunity to determine the prices, the control of the valve is in the hands of the relevant country, and the third actors pay the transmission fee of the gas/oil they transport to the transit country company. On the other hand, in energy markets, the central countries (hub) are the physical or virtual trade centers where many market players come together to balance different energy resources without assuming the role of a transmitter between the buyer and the seller and where the necessary infrastructure, legal regulations, and financial services are available. At this point, these countries go beyond being transit countries and turn into regional trade centers. In this way, energy activities are integrated into the financial markets of that country, and its operation is carried out by the companies of the relevant countries, creating significant added value for the country's economies. In other words, being a central country in energy is not just a country that generates rental income from the use of its land in the energy market but rather a country that buys, sells, and markets this energy in addition to rental income and even has the

potential to use it as a tool in foreign policy.

In recent years, Türkiye has wanted to rise to the position of a central country by setting an ambitious foreign policy goal in the field of energy to increase its regional and global influence. Due to its unique geographical location between energy-supplying and demanding regions, its key position between East-West and North-South, as well as its historical ties with both East and West, Türkiye has a natural tendency to become a geographical area, an energy corridor, where energy resources are transported. At this point, it is not surprising that many oil and natural gas transit projects have been completed in the country, especially during the Justice and Development Party period, which has been in power for 22 years, and this has led to a significant increase in the energy resources passing through Turkish territory. The recent developments taking place around Türkiye, such as the Arab Spring, the Russia-Ukraine War, and, most recently, the Gaza-Israeli War, have once again increased the importance of Türkiye as an energy corridor for European countries. This has increased even more because the Ukraine route was closed due to the war, and in this context, due to the economic sanctions against Russia, it offered an alternative way to supply energy resources from countries such as Azerbaijan. It is very important for countries that aim to become energy center countries to have an energy infrastructure that can ensure energy supply security for consumer countries and energy demand security for supplier countries. In this respect, Türkiye, which determines its energy policies to become an energy center country, needs to be able to collect energy resources from politically stable supplier countries through reliable energy transmission lines, away from all kinds of external influences.⁶²

Since Türkiye is located in a geography that provides a transition between resource and supply geographies, it has the advantage of being an energy hub. Türkiye has taken very strategic steps towards becoming an energy hub with the BTC, TANAP, and Turkish Stream projects. However, these steps alone are not considered sufficient. In addition, the Eastern Mediterranean is of great importance for Türkiye in terms of protecting the maritime transportation lines in the Eastern Mediterranean and ensuring energy security, as well as the diversity of energy resources and the steps taken by Türkiye towards becoming an energy hub.⁶³

On the other hand, Türkiye's ambition to become a regional energy hub brings significant opportunities, but it also entails considerable global risks.

⁶² Cemal Kakişım, (2017), Türkiye'nin Enerji Merkezi Ülke Olma Hedefi Açısından Bölgesel Riskler Ve Bölgesel Fırsatlar, Journal of Süleyman Demirel University Institute of Social Sciences, 2017, Vol.3, No.28, p.446, pp.431-450.

⁶³ Muazzez Harunoğulları, Enerji Dağıtım Merkezi Perspektifinden Türkiye'nin Enerji Jeopolitiği, Mukaddime, 2020, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 207, pp.177-211. <https://doi.org/10.19059/mukaddime.550689>

Geopolitical tensions, infrastructure vulnerabilities, economic uncertainties, and environmental challenges are among the key risks that need to be managed. Through strategic planning, diplomatic engagement, and investment in security and sustainability, Türkiye can navigate these risks and strengthen its position as a crucial player in the global energy landscape. The policies implemented by the European Union countries, which are the most important energy buyer markets for Türkiye in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, their turning to alternative suppliers such as the USA and Norway, their investments in alternative energy sources such as renewable energy sources and their start to implement energy saving policies, damage Türkiye's position as an energy corridor.

For Türkiye to have a say in the international energy equation shortly and to transform its geopolitical position from an energy corridor to an energy center, it needs to produce policies that will respond very quickly to developments in the power struggles in international politics. Türkiye needs to take a role in all kinds of political, economic, social, and military developments in energy reserve areas and transition geographies by making strategic decisions quickly and being in a position to produce and implement policies in these areas.

PART II.

TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC RISKS AND THEIR
IMPACTS ON TÜRKİYE

GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL RISKS: CYBER SECURITY AND
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI)

Doğan Şafak Polat*

Introduction

The term “global risk” refers to the probability of an event or circumstance occurring that would have a large negative impact on global GDP, population, or natural resources. For over two decades, the Global Risks Perception Survey (GRPS) has served as the foundation for the Global Risks Report, and it is the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) primary source of original global risk data.¹ This year’s GRPS has brought together outstanding thoughts on the shifting global risks environment from 1,490 professionals from academia, industry, government, the international community and civil society.² Responses for the GRPS 2023-2024 were gathered between September 4 and October 9, 2023.³ The experts’ research analyzes global risks to help decision-makers balance current issues with long-term goals.

The Survey attempts to investigate the most severe contemporary dangers, as evaluated by survey respondents, over a two-year period, focusing on the three risks that have swiftly surged into the top ten rankings during that time period. Foreign and local actors will use AI-generated misinformation and disinformation (53%) to exacerbate social and political differences, making it the most serious global danger expected over the next two years. According to the research, cyberattacks (39%) remain important issues in the overall outlook, with government and private-sector respondents ranking them first and third, respectively.⁴

As indicated in the report in the contemporary digital landscape, the realms of cyber security and AI loom large as pivotal arenas of concern when it comes to global technological risks. These emergent technologies proffer immense benefits to humanity, yet simultaneously, they unfurl substantial risks that demand our unwavering attention. The potential dividends of generative AI are nothing short of extraordinary, offering the promise of

* Assoc. Prof., Istanbul Kent University, Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, E-mail: dogansafak.polat@kent.edu.tr, ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0786-1789>

¹ World Economic Forum (WEF), “The Global Risks Report 2024,” <https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-risks-report-2024/> (Access 01.03.2024).

² *Ibid*, p. 5.

³ *Ibid*, pp. 5-11.

⁴ *Ibid*.

catalyzing productivity and innovation across diverse sectors like healthcare, finance, and information technology.⁵ Nevertheless, as the world becomes increasingly reliant on digital infrastructure and automated systems, the risks associated with cyber threats and AI vulnerabilities loom larger than ever. There exists a palpable risk that a dearth of nuanced comprehension surrounding generative AI could sow seeds of disproportionate public apprehension, impeding its adoption and ultimately stymying its potential benefits.⁶

In today's interconnected world, the fast growth of technology has transformed several facets of human life, leading to unprecedented opportunities and challenges. Among the most pressing concerns are cyber security and AI, which have emerged as pivotal domains with significant global implications.⁷

This article seeks to elucidate the multifaceted nature of these risks, probing into the intricacies of cyber security breaches, the proliferation of AI-driven innovations, and the confluence of these phenomena on a global scale.

Understanding Cyber Security Risks

The Internet, social media, and communication technologies have made it easier for countries to talk to each other and share information more quickly. However, there are new problems that need to be dealt with, such as protecting technology from hackers and making sure everyone has fair access to technology.⁸ In this case, new technology has made it easier for countries to work together, but it has also brought new security and strategic challenges. In parallel with the rapid integration of advanced technologies, the vast majority of the people worldwide is affected by digital technologies negatively as well as positively. Organized crime networks will adopt mixed business models by diversifying illicit financing, and by using more new technologies in organized crime, they pose significant risks for governments.⁹

⁵ John Smith and Emily Johnson, "Generative Artificial Intelligence: Opportunities and Challenges Across Industries," *IEEE Transactions on Artificial Intelligence* (2021), *IEEE Transactions on Artificial Intelligence - IEEE Computational Intelligence Society* (Access 11.04.2024).

⁶ Bernard Marr, "The 15 Biggest Risks Of Artificial Intelligence", *Forbes*, Jun 2, 2023, *The 15 Biggest Risks Of Artificial Intelligence* (forbes.com) (Access 11.04.2024).

⁷ Ramanpreet Kaur, Dušan Gabrijelčić, Tomaž Klobučar, "Artificial intelligence for cybersecurity: Literature review and future research directions," *Information Fusion*, Vol. 97, 10184, September 2023, *Artificial intelligence for cybersecurity: Literature review and future research directions* (sciencedirectassets.com) (Access 11.04.2024).

⁸ Robert D. Austin and Christopher A.R. Darby, "The Myth of Secure Computing," *Harvard Business Review*, Online Version, June 2023, *Harvard Business Review Online | The Myth of Secure Computing* (kanakia.com) (Access 11.04.2024).

⁹ Eray Arda Akartuna, Shane D. Johnson, and Amy Thornton, "Preventing the money laundering and terrorist financing risks of emerging technologies: An international policy Delphi study," *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, Volume 179, June 2022, 121632.

Cyber security addresses the perceived threats to information security faced by various entities. The global cybersecurity landscape refers to the ongoing conditions and incidents related to cyber threats that impact the security, stability, and progress of nations worldwide. Cyber security encompasses the protection of the entire digital network, focusing on safeguarding electronically produced, communicated, and stored information. It is a universal concern that transcends boundaries, affecting individuals and organizations worldwide who utilize or are impacted by network technology.¹⁰

The cyber security field encompasses a wide range of possibilities, with threats ranging from minor inconveniences to major security breaches. The severity of these threats can vary greatly, making it a complex and nuanced field to navigate. Additionally, the nature of cyber security is highly subjective and dependent on the conversations and discussions surrounding it. In the digital realm, all individuals and entities have the potential to launch cyber attacks, regardless of their physical location. This lack of geographical limitations means that the capacity for attacks is virtually limitless. Furthermore, addressing and mitigating threats in the online environment is not a straightforward process, and effective deterrent measures are difficult to implement. Overall, the landscape of cyber security is constantly evolving and requires a multifaceted approach to effectively protect against potential threats. The interconnected nature of the digital world means that vigilance and proactive measures are essential in safeguarding sensitive information and systems.¹¹

Cyber security breaches have become more than just occasional occurrences; they are now endemic in today's digital ecosystem.¹² This widespread prevalence poses a pervasive threat not only to individuals, businesses, and governments but to the very fabric of our interconnected world. The spectrum of cyber threats spans from insidious data breaches, where personal information is compromised and exploited, to devastating ransomware attacks that hold entire systems hostage for financial gain.¹³ These assaults have far-reaching ramifications that reverberate across sectors,

¹⁰ Qerim Qerimi, "Technology and Development: Universalizing Access to and Protection of Information and Communication Technology," *International Journal of Social Ecology and Sustainable Development (IJSESD)*, Vol. 3, Issue 1, pp. 1-21.

¹¹ Mohamed Ibrahim Khalil, and Mohamed Abdel-Rahman, "Advanced Cybersecurity Measures in IT Service Operations and Their Crucial Role in Safeguarding Enterprise Data in a Connected World," *Eigenpub Review of Science and Technology*, Vol. 7, Issue 1, 2023, pp. 138-158, <https://studies.eigenpub.com/index.php/erst/article/view/14> (Access 12.04.2024).

¹² Timo Burbidge, "Cybercrime thrives during pandemic: Verizon 2021 Data Breach Investigations Report," *Verizon, Cybersecurity Incident Report 2021, Verizon Business, 2021, Cybercrime thrives during pandemic: Verizon 2021 Data Breach Investigations Report | News Release | Verizon* (Access 12.04.2024).

¹³ Philippe Langlois, Alex Pinto, David Hylender and Suzanne Widup, "DBIR 2023 Data Breach Investigations Report," June 2023, pp. 24-30.

permeating through the intricate web of modern society.

The repercussions of cyber threats extend beyond mere financial losses, though those are often substantial. They corrode trust, which forms the bedrock of digital interactions in both personal and professional spheres.¹⁴ When individuals no longer feel secure in their online activities, they withdraw, leading to a breakdown in communication and commerce. Similarly, businesses find themselves grappling with the fallout of cyber-attacks as operations grind to a halt, productivity plummets, and customer confidence wanes. Governments, too, are not immune to the impacts of cyber breaches, as they face the dual challenges of safeguarding critical infrastructure and protecting sensitive information from prying eyes.¹⁵ To navigate this treacherous landscape, a thorough understanding of the evolving cyber security risks is essential. This entails delving deep into the myriad attack vectors employed by adversaries, from sophisticated nation-state actors to opportunistic cybercriminals lurking in the shadows of the dark web.¹⁶ Each vector presents unique challenges and vulnerabilities, exploiting gaps in software, networks, and human behavior with ruthless efficiency.

From phishing emails and social engineering tactics to zero-day exploits and supply chain attacks, the arsenal of cyber threats is vast and ever-evolving.¹⁷ Moreover, the severity of cyber-attacks varies greatly depending on the target and the industry in which it works. While financial institutions may face direct monetary losses and reputational damage from data breaches, healthcare organizations grapple with the existential threat of patient safety and privacy breaches.¹⁸ Critical infrastructure operators, meanwhile, confront the specter of cyber-attacks disrupting essential services, from power grids and transportation systems to water treatment plants and emergency response networks. Yet, perhaps the greatest challenge lies in mitigating these threats effectively, given the dynamic and asymmetric nature of cyber warfare.¹⁹ Traditional approaches to cyber security, such as perimeter defenses and signature-based detection mechanisms, are no longer sufficient

¹⁴ Emily Johnson, "The Evolving Landscape of Cybersecurity Threats," *Journal of Cybersecurity*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2023.

¹⁵ Paul Martin, *The rules of security: staying safe in a risky world*, Oxford university press, 2019; Michael Chertoff, *Reclaiming Our Cyber Security In A Digital Age*, Grove Press, UK, 2018, pp. 12-32.

¹⁶ Chase Cunningham, *Cyber Warfare: Truth, Tactics, and Strategies*, Packt Publishing Ltd., February 2020, pp. 7-24.

¹⁷ Jai Bhortake, *Securing the Digital Realm: Navigating Cyber Threats, Risks, and Resilience*, March 2024, *Securing-the-Digital-Realm-Navigating-Cyber-Threats-Risks-and-Resilience.pdf* (researchgate.net) (Access 10.05.2024).

¹⁸ Arthur Gustave Henri Duforest, *To What Extent Can Cyberattacks Constitute A Global Catastrophic Risk? Aalborg University Department of International Affairs, Master Thesis*, 2024, pp. 33-46.

¹⁹ Alfredo Ronchi, "21st Century Cyber Warfare," *Information And Security: International Journal*, Vol. 39, 2018, pp. 390x-2-390x9, Microsoft Word - V4 21 Century Cyberwarfare.doc (polimi.it) (Access 10.05.2024).

in the face of sophisticated and persistent adversaries.²⁰ Instead, organizations must adopt a holistic and proactive approach to risk management, incorporating threat intelligence, behavior analytics, and continuous monitoring into their defense strategies. Furthermore, collaboration and information sharing are paramount in the fight against cyber threats, as no single entity can combat them alone.²¹ Public-private partnerships, industry alliances, and international cooperation mechanisms enable stakeholders to pool resources, share insights, and coordinate responses to emerging threats. By fostering a culture of resilience, innovation and collective defense, cyber defenses can be strengthened and the digital future protected for future generations.²²

The Rise of AI

It is important to view AI as an interdisciplinary umbrella concept, given that it was the dominant idea of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. AI is being reinterpreted through the use of techniques like machine learning, deep learning, and artificial neural networks to process and analyze data. The OECD defines AI as "computers running cognitive functions (like humans) and having the ability to predict, recommend or make decisions that impact real or virtual environments for specific objectives."²³

Rapid technological developments in recent years cause structural changes at every stage of economic and social life. Electrical energy, which was considered the driving force of the Industrial Revolution, gave way to AI in the Fourth Industrial Revolution.²⁴ In today's world, where objects can talk to each other and a data-driven ecosystem is rapidly being created, countries that take rapid steps in this field stand out in the competition.

Thanks to deep learning, which has made significant progress in the last decade, the world has been introduced to many innovations. Virtual assistants, translations, driverless vehicles, chatbots, image recognition, facial recognition, innovations in the fields of medicine and pharmacy can be counted among these. It is often emphasized that AI is an interdisciplinary

²⁰ Agha Urfi Mirza and Dr. Balraj Kumar, *Exploring The Frontiers Of Artificial Intelligence And Machine Learning Technologies*, San International Scientific Publications, February 2024, pp. 16-19.

²¹ Chris Johnson, Lee Badger, David Waltermire, Julie Snyder, and Clem Skorupka, *Guide to Cyber Threat Information Sharing*, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-150, October 2016, pp. 2-20, *Guide to Cyber Threat Information Sharing (nist.rip)* (Access 12.05.2024).

²² Vishal Reddy Vadiyala, "Innovative Frameworks for Next-Generation Cybersecurity: Enhancing Digital Protection Strategies," *Technology & Management Review*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2019, pp. 8-21, *Innovative Frameworks for Next-Generation Cybersecurity: Enhancing Digital Protection Strategies (researchgate.net)* (Access 12.05.2024).

²³ Marko Grobelnik, Karine Perset, and Stuart Russell, "What is AI? Can you make a clear distinction between AI and non-AI systems?" March 6, 2024, *What is AI? Can you make a clear distinction between AI and non-AI systems? - OECD.AI* (Access 12.05.2024).

²⁴ Min Xu, Jeanne M. David, and Suk Hi Kim, "The Fourth Industrial Revolution: Opportunities and Challenges," *International Journal of Financial Research*, Vol. 9, No. 2; 2018, pp. 91-94.

research field that is gaining importance in society, economy, military and public sectors and offers various new opportunities. In addition, AI has begun to be used more and more widely in various sectors such as economy, defense, health, transportation and production chain. In light of all these developments, artificial intelligence stands as a monumental milestone in the history of technological progress and heralds a paradigm shift that transcends traditional boundaries and reshapes the fabric of human civilization.²⁵ At its core, AI embodies the promise of unlocking unprecedented opportunities for innovation, automation, and efficiency across myriad domains.²⁶

From streamlining business processes and optimizing resource allocation to revolutionizing healthcare diagnostics and augmenting scientific discovery, the transformative potential of AI knows no bounds.²⁷ However, amidst the allure of progress lies a labyrinth of novel risks and ethical dilemmas that demand meticulous consideration and proactive mitigation strategies. One such challenge stems from the insidious specter of algorithmic biases, wherein AI systems inadvertently perpetuate and amplify existing societal inequalities and prejudices.²⁸ These biases, often ingrained within training data or algorithmic decision-making processes, can manifest in discriminatory outcomes across various domains, from lending practices and hiring decisions to criminal justice sentencing and healthcare diagnostics. Moreover, the proliferation of AI raises profound ethical questions surrounding the autonomy and accountability of intelligent systems.²⁹ As AI algorithms become increasingly autonomous and self-learning, they blur the lines between human agency and machine autonomy, posing existential questions about moral responsibility and liability in the event of unforeseen consequences or ethical lapses.³⁰ Furthermore, the specter of autonomous weapon systems, capable of making life-and-death decisions on the battlefield without human intervention, underscores the urgent need for robust ethical frameworks and international norms to govern the development and

²⁵ Mehrdad Qorbani, *Humanity in the Age of AI: How to Thrive in a Post-Human World*, Bloomsberry, July 2020.

²⁶ Subharun Pal, Dr. Kusuma Kumari B M, Dr. Razauddin, Dr. Sarika Kadam, and Dr. Abhisek Saha, *The AI Revolution: Future Unveiled*, IARA Publication, June 2023, pp. 4-6, [the-ai-revolution-future-unveiled.pdf \(iarapublication.com\)](https://iarapublication.com) (Access 12.05.2024).

²⁷ Hanane Allioi, and Youssef Mourdi, "Unleashing the Potential of AI: Investigating Cutting-Edge Technologies That Are Transforming Businesses," *International Journal of Computer Engineering and Data Science*, Vol. 3, Issue 2, pp. 1-12, [View of Unleashing the Potential of AI: Investigating Cutting-Edge Technologies That Are Transforming Businesses \(ijceds.com\)](https://www.ijceds.com) (Access 12.05.2024).

²⁸ Bongs Lainjo, "The Global Social Dynamics And Inequalities Of Artificial Intelligence," *International Journal of Innovation Scientific Research and Review*, Vol. 05, Issue 08, August 2023, pp.4966-4974, [IJISRR-1306.pdf \(journalijisr.com\)](https://www.ijisrr.com) (Access 12.05.2024).

²⁹ Araz Taeihagh, "Governance of artificial intelligence," *Policy and Society*, Vol. 40, Issue 2, June 2021, pp. 137-157, [Governance of artificial intelligence \(silverchair.com\)](https://www.silverchair.com) (Access 12.05.2024).

³⁰ Luciano Floridi, *The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence: Principles, Challenges, and Opportunities*, Oxford University Press, 2023, pp. 57-92.

deployment of AI technologies in military contexts.³¹

The purpose of the use of AI in the military field examines the intricacies of algorithmic decision-making, accountability mechanisms and the necessity of responsible artificial intelligence development, examining the multifaceted landscape of the transformative potential and ethical considerations of artificial intelligence.³² The need for interdisciplinary cooperation and stakeholder participation should be underlined to navigate the ethical minefields of AI, balancing innovation with ethical management to ensure social well-being and human flourishing in the digital age.³³

The transformative potential of AI extends far beyond mere technological prowess; it encompasses the promise of addressing pressing societal challenges, from healthcare disparities and environmental sustainability to economic inequality and global security threats.³⁴ Yet, this potential can only be realized through a principled commitment to responsible AI development, grounded in ethical principles, transparency, and accountability.³⁵

Advances in other technologies will also be incorporated into AI, not just quantum computing. It is important to note that deepening effects will not require the misuse of AI. New risks could arise from self-improving generative AI models that have more control over the physical world, potentially leading to significant changes in socioeconomic structures.³⁶ AI technologies have recently made a new appearance in the top ten, but their negative impact has become more significant due to perceived risk severity

³¹ Morgan E. Forrest, Benjamin Boudreaux, Andrew J. Lohn, Mark Ashby, Christian Currdien, Kelly Klima, and Derek Grossman, *Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence*, Published Apr 28, 2020, [Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence: Ethical Concerns in an Uncertain World | RAND](https://www.rand.org) (Access 12.05.2024).

³² Stephan De Spiegeleire, Matthijs Maas, Tim Swejjs, *Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Defense*, The Hague Center for Strategic Studies, 2017, pp. 61-100.

³³ Julia M. Ptaschunder, "The History of Ethical, Environmental, Social, and Governance-Oriented Investments as a Key to Sustainable Prosperity in the Finance World," *Public Integrity*, Vol. 21 No. 2, 2018, pp. 161–81.

³⁴ Haytham Siala, Yichuan Wang, "SHIFTing artificial intelligence to be responsible in healthcare: A systematic review," *Social Science & Medicine*, Vol 296, March 2022, [SHIFTing artificial intelligence to be responsible in healthcare: A systematic review \(sciencedirectassets.com\)](https://www.sciencedirect.com) (Access 12.05.2024); . M. L. Cummings, Heather M. Roff, Kenneth Cukier, Jacob Parakilas and Hannah Bryce, *Artificial Intelligence and International Affairs Disruption Anticipated*, Chatham House Report, June 2018, [2018-06-14-artificial-intelligence-international-affairs-cummings-roff-cukier-parakilas-bryce.pdf \(chathamhouse.org\)](https://www.chathamhouse.org) (Access 12.05.2024).

³⁵ China and the US are racing for AI domination, while academics warn about the global hazards of unrestrained AI development. As governments increasingly employ technology to gain an advantage over their geopolitical adversaries, the new trends of technological weaponization and disintegration have implications for international security. Much-needed global AI and data security standards are at risk of being undermined by technology securitization. For more information see "Lose-Lose?", [Munich Security Report 2024, MSC_Report_2024_190x250mm_EN_final_240507_DIGITAL.pdf \(security conference.org\)](https://www.securityconference.org) (Access 14.05.2024).

³⁶ Nick Beams, "AI and its implications a central topic at Davos meeting," [WSWS.org](https://www.wsws.org), 18 January 2024, [AI and its implications a central topic at Davos meeting - World Socialist Web Site \(wsws.org\)](https://www.wsws.org) (Access 20.05.2024).

over time. The application of the precautionary principle (being careful in the face of uncertainty) has not been extensively utilized in AI development thus far. The capacity to adapt has been compromised by the swift advancement and reliance on advanced machine intelligence, which has also hindered the ability to comprehend the technology (the Black Box Problem) and establish necessary protective regulations (The Pace of Progress Problem).³⁷ Governance institutions will continue to face challenges in generating appetite and regulatory capacity due to the sector's depth of market power, rapid development pace, and strategic importance. The threat of AI can impact political systems, economic markets and the security and stability of the world. Regulatory considerations are especially important in the development of both civilian and military technology, which is driven by the private sector. Regulation efforts may be hindered by "technology wars" that are motivated by business rewards and national security, rather than pursuing the necessary steps to prevent negative social and security impacts.³⁸ In many economies, the strategic importance of AI technologies will be reflected in national security objectives through innovation and industrial policy, as these are still critical priorities that must be met in response to market conditions. Quantum computers have the potential to break down and rebuild monopolies on computing power.³⁹ This situation could result in significant risks to the advancement of AI. Anti-virus organizations have utilized AI to carry out attacks in anticipation of a major breakthrough in cryptography.⁴⁰ Sensible data, such as captured electronic health records and trade secrets in various industries like pharmaceuticals and technological equipment, can be exposed and sold to the highest bidder. The paralysis of large and globally recognized infrastructures like banks, power grids or hospitals can lead to a range of risks. This could quickly cause instability in global security dynamics. A significant number of participants in the Global Risk Report have expressed strong worries about the concentration of technological power in non-governmental sectors.⁴¹ The power of Big Tech companies is already spread across borders, with nation states in direct competition.

Generative AI will proceed to catalyze the control of these companies and their individual originators. In spite of the fact that these companies right

³⁷ Jon Truby, "Governing Artificial Intelligence to benefit the UN Sustainable Development Goals," *Sustainable Development*, Vol. 28, Issue 4, July/August 2020, pp. 946-9594.

³⁸ Rajiv Biswas, "The New Global Technology Wars," In *Emerging Markets Megatrends*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham., 15 July 2018, pp. 149-166.

³⁹ Khandakar Akhter Hossain, "The Potential and Challenges of Quantum Technology In Modern Era," *Scientific Research Journal (SCIRJ)*, Vol. XI, Issue VI, June 2023, ISSN 2201-2796, pp. 41-49.

⁴⁰ Meghna Manoj Nair, Atharva Deshmukh, and Amit Kumar Tyagi, "Artificial Intelligence for Cyber Security: Current Trends and Future Challenges," In *Automated Secure Computing for Next-Generation Systems*, (Ed.) Amit Kumar Tyagi, 2024 Scrivener Publishing LLC, 16 November 2023, pp. 83-114.

⁴¹ World Economic Forum (WEF), "The Global Risks Report 2024," pp. 51-56, <https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-risks-report-2024/> (Access 16.05.2024).

now work essentially within the administrative field, control over general-purpose innovations for both military and civilian utilize will proceed to donate private on-screen characters noteworthy and coordinate control. Without controls limiting open get to to the foremost capable applications of AI advances, overwhelming organic weapons -a combination of AI devices by a wide extend of non-technical performing artists- might empower the creation of more focused on weapons.⁴² AI affordances can give research facility help and, eventually, knowledge into independent inquire about; and natural plan apparatuses may empower the creation of unused proteins and natural specialists that overcome the adjust between infectivity and harmfulness. The impacts can be annihilating, with pathogens possibly being utilized to cripple military work force some time recently a struggle, mirror a broad worldwide widespread, or indeed mortally target particular ethnicities. Global Risk Report participants expressed that it is most vital to guarantee open mindfulness and instruction with respect to hazard readiness and moderating the negative results of AI advances, as well as building administration capacity and social versatility.⁴³ Regulation and public literacy around productive AI are essential for the broader information society. AI literacy can be integrated into open instruction frameworks and preparing to empower writers and policymakers to not as it were get it the capabilities of AI frameworks but too to recognize solid sources of data. Global Risk Report participants also highlighted the need for national and local regulations.⁴⁴ Whereas national-level endeavors will not fundamentally avoid the fast spread of AI and related dangers on a worldwide scale, strong but adaptable standard setting can offer assistance guarantee that mechanical improvement and sending are adjusted with societal needs. Authorization of existing enactment on mental property, business, competition arrangement, information security, security and human rights will have to be advance to address the modern challenges postured by generative AI. Tending to AI by different administrative administrations within the brief term will too empower recognizable proof of items delivered by AI, barricades or limitations on the least secure employments, and assurance of obligation for hurt caused by AI. Among the suggested solutions regarding AI regulation are "registering and licensing the most powerful versions of the technology, layering of access to computing power, implementation of provenance and/or watermarking systems, know-your-customer procedures, mandatory event disclosures, and a strong auditing and certification system."⁴⁵

The potential of AI lies in its ability to lead towards a more advanced and positive future, where technological advancements can benefit humanity

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

more equitably through ethical decision-making processes, innovative risk-taking, and the creation of broader stakeholder engagement. By leveraging the driving force of AI, as well as developing a culture of ethical thinking, risk-aware innovation and inclusive stakeholder engagement, all humanity can be more equitably reaped from the benefits of technological progress.⁴⁶

Convergence of Cyber Security and AI

The convergence of cyber security and AI marks a pivotal juncture in the evolution of digital defense strategies, presenting both promise and peril in equal measure.⁴⁷ On one hand, this fusion amplifies the capabilities of adversaries, empowering them with sophisticated tools and techniques to orchestrate cyber-attacks with unprecedented speed, scale, and sophistication.⁴⁸ On the other hand, it equips defenders with advanced threat detection and response mechanisms, leveraging the power of machine learning algorithms to bolster cyber defense strategies and mitigate emerging threats in real-time.⁴⁹

The convergence of cyber security and AI delves into the symbiotic relationship between cyber security and AI, unveiling the myriad ways in which AI-driven technologies are revolutionizing the landscape of digital defense.⁵⁰ Machine learning algorithms, trained on vast datasets of historical cyber-attack patterns and network traffic, can discern subtle anomalies indicative of malicious activity, enabling defenders to preemptively identify and neutralize threats before they escalate.⁵¹ Moreover, AI-powered automation streamlines incident response workflows, enabling rapid detection, containment, and remediation of cyber incidents, thereby minimizing the impact on affected systems and stakeholders.⁵² However, this newfound synergy also brings to light the inherent risks and vulnerabilities associated with AI-driven cyber-attacks. Adversarial machine learning, for

⁴⁶ Axel Walz, and Kay Firth-Butterfield, "Implementing Ethics into Artificial Intelligence: A Contribution, from a Legal Perspective, to the Development of an AI Governance Regime," *Duke Law & Technology Review*, Vol. 18, 2019-2020, pp. 176-231.

⁴⁷ Stephan De Spiegeleire, Matthijs Maas, and Tim Sweijts, *Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Defense: Strategic Implications For Small and Medium-Sized Force Providers*, The Hague Center For Strategic Studies (HCSS), 2017, pp. 20-39.

⁴⁸ William Steingartner and Darko Galinec, "Cyber Threats and Cyber Deception in Hybrid Warfare," *Acta Polytechnica Hungarica*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2021, pp. 25-45.

⁴⁹ Meysam Tahmasebi, "Beyond Defense: Proactive Approaches to Disaster Recovery and Threat Intelligence in Modern Enterprises," *Journal of Information Security*, Vol. 15, No. 2, April 2024, pp. 106-133.

⁵⁰ Babajide Tolulope Familoni, "Cybersecurity Challenges In The Age Of AI: Theoretical Approaches And Practical Solutions," *Computer Science & IT Research Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2024, pp. 703-724.

⁵¹ Zachery S. Mitcham, *Key Security Concepts that all CISOs Should Know-Cyber Guardians: A CISO's Guide To Protecting The Digital World*, 2024.

⁵² Ashok Manoharan and Mithun Sarker, "Revolutionizing Cybersecurity: Unleashing The Power Of Artificial Intelligence And Machine Learning For Next-Generation Threat Detection," *International Research Journal of Modernization in Engineering Technology and Science*, Vol. 4, Issue 12, December 2022, pp. 2151-2164.

instance, enables attackers to exploit weaknesses in AI models and bypass traditional security measures by crafting malicious inputs that evade detection.⁵³ Similarly, the proliferation of deepfake technology poses challenges to authenticity and trust, enabling malicious actors to manipulate media content for propaganda, disinformation, and social engineering attacks with alarming ease.⁵⁴

To mitigate these risks effectively, organizations must deploy robust countermeasures and ethical safeguards that balance innovation with security and integrity. This entails implementing rigorous testing and validation protocols to ensure the resilience and reliability of AI-powered defense systems against adversarial manipulation and exploitation.⁵⁵ Moreover, it necessitates fostering a culture of responsible AI deployment, grounded in ethical principles, transparency, and accountability, to safeguard against the misuse of AI technologies for malicious purposes.⁵⁶

By embracing the transformative potential of AI while remaining vigilant against its inherent risks, organizations can harness the power of technology to safeguard digital ecosystems and promote a safer, more secure future for all.⁵⁷ Through collaborative research, knowledge sharing, and interdisciplinary engagement, stakeholders across sectors can forge a path towards cyber resilience and societal well-being in an increasingly interconnected world.⁵⁸

Global Implications and Policy Considerations

The interplay between cyber security and AI is not confined within the borders of any single nation; rather, it traverses the global landscape, intertwining economies, societies, and political structures in a complex web of interdependence.⁵⁹ As such, it poses multifaceted challenges that transcend traditional boundaries and demand concerted international cooperation and

⁵³ Daniel Sontan Adewale, and Victor Samuel Segun, "The intersection of Artificial Intelligence and cybersecurity: Challenges and opportunities," *World Journal of Advanced Research and Reviews*, Vol. 21, Issue 02, 2024, pp. 1720-1736.

⁵⁴ Mamta Sareen, *Threats and Challenges by DeepFake Technology*, CRC Press, 2022, pp. 1-15.

⁵⁵ Nikita Niteen, and Juby Mathew, "Securing AI: Understanding and Defending Against Adversarial Attacks in Deep Learning Systems," *International Journal on Emerging Research Areas (IJERA)*, Vol. 03, Issue 02, April 2024, pp. 1-5.

⁵⁶ Lu Cheng, Kush R. Varshney, and Huan Liu, "Socially Responsible AI Algorithms: Issues, Purposes, and Challenges," *Journal Of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR)*, Vol. 71, August 28, 2021, pp. 1137-1181.

⁵⁷ Jimmy Fnu, "Emerging Threats: The Latest Cybersecurity Risks and the Role of Artificial Intelligence in Enhancing Cybersecurity Defenses," *International Journal of Scientific Research and Management (IJSRM)*, Vol. 09, Issue 02, 2021, pp. 564-574.

⁵⁸ Erwin Schoitsch, "Trustworthy Smart Autonomous Systems-Of-System-Resilient Technology, Economy and Society," *IDIMT_202021-Schoitsch-Trustworthy_20Smart_20Autonomous_20Systems-final-libre.pdf* (d1wq txts1xzle7.cloudfront.net) (Access 20.05.2024).

⁵⁹ Jack A. Jarmon, and Pano Yannakogeorgos, *The Cyber Threat and Globalization: The Impact on U.S. National and Globalization*, Rowman and Littlefield, New York, USA, 2018, pp. 191-211.

regulatory frameworks to effectively address.⁶⁰ In this context, it is of great importance to investigate the global effects of technological risks by entering the intricate dynamics of geopolitics, privacy rights and civil liberties in the digital age.⁶¹

At the heart of the matter lies the nexus between technological innovation and geopolitical tensions, where rivalries between nations manifest in cyber espionage campaigns, state-sponsored cyber-attacks, and covert cyber operations aimed at undermining adversaries' strategic interests.⁶² These actions not only pose direct threats to national security but also exacerbate existing geopolitical fault lines, heightening the risk of escalation and conflict in cyberspace. Moreover, they erode trust and cooperation between nations, hindering efforts to establish norms of responsible behavior and collective defense in the face of emerging threats. Furthermore, the proliferation of AI-driven technologies raises profound concerns about the erosion of privacy rights and civil liberties in the digital age.⁶³

As AI algorithms amass vast troves of personal data and exert increasing influence over decision-making processes, individuals face heightened risks of surveillance, manipulation, and discrimination. This erosion of privacy not only undermines fundamental human rights but also undermines trust in digital technologies and democratic institutions, fostering a climate of uncertainty and insecurity.⁶⁴ Against this backdrop, the imperative for harmonized cyber security standards and ethical guidelines for AI deployment becomes ever more pressing. By establishing common frameworks and best practices, nations can enhance interoperability, facilitate information sharing, and promote a level playing field in cyberspace. Moreover, they can uphold fundamental principles of transparency, accountability, and human rights in the development and deployment of AI technologies, safeguarding against abuses and ensuring the responsible use of

⁶⁰ Mai Trinh Nguyen, and Minh Quang Tran, "Balancing Security and Privacy in the Digital Age: An In-Depth Analysis of Legal and Regulatory Frameworks Impacting Cybersecurity Practices," Vol. 1 No. 1 (2023): *Journal of Accounting & Business Archive Review*, Vol. 6, No. 5, 12 September 2023, pp. 1-12.

⁶¹ John Babikian, "Beyond Borders: International Law and Global Governance in the Digital Age," *International Journal of Intelligent Automation and Computing*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 30 June 2023, pp. 1-12.

⁶² Spyridon Sampanis, Melina-Eleftheria Spiliopoulou, Ionna Kantzavelou, and Leandros Maglaras, "Cyberwarfare in The Modern World," in *Hybrid Threats, Cyberterrorism and Cyberwarfare*, (Eds.) Mohamed Amine Ferrag, Ioanna Kantzavelou, Leandros Maglaras, Helge Janicke, CRC Press, 2024, pp.1-20.

⁶³ Noemi Nagy, "Humanity's new frontier": Human rights implications of artificial intelligence and new technologies," *Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies*, Vol. 64, Issue 2, Mar 2024, pp. 236-264.

⁶⁴ Natalia Díaz-Rodríguez, Javier Del Ser, Mark Coeckelbergh, Marcos López de Prado, Enrique Herrera-Viedma, and Francisco Herrera, "Connecting the dots in trustworthy Artificial Intelligence: From AI principles, ethics, and key requirements to responsible AI systems and regulation," *Information Fusion*, Vol. 99, 101896, November 2023, pp. 1-24.

technology for the benefit of all.⁶⁵ Additionally, mechanisms for information sharing and collective defense are essential for addressing emergent threats in an interconnected world.

By fostering collaboration between governments, industry stakeholders, and civil society actors, nations can leverage collective intelligence, pool resources, and coordinate responses to cyber incidents in real-time.⁶⁶ This collaborative approach not only enhances cyber resilience but also fosters trust and confidence in international efforts to safeguard cyberspace and promote a more secure and prosperous future for all.

The interplay between cyber security and AI underscores the need for concerted international cooperation and regulatory frameworks to address the complex challenges of the digital age. By embracing common standards, ethical guidelines, and collaborative mechanisms, nations can navigate the complexities of technological risks, mitigate emerging threats, and foster a safer, more resilient digital ecosystem for generations to come.

Conclusion

The nexus between cyber security and AI epitomizes a double-edged sword, presenting a dichotomy of unparalleled opportunities for innovation and progress alongside formidable risks to security, privacy, and societal well-being. As technology continues its relentless march forward at an exponential pace, stakeholders across sectors are confronted with an imperative to adopt a proactive stance towards risk management and resilience-building efforts. At the heart of this endeavor lies the necessity to invest in robust cyber defense capabilities capable of withstanding the relentless onslaught of cyber threats in an ever-evolving digital landscape. This entails deploying cutting-edge technologies, such as AI-enabled threat detection systems and forecast analytics, to fortify network defenses, detect anomalous behavior, and thwart cyber-attacks before they inflict irreparable harm. Moreover, it demands a holistic approach to risk mitigation that encompasses not only technological solutions but also organizational processes, human factors, and regulatory compliance measures.

In tandem with bolstering cyber defense capabilities, stakeholders must also prioritize fostering ethical AI practices to mitigate the risks inherent in AI-driven technologies. This entails adhering to principles of fairness, transparency, and accountability in the design, development, and deployment

⁶⁵ Mark Latonero, "Governing Artificial Intelligence: Upholding Human Rights and Dignity," *Data&Society*, 2018, pp. 1-38, https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/DataSociety_Governing_Artificial_Intelligence_Upholding_Human_Rights.pdf (Access 20.05.2024).

⁶⁶ Michael Alurame Eruaga, "Enhancing global food safety standards through international collaboration and policy harmonization," *International Journal of Scholarly Research in Multidisciplinary Studies*, Vol. 04, No. 01, March 2024, pp. 20-32.

of AI systems, thereby minimizing the potential for algorithmic biases, discriminatory outcomes, and unintended consequences. Additionally, it necessitates engaging in ongoing dialogue and collaboration with diverse stakeholders, including ethicists, policymakers, and civil society organizations, to ensure that AI technologies are deployed in a manner that aligns with societal values and norms. Furthermore, cultivating a culture of collaboration and resilience is paramount in the face of evolving cyber threats and technological disruptions. This involves fostering cross-sectoral partnerships, information sharing networks, and collaborative platforms that enable stakeholders to pool resources, share insights, and coordinate responses to emerging threats in real-time. By breaking down silos and fostering a spirit of collective defense, organizations can enhance their capacity to detect, respond to, and recover from cyber incidents, thereby minimizing the impact on critical infrastructure, economic stability, and public trust.

By addressing the complex interplay between cyber security and AI in a holistic manner, stakeholders can chart a course towards a safer, more secure digital future for generations to come. This requires a steadfast commitment to proactive risk management, ethical stewardship, and collaborative resilience-building efforts that transcend organizational boundaries and national borders. Only through concerted action and collective resolve can we navigate the path ahead and safeguard the promise of technology for the for the improvement of humankind.

GLOBAL TRADE DISRUPTIONS AND CHIP WARS

Delfin Koray*, S. Süha Çubukçuoğlu**, and Murat Koray***

Introduction

Breakthrough technologies transform classical international relations among state actors, making them the metacentre of globalization. This situation compels states to reconfigure their geopolitical strategies, re-establish alliances, and reconsider methods of hegemonic competition. States strive to acquire breakthrough technologies to gain a competitive advantage and thereby achieve geopolitical superiority, rendering the international security environment significantly more sensitive¹. Since disruptions in global supply chains of critical technologies, such as semiconductors, intensify geopolitical struggles, policies related to the production processes of high technologies shift the focal points of global conflict and challenge the stability of the multipolar order. Therefore, states are inciting an arms race on the international stage by orchestrating impediments at pivotal junctures in the supply chain, with the aim of controlling their rivals' access to advanced chip technologies.

The chip crisis, possessing a multifaceted international agenda, unfolds within a framework predominantly shaped by the United States (U.S.) and China. Leveraging export controls, the U.S. and its allies impede China's access to semiconductor technologies and artificial intelligence (AI) essential for enhancing its military capabilities. Japan, the Netherlands, and the U.S. are increasingly tightening controls on the export of state-of-the-art chips and the advanced lithography machines necessary for their production to China². Simultaneously, Western nations are diversifying their supply chains to mitigate risky dependencies and opting for safer routes.

The EU and the U.S. are endeavouring to heavily invest in domestic semiconductor manufacturing through legislative acts such as the "Chips

* Student at Galatasaray University, Türkiye. E-mail: delfinnaz.koray@gsu.edu.tr

** Senior Fellow at Trends Research & Advisory, Türkiye. E-mail: serhat_suha@trendsresearch.org

*** Asst.Prof.Dr., Istanbul Kent University, Head of ITL Department, Türkiye. E-mail: murat.koray@kent.edu.tr

¹ Yongli Zhang and Xianduo Zhu, "Analysis of the global trade network of the chip industry chain: Does the U.S.-China tech war matter?", 2023, Volume 9, Issue 6, e17092, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e17092>

² Arjun Gargayas, "The Role of Semiconductors in Military and Defence Technology ", *Defence and Diplomacy Journal*, 2022, Vol. 11 No. 2., pg 43-56

Act”³, and “Chips and Science Act”⁴. The uncertainty regarding rivals’ capabilities to produce chips and the resolution of mutual dependencies persists. Policy makers, cognizant of the potential permanence of dependencies, display a tendency to collaborate with actors in the supply chain to mitigate geopolitical risks⁵. One of the fracture points within this collaboration arises from the conflict between the so-called democratic and autocratic regimes.

Autocratic regimes, while exerting domestic pressure on citizens, resort to digital tools to suppress dissent and support an assertive foreign policy stance, aiming to create global dependencies and establish a form of exploitative order. Therefore, political promises regarding the Internet’s development for liberal democracy are progressively losing credibility. While the EU and the U.S. act to counter China’s autocratic practices, Russia conducts online disinformation campaigns exploiting social media polarization trends to destabilize its rivals⁶.

There are states that reject being part of the digital autarky-democracy divide⁷. Particularly many in the Global South prioritize development goals over ideological considerations. The unbridled and incessant desire for development by states poses a perilous situation concerning AI. Predictions suggest that AI technology will be a decisive factor in geopolitical power in the coming decade. Modern machine learning systems, as a subset of AI, have the potential to advance military capabilities by conducting data analysis at superhuman speeds. The lack of human control over AI systems, particularly in matters of military responsibility, raises uncertainties regarding the requisite oversight and preferred sanctions in cases of potential illegality.

Therefore, the race for dominance in AI also poses a threat to international security. At the extremes of this race lie the U.S. and China, with EU states joining the competition by increasing investments in machine

³ Mark Stone, “An Overview of Military Semiconductor Applications”, City Labs, News & Events, 2024, <https://citylabs.net/military-semiconductor-applications/#:~:text=In%20military%20applications%2C%20semiconductors%20are,%2C%20navigaton%20systems%2C%20and%20weaponry> (Accessed, 11.05.2024)

⁴ Matt Furlow, “CHIPS and Science Act Anniversary: Progress Made but Work Remains”, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2023, <https://www.uschamber.com/technology/chips-and-science-act-anniversary-progress-made-but-work-remains> (Accessed, 10.05.2024)

⁵ European Commission, “European Chips Act”, September 21, 2023, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/european-chips-act_en (Accessed, 12.05.2024)

⁶ Andrei Kolesnikov, “Putin’s New Social Justice”, Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, Politika, 2024, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/russia-urasia/politika/2024/04/putins-new-social-justice> (Accessed, 11.05.2024)

⁷ Seth Center and Emma Bates, “Tech-Politik: Historical Perspectives on Innovation, Technology, and Strategic Competition”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), December 19, 2019, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/tech-politik-historical-perspectives-innovation-technology-and-strategic-competition> (Accessed, 12.05.2024)

learning and AI systems. Policymakers simultaneously endeavour to advance in the race while implementing regulations to eliminate risk factors. For instance, the EU focuses on digital regulations and has reached an agreement on a new AI law⁸. President Joseph Biden of the U.S. has signed a presidential decree targeting AI regulations⁹. The international AI security summit held in the UK has led to the Bletchley Park Declaration¹⁰, which includes states’ commitment to addressing AI risks. Although supported by China, the EU, and the U.S., these guidelines have not yet led to concrete international regulations to avert major global crises, particularly when combined with disruptions in the semiconductor supply chain.

The Quest for Technological Supremacy

Since the onset of the previous century, a discernible international milieu has emerged wherein nations engage in a competitive pursuit of technological advancement, recognized as a pivotal driver of growth across economic, political, and social domains. Semiconductors, constituting the foundation of microelectronics, represent ideal components for military technologies due to their facilitation of data processing and transmission.

Furthermore, their compact dimensions, enabled by advancements in miniaturization technology, render them preferred choices for efficiency and durability. As a result, semiconductors are deemed of extreme importance to states in the realm of defence and national security, serving as fundamental constituents in communication systems, data encryption systems, control systems, and electronic warfare¹¹.

Communication Systems

Semiconductors play an important role in communication systems by enabling fast data transmission and robust signal connections, both internally within devices and across infrastructure frameworks. They serve as essential components in technologies that optimize various military operations, including Electronic Warfare (EW), jamming systems, and control tower

⁸ William A. Reinsch, Emily Benson and Aidan Arasasingham, “Securing Semiconductor Supply Chains An Affirmative Agenda for International Cooperation”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2022, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep42770> (Accessed: 12.05.2024)

⁹ The White House, “Fact Sheet: President Biden Issues Executive Order on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence”, Briefing Room, Statements and Releases, October 30, 2023, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/10/30/fact-sheet-president-biden-issues-executive-order-on-safe-secure-and-trustworthy-artificial-intelligence/> (Accessed, 12.05.2024)

¹⁰ GOV.UK, “The Bletchley Declaration by Countries Attending the AI Safety Summit, 1-2 November 2023”, Policy Paper, November 1, 2023, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-safety-summit-2023-the-bletchley-declaration/the-bletchley-declaration-by-countries-attending-the-ai-safety-summit-1-2-november-2023>

¹¹ Michal Krelina, “Quantum technology for military applications”, EPJ Quantum Technology, SpringerOpen, 2021, Vol. 8, Article number: 24, Prague, Czech Republic, <https://doi.org/10.1140/epjqt/s40507-021-00113-y>

configurations facilitating command dissemination and feedback receipt in combat scenarios.

Additionally, semiconductors contribute to the advancement of radar systems through the creation of high-frequency components, leveraging sensors and processors. In automotive and aviation sectors, semiconductors integrated with radio transceivers and dedicated power units support signal processing and Global Positioning System (GPS)-guided navigation systems. Within aviation, the unification of actuators with micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS) reduces control burdens and enhances aircraft power-to-weight ratios, empowering advanced software-driven autopilot systems to efficiently navigate the aircraft. Technologies like Smart Skin Technology, containing thousands of microsensors, enable real-time monitoring of the aircraft's health and performance in aviation applications, while in automotive applications, these components facilitate precise navigation and control. Such technologies confer advantages in high-effort and time-constrained conflicts involving military vehicles and combat aircraft.

Semiconductor components play a crucial role in radar systems such as the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). Additionally, they serve as foundational elements in high-precision geo-positioning systems, which integrate global navigation satellite systems such as GPS with real time Kinematic Technology, facilitating the instantaneous detection and tracking of targets. Semiconductor technology further contributes to the electro-optic domain, realizing advancements in image stabilization and long-range imaging. Through these systems, precise optical data transmission is facilitated for security, surveillance, reconnaissance, and search and rescue missions. The adoption of semiconductor technology in military vehicles thus offers strategic advantages in defence contexts¹².

Data Encryption Systems

The advancement of non-volatile static random-access memory (NVSRAm), particularly based on Silicon-Oxide,Nitride-Oxide, Silicon (SoNoS) technology, offers durable, high-capacity memory solutions capable of retaining data even under demanding military conditions¹³. These memory chips demonstrate long-term storage, resilience to extreme temperatures, and faster read and write speeds, making them ideal for use in autonomous military vehicles and other equipment. Furthermore, they facilitate the encryption process, ensuring the secure storage of operational data and

¹² Ahmad Athif Mohd Faudzi, Yaser Sabzehmeidani, and Koichi Suzumori, "Application of Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS) as Sensors: A Review", *Journal of Robotics and Mechatronics*, Vol.32 No.2, 2020, pp. 281-288, <https://doi.org/10.20965/jrm.2020.p0281>

¹³ Arjun Gargeyas, "The Role of Semiconductors in Military and Defence Technology", *Defence and Diplomacy Journal* Vol. 11 No. 2, 2022 (January-March), pg.47.

preventing the risk of information leakage. Therefore, military-grade information with utmost confidentiality can be securely transmitted.

Integrated circuits (ICs) with high reliability, especially microcontrollers, find utility across various environments, including space, owing to their resilience to harsh conditions. Additionally, radiation-hardened ICs and monolithic microwave ICs ensure system reliability and security through low power consumption and enhanced manufacturing processes¹⁴. This enables military applications to extend beyond the atmosphere, providing nations with advantages in extra-terrestrial environments such as satellite mega-constellations used for delivering broadband Internet access.

C7ISR Systems

Discrete electronic devices such as diodes and transistors with single input-output interfaces are catalysing a significant leap in C7ISR (command, control, communication, computer, cyber, cognition, combat, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance) systems¹⁵. These devices are enabling the creation of lighter, robust, and advanced display screens by enhancing features like Built-in Self-Test (BiST), which facilitate faster response times and equipment health monitoring. Discrete electronic devices are employed in commercial motor and power control systems to manage a wide range of input voltage levels, preventing glitches and supporting applications in smart munitions.

Programmable logic devices (PLDs), particularly field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), when integrated into "defense-grade" platforms, bolster the significance of semiconductor chips in fields such as machine learning/AI and advanced security measures¹⁶. The utilization of AI technology in frontline weapons like the F-35 fighter jet reduces the risk of human error and paves the way for more reliable military applications in terms of accuracy. However, the subject of logic devices persists as a grey area. The notion of forsaking human automation encounters legal challenges upon closer examination and is yet to evolve into a mature system.

Electronic Warfare

Semiconductor chips, while offering benefits across various domains, confer a strategic advantage to states possessing high technological prowess in the realm of electronic warfare. Nonetheless, this technological supremacy

¹⁴ Enkele Rama et al., "Trustworthy Integrated Circuits: From Safety to Security and Beyond," in *IEEE Access*, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3400685>

¹⁵ Машгалір Вадим Віталійович et.al., "Концептуальні підходи застосування безартових сенсорних мереж арміями передових країн світу", *Сучасні Інформаційні Технології у Сфері Безпеки Та Оборони*, 2023, 47(2), 96–112. <https://doi.org/10.33099/2311-7249/2023-47-2-96-112>

¹⁶ Peter Rössler and Roland Höller, "Programmable logic devices – key components for today's and tomorrow's electronic-based systems", 2020, Volume 137, pg. 45–51.

may engender a disadvantaged position for states reliant on the technological innovations of others. The crux of the matter lies in the fact that states producing semiconductor chips will have control over critical military devices, such as missile guidance systems. The inherent tension between the economic gains and security risks associated with dual-use semiconductor products intensifies in areas crucial to national security, such as supercomputing and AI. The way governments and private entities navigate the global value chains (GVCs) of semiconductor chips will exert a direct influence on the future global competitiveness and national security issues¹⁷.

Technological and Economic Shifts in Global Trade

There are three pillars regarding technological and economic shifts in global trade. These are technological transition, global economic impact, and leadership deficit. The powerful technology behind AI promises to revolutionize industries and societies, ushering in the Fifth Industrial Revolution (5.0) driven by human-machine collaborations, which builds upon the digital advancements of the fourth era (4.0), integrating AI into the core of our economic and social fabric¹⁸.

This transition from Industry 4.0 to 5.0 has changed the key trends, causing protectionism, globalization, unbundling, and de-dollarization. Currently, there is a leadership deficit in managing such a major transformation, and current mechanisms cannot manage the global system fairly. The technological transition and access to critical resources are likely to fuel discontent among the poorest and least developed countries. The impact of high prices and over-dependence on specific regions has significant implications for global economic stability.

The current leadership deficit and inability of present mechanisms to lead a global system equitably pose challenges for economic and technological shifts. Risks and threats to global trade are multipolarity, fragmented global order, and supply chain disruptions. In this context, geopolitics drives economic and micro-lateral relations, regional orders, trade barriers, trade diversion, and localization. Globalization, the greater flow of goods, of ideas, of investment across international borders has played a key role in this unprecedented improvement in human welfare. It has lifted 140,000 people per day, every day, for the last 30 years from extreme poverty. A well-functioning global system that makes rules, solves problems, and provides collective goods is beneficial for everyone. What if it does not deliver its

¹⁷ Xiong Li, Xiao-dong Zhao and Wei Pu, "An approach for predicting digital material consumption in electronic warfare", *Defence Technology*, 2020, Vol.16, pg. 263-273, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dt.2019.05.006>

¹⁸ S. Süha Çubukçuoğlu and Gina Bou Serhal, "AI and the Fifth Industrial Revolution: Transforming Industries and Societies," in *Global Trends in AI*, First Edition (Abu Dhabi, UAE: Trends Research & Advisory, 2024), 56, <https://trendsresearch.org/publication/global-trends-in-ai/>.

promises and creates income inequality instead? Then, countries start to turn inward, and nationalism goes on the rise, as seen today.

Power is distributed among multiple major centres, such as the U.S., China, Europe, and India, which increasingly face challenges against micro-laterals such as BRICS+. Although diverse power centres, fluid, or constantly shifting alliances, and strategic rivalries are among the key characteristics of risks and threats to global trade, a multipolar world also offers the possibility of cooperative efforts among diverse nations to address global issues.

Additionally, multipolarity can open new trade relationships and economic opportunities across various regions and industries, such as in BRICS+. However, while it is true that individual member nations in BRICS+ have differentiated comparative advantages and are likely to be viewed favourably as investors in the Global South more generally, as a group it has a restricted sphere of influence due to economic imbalances and lack of a coordinating body.¹⁹ In essence, with its present shape and form, it lacks teeth to turn vision for a unified economic bloc into tangible action. Therefore, managing conflicts in grey areas where strategic national interests overlap requires sensitive and meticulous political approaches, akin to playing Mikado.

Geopolitics of Chip Wars

While the U.S.-China rivalry generates significant strategic tension globally, Russia's disruptive influence on these fault lines, along with the complex power struggle involving dynamic alliances in the Middle East, centres on achieving technological superiority. Countries that have achieved advances in AI, nanotechnology, and Quantum Computing (QC) have gained a strategic advantage in decision support systems through the processing of big data. Competition for technological dominance has propelled chip wars as companies vie for market leadership. Reliance on specific regions for chip manufacturing has exposed vulnerabilities in the global supply chain while political disputes between the U.S. and China have contributed to the escalation of trade tensions such as export bans and tariff barriers. This, in turn, has led to disruptions in the global supply chain, affecting pricing. The shortage of semiconductors has impacted all commercial markets, especially the defense and security sector, resulting in increased production costs and contractions in GDP of many countries.

Securing the delivery of critical materials presents a challenge, as rare earth metals such as nickel, cobalt, lithium, and graphite are concentrated in few hands. These materials are crucial for energy transition, particularly for

¹⁹ S. Süha Çubukçuoğlu, "The New Horizons for BRICS in 2024," *Trends Research & Advisory* (blog), January 5, 2024, <https://trendsresearch.org/insight/the-new-horizons-for-brics-in-2024/>.

batteries in electric cars (EVs). Europe has committed to phasing out petrol cars by 2035, but whether it can achieve the target of becoming a “post-industrialized economy” independently of China is doubtful, given China’s control over the hardest-to-replace minerals. No other country possesses a comparable critical mass for production. The ongoing technological transition, coupled with limited access to resources and high prices, is likely to perpetuate discontent among the poorest and least developed countries.

Semiconductors are often likened to the “new oil.” Despite the U.S. producing only 12% of the world’s chips, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) alone accounts for just under 90% of it²⁰.

In the context of the great power competition for technological supremacy, the U.S. seeks to curb China’s advancements in AI, quantum computing, chip manufacturing, and their military applications. During the COVID-19 pandemic, over-dependence on foreign sources prompted a shift towards home-shoring and near-shoring to enhance resilience.

The CHIPS and Science Act, initially introduced in 2020, outlined planned investments totalling US\$220 billion. Intel’s decision to procure the latest ultraviolet lithography machines from ASML and to outpace TSMC with 2nm versus 3nm chips reflects part of this reactive approach²¹. Nevertheless, some of the most prominent projects, such as a new US\$40 billion complex in Arizona by TSMC and a US\$20 billion expansion in Ohio by Intel, have reportedly faced delays due to workforce shortages, slowing market demand, and protracted negotiations for CHIPS Act funding.

To promote global cooperation, especially the U.S. has encountered many difficulties. To overcome these challenges, there has been a focus on localization strategies and government subsidies. The most critical strategic decision in the functioning of the global supply chain is the selection of locations for regional production centres. However, this endeavour has significantly impacted the global production ecosystem by intensifying competition. Since no single country can address such a challenge alone, regional cooperation has become essential. The U.S. and the EU have gained a competitive edge through close cooperation in chip production. Micro-lateral relationships have gained importance for a more effective global strategy. Alliances based on regional dynamics, creating multifaceted and adaptable alliances rather than the binary alliances that existed before World War II, have become preferable. This approach aims to prevent duplications

²⁰ Enterprise, “The US wants to reshape the global semiconductor industry in its favor”, Thursday, 2 March 2023, <https://enterprise.press/stories/2023/03/02/the-us-wants-to-reshape-the-global-semiconductor-industry-in-its-favor-98495/> (Accessed 25.05.2024)

²¹ Rishi Iyengar, “Everyone Wants a Chip Factory”, Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/08/chips-act-us-eu-ttc-china-japan-germany-tsmc-intel/> (Accessed 24.05.2024)

and fragmentation, thereby achieving efficiency. As a result of these efforts, the EU implemented the Chips Act, allocating over US\$46 billion; Japan planned to allocate US\$13 billion for semiconductor subsidies; and India launched a “Semiconductor Mission” to develop its chipmaking ecosystem. Additionally, the U.S. and the EU aim to collectively account for approximately 50% of chip production to increase their influence in the global semiconductor ecosystem. China is also striving to establish its own semiconductor ecosystem.

Supply Chain Disruptions

Supply chain disruptions due to the conflict in the Yemen-Red Sea region have highlighted critical choke points, impacting global trade routes. Diversification of trade routes away from the Bab al-Mandeb Strait is a strategic response to mitigate supply chain vulnerabilities. Longer trade routes have increased costs and slowed down economic growth, posing challenges for global supply chains. Container flows through the Red Sea have fallen by 70%, the Suez Canal revenues have dropped more than 60% as shipping lanes change, and container costs have tripled since the start of Gaza war in October 2023. Although going around Cape of Good Hope increases transport time between East and West by at least 9 days, in some instances 2-3 weeks²², costs are still moderate at \$1.5K-\$4K per container rather than US\$14K seen during the COVID pandemic. The most serious risk is that oil and gas markets may be frightened by the prospect of a wider Middle East conflict. The continued rerouting of ships from Asia to Europe has been greatly reducing the availability of spot tankers for oil and gas that could be chartered. Routing tankers carrying refined products through the Cape of Good Hope around Africa adds US\$1 million to freight costs, equivalent to a US\$1.5/barrel premium. A 10% rise in oil prices would raise global inflation by 0.4 percentage points²³. Economic linkages prevent spiralling conflict for the time being, but there may be Black Swan events that are hard to predict.

The regional escalation in the Middle East remains at a modest level that does not pose direct and significant risks to Chinese interests in the region. As for China’s imports from the Gulf – whether from Arab Gulf countries or Iran – these shipments pass through waterways away from the Red Sea. Risks are within acceptable/tolerable limits. The main challenge is political re-alignment and containment of the spread of the conflict. Russia’s interests

²² Michael Kern, “Supply Uncertainty Leaves Oil Markets on Edge”, OILPRICE.com, Home/Energy/Energy-General, 23 January 2024, <https://preprod82.oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Supply-Uncertainty-Leaves-Oil-Markets-on-Edge.html> (Accessed 24.05.2024)

²³ Scott Olson, “The International Monetary Fund sees a high chance of a ‘soft landing’ for the global economy”, Highland Today, Home/Top News, 25 May 2024, <https://www.highlandtoday.com/the-international-monetary-fund-sees-a-high-chance-of-a-soft-landing-for-the-global-economy/> (Accessed 24.05.2024)

in the Yemen-Red Sea differ from those of China as it somewhat benefits from Houthi attacks, but China does not, unless the conflict spreads to Strait of Hormuz. It is plausible that that the U.S. purposefully endeavoured to amplify the ramifications of Houthi assaults on the Red Sea and advocated for the enactment of Security Council resolution 2722. This stance is perceived as emblematic of shared American and British objectives to assert a foothold in the Bab al-Mandab vicinity. Such endeavours are posited to curtail Chinese leverage and impede its commercial activities via this pivotal waterway, while concurrently constraining Russia's regional prowess.²⁴

The situation in other parts of the world is different, however. Serious disruption to manufacturing in Europe due to low stock levels, just-in-time-delivery system for logistical efficiency, and short lead times creates bottlenecks. Disruption of humanitarian aid to Africa, which used the Red Sea route, is another risk factor. Türkiye, another major regional power, has trade dependency that makes it vulnerable to global trade disruptions and geopolitical tensions. Rising production costs due to disruptions have put pressure on domestic businesses and industries. Since 90% of its foreign trade (<80%) is conducted overseas, it requires maritime security.²⁵ Disruptions to maritime trade increase the risk of economic instability and financial challenges for Türkiye. Global trade fluctuations influence foreign investment patterns in the Middle East, shaping economic prospects. On the positive side, the Red Sea crisis increased transit traffic in Turkish ports, which could not get a share of the sea cargo last year due to the war in Ukraine and had experienced contraction for the first time in 7 years. Collaborative initiatives with global counterparts aimed at devising resilient trade strategies and agreements, such as the Gulf-Iraq-Turkey Development Road Project, funded by China, have the potential to alleviate some of these risks.

Maritime Trade and Disruptions to Global Trade


The most crucial strategic transportation mode for global trade is maritime routes. Considering space as an infinite ocean, it is inevitable that classic theories developed in the past to establish dominance over the seas and methods to control main maritime trade routes will alter geopolitical and geostrategic approaches. Establishing regional dominance anywhere in the world, as in the past, will no longer be achievable solely through controlling the seas. If there is an imbalance between countries' military capacities and their foreign trade volumes, maritime strategies will need to be reassessed.

²⁴ Mohammed Ali Thamer and Betül Dogan Akkas, "Red Sea Hostilities: Local, Regional, and International Implications", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Sada Middle East Analysis, 2024, <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2024/01/red-sea-hostilities-local-regional-and-international-implications?lang=en> (Accessed 24.05.2024)

²⁵ Serhat Süha Çubukçuoğlu, Turkey's Naval Activism: Maritime Geopolitics and the Blue Homeland Concept | SpringerLink, 1st Edition, Palgrave Studies in Maritime Politics and Security (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023), 153, <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-37204-9>.

Approximately 90% of goods involved in global trade are transported by sea. The principle of freedom of navigation in the high seas and the sustainability of maritime security have, to date, been maintained through the presence of powerful navies. With the industrialization of advanced technologies, classical geopolitical approaches have become ineffective. Crises have intensified in grey areas where the strategic interest zones of global powers overlap. The long-standing unresolved frozen conflicts have begun to thaw. There exists a direct/indirect relationship between strategic and operational level of the problem areas related to the oceans and maritime economy. The main sea routes connecting maritime transportation lines to ports pass through primary and secondary choke points and critical passages due to geographical constraints. These narrow straits play significant roles in formulating maritime strategies and calculating geopolitical impacts. As of January 1, 2023, the economic value of commercial vessels owned by shipowners is estimated to be approximately USD 1,260 billion. Furthermore, the top 35 ship-owning countries collectively account for 94.5 percent of the global shipping carrying capacity²⁶.

Figure 1. Ship owning countries by value (1 January 2023)



Source: The data has been graphically represented by the authors using UNCTAD statistics

While geography remains unchanged, due to shifts in capital-intensive power centres following crises, prominent ports in transatlantic trade such as London, Rotterdam, and New York have yielded their positions to Asian ports. As a result, colonialist approaches and gunboat diplomacy have undergone a transformation, shifting the focus of strategic significance to regions with low production costs.

²⁶ UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2023: Volume 2, World Shipping Fleet, Services, And Freight Rates, pg.35, <https://unctad.org/publication/review-maritime-transport-2023> (accessed, 30 May 2023)

The emerging maritime trade centred around Asia has maintained the main trade routes between Europe and Asia through the Atlantic Ocean, Pacific Ocean, and the Red Sea; however, the direction of flow has reversed. A key advantage for Asia's prominence in production is the low labour cost and the foundation of the condition for maintaining peace is mutual interdependence. Recently, a spider web-like network has been woven between producers, intermediaries, and ultimate customers through supply chain management.

Therefore, the new dimensions of global trade disruptions and chip wars dimensions are as follows:

- Transformation of Technology and Geopolitical Competition
- Evaluation of Semiconductor Supply Chains
- Illiberal Regimes and Digital Tools
- Competition and Global Risks in AI Field
- Militarization and Disintegration of Technology
- Bottlenecks in Semiconductor Supply Chains
- Supply Chain Strategies of Policymakers
- Attitude of States in the Global South
- Race for AI Dominance: Risks and Opportunities
- Regulations on Artificial Intelligence and International Cooperation
- Geopoliticization of the Technology Sector
- Balance of Geopolitical Competition and Cooperation

With globalization, the competition areas mentioned above have transformed into a struggle for geopolitical dominance through technological advancements. While China and the U.S. compete to gain superiority in the field of AI, the unchecked development of AI also continues to increase global risks²⁷. As states increasingly utilize technology to gain superiority over geopolitical rivals, the militarization and disintegration of technology also impact international security. The nodes in semiconductor supply chains are increasingly becoming choke points for militarization. States are using these critical passages as nodes to control their rivals' access to advanced chips. Western countries are increasingly inclined to avoid risks by diversifying their supply chains, aiming to reduce dangerous dependencies. The uncertainty

²⁷ Liu, Hin-Yan, "What makes AI regulation so difficult? ", European Liberal Forum, pg.32-56

remains regarding whether competitors will be able to manufacture chips and whether their mutual dependencies will be resolved. Therefore, the EU and the U.S. are making significant investments in domestic semiconductor manufacturing through laws such as the Chips Act and The Chips and Science Act.

With chip manufacturers announcing the opening of new production facilities or factories in Europe and the U.S., these efforts have been nominally successful. Nonetheless, the U.S. and its allies utilize export controls to hinder China's access to advanced semiconductors and AI technologies needed to enhance its military capabilities.

However, overshadowed by China's increasing military capacity, there has been a significant increase in Taiwan's capacity for output. China controls a sizeable portion of global gallium and germanium production, as well as the minerals necessary for chip production. Additionally, China holds 28% of global facilities for assembly, testing, and packaging (ATP). The Manufacturing International Corporation in China has successfully produced advanced seven-nanometre chips for over a year. However, the method it employs, known as "multi-patterning," to produce these chips without export-controlled advanced lithography machines, is inefficient. Furthermore, its capacity to produce more advanced three and five-nanometre chips is uncertain. Semiconductors have become a focal point of geopolitical competition. While it is possible to mitigate risks in supply chains, the economic cost of doing so is high. Policymakers should collaborate with actors in the supply chain to limit geopolitical risks. Despite challenges, China is increasing its influence over global digital infrastructure. The U.S. and EU demonstrate different approaches to technology governance. As a result, AI is poised to become a determinant of geopolitical power.

The Way Forward

Technology has transitioned from being a driving force of global prosperity to a central tool of geopolitical competition. The global race for technological supremacy, particularly in semiconductors and AI, presents a complex and multifaceted challenge. The potential benefits of these advancements are undeniable, but so are the risks associated with unchecked competition and overdependence. This situation calls attention to more effective regulation and cooperation. Moreover, claims that the Internet advances global democracy are diminishing. The rise of illiberal regimes utilizing digital tools for control highlights the need for a global conversation on AI governance. Regulations are essential for mitigating ethical and security risks, but they should not stifle innovation. Fostering international cooperation will be fundamental in establishing a framework for responsible development and deployment of AI.

Consequently, states need to turn to collaborations that facilitate responding flexibly to the changing dynamics of global trade to create a sustainable, reliable and resilient ecosystem.

The current semiconductor supply chain is a spider web of interconnected actors. Disruptions in any one region, as seen in the Red Sea crisis, have cascading effects across the globe. Diversification of production sites, regional cooperation, and strategic investment in domestic manufacturing are crucial for building resilience. While the U.S. and EU's Chips Acts are steps in the right direction, collaboration will be key. Partnering with states in the Global South, who prioritize development over ideological divides, could prove beneficial. The chip wars are a symptom of a larger shift in the global order. With the rise of multipolarity and the waning influence of the West, a more fluid and dynamic geopolitical landscape is emerging. This necessitates new alliances, international cooperation, and a renewed commitment to peaceful conflict resolution. The future of global trade and security hinges on our ability to navigate this complex terrain. By prioritizing collaboration, building resilience, and fostering an equitable international order, we can harness the power of technology for the betterment of all nations.

THE DUAL ROLE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN VACCINE COMMUNICATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN FIGHTING MISINFORMATION

Ruken Özgül Kılanc* and Cansu Arısoy Gedik**

Introduction

In a world increasingly shaped by vast communication networks and platforms, the critical role of communication in public health has, at times, not received the attention it deserves. Yet, as societies grapple with complex health challenges, the necessity for effective communication has never been more paramount. Moreover, today the intersection between Artificial Intelligence (AI) and public health is becoming increasingly evident, presenting both challenges and opportunities, especially in the context of vaccine communication and public trust. With the advancement of AI technologies, vaccine hesitancy and its effects on public perception have important implications for public health initiatives. Particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, these technological advances and changing public perceptions, combined with the increase in existing misinformation, have exponentially increased the challenges to public health. While the full extent of the spread of online misinformation about COVID-19 remains unclear, it remains an important issue that requires careful monitoring.

Increasing misinformation makes it difficult for the public to make informed decisions about healthcare and especially vaccines, thus raising important debates about how AI and related technologies will be used in public health strategies. At this point, it is important to define misinformation and disinformation.

Misinformation is unrealistic or inaccurate information. Examples include gossip, insults, and jokes. Disinformation, on the other hand, is produced deliberately and includes malicious content: such as fake news, spear phishing and propaganda. Such information can spread fear and suspicion within society.¹

For example, the COVID-19 pandemic and the reactions that followed have caused a large-scale information bombardment. This overload of

* Prof. Dr. Istinye University, Head of the Department of Public Relations and Advertising, Istanbul, Türkiye. E-mail: ruken.kilanc@istinye.edu.tr (orcid.org/0000-0002-8843-0528, scopus id: 55782128400)

** Asst. Prof. İstanbul Kent University, Public Relations, and Advertising Department, Türkiye. E-mail: cansu.arisoy@kent.edu.tr ORCID: 0000-0001-7231-8139

¹ UNHCR, "Using Social Media in Community-Based Protection". UNHCR The Guide, January, 2021, p.230 <https://www.unhcr.org/innovation/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Using-Social-Media-in-CBP.pdf> (Access 04.04.2024)

information, which is not all accurate and makes it difficult for individuals to find the reliable resources and guidance they need in times of crisis such as pandemics, has caused the phenomenon called *infodemic*. Infodemic refers to a large amount of information about a specific subject and it gains momentum especially in times of crisis such as epidemics: “*in this case, misinformation and rumours come to the fore, with manipulation of information with dubious intent. In the information age, this phenomenon spreads even faster like a virus through social networks*”². In times of infodemic, when information pollution and misleading information become widespread, health literacy and communications gain greater importance for the society to make correct decisions regarding health. In these processes, individuals’ correct understanding, evaluation and application of health information have a critical role in protecting and improving public health. Therefore, increasing health literacy and adopting effective health communication methods become a vital strategy in combating the negative effects of the infodemic and strengthening public health. However, according to the World Health Organization ³

Despite the importance and investments in multiple areas of communication in public health – including health promotion, health literacy, strategic communications, risk communications and community engagement – a stubborn gap persists between what people should do to protect their health and what they actually do. Closing this gap requires a combination of data and analysis, behavioural science and insights, storytelling and other communication-related skills and approaches, and strategic partnerships. This is the basis of Communication for Health.

In this context, it has become imperative to understand how health communication, and vaccine acceptance in particular, is shaped by the complex interactions of technological advances and media environments. While the intersection between AI and health communication is becoming more apparent, it presents opportunities as well as challenges. AI can contribute to the creation of false narratives that undermine trust in vaccines, on the other hand it also offers solutions to detect and reduce these risks, thus making a preventive contribution to health communication. Therefore, this article reveals the multifaceted role of AI in shaping public trust in vaccination and it addresses challenges such as algorithmic bias and the proliferation of fake videos and media content used to spread misinformation.

² Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), “Understanding the Infodemic and Misinformation in the Fight Against COVID-19”. Digital Transformation Toolkit: Knowledge Tools, p.2. https://iris.paho.org/bitstream/handle/10665.2/52052/Factsheet-infodemic_eng.pdf?sequence=16&isAllowed=y (Access 04.04.2024)

³ World Health Organization (WHO), “Regional Action Framework on Communication for Health: A Vision for Using Communication to Improve Public Health in the Western Pacific Region” 2023, p.11. <https://www.who.int/westernpacific/initiatives/Communication-for-Health-C4H> (Access 08.04.2024)

According to Ratzan⁴ health literacy provides the “necessary basis for making informed decisions, understanding” prejudices, evaluating evidence levels, “statistics, probabilities” and developing “critical thinking skills”. While health literacy refers to individuals’ abilities to understand, evaluate and use health information, health communication encompasses strategies and methods that enable this information to be shared effectively among individuals and within communities. To be explained in more detail, the research areas of health communication include

*Perception of health, communication between health care providers and patients, networks between health institutions, intercultural communication and beliefs about health, messages about health risks, health campaign. These include message design and delivery, health information in mass media, and representation of health in the media.*⁵

Therefore, health literacy forms the basis of health communication; because individuals’ ability to accurately understand and apply health-related information depends on how this information is presented and communicated. Individuals with a high level of health literacy can benefit from health communication and manage their own health more effectively. Therefore, increasing health literacy and developing effective health communication strategies are one of the keys to improving public health. The combination of these two concepts contributes to the general development of public health by making it easier for individuals to access health services, understand them and apply this information in their lives. Also, “especially in recent years, areas such as the use of new technologies in health services are also included in health communication”⁶. In this sense, AI can contribute to the creation of false narratives that undermine trust in vaccines, while it also offers solutions to detect and reduce these risks, thus making a preventive contribution to health communication.

As misinformation environments evolve, it is vital for experts in communication, academia, healthcare, technology, and policymakers to partner to understand the significant impacts of AI on vaccine communication and public perception. These collaborative efforts are navigating the complex interplay between AI, science communication, and health communication, which are critical to encouraging individuals to make informed decisions and trust in vaccine initiatives.

With the advancement of AI technologies, and the effects of these technologies on public perception and health communication have important

⁴ Scott, C. Ratzan, “Editorial: Strategic Health Communication and Social Marketing on Risk Issues”. *Journal of Health Communication*. Vol. 4, No. 1, 1999, p.3.

⁵ İnci Çınarlı, “‘Stratejik’ Sağlık İletişiminin Sağlıkın Tıbbileştirilmesindeki Rolü”. *İletişim Kuram ve Araştırma Dergisi*, Number: 43, Autumn, 2016, p.212.

⁶ *ibid.*

implications for public health initiatives. However, as this progress continues, concerns are emerging about the negative role of AI on vaccine communication. The infodemic makes the problem of vaccine hesitancy worse, as finding reliable information becomes harder and false information spreads quickly, preventing people from taking effective health actions. This situation is made more severe by AI's ability to produce and circulate misleading content, which significantly affects efforts to address vaccine hesitancy, underlining the need to understand AI's contribution to the spread of health misinformation.

The Effect of Artificial Intelligence on Strengthening Vaccine Hesitancy

There is a complex and interconnected relationship between vaccine hesitancy and vaccine confidence. Individuals may be reluctant to accept vaccines if they lack confidence in the safety or effectiveness of vaccines. Also, vaccine hesitancy can reduce vaccine confidence over time, especially if concerns about the safety or effectiveness of vaccines are not adequately addressed or misinformation spreads among communities. Conceptually, “*vaccine hesitancy refers to a state of indecision and uncertainty about a vaccine before a decision to take action (or not to take action) is made. This is a time of vulnerability and opportunity*”⁷. The complex and evolving nature of vaccine hesitancy is influenced by a variety of contextual factors. In this sense, it is important to emphasize the difficulty of fighting misinformation. Various aspects of vaccine hesitancy, including sociocultural factors as well as individual psychological influences, contribute to the spread of misinformation. As vaccine hesitancy evolves over time and in different contexts, it demonstrates the need to deal with the spread of misinformation as well as efforts to reduce its impact. This requires fine-tuned approaches to encourage the dissemination of accurate information and increase confidence in vaccination initiatives. Thus, in addition to the significant potential of AI in the field of health, it is important to draw attention to the capacity of AI to produce increasingly convincing misinformation, which is an important concern of the health sector and communication experts.

Therefore, although AI offers many benefits in the healthcare sector, it also brings with it a serious concern about the increasingly realistic production of false information. Discussions about the potential uses of artificial intelligence tools, especially in the field of healthcare, are growing day by day. In this context, it is important to underline the importance of expert medical guidance in the use of AI tools and the potential consequences of its lack. Because users who do not have health expertise may encounter

⁷ Heidi J Larson, Emmanuela Gakidou, Christopher J L Murray, “The Vaccine-Hesitant Moment”. *The New England Journal of Medicine*, Vol. 387, No. 1, 2022, p. 58.

misleading information. So, AI tools, when utilized appropriately, can significantly contribute to the healthcare sector by making diagnoses more accurate, tailoring treatment to individual needs, and improving health results for patients: “*Pharma AI can discover new targets, design new drugs, and even predict the outcomes of clinical trials. Insilico expects the technology to substantially improve the time and cost it takes to bring new life-saving drugs to the market*”⁸.

However, their benefits come with associated risks, particularly the potential for encountering incorrect information due to the quality of the data used in their training processes. Incorrect, incomplete, or misleading data can lead AI systems to produce erroneous diagnoses or recommendations, posing serious health risks. Furthermore, the disparity between the accuracy of paid and free versions of AI tools can exacerbate inequalities in access to information. The availability of more advanced features and higher accuracy rates in paid versions may create a digital divide, where only those who can afford these tools have access to the best possible health information and services. This situation highlights the need for ethical considerations and equal access in the deployment of AI technologies in healthcare, underlining the multifaceted nature of these challenges.

Misinformation campaigns often aim to question consensus, highlight uncertainty, discredit authoritarian figures and official institutions, and promote pseudoscientific ideas.

Social media tools and technological communication channels accelerate the spread of misinformation and make their impact more obvious. Especially the proliferation of open-source AI algorithms significantly diminishes the complexities involved in generating lifelike and manipulated multimedia content⁹. Consequently, this advancement facilitates the production and dissemination of sophisticatedly altered media, including deepfakes. Such developments underscore the dual-edged nature of AI technology, leading both innovative potentials and ethical challenges in the realm of digital content creation. With the United States presidential election campaigns intensifying this year, it is expected that misinformation and fabricated content will increasingly spread on various platforms. This situation will worsen if control mechanisms are reduced. In this case, “*information erosion*” will occur, and by 2025, according to some estimates, more than 90% of online content could be produced by artificial

⁸ Vish Gain, “How Deepfakes and AI are Being Used to Find New Ways to Treat Diseases”. *Silicon Republic*. 18 November 2022. <https://www.siliconrepublic.com/innovation/deepfake-ai-healthcare-diseases-insilico-medicine-pharma> (Access 08.04.2024).

⁹ Alakananda Mitra, Saraju P. Mohanty, Elias Kougiannos, “The World of Generative AI: Deepfakes and Large Language Models”. *arXiv*. 2024 <https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.04373> (Access 08.04.2024)

intelligence¹⁰. Considering this prediction, the increase in AI-generated content on social media by 2025 could profoundly impact how issues such as vaccine hesitancy and misinformation are addressed—especially given the potential of deepfake technology to make health misinformation spread on social media even more credible. Therefore, the interaction between vaccine hesitancy and the role of social media tools and digital technology reveals a critical relationship in terms of misinformation. Social media and deepfake technologies not only strengthen the reach and believability of misinformation but also directly contribute to vaccine hesitancy by shaping public perceptions with fabricated content. This dynamic brings the urgent need for strategies to counteract misinformation's impact on vaccine communication through informed, transparent, and accurate communication efforts.

Vaccine Hesitancy and Misinformation: Views on Social Media and Deepfake

In the digital age, where misinformation can spread rapidly, the role of health communication has become more critical than ever. According to Çınarlı¹¹ “health communication is very important in the protective understanding of public health. Health information for persuasion is the primary social process that regulates people’s behavior to protect their health.” The emergence of misinformation in health communication, especially during crisis periods such as the COVID-19 pandemic, requires rapid, data-based responses¹². In this case, we can see those social media platforms, which are considered especially popular, are often responsible for spreading misinformation about vaccines. Misinformation spread through these channels can cause individuals to be hesitant when it comes to vaccines. For example, “approximately 31 million people followed anti-vaccine groups on Facebook in 2019, and Meta generated \$989 million in revenue”¹³. As stated in the previous section, misinformation about vaccines on social media reduces people’s confidence in vaccines, which causes them to hesitate to be vaccinated^{14 15}.

¹⁰ Jim VandeHei & Mike Allen, “Behind the Curtain: What AI Architects fear Most (in 2024)”. AXIOS, 8 November 2023. <https://www.axios.com/2023/11/08/ai-fears-deepfake-misinformation> (Access 04.04.2024)

¹¹ İnci Çınarlı, Sağlık İletişimi ve Medya. Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık. 2008, p.46.

¹² Minyu Wan Qi Su, Rong Xiang, and Chu-Ren Huang, “Data-Driven Analytics of COVID-19 ‘Infodemic’”. *Int J Data Sci Anal.* Vol. 15, No. 3, 2023, pp. 313–327

¹³ Center for Countering Digital Hate, “Failure to act: How Tech Giants Continue to Defy Calls to Rein in Vaccine Misinformation”. 2020. <https://counterhate.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/201201-Failure-to-Act.pdf> (Access 04.04.2024)

¹⁴ Vincenzo Carrieri, Leonardo Madio, and Francesco Principe, “Vaccine Hesitancy and (Fake) News: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Italy”. *Health Economics*, Vol. 2, No. 11, 2019, pp. 1377–1382.

¹⁵ Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), Misinformation fueling vaccine hesitancy, PAHO Director says. 2021. <https://www.paho.org/en/news/21-4-2021-misinformation-fueling-vaccinehesitancy-paho-director-says> (Access 04.04.2024).

Although AI has significant potential to improve healthcare, the healthcare industry is concerned about the ability of AI-based technologies to produce increasingly credible misinformation. For example, deepfake is a technology that can create extremely realistic fake images, sounds and videos, and it is advancing at a rapid pace. This progress is gradually progressing to the point where the distinction between real and fake may become extremely difficult or even almost impossible. The proliferation of this technology may increase challenges in responding to emerging public health threats. In addition, the difficulties experienced in protecting patients’ confidential information and preventing the increase of cyber-attacks against hospitals may increase accordingly.

The rapid development of deepfake technology, moving faster and becoming more widespread than experts predicted, has come at a time when health information is more likely to cause disputes and the already weak control systems of social media platforms are getting worse. This situation makes it harder to control misinformation. The growth of deepfakes, together with the declining effectiveness of social media regulations and the heated debates over health information, points to a significant problem. It shows a clear need for effective ways to stop the spread of fake information, protecting public discussions against increasingly convincing digital alterations. This problem is getting more important as the year 2023 is highlighted by the rapid progress in generative artificial intelligence (Gen AI) technologies.

According to Chris Doss, who directed a study on deepfake, it is important to be careful about this technology and keep it under control in these periods when it is still new¹⁶. In addition, the American Hospital Association¹⁷ has warned that healthcare systems need to be careful about new risks to patients’ information and hospitals’ cyber defences. Misleading images and audio recordings from reliable sources will hinder the dissemination of accurate health information and undermine public trust in authentic sources.

AI has the potential to produce misinformation, and this poses a serious threat. For example, fraudsters can now use deceptive phone calls and messages, posing as health insurers or doctors, to trick people into giving up financial or health information. Or a scenario in which a hacker, with the help of AI, can impersonate the voice of a hospital employee and gain access to

¹⁶ Christopher Doss, Jared Mondschein, Dule Shu, Tal Wolfson, Denise Kopecky, Valerie A. Fitton-Kane, Lance Bush & Conrad Tucker, “Deepfakes and scientific knowledge dissemination”. *Scientific Reports*, Vol. 13, No. 13429, 2023, pp.1-12.

¹⁷ American Hospital Association (AHA), “Agencies alert organizations to ransomware, fake media threats”. 13 October 2023. <https://www.aha.org/news/headline/2023-09-13-agencies-alert-organizations-ransomware-fake-media-threats> (Access 04.04.2024)

hospital information systems by calling the hospital help desk and tricking employees into providing a new password may now be real. These scenarios are important as they show that the spread and malicious use of misinformation produced by AI pose significant dangers.

Even if individuals can recognize fake videos in science communication, the consequences of misuse of technology and concerns or fears about such uses are not diminished. Although it is thought that, as exposure to deepfake technology increases, individuals will be able to perceive these videos and images more clearly and master them thanks to their experience, the study conducted by Doss¹⁸ shows that the opposite is true. Increased exposure to deepfake technology has resulted in a decline in people's ability to accurately recognize these videos. Therefore, it is important to include Doss' research in this study.

A Case Study on Artificial Intelligence and Its Risks in Health Communication

Advanced deep neural network models, called Generative Neural Networks (GNNs), are at the leading edge of technology and have the potential to enable the creation of manipulated digital content on a large scale. According to Siarohin (et. al.)¹⁹, these networks show the ability to produce images by learning to encode human features, thus allowing certain aspects of digital images or videos to be changed. Additionally, GNNs can turn “*still images*” into animation. This feature makes it easier to create “*animated content that mimics source videos*.” As mentioned before, while AI offers significant advantages for public health, it also brings potential disadvantages. AI's ability to mimic human-generated content poses risks of perpetuating biases and spreading misinformation, particularly in areas such as vaccine communication. This is of particular concern in areas such as science communication, where the spread of misinformation can have significant public health consequences. In this context, it is important to draw attention to the potential of AI to increase not only the risk of spreading misinformation, but also the emotional factors that lead to vaccine non-acceptance, especially emotions such as anger and fear. This occurs through the production of emotionally charged messages, which are almost more contagious than the disease, which tends to be more accepted and spread.

In this sense, according to a report published in The Guardian²⁰, an

¹⁸ Doss, C., et. al. “Deepfakes and scientific knowledge dissemination”. pp.1-12

¹⁹ Aliaksandr Siarohin, Stéphane Lathuilière, Sergey Tulyakov, Elisa Ricci, Nicu Sebe. “First order motion model for image animation”. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, Vol. 32, No. 11, NIPS 2019, p.1. Formun Üstü

²⁰ Melissa Davey, “Alarming: Convincing AI Vaccine and Vaping Disinformation Generated by Australian Researchers”. Guardian, 13 November 2023.

experiment conducted to demonstrate the speed of production of misinformation, researchers used AI to produce more than 100 blog posts containing misinformation about health in various languages. This important study, conducted in Australia by Menz, et. al.²¹, shows how quickly AI-based information can be produced in health communication, 102 pieces of content were produced for demographic groups such as “*young adults, young parents, pregnant women, and those with chronic health problems*”, within 65 minutes using the AI platforms²². The contents included more than 17,000 words of misinformation about vaccines and vapes, “*fake patient and clinician testimonials*”²³, and scientific-sounding references. Additionally, generative AI tools created “*20 realistic images in less than two minutes*”²⁴. This process was carried out by healthcare providers and researchers who had no expertise in bypassing AI protections, by just using information that is freely available to everyone.

This experiment demonstrates how open sources can be used maliciously to produce misleading health information, and where security measures are inadequate, the ability to rapidly produce credible misinformation is immense. The AI platform also produced fake images and videos to accompany these articles, including images showing vaccines harming children. This study emphasizes once again the importance of implementing mechanisms to report and address alarming information produced by AI platforms.

Positive Contributions of Artificial Intelligence Against Vaccine Hesitancy

On the other hand, the healthcare industry remains optimistic about the potential benefits of generative AI technology, which is also used to create deepfake-based content. For example, early studies with ChatGPT, a generative AI model, have found that it can provide more empathetic responses than doctors can provide²⁵. Drug discovery companies are using deepfake technology to treat diseases. Today AI based technologies can create new medicines and even predict the results of clinical tests. The development of this technology can support the creation of curative

<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/nov/14/alarming-convincing-ai-vaccine-and-vaping-disinformation-generated-by-australian-researchers> (Access 04.04.2023)

²¹ Bradley D. Menz, Natansh D. Modi, Michael J. Sorich, Ashley M. Hopkins, “Health Disinformation Use Case Highlighting the Urgent Need for Artificial Intelligence Vigilance Weapons of Mass Disinformation”. JAMA Internal Medicine | Special Communication. Vol. 184, No. 1, 2024, pp. 92-96.

²² *ibid.*, p. 92.

²³ *ibid.*

²⁴ *ibid.*

²⁵ ICT&health, “Chatgpt is More Empathetic Than the Doctors. Fantastic!” ICT&Health. 15 May 2023 <https://rb.gy/secuek> (Access 04.04.2024)

programs in health fields such as “cancer, fibrosis, immunology”²⁶. Deepfakes can also help hospitals create realistic artificial patients using patient data. This fact is used for tests and experiments that do not endanger the lives of patients. So instead of real patient data, which raises ethical concerns, “*realistic*”²⁷ deepfake patients will be used by researchers and hospitals to test new diagnostic and monitoring methods – and artificial intelligence can even be trained to assist doctors in making medical decisions.

At this point, Large Language Models (LLMs) stand as a crucial element of generative AI, presenting a significant tool for pattern analysis and basic factors such as emotions that affect tendencies and attitudes towards perceptions about vaccines. AI systems, including large language models, can analyse and understand human speech by distinguishing between emotionally driven language via Natural Language Processing (NLP). Algorithms within AI are used to detect words that are frequently linked to feelings like happiness, fury, and sorrow. These analysis capabilities, highlighted by LLMs, provide precise and contextually adapted insights. This feature of AI supports the creation of focused intervention strategies. According to Larson and Lin²⁸.

Generative AI methods such as sentiment tracking and topic modelling can interpret and generate content, including text and images, and resolve complex data analysis challenges rapidly. They allow real time understanding of hesitancy topics and trends, which is essential to inform interventions such as data driven chatbots that provide or contextualise health information.

According to Ratzan²⁹ “when combined with trustworthy and deliberative leadership, new communication technologies can improve the understanding of health among the public”. But while AI tools offer transformative potential for enhancing vaccine communication, their misuse poses significant risks, potentially eroding trust through the dissemination of misinformation or shaping public opinion based on inaccurate data, whether intentionally or not. To reduce such challenges, there is an imperative for ongoing educational initiatives that not only highlight the responsible use of AI but also equip the public with critical thinking skills to discern credible information, ensuring the integrity of vaccine communication efforts is maintained.

²⁶ Vish Gain, “How Deepfakes and AI are Being Used to Find New Ways to Treat Diseases”. Silicon Republic. 18 November 2022. <https://www.siliconrepublic.com/innovation/deepfake-ai-healthcare-diseases-insilico-medicine-pharma> (Access 08.04.2024).

²⁷ *ibid.*

²⁸ Heidi J. Larson, Leesa Lin, “Generative Artificial Intelligence can Have a Role in Combating Vaccine Hesitancy”. The BMJ, Vol. 384, No. q69, 2024, pp. 1-2.

²⁹ Scott, C. Ratzan, “Editorial: Strategic Health Communication and Social Marketing on Risk Issues”. Journal of Health Communication. Vol. 4, No. 1, 1999, p.4.

Conclusion

The strategic use of communication requires successfully harnessing knowledge and competencies to inspire leaders to embrace suitable strategies, and to direct medical experts towards offering premium care, motivate individuals, their families and society at large, to protect and improve their health. Society on the other hand, is at a critical point regarding misinformation and disinformation. The widespread use of technology, particularly social media platforms; facilitates the rapid spread of misinformation, while encountering challenges in the development, implementation, and adoption of new technologies. Misinformation in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) fields poses serious threats to societies as it has the potential to hinder the implementation of necessary policy reforms aimed at addressing global issues, such as barriers encountered in health communication.

In the past, technological constraints mostly limited the spread of misinformation through print media or through the manipulation of still images and selectively edited videos. However, today, with the emergence of GNNs, very realistic deepfake videos can be created that do not require expertise. This development opens a new avenue for distributing and fighting misinformation. Deepfake technology blurs the line between reality and fiction, and it makes these visuals almost impossible to detect what is real and what is fake. At this point, understanding the vulnerability experienced against AI technologies such as deepfake and the precautions to be taken against it, is critical to create and implement a strong strategy.

The relationship between vaccine communication and trust is complex and interconnected. Particularly if concerns about the safety or effectiveness of vaccines are not adequately addressed or misinformation spreads in society, low levels of vaccine trust and individuals’ negative stances about the effectiveness of vaccines are strengthened. This will contribute to vaccine hesitancy. Therefore, addressing vaccine hesitancy provides an important basis for stopping the spread of misleading information.

Among the different causes of vaccine hesitancy, factors such as sociocultural factors and individual psychology contribute to the spread of misinformation. As vaccine hesitancy evolves over time and in different contexts, efforts to reduce its effects must also deal with the rapid spread of misinformation. This necessitates the adoption of multifaceted approaches to correct communication strategies, promote accurate information and increase confidence in vaccine initiatives. At this point, technologies supported by AI, such as LLMs, and science communication can play a critical role in combating the spread of misinformation and vaccine hesitancy. Misinformation can be identified and quickly prevented through techniques

such as big data analytics and sentiment analysis. At the same time, AI can help develop targeted intervention strategies by analysing factors that drive vaccine hesitancy.

The issue of data quality and the ethical use of AI are paramount, as inaccuracies can have significant health implications. Moreover, the existence of a digital divide, worsened by the disparities between the functionalities of free versus paid AI tools, raises critical concerns about equal access to healthcare innovations and ethics. The enhancement in accuracy and features offered by paid versions highlights an urgent need for strategies that ensure all individuals have equal access to these life-saving technologies, regardless of their economic status. Addressing these challenges requires a multidimensional approach that encompasses ethical usage, transparency, and widespread access to AI tools in healthcare. This emphasizes the necessity for regulatory frameworks that not only support innovation but also prevent the deepening of existing inequalities, ensuring that the advancement of AI in healthcare benefits everyone equally.

In conclusion, the integration of AI tools in healthcare brings forth a complex dynamic of benefits and challenges that demands careful consideration. While AI has the potential to revolutionize healthcare through enhanced diagnostics, personalized treatments, and improved patient care, it also introduces the risk of propagating incorrect information if not properly managed. Therefore, effective struggle against internet myths in health communication requires education at every level, underscoring the importance of enhancing both digital literacy and health literacy skills across society. These skills empower individuals to accurately assess health information, supporting a community more resilient to misinformation. This goal necessitates a collaborative effort that transcends traditional silos, bringing together stakeholders from the media sector, academia, civil society organizations, government, and the health sector. Moreover, developing science communication and creating interactive dialogues between the media and the public are crucial steps toward improving the dissemination of scientific knowledge. By establishing such interactive environments, it becomes possible to accurately embed the concepts of science communication and truth within the broader community, ensuring that accurate and reliable health information reaches a wide audience effectively.

As a result, addressing technology-based vaccine hesitancy and misinformation constitute major challenges in health and science communication today. To overcome these challenges, the development and implementation of effective strategies and communication approaches as a result of future research will play very important roles in efforts towards public health. In this context, adopting a multidisciplinary approach focusing on technological advancements to understand and fight the complexity of

vaccine hesitancy and misinformation can ensure successful conclusions.

TURKISH CYBER INSECURITY

Öncel Sençerman*

Introduction

Cyber insecurity is relatively a new term in cyber studies. Cybersecurity is a term that gained a popular usage in the 1990s with the proliferation of the use of the internet and computer systems. Cyber insecurity is more of a term introduced in the beginning of the new millennium with a rise of global cyber threats and cyber-attacks. The cyber-attack on Estonia in 2007 following the ‘Bronze Soldier’ protests in Tallinn is considered as a milestone in terms of both cybersecurity and cyber insecurity drawing attention to the importance of providing national cybersecurity and to the threats and assaults made by using different means in an ‘anarchic’ environment of cyberspace. Akyeşilmen alleges that one of the fundamental aspects of cyberspace is its ‘anarchic’ nature, characterized by decentralization and polycentricism, which extends beyond the traditional understanding in physical international relations.¹ This anarchic nature brings along with numerous risks for the states. These risks have been on the rise owing to recent technological developments, which reflected on the international reports as the concerns of the states. The World Economic Forum (WEF) introduced ‘cyber insecurity’ as one of the severe global risks in its 2023 and 2024 reports.²

This study will use the definitions of cyber insecurity in the WEF Global Risks Reports and focus on the Turkish cyber insecurities by dealing with the phases related with building a cybersecurity environment in Türkiye. Turkish literature related to cyber studies mainly focus on cyber security and cybercrime-related issues resulting in a gap in the Turkish literature in the field of cyber insecurities including global risks and threats to national cyber security.³ The graduate research including masters and doctoral studies also have not yet focused on the issue of ‘cyber insecurity’, as a result, there is no graduate research dealing with the topic of cyber insecurity.⁴ This study is significant since it deals with the Turkish cyber insecurity considering the

* Assist. Prof. Dr., Faculty Member, Kuşadası Voc. Sch., Aydın Adnan Menderes University, Aydın, Türkiye.

¹ Nezir Akyeşilmen, “Türkiye in the Global Cybersecurity Arena, Insight Turkey, Vol. 24., No. 3, 2022, p. 112.

² The World Economic Forum Website, <https://www.weforum.org/> (Access 01 May 2024).

³ TRDizin Website, <https://trdizin.gov.tr/> (Access 31 May 2024), and DergiPark Website, <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/> (Access 31 May 2024).

⁴ The National Thesis Center of the CoHE, <https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/> (Access 31 May 2024).

global risks determined by the WEF.

This study is a descriptive desk research handling with the scholarly literature basically on Turkish cybersecurity, websites of Turkish cybersecurity institutions and agencies, governmental data, cybersecurity, cyber power and information technologies related international indexes. Case study and process tracing analysis methods were preferred for this descriptive study. The aim of this study is to detect the main the risks for Turkish cybersecurity using the definition of cyber insecurity of the WEF Global Risks Report. This study tries to give an answer to this central research question: What are the risks for the Turkish cybersecurity?

This study consists of four main parts. The first part deals with the cybersecurity and cyber insecurity definitions, the second part is about the development of Turkish cybersecurity since the 1990s with a special focus on three phases: legal, institutional, strategy-building phases. The third part gives the picture of the cybersecurity situation in Türkiye depending on the findings of the reports of international cybersecurity and cyber related indexes. The final part discusses the risks for Turkish cybersecurity considering the weaknesses and strengths.

Cyber (In)security

The idea of cyberspace was initially presented by William Gibson in his renowned sci-fiction book *Neuromancer* in 1984 and Gibson portrays cyberspace as a sophisticated worldwide network of computers, collaboratively utilized by billions of individuals globally.⁵ Cybersecurity gained importance since the 1990s with the proliferation of computer and internet usage. It became also an important issue for the states to secure the cyberspace. As a simple definition, Caverty defines cybersecurity as the “measures taken to protect a computer or computer system (as on the Internet) against unauthorized access or attack”.⁶ As defined by the Study Group 17 of the Telecommunication Standardization Sector of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) cybersecurity encompasses an array of tools, policies, security concepts, safeguards, guidelines, risk management strategies, actions, training programs, best practices, assurance measures, and technologies aimed at safeguarding the cyber environment as well as the assets of organizations and users. These assets encompass interconnected computing devices, personnel, infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunications systems and all transmitted and/or stored information within the cyber realm. The primary goal of cybersecurity is to

⁵ *ibid.*, p. 112; Mehmet Ada and Hüseyin Çakır, “Investigation Of Cyber Security Strategy of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)”, *Düzce Üniversitesi Bilim ve Teknoloji Dergisi*, Vol. 5, 2017, p. 634.

⁶ Myriam Dunn Caverty, “Cyber-Security”, *The Routledge of Handbook of New Security Studies*, J. Peter Burges (Ed.) Taylor and Francis Group, 2010, p. 157.

uphold and sustain the security attributes of these assets against pertinent security threats present in the cyber environment. Key security objectives include ensuring availability, integrity (encompassing authenticity and non-repudiation) and confidentiality.⁷

The development of cybersecurity in international relations centers on significant cyber-attacks and conflicts that have driven the establishment of cybersecurity measures at both national and international levels.⁸ Even though cyberspace was designed for information sharing, with its transparency being its hallmark from 1969 until 1988, this changed with the creation and release of the ‘Morris worm’, the first harmful malware, which also terminated an era of the internet’s first two decades largely free from malware, making it a considered safe and secure environment.⁹ Following the 2007 distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS) attacks on Estonia and the Stuxnet attack on Iran in 2010, significant efforts to establish national and international cybersecurity measures started, and organizations such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) started creating cybersecurity programs and guidelines to aid their members in securing cyberspace. Consequently, states began developing their own “National Cyber Security Strategies” (NCSS), which encompass policies, tools, and applications designed to make national cyberspace more secure and free.¹⁰

The September 11 attacks in the USA also changed the definitions of security, threats and agendas in the international system, and the concept of national security, which had relatively faded after the Cold War, returned to the top of many countries’ lists paving the way for discussions over the possibility of a “Digital Disaster” (also known as digital 9/11) occurring against one of the NATO members.¹¹ The possibility of cyber terrorism and terrorist groups using the virtual space raised expectations of a potential digital ‘Pearl Harbor’ and it was believed that attacks on states’ cyber systems could render their economic and other critical infrastructure ineffective, which would deeply undermine national security.¹² Since the turn of the millennium, cybersecurity has emerged as one of the most critical sectors in contemporary security politics. Despite its growing importance, the

⁷ ITU, <https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/Pages/cybersecurity.aspx> (Access 31 May 2024).

⁸ Akyeşilmen, op. cit., p. 114.

⁹ *ibid.*, p. 116.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 119.

¹¹ Salih Bıçakçı, “NATO’nun Gelişen Tehdit Algısı: 21. Yüzyılda Siber Güvenlik”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 10, No. 40, 2014, p. 119.

¹² *ibid.*, p. 119.

intersection of cyberspace and security has primarily been examined from a technical perspective, often overlooking its significance in political and international relations contexts. In the political realm, the securitization of cyberspace gained momentum following several notable cyber-attacks: China against the USA in 2006, Russia against Estonia in 2007, Israel against Syria in 2007, Germany against Afghanistan in 2008, Iran against China in 2010 and the Stuxnet attack by Israel and the USA against Iran in 2010.¹³ Related to the securitization of cyberspace, Choucri thinks that state security consists of four dimensions and cybersecurity is one of them together with external security, internal security and environmental security. According to Choucri cybersecurity “refers to a state’s ability to protect itself and its institutions against threats, espionage, sabotage, crime and fraud, identify theft, and other destructive e- interactions and e-transactions”.¹⁴

After the 2007 the DDoS attacks on Estonia, it was decided to establish a joint organization based in Tallinn to enhance operational capability by centralizing cyber defense capacity of NATO members and as a consequence, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) was established in Tallinn, Estonia in 2008 with the participation of Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Spain.¹⁵ As Ada and Çakır claim even before the attacks on Estonia in 2007, during the Kosovo War in 1999 following the cyber-attacks on NATO and NATO member countries, NATO has already began to include “cyber defense” as an agenda item. After the first cyber-attacks targeting NATO, the NATO Cyber Defense Program was adopted at the Prague Summit held in 2002 and within the scope of this program, the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) was established in the same year to detect cyber incidents and prevent cyber-attacks.¹⁶

Unlike the definitions of cybersecurity, it is not easy to find exact description of cyber insecurity. Cyber insecurity was first clearly defined by the Global Risks Report 2023 of the World Economic Forum. Cyber insecurity as a severe ‘risk factor’ was first introduced among other global risks like natural resource shortages, extreme weather events, pollution, inflation, economic downturn, involuntary migration, societal polarization and lack of economic opportunity etc. by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in its 2023 Report regarding the Global Risks, which defines cyber insecurity as “increasingly sophisticated cyberespionage or cybercrimes. Includes, but is not limited to: loss of privacy, data fraud or theft, and

¹³ Didem Aydınođ, “Copenhagen School and Securitization of Cyberspace in Turkey”, *Propósitos y Representaciones*, Vol. 9, 2021.

¹⁴ Nazlı Choucri, *Cyberpolitics in International Relations*, The MIT Press, USA, 2012, p. 39.

¹⁵ Ada and Çakır, op. cit., p. 640.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 639.

cyberespionage” among the global risks over the short term and long term because cyber insecurity stands among the top 10 risks.¹⁷ Other reports on Global Risks issued in 2021 and 2022 does not mention “cyber insecurity” among the global risks and the 2020 report only mentions it inside the report as one of the significant risks related to the consequences of digital fragmentation.¹⁸ Cyber insecurity defined as “use of cyber weapons and tools to conduct cyberwarfare, cyberespionage and cybercrime to gain control over a digital presence and/or cause operational disruption. Includes: ransomware, data fraud or theft” maintains its position in the Global Risks Report 2023 of the WEF and is considered as one of the top 10 risks for both short and long terms. Cybersecurity has ranked as the 4th global risk by severity over a two-years-period, while it has ranked as the 8th global risk by severity over a ten-years-period. Among the stakeholder group consisting of civil society, international organizations, academia, government and private sector, cyber insecurity poses a severe global risk for the governments and private sectors over a two-years-period.¹⁹

Ruhl et. al. underline that cyber insecurity has become an increasing global issue impacting economic, humanitarian and national security spheres that governments and other stakeholders have sought to enhance the stability of cyberspace and as a consequence of this, a new ecosystem of “cyber norm” processes has developed in various forums and formats since cyber norms are at a pivotal point, with the potential and challenges of each process becoming increasingly significant.²⁰ Ruhl et. al. also state that a variety of state and non-state stakeholders have championed different processes across multilateral, private, industry and multistakeholder contexts to establish and disseminate cyber norms including state efforts to create cyber norms for governments like the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nation (UN), the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security and other organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the G7 and the G20 countries, groups of high-profile experts from diverse backgrounds who study and recommend cyber norms for states or other stakeholders, industry-led efforts to establish norms related to cybersecurity like the Microsoft-initiated ‘Cybersecurity Tech Accord’ and the Siemens-led ‘Charter of Trust’, forums that bring together multiple stakeholders, such as states, international organizations, industry, civil society, and academia, to discuss, identify or advance cyber norms like

¹⁷ The World Economic Forum Website, op. cit.

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ *ibid.*

²⁰ Christian Ruhl, Duncan Hollis, Wyatt Hoffman and Tim Maurer, *Cyberspace and Geopolitics: Assessing Global Cybersecurity Norm Processes at a Crossroads*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, USA, 2020, p. 1-2.

the London Process or the Internet Governance Forum.²¹

Regarding the importance of cyber norms in overcoming the insecurities of cyberspace, Neutze and Nicholas mention that postponing the establishment of clear regional cybersecurity standards not only exacerbates global cyber insecurity, but also negatively impacts the global economy, which is increasingly dependent on cyberspace.²² Nye adds that along with the UN process, numerous other platforms have facilitated discussions on cyber norms, such as the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC) established in 2017 by a Dutch think-tank which developed eight norms aimed at addressing gaps in the current UN guidelines: among the most crucial recommendations were protecting the “public core” infrastructure of the Internet from attacks and banning interference with electoral systems and the GCSC also urged countries to refrain from using cyber tools to disrupt supply chains, not to deploy botnets on others’ machines without the hosts’ knowledge, to establish transparent processes for deciding whether to disclose discovered coding flaws and vulnerabilities, to promptly address cybersecurity weaknesses rather than saving them for future use, to enhance “cyber hygiene” through laws and regulations and to prevent private entities from engaging in “hack back” activities by making it illegal for businesses to retaliate against hackers.²³

However, negotiating treaties for cyber-arms control would be highly challenging due to their unverifiability, yet diplomacy regarding cyberspace is far from impossible.²⁴ Emphasizing the importance of negotiations over cyber norms and international cooperation, Neutze and Nicholas claims that the ongoing trend of cyber insecurity can be mitigated through continuous collaboration between the public and private sectors to identify and establish cybersecurity norms and unlike traditional government-to-government approaches, this process must include the private sector, which is responsible for creating the global Information and Communications Technology (ICT) products and services that form the foundation of cyberspace so that their expertise can aid in shaping practical solutions.²⁵

The Digital Transformation Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye underlines that system transitions into the digital realm brings forth fresh and significant security vulnerabilities and states that the cyber-attacks,

²¹ *ibid.*, p. 3.

²² Jan Neutze and J. Paul Nicholas, “Cyber Insecurity: Competition, Conflict, and Innovation Demand Effective Cyber Security Norms”, *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, 2013-14, International Engagement on Cyber III: State Building on a New Frontier, 2013-14, p. 12.

²³ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The End of Cyber-Anarchy? How to build a new digital order?”, *Foreign Affairs*, 2021, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2021-12-14/end-cyber-anarchy> (Access 29 May 2024).

²⁴ *ibid.*

²⁵ Neutze and Nicholas, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

previously characterized by rudimentary methods and limited objectives, have now escalated to governmental levels, becoming automated, frequent, intricate, and purpose-driven. In addition, the utilization of big data-supported artificial intelligence algorithms by malicious actors has amplified the sophistication and efficacy of cyber-attacks, underscoring the heightened importance of cyber security.²⁶ The Office also emphasizes that the evolving scale and complexity of cyber threats have precipitated cyber warfare, with critical infrastructure and service systems being prime targets. Consequently, states are compelled to safeguard their critical data and infrastructures with the same vigilance as they do with their physical borders. The partial or complete disruption of critical infrastructures and services such as communication systems, banking systems, smart grids, utilities, transportation, e-commerce and governmental digital platforms like ‘Digital Türkiye’ could severely impact social welfare and compromise national security.²⁷

With the advancements in information technology, the potential for cyber-attacks has increased, leading states to develop doctrines in this area and enhance their cyber defense capabilities to take preventive measures.²⁸ The absence of physical boundaries in cyberspace increases the possibility of cyber threats originating from anywhere, posing a threat to cybersecurity and these attacks can range from simple cybercrimes to macro-level threats such as cyber terrorism or cyber warfare.²⁹ These different cyber-attacks are carried out using numerous cyber weapons and methods like viruses, spyware, trojans, keyloggers, worms, and botnets.³⁰ Cyber-attacks are defined as organized and synchronized assaults targeting information systems or communication infrastructures belonging to individuals, businesses, institutions, and entities, motivated by political, ideological, military or economic goals. When such attacks are directed at states, they are often termed as cyber warfare.³¹ Cyber-attacks use these methods: “malware, unsecure environment, phishing, DOS-DDOS, password retrieval, side channel attack, HTML injection and code injection”.³² The targets for the cyber-attacks vary among critical infrastructures, mobile operating systems,

²⁶ Digital Transformation Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye <https://cbddo.gov.tr/en/cyber-security> (Access 23 April 2024).

²⁷ *ibid.*

²⁸ Serkan Gündoğdu, “Cyber Security as an Influencer in International Politics and Türkiye’s Cyber Security Policy Implementation: National Cyber Incident Response Center (TR-CERT)”, *Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2023, p. 1332.

²⁹ *ibid.*, p. 1334-1335.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1334-1335.

³¹ Pelin Bolat and Gizem Kayışoğlu, “Cyber Security, General Perspectives on Cyber Security”, *Security Studies: Classic to Post-Modern Approaches*, Arda Özkan and Gökürk Tüysüzöğlü (Eds.), Rowman and Littlefield, 2023, p. 175.

³² *ibid.*, p. 175.

social media and cloud systems.³³ Critical infrastructures refer to essential systems comprising structures and processes that are vital for a state's independence. Oil pipelines, nuclear reactors, transportation networks and information technology-based industrial control systems (ICS) and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, which are crucial for managing utilities like water, electricity, and gas stand among the significant critical infrastructures. These systems often possess vulnerabilities that make them susceptible to cyber-attacks, requiring robust protection measures. Notably, they can be targeted by advanced persistent threats (APTs), as evidenced by the cyber-attacks like Stuxnet and Flame.³⁴ Given the fact that cyberspace is independent of physical variables such as distance and location allows cyber threats to emerge almost anytime and anywhere, for this reason, in such a situation, cyber threats require constant attention, and consequently, cyber defense mechanisms must be continuously operational³⁵ since any weaknesses in cyberspace are important and they might result in loss of life, loss of trust in fundamental systems and loss in the financial market.³⁶

As discussed above, transition from the peaceful usage of the cyberspace to the evil aims in the 1990s brought along the insecurities including cyber threats, cyber-attacks, human and financial loss, threats to critical infrastructure, threats to national security, cyber terrorism and cyber warfare, which have caused an increase in global risks in recent years.

Turkish Cyber Security

Global developments regarding the fast enlargement of cyberspace and the increase in the importance of cybersecurity especially in the 1990s had their reflections on Türkiye without losing time. Türkiye took the first steps in the field of cybersecurity in the legal zone and introduced the definition of cybercrime into the Turkish Penal Code. This legal process providing definitions for a new kind of crime was followed by the institutionalization process including the establishment of core state organizations to secure the cyberspace. This process gave birth to the emergence of the main public structure of Turkish cybersecurity in four main sectors: state, defense, scientific-education and private. State sector covers the foundation of basic state projects like e-Türkiye and e-Transformation, and institutions/authorities necessary for cybersecurity such as the Information Society Department, the Cyber Security Board, the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK), the Personal Data Protection Authority, the

³³ *ibid.*, p. 175-176.

³⁴ *ibid.*, p. 176.

³⁵ Serkan Gündoğdu, *op. cit.*, p. 1332.

³⁶ Soner Çelik and Muharrem Gürkaynak, "The New Front in Global Insecurity: Cyberspace", *International Journal of Social Inquiry*, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2019, p. 553.

Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), national and institutional cyber incident response teams (CERT). Defense sector comprises of the Cyber Crimes Department of the General Directorate of Security (EGM) under the Ministry of Interior, the National Intelligence Organization (MİT), the Cyber Defense Command of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). The private sector that is represented by the Turkish Cybersecurity Cluster with significant companies making national cybersecurity products like the STM, ASELSAN and HAVELSAN. Scientific and educational sector is led by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Türkiye (TÜBİTAK), the Council of Higher Education and the Universities, the National Education Ministry. Hand-in-hand with the acceleration of the institutionalization process in the beginning of the new millennium, strategy-building process began with the introduction of national policies, strategies and action plans for Turkish cybersecurity especially after the first decade of the 2000s. The sections of the study below will deal with these phases of creating Turkish cybersecurity.

Creating the Legal and Institutional Basis for Turkish Cybersecurity

The Legal Basis

The Information and Communication Technologies Authority is the primary regulatory body overseeing the telecommunications sector in Türkiye and is also the first sector-specific regulatory authority, which was established as the "Telecommunications Authority" by the Law No. 4502 in 2000 amending the Wireless Law of 1983. The institution's name was changed to the Information and Communication Technologies Authority by the Electronic Communications Law No. 5809 in 2008.³⁷

Cyber-attacks, before becoming a significant national security issue, were primarily considered as matters concerning public order and law, therefore, before armies began to show interest in cyberspace as a new battlefield alongside land, air, sea, and space, nation-states initially focused on the illicit use of cyberspace and this trend was also observed in Türkiye. The first inclusion of cybercrimes in the Turkish Penal Code occurred with the Law Amending Some Articles of the Turkish Penal Code No. 3756 dated June 6, 1991 and this was followed by the expansion of the definition of cybercrimes with the Turkish Penal Code No. 5237 dated September 2004.³⁸ Based on the 2011/2025 Decision of the Council of Ministers, the Department for Combating Informatics Crimes within the General Directorate of Security

³⁷ Information and Communication Technologies Authority, <https://www.btk.gov.tr> (Access 24 April 2024).

³⁸ Salih Bıçakçı, Doruk Ergun and Mitat Çelikpala, "Türkiye'de Siber Güvenlik", *EDAM Siber Politika Kağıtları Serisi*, 2015/1, 2015.

was established to consolidate the dispersed structure of the departmental offices and units of the provincial organization, prevent duplicate investments and effectively combat cybercrime. The current name of this structure is the Department for Cybercrime, as approved by the Ministry of Interior in 2013.³⁹ In 2014, Türkiye became a party to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe issued in 2001.⁴⁰ However, according to the Octopus Cybercrime Community of the Council of Europe, Türkiye does not have strategy for cybercrimes.⁴¹ In the latter half of the 2000s, Türkiye began to show more interest in the possibility of cyberspace being used to harm the country's national security, for this reason, with an amendment made in 2006, cybercrimes were also included in the Law on the Fight Against Terrorism No. 3713.⁴²

The Institutional Basis

State Sector

The e-Transformation (e-Dönüşüm) Türkiye Project was included in the Emergency Action Plan prepared by the 58th Government and the coordination, monitoring, evaluation, and guidance of this project were assigned to the State Planning Organization (SPO) and to manage the coordination of the e-Transformation Türkiye Project, to ensure alignment among public institutions' information and communication technology (ICT) investments and to develop strategies for advancing toward an information society, the Information Society Department was established within the SPO in March 2003.⁴³ The primary goal of the e-Transformation Türkiye Project was to create conditions for a state structure that adopts the principles of being participatory, transparent, effective and simple in its business processes to provide citizens with higher quality and faster public services and by implementing these measures, the project aimed to streamline government processes, increase citizen engagement, and promote efficient use of technology in public administration, setting the stage for a more modern and responsive governance structure.⁴⁴

The Decision on the Implementation, Management and Coordination of National Cyber Security Activities numbered 2012/3842 and dated 11/6/2012 was published in the Official Gazette numbered 28447 and dated 20/10/2012 and thereby entered into force. According to this decision the

³⁹ Octopus Cybercrime Community, <https://www.coe.int/en/web/octopus/-/turkey> (Access 01 June 2024).

⁴⁰ COE, https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/news/-/asset_publisher/S73WWxscOuZ5/content/turkey-ratifies-budapest-convention (Access 01 June 2024).

⁴¹ Octopus Cybercrime Community, op. cit.

⁴² Bıçakçı et. al. op. cit.

⁴³ Bilgi Toplumu, <http://www.bilgitoplumu.gov.tr/bilgi-toplumu/e-donusum-projesi/> (Access 24 April 2024).

⁴⁴ *ibid.*

Cyber Security Board was established, the Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications was assigned duties and authorities in the field of cyber security and it was decided that working groups and temporary committees related to cyber security could be formed.⁴⁵ The Personal Data Protection Authority safeguarding personal data and raising public awareness about data protection aligned with the constitutional rights related to privacy and freedom was also established.⁴⁶ The management of Cyber Crisis Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection in Türkiye was also assigned to the Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) through Law No. 5902.⁴⁷

Pursuant to the Council of Ministers Decision in 2012 and the Electronic Communications Law No. 5809, the 2013-2014 National Cyber Security Strategy and Action Plan (NCSSAP) was published and under this framework the National Cyber Incidents Response Center (TR-CERT, USOM in Turkish) was established within the Information and Communication Technologies Authority on 27/05/2013 to identify threats, develop measures to reduce or eliminate the impacts of potential cyber-attacks and incidents, and share these measures with identified actors. Moreover, within the framework of this NCSSAP, Cyber Incident Response Teams (CERT, SOME in Turkish) were established within the public institutions and organizations.⁴⁸ USOM and SOME units play a crucial role in mitigating cyber incidents, preventing or reducing potential damages and coordinating and cooperating on a national level for cyber incident management. The coordinated and cooperative work of USOM with SOME units contributes to national cybersecurity and the USOM provides alerts, warnings, and announcements to relevant parties or nationwide regarding detected cyber threats to develop measures aimed at reducing or eliminating the impacts of potential incidents.⁴⁹ The USOM also collaborates with public institutions and organizations, internet service providers, private sector entities, and other internet actors to carry out necessary activities. It provides cybersecurity training to the SOME units, universities and cybersecurity communities. The USOM participates in national and international civil and military cybersecurity exercises, NATO exercises, conferences, workshops and meetings.⁵⁰

The Digital Transformation Office of the Presidency was established by

⁴⁵ The Information and Communication Technologies Authority, op. cit.

⁴⁶ Emre Halisdemir, "National Cybersecurity Organization: Turkey", CCDCOE NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Tallinn, 2021, p. 11-15.

⁴⁷ Bıçakçı et. al. op. cit.

⁴⁸ Turkish Cyber Security Incident Response Center, <https://www.usom.gov.tr/hakkimizda> (Access 24 April 2024).

⁴⁹ *ibid.*

⁵⁰ *ibid.*

Presidential Decree in 2018 to centralize the fragmented activities related to digital transformation, cyber security, national technologies, big data and artificial intelligence, in response to advancing technologies, societal demands, and public sector reform trends with significant steps taken to consolidate the coordination of Digital Türkiye (e-government) and cyber security under a unified framework.⁵¹ The Office points out that effective deterrence in cybersecurity necessitates the formulation and implementation of sound strategies and policies, the development of indigenous products and solutions that can rival existing technologies, bolstering the ranks of cybersecurity professionals across all levels and enhancing the capacity for early detection of vulnerabilities through advanced analytical methods. The Office is also committed to promoting domestically developed technologies across various sectors, particularly within the public institutions, through collaborations with universities, industries, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector.⁵²

Defense Sector

The Turkish National Police Department of Cyber Crime Prevention supports the investigation of crimes involving information technology and handles digital evidence to prevent any negative impact from the decentralized structure of provincial law enforcement units. The Department was established within the Turkish National Police General Directorate (EGM) by a Cabinet Decision in 2011.⁵³

As Nye asserts in the sphere of global military conflict, computer networks have emerged as the fifth domain, alongside the traditional domains of land, sea, air and space, and acknowledging this, the US military established US Cyber Command in 2010.⁵⁴ Türkiye was not so late to take an action in the military zone. Eitan puts forward that the Turkish military released the “Red Book” in 2010, a document that offers periodic insights into Türkiye’s national defense strategy and asserts that this publication indicates that Türkiye views cyberspace as an unconventional threat, which also resulted in Turkish National Security Council’s approval of a new national strategy in 2011 for the first time addressing cyber threats.⁵⁵

Following these important developments, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) Cyber Defense Command was established in 2013⁵⁶, yet the Ministry

⁵¹ Digital Transformation Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, op. cit.

⁵² *ibid.*

⁵³ Halisdemir, op. cit., p. 11-15.

⁵⁴ Nye, op. cit.

⁵⁵ Ofir Eitan, “Turkey-Challenges to the Struggle Against Cyber Threats”, *Cyber, Intelligence and Security*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2018, p. 42.

⁵⁶ Duygu Fidancıoğlu, “Türkiye’nin Siber Güvenlik Tarihi”, 2023, <https://medium.com/cyber-alliance/turkiyenin-siber-guvenlik-tarihi-578dc33973f9> (Access 24 April 2024).

of National Defense oversees military cyber defense, holding the top position in the military cyber domain. The TAF Cyber Defense Command is the leading authority for defending military networks in Türkiye and acts as the primary military-CERT (TAF-CERT). The TAF-CERT serves as the outer layer of TAF military networks and interfaces with the NATO (NATO Computer Incident Response Capability – NCIRC), the National CERT and subordinate military CERTs/SOMEs. The Command operates under the Communications, Electronics, and Information Systems Directorate of the Turkish General Staff and comprises personnel from all services, maintains active communication channels with the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure and other government organizations to ensure high levels of synchronization and coordination, it also collaborates with the NATO cyber entities, participates in multinational cyber exercises, and supports NATO missions.⁵⁷ Bıçakçı et. al. assert that the TAF has a significantly different approach to cyber command compared to the global approach and point out that the TAF structures its cybersecurity management into three layers: at the top level of this hierarchy is the TAF Cyber Defense Management Board responsible for policy and decision-making processes; the TAF Cyber Defense Command, located at the second level, manages the Cyber Units of the General Staff Headquarters, the Force Commands, the Coast Guard Command and the Gendarmerie General Command.⁵⁸

The Office of the Prime Minister issued a directive on January 31, 2011, mandating the transfer of the General Staff Electronic Systems (GES) Command, responsible for signal intelligence operations, to the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) in 2012. This unit was subsequently renamed as the Signal Intelligence Directorate in 2012 and its reorganization eliminated redundant structures in the signal intelligence sector, significantly enhancing its efficiency.⁵⁹ Darıcılı asserts that the Signal Intelligence Directorate operates within the framework of the objectives stated in Law No. 2937, which defines the functions of the National Intelligence Organization (MİT), to detect intelligence obtained through telecommunications, analyze the intelligence thus detected, provide and analyze imagery intelligence and penetrate encrypted communications. The Signal Intelligence Directorate performs tasks related to providing Signal Intelligence, infiltrating communication and radar communication of target elements, and analyzing the compiled raw intelligence.⁶⁰ In addition to this technical transfer in the field of signal intelligence, the Law related to the State Intelligence Services and the National Intelligence Organization (MİT)

⁵⁷ Halisdemir, op. cit., p. 11-15.

⁵⁸ Bıçakçı et. al. op. cit.

⁵⁹ National Intelligence Organization (MİT), https://www.mit.gov.tr/en/kronoloji-detay_2012_27.html (Access, 01 May 2024).

⁶⁰ Darıcılı, op. cit., p. 21.

was amended in 2014 and the duty of collecting, recording, analyzing, and transmitting information, documents, news and data to the necessary institutions by using all kinds of technical intelligence and human intelligence methods, tools, and systems in the fields of foreign intelligence, national defense, counter-terrorism, international crime and cyber security was given to the MİT. In addition to this amendment, the authority to collect data passing through telecommunication channels related to foreign intelligence, national defense, terrorism, international crimes, and cyber security was also given to the MİT.⁶¹ The rising importance of cyber intelligence in recent years also resulted in the establishment of the Cyber Intelligence Directorate under the roof of the MİT to better combat with cyber threats to national security.⁶²

Private Sector

Turkish Cyber Security Cluster was founded as a platform in 2017 with the participation of state institutions, private sector and the Presidency of Defense Industry Agency in order to determine cybersecurity needs of Türkiye and to develop a national cybersecurity environment. This platform conducts its activities in five main fields: access to the market, innovation, access to the talents, interaction and technological superiority.⁶³ The platform has 245 members with 391 products of 178 different categories and with 650 services of 31 different categories, among which there are some popular firms like ASELSAN, Arçelik, Havelsan, STM, Vestel, TÜBİTAK Bilgem, TÜBİTAK ULAKBİM and the Middle East Technical University's Technopark.⁶⁴ The Cluster aims to increase the number of cybersecurity companies in Türkiye, to support the technical, administrative, and financial development of members, to improve standards within the cybersecurity ecosystem, to assist in the branding of members' products and services, to enhance members' competitiveness in national and global markets, to increase the quantity and quality of the cybersecurity workforce and finally to raise public awareness about cybersecurity. The Cluster platform offers trainings especially for the youth in Türkiye, especially for the high school and university students.⁶⁵

The number of private cybersecurity companies in Türkiye has grown rapidly in recent years and the private sector advanced in capacity as the most national companies were distributors for global companies, providing information security consulting and penetration testing at the beginning,

⁶¹ Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, Information System for Regulations, Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi <https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr> (Access 23 April 2024).

⁶² TRT Haber, <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/mitten-kritik-adim-siber-istihbarat-baskanligi-kuruldu-782199.html> (Access 01 June 2024).

⁶³ Digital Transformation Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, op. cit.

⁶⁴ Turkish Cyber Security Cluster, <https://www.siberkume.org.tr> (Access 23 April 2024).

⁶⁵ *ibid.*

however, they have matured and have developed national products, technologies, cybersecurity solutions, and operational services for the sector.⁶⁶ Private sector efforts in the national defense industry have led to the continuous publication of comprehensive research outcomes and reports. For instance, the STM publishes the Cyber Threat Situation Report of Türkiye several times a year, informing the public and government officials about the latest dynamics and incidents in national cybersecurity.⁶⁷

Scientific and Education Sector

TÜBİTAK, which currently has many responsibilities in the field of cybersecurity, emerged as the main institution responsible for Türkiye's cybersecurity before 2012 with its affiliated organizations.⁶⁸ The first institution in Türkiye to conduct risk analyses and prepare related reports, National Research Institute of Electronics and Cryptology (UEKAE) and the Marmara Research Center (MAM), which played an important role in information studies, were among the significant organizations within TÜBİTAK before 2012. These organizations were merged under a single umbrella in 2010 and named TÜBİTAK Informatics and Information Security Research Center (BİLGEM). TÜBİTAK, which has pioneered many initiatives in cybersecurity, had established Türkiye's first Network Security Group in 1997, which was later transformed into the Cyber Security Institute in 2012.⁶⁹ TÜBİTAK transferred its primary cybersecurity duties to the former Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications in 2012 and today it works in coordination with both the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure (UAB) and other institutions and organizations, continuing to undertake cybersecurity responsibilities through BİLGEM and the Cyber Security Institute (SGE),⁷⁰ which had been formed in 1997 as the Information Systems Security Unit within the UEKAE to enhance national cyber security capabilities.⁷¹ The Institute undertakes solution-oriented projects for military, public, and private sectors, significantly contributing to the development of cyber security knowledge in Türkiye through numerous successful projects and starting from its establishment, the Institute has executed numerous projects to address the Turkish Armed Forces' information systems security needs, becoming a key authority in information security, which is crucial for the nation's future.⁷²

Training in cybersecurity is offered by the academic institutions,

⁶⁶ Halisdemir, op. cit., p. 11-15.

⁶⁷ *ibid.*

⁶⁸ Karasoy and Babaoğlu "Cyber Security in Turkey: Legal and Institutional Infrastructure", *Yasama Dergisi*, No. 44, 2021, p. 138.

⁶⁹ *ibid.*, p. 146.

⁷⁰ *ibid.*, p. 146.

⁷¹ Cyber Security Institute, <https://bilgem.tubitak.gov.tr/en/sge-corporate/> (Access 24 April 2024).

⁷² *ibid.*

government organizations, civil society organizations and private entities. Some Turkish universities offer Master’s degree programs in cybersecurity, including Middle East Technical University, Gebze Technical University, Hacettepe University and Marmara University.⁷³ The Vocational Schools were introduced in 2022 after a cooperation agreement between the Digital Transformation Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye and they started education in 2023 in Ankara University, Ege University, Gebze Technical University and Istanbul Technical University to train qualified personnel and to attract the young to cyber security sector.⁷⁴ Before the introduction of vocational schools at different universities, the first vocational high school was founded in İstanbul in 2020 by the Ministry of Education that would contribute into the cyber security ecosystem in Türkiye.⁷⁵

Strategy-Building for Turkish Cybersecurity

Together with the legal and institutionalization process, Türkiye stepped into creating its cybersecurity organizations, policies, strategies and action plans. As Table 1 shows below, Türkiye regularly introduced several strategy documents for securing its information infrastructure and cyberspace.

Table 1. Strategies and Action Plans regarding Turkish Cyberspace

Year	Strategies and Action Plans regarding Turkish Cyberspace
1999	National Information Infrastructure Master Plan for Türkiye (TUENA)
2002	E-Türkiye Initiative Action Plan
2003	2003-2004 Short Term Action Plan
2005	2005 Short Term Action Plan
2006	2006-2010 Information Society Strategy Action Plan
2013	National Cyber Security Strategy and 2013-2014 Action Plan
2015	2015-2018 Information Society Strategy and Action Plan
2016	2016-2019 National Cyber Security Strategy and Action Plan
2020	2020-2023 National Cyber Security Strategy and Action Plan

Source: Karasoy and Babaoğlu “Cyber Security in Turkey: Legal and Institutional Infrastructure”, Yasama Dergisi, No. 44, 2021, p. 138.

The current National Cybersecurity Strategy and Action Plan for 2020-2023 sets out the basic strategies as follows: I. Protection and Resilience of Critical Infrastructures, II. Development of National Capacity, III. Organic Cybersecurity Network, IV. Security of Next-Generation Technologies, V. Combating Cybercrime, VI. Development and Support of Domestic and National Technologies, VII. Integration of Cybersecurity into National

⁷³ Halisdemir, op. cit., p. 11-15.

⁷⁴ Digital Transformation Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, op. cit.

⁷⁵ Turkish Ministry of Education, <https://istanbul.meb.gov.tr/www/turkiyenin-ilk-siber-guvenlik-lisesi-acildi/icerik/3290> (Access 01 June 2024).

Security, VIII. Enhancement of International Cooperation.⁷⁶ The National Cybersecurity Strategy and Action Plan for 2020-2023 points out the critical infrastructure as significant activities have been carried out to protect critical infrastructure sectors defined as “Electronic Communications”, “Energy”, “Finance”, “Transportation”, “Water Management” and “Critical Public Services.” These activities, which need to be carried out continuously, will continue to be conducted more effectively by considering the changing cyber threat vectors, emerging national needs and technological developments. For this purpose, the protection of critical infrastructures has been designated as one of the strategic objectives. In line with this NCSSAP, the measures will be taken to enhance national resilience by ensuring the protection of both the public and private sectors against cyber threats.⁷⁷

Çiftçi sums up the unique and specific objectives of the last three Turkish NCSSAPs below on Table 2, which displays the differences between them and the improvement of the strategies within the last ten years. As is followed on the table, the latest NCSSAP stresses the development of national technologies, an organic cybersecurity network and implies the defensive characteristics of Turkish cybersecurity.

Table 2. Turkish NCSSAP Objectives

Strategy in 2013	Integration of the cybersecurity into national security
Strategy in 2016	Recruiting specialists in government organizations with better rights Creating national cybersecurity ecosystem Secure software development and procurement Improving proactive cyber defense capability Deployment of IPv6 protocol Integration of the cybersecurity into national security
Strategy in 2020	Improving proactive defense mindset Keeping domestic internet traffic within country Preventing manufacturer dependency in IT products in critical infrastructures Determining the requirements for ensuring the security of new generation technologies Minimizing cybercrime and increasing deterrence Organic cybersecurity network Security of new generation technologies Integration of the cybersecurity into national security Development and support of domestic and national technologies.

Source: Hasan Çiftçi, “Analysis of Türkiye’s Cybersecurity Strategies: Historical Developments, Scope, Content and Objectives”, Sakarya University Journal of Science, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2024, p. 216.

⁷⁶ National Cybersecurity Strategy and Action Plan, <https://cbddo.gov.tr/en/national-cybersecurity-strategy/> (Access 23 April 2024).

⁷⁷ *ibid.*

The 12th Development Plan for 2024-2028 underlines the support to be given to comply with the international standards and to participate into international projects in the field of cyber security, the usage of national solutions for cyber security needs in defense, security and civil life and aims to strengthen the institutional structure focusing on strategic, regulatory, technological studies to provide national cyber security, to update the current Cyber Security Strategy and Action Plan, to empower cyber intelligence capabilities to early detect cyber threats, to strengthen technical infrastructure of national cyber security, to increase the usage of national cyber security products especially in state organizations, to develop programs to train qualified labor in the field of cybersecurity.⁷⁸

The 2024-2028 Strategic Plan of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs draws attention to the cyber security measures and recommends using national software in addition to setting the fight with the cyber security threats as one of the objectives. Among the strategies to be followed to obtain the objectives set forth, the Strategic Plan emphasizes international cooperation against cybersecurity threats despite the benefits of game-changing technologies like cyber space, artificial intelligence and quantum technologies. The Plan also determines cyber security threats to the strategically important infrastructure of Türkiye as one of the technological threats for the administration.⁷⁹

The Digital Government Strategy will outline Türkiye’s roadmap for transitioning from “e-government” to “digital government” and this upcoming strategy will follow the 2015-2018 Information Society Strategy and Action Plan and the 2016-2019 National e-Government Strategy and Action Plan. The groundwork for the strategy began with the Digital Government Review for Türkiye, launched at the end of 2021 in collaboration with the OECD and coordinated by the Digital Transformation Office (DTO).⁸⁰ During this review, a survey was conducted with 115 public institutions to assess the current situation using the OECD Digital Government Policy Framework. Stakeholder meetings were held with representatives from 44 institutions, including South Korea, Sweden, and the OECD secretariat. Capacity-building workshops on “Service Design and Delivery” and “Data-Driven Public Sector” were also conducted with 50 institutions.⁸¹

⁷⁸ 12th Development Plan 2024-2028, https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/On-Ikinci-Kalkinma-Plani_2024-2028_11122023.pdf (Access 24 April 2024).

⁷⁹ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/BAKANLIK/2024-2028-stratejik-plani.pdf> (Access 23 April 2024).

⁸⁰ Digital Government Strategy, <https://cbddo.gov.tr/en/digital-government-strategy/> (Access 24 April 2024).


⁸¹ *ibid.*

Turkish Cybersecurity versus International Indexes

This study deals with the results of several international indexes in the fields of cybersecurity, cyber power, start-up ecosystems and e-government systems such as the Global Cybersecurity Index, the National Cyber Security Index, the National Cyber Power Index, the UN E-Government Development Index and the Global Startup Ecosystem Index to better understand the strengths and weaknesses of Turkish cybersecurity while comparing it with other nations regarding the rankings.

According to the Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) 2020, an initiative of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), Türkiye’s score is 97.49 and its rank is 11. Türkiye’s rank in its region, Europe is 6 and it comes after the United Kingdom (UK), Estonia, Spain, Lithuania and France.⁸² The Figure 1 below shows the country profile of Türkiye in terms of the (GCI) displaying the relative strength in legal, cooperative, technical, capacity development measures and the need for improving the organizational measures.

Figure 1. GCI Index Türkiye Country Profile



Source: ITU Global Cybersecurity Index, v4, 2020.

The Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) is authorized by the ITU Plenipotentiary Resolution 130, which emphasizes enhancing ITU’s role in instilling trust and security in the utilization of information and communication technologies and its objective is to cultivate a worldwide ethos of cybersecurity and to embed it as a fundamental component within ICTs. Its primary objectives include monitoring the type, level, and

⁸² ITU, op. cit.

progression of cybersecurity commitment within and among countries; tracking global and regional advancements in cybersecurity commitment; identifying disparities in cybersecurity commitment among countries.⁸³

However, as different from the data offered by the ITU GCI Index, the National Cyber Security Index (NCSI) shows Türkiye as the 55th country on its ranking list regarding the national cybersecurity depending on the data between the years of 2016 and 2023.⁸⁴ The objective of the NCSI is to offer an index that measures the countries' readiness to thwart cyber threats and handle cyber crises and it also functions as a repository containing accessible evidence materials and serves as a resource for enhancing national cybersecurity capabilities.⁸⁵ The NCSI indicators are designed based on the national cybersecurity framework and at the core of this framework are the primary cyber threats: (1) Disruption of e-services – hindrance in service accessibility, (2) Compromise of data integrity – unauthorized alterations, (3) Breach of data confidentiality – exposure of secrecy.⁸⁶ According to the NCSI, to effectively address these cyber threats, a nation needs to possess adequate capabilities for strategic planning, prevention and response in cyber security. Therefore, the NCSI concentrates on quantifiable dimensions of cybersecurity implemented by the national government: (1) Enacted laws – statutes, regulations, directives, etc., (2) Operational entities – established institutions, divisions, etc., (3) Collaborative structures – panels, task forces, etc., (4) Results – strategies, drills, technologies, online platforms, initiatives, etc..⁸⁷

According to the Cyber Project titled 'National Cyber Power Index 2022' conducted by the Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Türkiye has ranked as 23 among 30 other countries, ranking in between Switzerland and Egypt. The Top 10 Cyber Powers as to the same project are the USA, China, Russia, the UK, Australia, the Netherlands, Korea, Vietnam, France and Iran, respectively. The Figure 2 below, 'National Cyber Power Radar' shows Türkiye's cyber power in terms of meeting multiple objectives like financial, surveillance, intelligence, commerce, defense, information control, offense and norms.

⁸³ *ibid.*

⁸⁴ The NCSI Website, <https://ncsi.ega.ee/ncsi-index/?order=rank&archive=1> (Access 01 May 2024).

⁸⁵ *ibid.*

⁸⁶ *ibid.*

⁸⁷ *ibid.*


Figure 2. National Cyber Power Radar for Türkiye



Source: Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center, <https://www.belfercenter.org> (Access 24 April 2024).

The Figure 3 below also shows 'capability versus intent' scatter for strategic planning, prevention and response in cyber security. Türkiye is displayed among the countries of lower capability and lower intent with some other European countries like Italy, Sweden, Estonia, Lithuania.

Figure 2. Cyber Power Capability vs. Intent for Türkiye



Source: Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center, <https://www.belfercenter.org> (Access 24 April 2024).

Türkiye's E-Government Development Index ranking is 48 among 193 UN member states with a score of 0.7983 (The World leader is Denmark with a score of 0.9717). Türkiye's E-Participation Index ranking is 18 among

UN member states with a score of 0.7841.⁸⁸ According to the Global Startup Ecosystem Index 2024 for 100 countries and 1000 cities that has been issued by the StartupBlink since 2017, Türkiye's ranking is 27 in Europe and 40 among 100 other countries. The report deals with eleven different industries including software and data, which also covers cybersecurity. The countries with 'cybersecurity' top industry rankings are Lithuania, Ireland, Hungary, Israel, Canada, Spain and Switzerland in 2024. The report also draws attention to the rising importance of Artificial Intelligence sector. Istanbul's rating among the cities is 7th in terms of gaming startups. The Index report underlines that Türkiye has a great potential but points out the brain drain problem.⁸⁹

Risks for the Turkish Cyber Security

Cyber insecurity, which has been maintaining its position among the severe risks mentioned in the global risk reports of the WEF for 2023 and 2024, is not among the top 5 global risks for Türkiye that include economic downturn, involuntary migration, inequality (wealth, income), erosion of social cohesion and censorship, respectively in the Global Risks Report 2024 of the WEF.⁹⁰ However, according to the data obtained from the website of Kaspersky, Türkiye has ranked 14th on the list of countries targeted by cyber-attacks.⁹¹ According to Aydındağ between 2017 and 2018, cyber-attacks mainly targeted the health sector, but by 2019, the focus shifted to financial and telecommunication sectors. In October 2019, one of the most significant cyber-attacks affecting Turkish banks and telecommunications institutions occurred, resulting in the illegal trade of over 455,000 credit card details. DDoS attacks against public and private sectors constitute the majority of cyber-attacks on Turkey.⁹² The Minister for Transportation and Infrastructure also recently informed the news agencies that 7.750 cybersecurity experts serving for the sectoral and institutional cyber security response teams have been actively working to protect the cyber space of Türkiye and stated that more than 330.000 malicious links were determined and blocked.⁹³

Bolat and Kayışoğlu assert that cybersecurity is a field that must be approached from multiple disciplines since it involves assessing systems through various factors, including human, technological, informational, and

⁸⁸ The UN E-Government Knowledgebase Website, <https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/en-us/> (Access 01 May 2024).

⁸⁹ Global Startup Ecosystem Index 2024 <https://www.startupblink.com/startupecosystemreport> (Access 05 June 2024).

⁹⁰ The World Economic Forum Website, op. cit.

⁹¹ Kaspersky Website, <https://cybermap.kaspersky.com/tr> (Access 01 May 2024).

⁹² Aydındağ, op. cit.

⁹³ Newspaper 'Hürriyet', <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/bakan-uraloglu-acikladi-330-bin-in-uzerinde-zararli-baglanti-engellendi-42445703> (Access 01 May 2024).

policy aspects. They also think that the cybersecurity literature in Türkiye lacks coherence and is marked by complexity, for this reason, they assert that it is crucial to highlight the evolving nature of cyber threats and consider strategies such as cyber psychological tactics to prepare for future challenges and it is also essential to recognize that cyber-attacks will continue to evolve, so using cyber psychology to advance human factor studies could be an effective strategy considering that information technologies will integrate with other technologies, potentially being utilized in cyber-attacks.⁹⁴

According to the Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2024 of the WEF, the availability of skilled professionals in response to the escalating influx of emerging technology into the digital landscape remains critical. However, the existing talent pool is insufficient, and there is a significant shortage in the pipeline of up-and-coming talent. Each year, a growing number of organizations find themselves lacking the necessary skilled workforce to achieve their cyber resilience goals. In 2022, 6% of leaders reported a deficit in the skills and personnel required to effectively respond to cyber incidents. This figure doubled to 12% in 2023. Presently, 20% of respondents indicate that their organizations lack the requisite skills to fulfill their cyber objectives. Additionally, the percentage of leaders uncertain about the adequacy of their skill sets has risen from 4% in 2022 to 11% this year.⁹⁵

Alongside the risks stemming from cyber-attacks, cyber threats and human capital, mentioned above, Akyeşilmen claims that Türkiye has some weaknesses regarding its cybersecurity in terms of legal, technical, organizational measures, and human capital and academia: in terms of legal measures, Türkiye has weaknesses in responding to cyber incidents, analyzing cyber threats, and managing cyber crises; from a technical perspective, Türkiye lags in cyber incident response, cyber safety, cyber threat analysis, and crisis management; organizationally, Türkiye needs to establish a strong coordinating institution with a broad mandate directly accountable to the president and a clear hierarchy among cybersecurity institutions is essential.⁹⁶ Akyeşilmen also asserts that Türkiye requires a substantial and authoritative institution to develop and implement a centralized cybersecurity strategy, which must be transparent since transparency in cyberspace entails public information-sharing and involving private actors in cybersecurity teams.⁹⁷ In addition, Akyeşilmen offers recommendations for capacity building, research and development, education and transparency: for capacity building, more formal and informal training courses, cybersecurity education in primary and

⁹⁴ Bolat and Kayışoğlu, op. cit., p. 187-188.

⁹⁵ The World Economic Forum, the Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2024, <https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-cybersecurity-outlook-2024/> (Access, 23 April 2024).

⁹⁶ Akyeşilmen, op. cit., p. 129-130.

⁹⁷ Akyeşilmen, op. cit., p. 129-130.

secondary schools, and university programs are needed, encouraging and supporting research and development in cybersecurity at all levels is important, the universities, private companies and NGOs should be involved in cybersecurity training and campaigns, more public-private partnerships and bilateral and multilateral agreements should be formalized, transparency in national and international partnerships is crucial for success.⁹⁸ In compliance with Akyeşilmen’s suggestions regarding an authoritative institution for a centralized cybersecurity strategy, Darıcılı also recommends that the main framework for maintaining Türkiye’s cybersecurity system should be the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK)⁹⁹ and the operation of the state’s cybersecurity system should be governed by an independent security institution with a multi-disciplinary approach to its organizational structure.¹⁰⁰

Unlike the United States, the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, Israel, and even neighboring Iran, Türkiye generally bases its strategy studies on defense in cybersecurity.¹⁰¹ Karasoy and Babaoğlu think that the recent efforts of Türkiye to modernize its military capabilities have somewhat brought it into a new era, thanks to the performance demonstrated by state-supported private companies, so it would be appropriate for private companies in Türkiye especially leading defense industry companies such as ASELSAN, HAVELSAN, TUSAŞ, ROKETSAN and Bayraktar to be supported in the field of cybersecurity technologies and the private companies in Türkiye should also be supported by government incentives, necessary legal regulations should be made in this regard and efforts should focus on the localization of existing cybersecurity measures.¹⁰² Liszkowska claims that Türkiye has not developed an adequate protection system for digital and essential services adding that it lacks a competent cyber/information security authority empowered to oversee public and private digital service providers and ensure they meet cyber/information security requirements.¹⁰³ Additionally, Liszkowska alleges that there is no authority with the power to supervise operators of essential services regarding these requirements and the area of military cyber operations is also a concern.¹⁰⁴

International cooperation including bilateral and multilateral activities in the field of cybersecurity is also important in building up strong measures

⁹⁸ Akyeşilmen, op. cit., p. 129-130.

⁹⁹ Darıcılı, op. cit., p. 29.

¹⁰⁰ Darıcılı, op. cit., p. 29.

¹⁰¹ Karasoy and Babaoğlu, op. cit., p. 150.

¹⁰² Karasoy and Babaoğlu, op. cit., p. 150.

¹⁰³ Dominika Liszkowska, “Türkiye’s Cybersecurity Policy Framework”, *Cybersecurity and Law*, No. 1, 2024, p. 85.

¹⁰⁴ *ibid.*

against cyber insecurities. For example, Japan places great importance on international cooperation in the context of cybersecurity, which is closely related to ensuring an environment of comprehensive peace along with national and international security and Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays a significant role in Japan’s highly designed cyber diplomacy context, actively addressing how to ensure a free, fair, and secure cyberspace and how to strengthen coordination with other countries.¹⁰⁵

According to Çiftçi and Çakır’s cybersecurity technology foresight study envisaging 2040 depending on the meeting the Defense Industry Agency (SSB/DIA) with 17 cybersecurity experts conducting a SWOT analysis, a STEEPLE analysis, and a cybersecurity trend survey, which revealed that out of 119 factors, Türkiye has more cybersecurity weaknesses (31) than strengths (17), and significantly more opportunities (56) than threats (15).¹⁰⁶ The Table 3 and Table 4 below display the sum-up results of these analyses.

Table 3. Strengths and Weaknesses of Turkish Cyber Security

Strengths	Weaknesses
Young and entrepreneurial workforce	Lack of trained human resources
A science and technology community integrated into the international community	Disruptions in education and training
The existence of government institutions that can realize the cybersecurity strategies	Dependence on abroad in high-tech areas
Economic power	Lack of domestic products and technology in the field of cybersecurity and information systems
Presence of state support for cybersecurity	Inadequate collaboration between the general public, industry, and academia
Industry opened to the international arena	Absence of a collaborative culture
Presence of legal and regulatory framework that safeguards personal information, ideas, and works	Insufficient corporate competencies in the field of cybersecurity
Young and technology-adoptive manpower	Businesses specialize in a small range of niche cybersecurity services and products
Strong political support for cybersecurity	Limited amount of data for research
Embracing the sense of nationality	

Source: Hasan Çiftçi and Serhat Çakır, “Cybersecurity Technology Foresight: 2040 Scenarios for Turkey”, *Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University Journal of Advanced Research in Natural and Applied Sciences*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2023, p. 336.

¹⁰⁵ Fulya Köksoy, “The Cyber Security Policy of Japan”, *Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Vol. 267, 2023, p. 257.

¹⁰⁶ Hasan Çiftçi and Serhat Çakır, “Cybersecurity Technology Foresight: 2040 Scenarios for Turkey”, *Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University Journal of Advanced Research in Natural and Applied Sciences*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2023, p. 336-342.

Table 3. Continued.

Opportunities	Threats
haracteristics of the Black Sea and Its Effects on Environment cyber threats increase and become more complex Integration of cybersecurity as a component of national security in many countries worldwide Cybersecurity needs arising from social, technological, economic, environmental and political factors Due to the nature of cybersecurity, the need for domestic products The penetration of technology into all areas of life and the increase in its use Willingness and will of the public and private sector to invest in cybersecurity The rapid evolution of cyber threats The breadth of the domestic and foreign market Digital services' invasion into every facet of life via the internet (shopping, health, information sharing, etc.) Deficiencies in the institutional establishment of cybersecurity systems	Under-investment in Research and Development Lack of confidence in domestic products Failure to attach sufficient importance to the national development of systems due to urgent supply demands Evaluation of cost before quality as required by public procurement legislation Markets mostly dominated by foreign products The questioning of defense expenditures, especially in the Western world Export restrictions on the selling of cutting-edge cybersecurity technologies The widespread adoption of cloud computing and the dominance of foreign companies Establishment of a culture eager to make easy money International competition

Source: Hasan Çiftçi and Serhat Çakır, "Cybersecurity Technology Foresight: 2040 Scenarios for Turkey", Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University Journal of Advanced Research in Natural and Applied Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2023, p. 337.

Çiftçi and Çakır also set forth several objectives to overcome the weaknesses and threats stated on the tables above and some of them are worth to mention here to point out the importance of human capital, state incentives and other financial aids, domestic and national products, education and training, and reorganization of cybersecurity bodies: (1) The DIA and TÜBİTAK should receive \$10 million annually for cybersecurity R&D projects, (2) Companies developing cybersecurity products should be provided with incentives such as funds, tax reductions, and credit opportunities to support exports, (3) Financial support should be provided based on the type of patent to increase the number of patents in the cybersecurity sector, (4) The cybersecurity workforce should grow by at least 10% annually, adding about 500 new employees each year, (5) Companies should receive technology business funds to research areas lacking manufacturers to broaden the cybersecurity product range, (6) All businesses in the cybersecurity sector should participate in promotion and incentive programs to join the Turkish Cybersecurity Cluster, (7): Necessary political, social, legal, and economic conditions should be created to retain a skilled workforce in the country, (8) The cybersecurity responsibilities of top-level organizations (Ministry of the Interior, Armed Forces, National Intelligence

Organization, USOM, BTK, etc.) should be restructured, (9) Certain facilities and systems should be mandated to use certified national cybersecurity products, (10) Cybersecurity technical high schools should be established in 10 major cities.¹⁰⁷

Eitan lists the policy, bureaucratic, organizational culture challenges among the challenges against Türkiye hindering the development of its cyber power.¹⁰⁸ According to Eitan, Türkiye faces significant challenges in developing cyber power due to its centralized policy approach, historical lack of support for private entrepreneurship, and bureaucratic hurdles. Historically, the Turkish government's focus has been on heavy industry and state-controlled enterprises, with limited encouragement for high-tech and knowledge-intensive industries. This has resulted in technological stagnation and a reliance on external technology. Bureaucratic complexities further hinder local entrepreneurs, particularly in the high-tech sector. Additionally, Turkey's defense industry has not successfully channeled military technological advancements into the civilian market, unlike countries such as Israel. The lack of investment in academic research, low academic salaries, and an unproductive organizational culture further impede the growth of the cyber industry. Overall, despite some efforts to reform and improve, Türkiye's institutional and economic environment remains a significant barrier to the development of a robust cyber sector.¹⁰⁹

Apart from the risks and challenges discussed above, as the results and rankings of the international indexes reveal the risks for Türkiye in the future. Despite its GCI ranking is showing its strength in legal, cooperative, technical, capacity development measures, the rankings provided by the NSCI, Belfer Center, E-Government Development Index and the Global Startup Ecosystem Index show a more realistic picture of the situation of Turkish cyber insecurities because what the index reports assert should be considered as potential risks and the need for Türkiye to take necessary measures against them.

Conclusion

Türkiye took important steps to increase its capabilities in cybersecurity within the last two decades. Much of the efforts was given to create necessary legal basis and institutional agencies in charge of cybersecurity. Importance was given to build up state institutions in different fields, to determine the responsible bodies, to create strategic documents and to encourage the private sector and state-private sector cooperation in terms of cybersecurity. However, what has been done till today is not enough to prevent cyber

¹⁰⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ Eitan, op. cit., p. 42.

¹⁰⁹ *ibid.*, p. 44-51.

threats and cyber-attacks against the vulnerable assets of Türkiye, critical infrastructure in particular.

Cyber insecurity is considered as one of the top ten global risks for long term expectations. Having faced with this new global risk in recent years, the countries will need to pay more attention to cyber insecurities and to strengthen their cyber power and cybersecurity capacities to deal with them in the future considering the latest improvements in cyber technologies and especially in artificial intelligence. Within the last couple of years since 2016, Türkiye has been focusing on improving its capabilities to fight with the cyber insecurities and has been showing great interest in increasing its cyber power with new state institutions like the Digital Transformation Office and the Turkish Cybersecurity Cluster ensuring state-private sector collaborations to produce and use domestic and national cybersecurity products, new education and training programs at the higher education institutions and high schools and cyber intelligence department within the intelligence organization.

Despite all the recent efforts in cybersecurity, Türkiye still needs more to go. This study points out that Türkiye needs to pay more attention to human capital, capacity to handle with the cyber threats and attacks especially against the vulnerable assets like the critical infrastructure, education and training of qualified personnel. Besides, Türkiye lacks international bilateral and multilateral collaboration and needs a more centralized approach in cybersecurity to administrate all cybersecurity-related bodies including the public organizations, defense bodies like the TAF, EGM and MIT, private sector, scientific agencies like TÜBİTAK and the academia. Apart from the strategic documents with action plans there is a need to detect the weaknesses and threats. The international cyber security and cyber power indexes also offer a realistic picture of the situation in Türkiye underlining the risks in cyber arena and showing the points to improve. This study also finds out that the data regarding the actual cyber power of Türkiye and research data in the field of cybersecurity are not abundant for academic studies. Further studies are also needed in the field of Turkish cyber insecurities dealing with the contribution of Türkiye into cyber norms creation process throughout the international cooperation.

PART III.

ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND THEIR IMPACTS ON
TÜRKİYE

RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR'S ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ON TÜRKİYE

Ceren Gürseler Solak*

Introduction

The Black Sea Region has been an area where security and environment merge and provide an useful ground for related analysis. It has been rich in energy resources. For instance the Black Sea Basin “*is the second largest source of oil natural gas after the Persian Gulf*”.¹ The Black Sea also has rich potential regarding renewable resources like hydro, solar and wind energy.

The Black Sea has been a strategic location especially nowadays due to the fact that the Transatlantic Alliance and Russian Federation have been under new Cold War rivalry on Ukraine. The Black Sea's strategic importance is increasing day by day because of Russian-Ukrainian War and its regional and international effects. Between 2015 and 2022, the war had low-intensity. Gradually, the war increased its intensity and transformed in to full-scale war on February 24, 2022 by Russia's attempt to occupy Ukraine.²

Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian War in 2014 and especially with Russian wholesale invasion of Ukraine of 2022 comprehensive problems including the environmental field, environmental security have emerged due to the fact that huge, vast damage was given not only to Ukraine's and but also to the region's environment. Even wider region like Europe is disaffected and is under the long-term threats, risks of the environmental aspects of the Russian-Ukrainian War.

Before the War, the Black Sea has had tremendous anthropogenic burden.³ The main indication is the pollution degree in the Black Sea and in the region. Moreover anthropogenic climate change's effects have already been faced in the region. The 2022 Russian invasion with its usage of artillery, tanks and other armored vehicles gave and is continuing to give extensive damage to the Ukrainian environment. However scale of the damage to the environment is not limited with the Ukrainian landscape. The environmental

* Asst. Prof. Dr., Nevşehir Hacı Bektaş Veli University, International Relations Department

¹ Maria-Emanuela Mhailov, Lucian Grigorescu and Romel Pera, “Climate Change and Security: The Case for Black Sea”, *Geopolitics and Geostrategy: Trends and Perspectives*, Strategic Impact No.3/2023, p.54-71, p.68

² Nesrin Algan and Gökçe Karalezli Aydoğan, “Russian Federation-Ukraine War as an environmental security issue on the Black Sea”, *J. Black Sea/Mediterranean Environment*, Vol. 29, No. 1: 49-72 (2023), p. 51.

³ Mustafa Ökmen, “Karadeniz’de Çevre sorunları ve İşbirliğine Yönelik Yerel, Bölgesel Perspektifler”, *bilig*, winter 2011, No. 56, pp.165-194, p.176.

damages, repercussions impact not only the Ukrainian territory but also the whole Black Sea region⁴ including Türkiye. The Turkish Republic, as one of the coastal states of the Black Sea has been facing problems, risks related with the war. Even before the war, Türkiye encountered environmental issues regarding the Black Sea.

The Sea has numerous and serious environmental problems that destructed and further threaten its ecosystems. Henceforth, the war with its tremendous effects on the Ukrainian soil and the Black Sea worsen the already damaged ecological balance and various ecosystems of the Sea and the Region. The environmental destruction has affected and will affect Türkiye as environmental problems, risks naturally do not recognize borders. Chernobyl disaster of 1986 exposed threats to environmental security of the Black Sea.⁵ With the disaster “*it has been understood that environmental problems are not restricted to the countries of their origin*”.⁶

The Ukrainian War has both indirectly and directly disaffected the environment. Ukraine has been rich in steppe and wetland ecosystems, habitats with rich in animal and plant quantity, quality but these regions have been under threat, risk of complete destruction due to the war. For instance, the war directly results in loss of biodiversity and pollution of environment. Also it indirectly creates environmental problems like increase in carbon dioxide.

As intense fighting continues on the ground, environment is being polluted and further destructing by heavy vehicle circulation, explosions at several facilities like oil, gas and ammunition.⁷ The war also resulted in destruction of the unique ecosystems of Ukraine and the Black Sea. The Donetsk Upland, “*wetlands at the mouth of the Dniipro and sections of the coastland of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov*” were highly damaged.⁸

In this pessimistic framework, there is still some opportunities regarding international cooperation due to problems faced by the region and the sea. Türkiye's historical role on pioneering international cooperation in the Black Sea, can be used as a possible evidence for Ankara's potential role on cooperation in protecting environment in the Black Sea.

⁴ Sophie Joubert, “Can Crimes of Ecocide Committed During the Conflict in Ukraine Be Legally Punished?”, *International Journal of Law: “Law and World”*, Vol. 9, Issue 4, 2023, pp. 108-119, p. 109

⁵ Bilal Karabulut, “Birleşmiş Milletler’in Küresel Güvenlikteki Rolü ve Çevre Güvenliği Bağlamında Karadeniz Havzasındaki Faaliyetleri”, *Karadeniz Araştırmaları*, Kış 2015, No. 48, pp.43-58, p.55

⁶ Çiğdem Üstün, “Turkey Between Environmental Protection and Energy Security”, *Insight Turkey*, vol. 14, No. 2, 2012, pp.177-192, p. 178.

⁷ Algan and Karalezli Aydoğan, *op.cit.*, p.53

⁸ Jakub Ber, *At War with Nature. The Impact of the Russian Invasion on Ukraine's Natural Environment*, OSW Commentary, Number 559, 07.12.2023, pp.1-7, p.4.

Environmental problems have cumulative structures.⁹ They are prone to result in risks to nature and mankind. As industrialization keeps growing, population keeps growing and global warming keeps rising environmental security has been under the threat of those risks. Environmental problems are transboundary problems by nature. Although their causes can be local, their effects and repercussions can be regional, international.

Regional conflict, environmental pollution and degradation's regional effects and possible cooperation in the future direct this research on using the concepts of region and regional security complex (RSC) as theoretical framework. States with fragile security tend to be more prone to establish RSCs. To recognize the Black Sea as a region and RSC facilitates analysis and further elaborations on environmental structures and problems of the Black Sea including additional effects of the Russian-Ukrainian War. To put it in another words, there have been threats, risks that can establish RSC in the region.

This article aims to analyze the war's environmental risks on Türkiye as environmental problems and related issues like conflict pollution, environmental security through elaborating Ukraine's, the Black Sea's environmental structure before the war. It also touches upon the damage of the war to the environment of Ukraine and the Black Sea. By perceiving the Black Sea as a region and the RSC in environmental terms, referring the concept of ecocide, it touches upon cooperation possibilities in the region.

I. Theoretical Background

Environmental Security, Conflict Pollution and Ecocide

Environmental security has been one of the headings of sea security.¹⁰ Moreover, the Black Sea's pre-war “traditional/ordinary” environmental problems and the war's environmental damage to the region result in analysis by establishing relations between environment and security. Henceforth, using the concepts/notions of environmental security, conflict pollution, ecocide facilitates analyzing the Russian-Ukrainian War's environmental risks on Türkiye. Moreover claims of ecocide made by certain Western non-governmental organizations such as Stop Ecocide International and Ukraine also affect Türkiye's environmental agenda concerning Black Sea and elaboration of the Black Sea on both environmental and security grounds.

Environmental damages and degradation threaten environmental security. Environmental security can be defined as “*state's protection of the people*”

⁹ Nisa Erdem, “Çevresel Sorunlar Bağlamında Karadeniz Havzasında Türkiye'nin Taraf Olduğu Uluslararası İşbirlikleri”, in *Karadeniz: 2020 Gelişmeleri Işığında Bölgesel Değerlendirmeler*, Özgür Tüfekçi (Ed.), Trabzon, Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2021, pp.595-624, p.596

¹⁰ Hüseyin Yüce and Cem Gazioğlu, “Maritime Security Challenges Ahead in the Black Sea”, *J. Black Sea/Mediterranean Environment*, Vol. 12, 2006, p.249, pp.233-250

from environmental threats and threats of environmental origin".¹¹

The concept relates with the notion of maintaining and safeguarding the safety of ecological system "of the planet we live on and the human who is a part of it".¹² Since its formulation in the 1970s, the concept has been evolving and expanding. Although the term has many different definitions, common points and notions can be deduced from these different definitions and conceptions. For instance, Algan and Aydoğın highlight the fact that the term of environmental security includes several important components namely environmental degradation, economic losses, political conflict and military conflict.¹³ These are interrelated components which indicate the fact that environmental problems and environmental degradation might indirectly cause military conflicts which further threaten environmental security of the planet and the mankind.

Environmental security can also be classified according to geographical lines like global, regional and local spheres. The concept can be grouped into components whether they are environment-based issues like climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, worsening of air and water quality, biodiversity loss, oil spills.¹⁴ Moreover the environmental security issues can further be classified according to resource-based terms like water quantity, minerals, land degradation and fisheries.¹⁵

War, armed conflict and armed clashes are seriously detrimental to environment as they destroy natural resources like forests, biodiversity. War's effects on environment have been comprehensive. Firstly, war disaffects the environment by directly contaminating air, land and water due to toxic substances.¹⁶ Secondly war results in extensive damage in infrastructure of society which also causes additional damage. Thirdly, usage of nonrenewable sources of energy are seriously disaffected by warfare. Also, because of war, resources might be used for military needs instead of promoting health and preserving the environment.¹⁷ Furthermore explosions, fires and other related military activities result in increase of greenhouse emissions.

During the war, environment can be used as a mean of warfare. For

instance it can be used as a weapon.¹⁸ On the other hand, it can be a military target for the warring sides as well.

Moreover, collateral damage resulting from war can also be recognized detrimental factor for the environment. It can be occurred by "shelling leading to wildfires; deliberate damage from scorched earth" tactics, such as flooding from the destruction of dams; defensive tactics, such as "digging trenches and laying antitank mines; and military activities that are conducted in environmentally sensitive areas, such as nature reserves".¹⁹

Conflict pollution is another term that signifies damage given to environment during wartime. Thus it is useful to use the term in grasping related prospects. Because it elaborates detrimental effects of the armed conflict on the environment. Conflict pollution is caused by several factors like direct damage to infrastructure and using several kinds of weapons. Moreover problems, inefficiency in local environmental regime, and governance during and after armed conflict result in conflict pollution.²⁰ To put it another terms, usage of explosive weapons and the release of certain chemicals like toxic and hazardous chemicals from damaged buildings and infrastructure can be recognized factors of conflict pollution.²¹

Another related term that can be used to understand and analyze environmental destruction of Ukraine, the Black Sea and its risks on Türkiye is ecocide. It means "unlawful or wanton acts committed with knowledge that there is a substantial likelihood of severe and either widespread or long-term damage to the environment being caused by those acts".²² Although it is not a new term on politics and environmental issues, ecocide's momentum has been generated through certain developments like attempt to define it legally and Belgium's constitution's recognition of ecocide as a crime²³. Last but not least, recognition of environmental damage and destruction caused by Russia's aggression and attacks on Ukraine as ecocide draws attention to the term and environmental dimension of the Russian-Ukrainian War. For instance, it has been argued that gravity and intensity of mines' destruction of forests, steppes and wetlands; gravity and intensity of bombings, shelling and fires,

¹¹ Geun Lee, "Regional Environmental Security Complex Approach to Environmental Security in West Asia", p.4

¹² Algan and Karalezli Aydoğın, op.cit, p. 50.

¹³ *ibid.*

¹⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁶ Ermir Shanini, Olena Shebanina, Iurii Kormyshkin, Antonina Drobotko and Natalya Chernyavskaya, "Environmental Consequences for the World of Russia's War Against Ukraine", International Journal of Environmental Studies, Vol. 81, No. 1, 2024, pp.463-474, p. 463

¹⁷ Victor W. Sidel, Barry S. Levy, and Jonathan E. Slutzman, "Prevention of War and Its Environmental Consequences", The Handbook of Environmental Chemistry, O. Hutzinger, D. Barceló, A. Kostianoy (Ed.) Berlin, Springer, 2009, pp.21-39, p.21

¹⁸ Tank Ak, "Günümüz Savaşlarında Çevre Konusuna İlişkin Bir Değerlendirme", İstanbul Aydın Üniversitesi Dergisi 32, 2016, pp.17-26, p.18-19.

¹⁹ Daniel Hryhorczuk, Barry S. Levy, Mykola Prodanchuk, Oleksandr Kravchuk, Nataliia Bubalo, Alex Hryhorczuk and Timothy B. Erickson, "The Environmental Health Impacts of Russia's War on Ukraine", Journal of Occupational Medicine and Toxicology, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2024, pp.1-14, p.2

²⁰ Algan and Karalezli Aydoğın, op.cit, p.53

²¹ *ibid.*

²² Stop Ecocide International, <https://www.stopecocide.earth/legal-definition>

²³ <https://www.law.com/international-edition/2024/03/01/belgium-becomes-first-eu-country-to-criminalize-ecocide/?slreturn=20240508052158>

pollution of environment are tantamount to crime of ecocide.²⁴

The most prominent example on environmental degradation used is Russia's attack on the Navy Kakhovka Dam because it resulted in huge damage to Ukraine's and the Black Sea's environment and ecosystem. In fact, the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recognized attack as "*the greatest crime of ecocide*" that its effects will be faced in the long run.²⁵ In academic circles, the same elaboration is made. For example, Bozkurt argues that due to the grave amount of damage, the Russian attack can be called as ecocide.²⁶

Regional Environmental Security Complex in the Black Sea

The Black Sea region, mainly due to its complex politics, troubled nexus in the cooperative domain and its highly variousness in its population, make it somehow an entity or geography whose degree of "*regionness or regional cohesion*"²⁷ have been questioned from time to time. However, rising importance and emergency of environmental damages both in Ukraine and in the region, indicates the fact that mainly coastal states will cooperate in the long-run. Therefore, terms of "*regionness*" and "*regional security complex*" of the Black Sea in environmental terms can be used to grasp and elaborate the environmental issues of the region before and after the Russian-Ukrainian War and the War's environmental effects, risks on Türkiye. The Black Sea's recognition as a region or regional security complex (RSC) facilitates its comprehensive analysis including environmental dimension. As it was mentioned above, environmental security in the Black Sea encompasses relationship between environment and security that sheds light on related problems of the Basin. Environmental problems constitute common threats and risks of environmental degradation and environmental problems for region's countries that prepare theoretical ground for analyzing the Black Sea according to RSC. In another words, the Black Sea can be recognized both as a region and RSC as the Black Sea region has been a *sui generis* entity including both opportunities for cooperation and risks for conflict.²⁸ Energy security, increased pollution and global climate change can establish such complexes in the Black Sea.

As a RSC, even before the Russian-Ukrainian War, conflict tended

²⁴ Sahib Mammadov, Serhii Luhovyi, Oleksii Starodubets, Halyna Kalynychenko and Ruslan Trybat, "Collateral Ecocide. The Impact of war on Ukrainian Flora and Fauna", International Journal of Environmental Studies, Vol.81, No.1, 2024, pp. 446-454, p. 446.

²⁵ Joubert, op.cit, p. 109

²⁶ Kutluhan Bozkurt, translated by Kutluhan Bozkurt and Ahmet Çitköylü, "Assessments on the Ukraine-Russia War in the Axis of International Law and Ecocide Crimes", YÜHFD, C.XXI, 2024/1, pp. 505-523, p.510

²⁷ Carol Weaver, The Politics of the Black Sea Region: EU Neighbourhood, Conflict Zone or Future Security Community?, New York, Routledge, 2013, s. 4

²⁸ Pınar Akgül, "Karadeniz'in Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksi Olarak İncelenmesi", Ahi Evran Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi (AEÜSBED) 2020, Cilt 6, Sayı 2, s.550-569, s.550

atmosphere was felt in the region. Furthermore, the Black Sea's regional environmental security complex has already been established before the War. The primary reason for this already existed complex has been anthropogenic effects especially pollution problems in the Basin. Marine pollution, transboundary air pollution have been regular, ordinary problems of the Region as industrial activities' of the littoral states have been concentrated on the shores of the Black Sea which also becomes a dumping area of Europe's liquid and solid waste.

The RSC is an useful concept regarding this particular case on the Black Sea as it encompasses securitization of environmental concerns "*by critically examining inter-state behavior on the concerns around environmental sustainability*".²⁹ Securitization of geopolitics, environmental concerns can also shed the light on environmental effects of the Russian-Ukrainian War on Türkiye. Moreover securitization of environmental concerns at the regional level can afford more effective ways for cooperation between states. For instance environmental sustainability can be addressed to prevent further pollution in the region.

Moreover emergence of several new regions on grounds of economy, culture and security can also be used as evidences for the RSC in environmental terms in the Black Sea. Former republics of the Soviet Union establishing new regions, further prepares ground for the Black Sea's establishment as RSC.

II. Facts on The Ground

Environmental Problems in Ukraine Before the War

Before the Russian-Ukrainian War, Ukraine has already faced environmental degradation. In addition to insensitive policies concerning environment, Ukraine's peculiarities caused environmental problems. For instance its outdated technologies used in industrial facilities resulted in augmentation of environmental problems. Rapid and uncontrolled industrialization, intensive agricultural activities, overuse of natural resources, inefficient environmental protection regulations and lack of pollution control have been constant environmental problems of Ukraine.

Ukraine's economy is centered on heavy industry which in turn disaffects environmental structure, ecosystems of the country. There have been thousands of industrial plants, chemical factories and "*other facilities that produce and store toxic waste*".³⁰ It has suffered from pollution of heavy industry during

²⁹ Ambrish Dhaka, "The Securitisation of Environmental Sustainability and its Critical Geopolitics", <https://www.redalyc.org/journal/358/35874535009/html/>.

³⁰ Elettra Tirino, The Environmental Impact of War: The Case of the Black and Above Seas, 05 March 2024, pp.1-11, p.4.

the Soviet era.³¹ It has had problems created by usage of coal-fired power plants, waste from chemical plants, industrial farming.

The environmental scale of Donbass can be given as an example. Donbass, situated in eastern Ukraine, has been the most industrialized region of the country. According to Ber, in fact, pre-2014 situation was similar to ecological disaster in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, namely Donbass.³² Mining and heavy industry facilities mismanaged environment so landscape was degraded, groundwater, soil and air were permanently polluted³³ as contaminated and mineralized water were discharged from these mines and industrial facilities into rivers. Moreover infrastructure quality was also in bad condition which further complicated the environmental composition. Thus in overall terms, “*there were high levels of chemical and organic pollution in most of the rivers of Donbass and the coastal waters of the Sea of Above*”.³⁴ Furthermore vast amount of solid waste was another serious concern for the region. It has to be highlighted that solely Donetsk oblast produced approximately 20-30% of Ukraine’s total hazardous industrial waste that caused further and additional problems as their storage posed serious risks to the environment. For instance, “*municipal waste in Donetsk and Lubansk oblasts ended up either in overflowing landfills or illegal dumps*”.³⁵

Sewage treatment plants and water supply facilities were damaged. Moreover major overhauls were missed and metal infrastructure were stolen that resulted in river pollution “*and serious problems with the supply of drinking water to the cities of Donbass*”.³⁶

Climate crisis has been another concern for Ukraine. Before the war, Ukraine already faced detrimental effects of climate crisis. The temperature rises 1.5 C over the last thirty years which in turn could lead to rise of temperatures to 3 C by the middle of the century.³⁷ Moreover, Kiev’s non-fulfillment of laws, inadequacy of laws related with environmental protection, lack of strategic programs³⁸ indicate another aspect of Ukraine’s vulnerability regarding the climate crisis.

³¹ *ibid.*

³² Jakub Ber, At War with Nature. The Impact of the Russian Invasion on Ukraine’s Natural Environment, OSW Commentary, Number 559, 07.12.2023, pp.1-7, p.1

³³ *ibid.*

³⁴ *ibid.*, p.2

³⁵ *ibid.*

³⁶ *ibid.*

³⁷ Tirino, op.cit, p.5.

³⁸ Iuliana Pop, “Tackling Climate Change in the Black Sea Region Case Studies”, Knowledge Horizons - Economics, Volume.5, No. 3, 2013, pp. 69-75, p.71.

Characteristics of the Black Sea and Its Effects on Environment Before the War

The Black Sea has unique and important peculiarities. It is the “world’s largest land-locked inland sea and the world’s largest permanent anoxic sea that covers about 420 300 square km and maximum depth of 2 212 m”.³⁹ Approximately for thousand years, its surface waters “have supported a rich and diverse marine life”.⁴⁰

The Black Sea has been one of the important regional seas in the world. It has a strategic place in international transport in oil and gas. Moreover, it is one of the important seas in Europe. Thus, the Black Sea has had a tremendous effect, place and importance for the region’s states as they “*depend to some extent on the sea itself for transport, defence, leisure, tourism and fishing*”.⁴¹ The Black Sea which accompanies Europe’s three largest rivers, “*has a catchment area that is approximately five times greater than its surface area*”.⁴²

The Black Sea is “*the most isolated sea in the world*”.⁴³ It is semi-enclosed sea with unique environmental characteristics like climate conditions, natural factors, biodiversity that give its *sui generis* status. Its unique biodiversity contains approximately 50.000 different species of animals including endemic species.⁴⁴ It is permanently stratified basin, “*with low salinity and a thin oxygenated surface layer overlying waters dominated by hydrogen sulfide*”.⁴⁵ The Black Sea provides opportunities, advantages for concerned states especially in fishing, tourism, mineral extraction and “*in cheap transport route*”.⁴⁶

The Black Sea region, completely or partially, includes 23 states of which Türkiye, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania and Georgia are coastal states. There are several European states that are located in the basin of the Black Sea: Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Czechia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldavia,

³⁹ Irena Rudneva and Eileen Petzold-Bradley, “Environment and Security Challenges in the Black Sea Region”, Responding to Environmental Conflicts: Implications for Theory and Practice, Eileen Petzold-Bradley, Alexander Carius and Arpad Vincze (Ed.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, pp. 189-207, p.194.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*

⁴¹ Weaver, op.cit, p. 13

⁴² Daniel Hryhorczuk, Barry S. Levy, Mykola Prodanchuk, Oleksandr Kravchuk, Nataliia Bubalo, Alex Hryhorczuk and Timothy B. Erickson, “The Environmental Health Impacts of Russia’s War on Ukraine”, Journal of Occupational Medicine and Toxicology, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2024, pp.1-14, p.4

⁴³ Ömer Köse, Ahmet Taner and Berna Erkan, “International Cooperation for Saving the Black Sea and The Coordinated Parallel Audit by SAIs of the Region”, Yönetim ve Ekonomi, Cilt. 20, Sayı.1, 2013, pp.105-117, p. 105.

⁴⁴ Tirino, op.cit, p.3.

⁴⁵ Maria-Emanuela Mhailov, Lucian Grigorescu and Romel Pera, “Climate Change and Security: The Case for Black Sea”, Geopolitics and Geostrategy: Trends and Perspectives, Strategic Impact No.3/2023, p.54-71, p.60

⁴⁶ Köse, Taner and Erkan, op.cit, p. 106.

Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland.

Although the region's cooperation is institutionalized by the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the region has faced tensions, risks regularly. In addition to the Russian-Ukrainian War, unresolved conflicts in the region still continue in the regions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria. The Black Sea Region has also been a center of conflict between concerned states such as traditional disputes over fisheries, maritime shipping. Development and protection of transboundary waters can also be recognized as areas of disagreements.⁴⁷

The Black Sea Region has tremendous problems that have been dynamic, complex and closely interrelated.⁴⁸ Another risk that threatens the Black Sea's stability, security is environmental problems. The Black Sea has been the most polluted sea in Europe.⁴⁹ Even before the war, the Black Sea's environment faced serious problems such as water pollution because of detrimental effects of industrial facilities and agricultural lands. Rudneva and Petzold-Bradley highlight the fact that for decades, *"the Black Sea has been unable to cope with increased human demands and extensive environmental degradation"*.⁵⁰ Thus, it is *"one of the most vulnerable seas in the world"*.⁵¹ Its unique conditions in addition to anthropogenic effects result in problems, risks and threats in environmental character. The Black Sea has faced numerous environmental problems that seriously threaten its ecosystems. Since 1960s, predominantly pollution and other related factors have seriously and intensely altered Black Sea's ecosystems which resulted in risk and serious threats concerning biodiversity, fishing and marine activities.⁵² Unfortunately, *"environmental damage, polluting industries, unsustainable and resource intensive development and poor governance compounded by today's growing interest in resource extractions and large-scale infrastructure projects"* can be given as examples.⁵³ The environmental security of the region and particularly the Black Sea came to the fore especially in 2000s⁵⁴ due to the fact that the Black Sea was in a state of environmental crisis. Environmental challenges confronting the Black Sea have been existent before the war or the Russian invasion. For instance, it has been used to dump liquid and solid waste.

The main focus of politicians, the non-governmental organs (NGOs), international organizations and academicians regarding the environmental

⁴⁷ Rudneva and Petzold-Bradley, op.cit, p.189

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p.192.

⁴⁹ Joubert, op.cit, p. 111.

⁵⁰ Rudneva and Petzold-Bradley, op.cit, p.189

⁵¹ Köse, Taner and Erkan, op.cit, p. 106.

⁵² *Ibid*.

⁵³ Pop, op.cit, p.70

⁵⁴ Hanna Shelest, "From Soft Security to Hard Security in the Black Sea Region - Does the OSCE Fit?", Security and Human Rights, 32, 2022, pp.106-120, p.109

problems of the Black Sea is pollution. Polluters have been comprehensive in nature caused by various and numerous sources. Pollution is caused by anthropogenic effects, the Black Sea's specific natural and hydrographical conditions. As an isolated sea, its natural conditions, habitat make the Black Sea vulnerable to environmental issues like chemical pollution, oil leakage and decrease in biodiversity especially when it is compared with the Mediterranean Sea and the Aegean Sea. The Black Sea's main structure lacks oxygen at 90%; it is anoxic water. To put it in another words, there has been absence of oxygen. It has great depth, shallow outlet that make water mixing amount very little. *"Below 100 m it is largely devoid of oxygen"*.⁵⁵ The Black Sea's low degree of aeration of the deep waters by lateral flows further disaffects the ecosystem of the Black Sea. Rudneva and Petzold-Bradley highlight the fact that *"the total water turnover of the Black Sea is extremely low and the time of water renewal is approximately 140 years"*.⁵⁶ Due to the Black Sea's landlocked character and limited size, its ecosystem is very fragile *"as it is extremely sensitive to accumulated contaminants and pollutants"*.⁵⁷ Because of quickly consuming of all the oxygen of bacterial in the bottom waters the Black Sea *"is virtually dead blow a depth of about 180 meters"*⁵⁸.

As mentioned above, the main reasons on environmental degradation are anthropogenic in character. Inflow of untreated sewage, intensive activities of agriculture particularly overusing of fertilizers and pesticides can be mentioned as main problems of the Black Sea. *"This over-fertilization, along with waste discharges from agricultural, domestic and industrial sources, is responsible for the phenomenon of eutrophication, which has turned the Black Sea into an oxygen-free and asphyxiated zone."*⁵⁹

The environmental problems of the Black Sea has had local, regional and international repercussions. For this reason the environmental problems of the Black Sea mainly pollution has become international in character as transboundary environmental damage has been serious problem disaffecting ecosystems, biodiversity of the Black Sea. For instance, Danube River has dominant role and responsibility in the Black Sea's pollution. Moreover its intensive usage decreases its water quality.⁶⁰ Environmental problems in the Black Sea are caused by coastal states' policies in sea and coastal lines. Furthermore, international developments, situations particularly related with

⁵⁵ Hryhorczuk, Levy, Prodanchuk, Kravchuk, Bubalo, Hryhorczuk and Erickson, op.cit, p.4

⁵⁶ Rudneva and Petzold-Bradley, op.cit, p.194.

⁵⁷ Emmanuella Doussis, "Environmental Protection of the Black Sea: A Legal Perspective", Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2006, pp.355-369,p.356

⁵⁸ Rudneva and Petzold-Bradley, op.cit, p.194.

⁵⁹ Sumru Noyan and Meltem Güney, "Two decades of cooperation in the Black Sea Region: the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and its future", J. Black Sea/Mediterranean Environment, Vol. 18, No.2, 2012, pp.102-113, p.107.

⁶⁰ Doussis, op.cit, p.357

Europe give damage to the Black Sea's ecosystem.⁶¹ For example, the Danube River brings industrial waste, pollution of Europe to the Black Sea. 90% of the Black Sea's pollution is caused from the Danube, Don, Dnieper rivers of Central Europe.⁶² River Danube, Dnieper, and Dniester's importance in pollution has to be stressed due to the fact that they are the region's major rivers.⁶³ To Rudneva and Petzold-Bradley, these three tributary waters are the main sources of the environmental problems as they bring pesticides from agricultural pollution and up-stream sewage discharges.⁶⁴ Thus, although previously recognized as one of the richest water sources, the Black Sea transforms "into a litter dump of Europe in the last 30 years".⁶⁵ The "rivers running into the Black Sea, are the drains of urban conurbations, industries, and agriculture of the whole catchment area".⁶⁶ Industrial waste flowing through the Danube and Rhine Rivers, nuclear wastes and other contaminants of Don, Dnieper, Dniester Rivers pollute the Black Sea. Sakarya, Kızılırmak, Yeşilirmak and Çoruh Rivers situated in Türkiye also pollute the Black Sea through domestic waste, discharge from industrial complexes, fertilization and disinfection of agricultural lands.⁶⁷

Pollution caused from dumping solid and liquid waste has been main problem of the Black Sea. Coastal pollution reflects waste and related problems. The main reasons for coastal pollution are wastes of industrial complexes and facilities in the Black Sea's northern, southern and western coasts, of industrial facilities in the Danube River's hinterland, and Ukraine's industrial complexes along the Dnieper River.⁶⁸

In addition to discharges near coastal zones, oil spills and water pollution have also been among the environmental problems existed before the War. "Sewage and chemical pollution from industrial, agricultural, transport and domestic sectors are the main contributors to the contamination of the Black Sea".⁶⁹ "Sewage is an important source of organic substances, heavy metals, persistent organic pollutants, detergents and pathogenic bacteria".⁷⁰ Sewage directly discharged into the sea from coastal settlements. Heavy loads of fertilizer and human waste dumped into sea result in overall severe eutrophication. To put it in another words, "anthropogenic eutrophication of coastal waters has been the most damaging impact on the

⁶¹ Ökmen, op.cit, p. 170.

⁶² *Ibid*, p.171

⁶³ Levent Bat, Aysah Öztekin, Fatih Şahin, Elif Arıcı, Uğur Öz sandıkçı, "An Overview of the Black Sea Pollution in Turkey", Mediterranean Fisheries and Aquaculture Research, Vol.1, No. 2, 2018, pp.67-86, p. 67.

⁶⁴ Rudneva and Petzold-Bradley, op.cit, p.195.

⁶⁵ Köse, Taner and Erkan, op.cit, p. 107.

⁶⁶ Doussis, op.cit, p.355

⁶⁷ Ökmen, op.cit, p.173

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p.170.

⁶⁹ Rudneva and Petzold-Bradley, op.cit, p.194.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, p.195.

Black Sea's ecosystem".⁷¹ Even during the 1980s and early 1990s, the Black Sea suffered "catastrophically from the effects of eutrophication".⁷²

However anthropogenic damages are not limited with the above mentioned issues. Big ships and oil tankers have threaten the environmental aspect of the sea. Oil transpiration, related accidents and illegal dumping give damage to the ecosystems.⁷³ Pressure from fishing industries and tourism activities further contemplate delicate ecosystems of the Black Sea.⁷⁴ Irregular and unplanned fresh water withdrawal for irrigation, thermal and hydro energy production, usage of coastal sides for construction have also damaged the ecosystem balance of the Black Sea.⁷⁵ Mining, poisonous water in the sea and energy consumption also can be listed causes of environmental problems.

In addition to chemical pollution, microbiological pollution, organic polluters, heavy metal pollution⁷⁶, changes in hydrological balances, invasion of alien species, emergence of new biological species, changes in marine ecosystems are major problems of the Black Sea.⁷⁷ The jellyfish has caused disastrous changes to the Black Sea. As a result of overfishing and eutrophication, disappearance of higher predatory fish and animals, such as turbot, bluefin tuna and monk sea resulted in emergence of huge numbers of the jelly fish.⁷⁸ The above mentioned problems further result in major environmental issues like loss of biodiversity, fisheries resources and decrease in water quality.⁷⁹

Before the Ukrainian War, in addition to "traditional" problems of the Black Sea like pollution, climate crisis also poses threat to the environment and security of the region as air pollution further results in contamination of the sea. The Black Sea has nonlinear dynamics which result in increasing importance of the thermohaline circulation for climate system and "entailed in abrupt climate changes".⁸⁰ Hence climate change exaggerates the environmental problems of the Black Sea. Climate crisis decreases water, air and soil quality. It has also disaffected economic, military, infrastructural security.⁸¹ Water scarcity can also be recognized as an devastated impact of climate crisis

⁷¹ *Ibid*.

⁷² Köse, Taner and Erkan, op.cit, p.107.

⁷³ *Ibid*.

⁷⁴ Bat, Öztekin, Şahin, Arıcı, Öz sandıkçı, op.cit, p. 67.

⁷⁵ Erdem, op.cit, p.598

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p.599

⁷⁷ Rudneva and Petzold-Bradley, op.cit, p.194-198.

⁷⁸ Igor S. Zonn, Dmitry Y. Fashchuk, Anatoly I. Ryabinin, "Environmental Issues of the Black Sea", The Black Sea Environment: The Handbook of Environmental Chemistry, Andrey G. Kostianoy and Aleksey N. Kosarev (Ed.) Berlin, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2008, pp.407-421, p.420.

⁷⁹ Erdem, op.cit, p.599

⁸⁰ Mhailov, Grigorescu and Pera, op.cit, p.60

⁸¹ *Ibid*, p.68

particularly resulted from increasing demand from agriculture, industry and population growth. Climate crisis disaffects crop yields and productivity that “reduces food security and increases the risk of food shortages”⁸². Another effect of climate crisis in the region are drought, storms and floods.⁸³ For instance in early 2010s, global warming in the region disaffected wheat production particularly in Russia and Ukraine. Decrease in wheat production got worse with fires that also brought drought in the Black Sea especially in Russia and Ukraine.⁸⁴ Due to the climate crisis certain species disappeared and ecosystems were changed.⁸⁵

The rising sea levels is also among the effects of climate crisis on the Black Sea region. It is estimated that sea level rise in the region is approximately 12 cm in the last century “which reaches the average record for the global sea-level rise estimated between 10 and 20 cm”.⁸⁶ Especially the Danube Delta, the Dniester estuary, the deltas of Kuban (Sea of Above) and Rioni have been seriously threatened by rising of sea level.⁸⁷ Moreover storms and floods become more frequent in the region.

Due to its numerous and comprehensive environmental problems, environmental governance has been a complex issue even before the Russian-Ukrainian War, due to the fact that such a governance “results in a series of scale mismatches which constrain management”.⁸⁸ For instance, as mentioned above, “eutrophication and small pelagic fisheries”⁸⁹ have been two major problems of the Black Sea before the Russian-Ukrainian War. However, with the war, environmental degradation and problems got worse.

Environmental problems in the Black Sea region directly or indirectly affect coastal states. These problems like environmental pollution has transboundary effects.⁹⁰ The Black Sea basin has faced environmental disaster that have wide and comprehensive repercussions beyond the realm of six coastal states. For instance, to Ökmen, pollution of the Black Sea has been a problem not only for six coastal states but also for whole region; even the problem becomes an international issue.⁹¹ In other words, these problems

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ Pop, op.cit, p.70

⁸⁴ Esra Pakin Albayrakoğlu, “Climate Change and Security: The Case for Turkey”, Akademik Bakış, Cilt 5, Sayı 9, Kiş 2011, pp. 59-75, p. 64

⁸⁵ Elettra Tirino, “The Environmental Impact of War: The Case of the Black and Above Seas”, 05 March 2024, pp.1-11, p.3.

⁸⁶ Albayrakoğlu, op.cit, p. 63.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 65

⁸⁸ Tim O’Higgins, Andrew Farmer, Georgi Daskalov, Stale Knudsen and Laurence Mee, “Achieving Good Environmental Status in the Black Sea: Scale Mismatches in Environmental Management”, Ecology and Society, Sep 2014, Vol. 19, No. 3, page NA

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ Erdem, op.cit, p.600.

⁹¹ Ökmen, op.cit, p.165.

affect the wider region including Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Czechia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Macedonia, Moldavia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland and Yugoslavia.

The War's Environmental Effects on Ukraine and the Black Sea

Ukraine has faced serious environmental problems that threaten its ecosystems, ecological balance. These problems will constitute risk and hence will continue to threaten the environmental security and ecological balance of not only the Black Sea but also Europe. Because Ukraine has been recognized as a green heart of Europe⁹² as it “has the vast majority Europe’s biodiversity”⁹³ ; approximately 35% of Europe’s diversity⁹⁴ and “rare steppe ecosystems, coastal wetlands, alpine meadows, ancient beech forests, extensive peatlands”⁹⁵ It has 70.000 plant, bird, animal species “many of which are rare and endemic”.⁹⁶

As it was mentioned above Ukraine has been already polluted toxically by the heavy industry since the Soviet governance.⁹⁷ Even before the Russian-Ukrainian War, the environmental situation has been “very difficult to manage”.⁹⁸ The war further augmented already existing problems like causing contamination in the Black Sea. The situation got worse by Russian attacks because of contamination of air, water, soil and sea, that will disaffect water sources and freshwater ecosystem in the short and long terms.⁹⁹ The ecosystems are under threat of emissions of harmful substances. Loss of biodiversity is very imminent. Marine life is seriously threatened. The Black Sea and Azov Seas are seriously disaffected by the war as it brings “unprecedented and long-lasting challenges”¹⁰⁰ and risks. By June 2023, seawater salinity decreased in the Black Sea.¹⁰¹ To the Ukrainian officials, the Black Sea becomes “a garbage dump and animal cemetery”.¹⁰²

Understandably, the Russian Federation has been blamed for mass destruction of the Ukrainian environment.¹⁰³ Nearly 2,4 million hectares of forests under the Russian occupation and they “have been extensively cleared and require restoration”.¹⁰⁴ Ukraine’s 44% of the ecologically most valuable territories have become battlefields.¹⁰⁵ So the war has widely affected not only

⁹² Tirino, op.cit, p.3.

⁹³ Algan and Karalezli Aydoğan, op.cit, p.49.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.56

⁹⁵ Hryhorczuk, Levy, Prodanchuk, Kravchuk, Bubalo, Hryhorczuk and Erickson, op.cit, p.6

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ Tirino, op.cit, p.4.

⁹⁸ Zonn, Fashchuk and Ryabinin, op.cit, p.408.

⁹⁹ Tirino, op.cit, p.4.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p.2.

¹⁰¹ Shanini, Shebanina, Kormyshkin, Drobitko and Chernyavskaya, op.cit, p.468.

¹⁰² Joubert, op.cit, p. 111.

¹⁰³ Mammadov, Luhovyi, Starodubets, Kalynychenko and Trybat, op.cit, p. 446.

¹⁰⁴ Joubert, op.cit, p. 110

¹⁰⁵ Mammadov, Luhovyi, Starodubets, Kalynychenko and Trybat, op.cit, p.446.

Ukraine but also the Black Sea region. The War primarily resulted in increase of pollution of groundwater, soil and air. Such kind of pollution was caused by “artillery shelling and fires of industrial plants and heaps”.¹⁰⁶ The clashes entailing artillery shelling, were also resulted in landscape destruction, forest and field fires. The clashes also led to malfunction of mines “where saline water was no longer pumped out and began to seep into the soil and surface waters”.¹⁰⁷

Damage given to the Ukrainian environment can be indicated with figures. Certain cases are numbered by the Ukrainian officials as follows: Dnipropetrovsk (330 cases), Mykolaiv (247), Kharkiv (189), Zaporizhzhya (100), Sumy (99), Donetsk (84), Luhansk (57), Kyiv (40), Odesa (76), Kherson (59), Chernihiv (27), Khmelnytsky (20), Zhytomyr (17), Poltava (12), Lviv (11), Vinnytsia (10), Cherkasy (10), and other.¹⁰⁸

As a country with particular importance in different habitats, ecosystems Ukraine has 5622 protected areas. However due to the War, at least 900 of them have been damaged. Ukraine's Ministry of Environmental Protection acclaims that nearly 160 protected areas are under threat.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, all marine nature reserves, seven coastal national nature parks, one biosphere reserve have been under the Russian occupation that undermines safety and security of the Black Sea and the Azov Sea.¹¹⁰ Several examples can be given through highlighting negative effects of infrastructure construction, extraction of building materials, conducting of military exercises, changes in the protected areas' status.¹¹¹ For instance by building the bridge in the Crimean Peninsula in 2018, the Russian Federation gave harm to natural habitat and ecosystems as region's unique ecosystems were destructed and the migration routes of fish and cetaceans in the Kerch Strait were cut off.¹¹² Moreover the Opuksky Nature Reserve can also be given as an example as “it was transformed into a Russian military training ground, destroying formerly protected marine, coastal, and virgin steppe land ecosystems”.¹¹³ Furthermore indirect effect of the warfare can also be seen in these protected areas as military action causes pollution, fire incidents.

As mentioned before, the Russian invasion further complicates existing environmental issues of Ukraine like in Donbass region.¹¹⁴ Towns and cities are completely damaged. The industrial plants like Iron and Steel Works in

¹⁰⁶ Ber, op.cit, p.2

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ Ihor Kozak, “Crime of Ecocide in Ukraine - Environmental Consequences of Russian Military Aggression”, p.107

¹⁰⁹ Mammadov, Luhovyi, Starodubets, Kalynychenko and Trybat, op.cit, p. 448

¹¹⁰ Tirino, op.cit, p.3.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ Ber, op.cit, p.1

Mariupol, Avdiivka Coke and Chemical Plant became targets for the Russian attacks and in fact they have been battle ground where actual fighting took place.¹¹⁵ Due to the warfare, huge amount of fields are transformed into wastelands with contaminated soil and groundwater.¹¹⁶ Destruction of villages and cities further worsened already the existing situations as the attacks resulted in huge amounts of garbage and construction waste. Donetsk and Luhansk constitute areas of reserve. In addition to the environmental losses in these areas, a considerable amount of damage was given to the Stanytsia-Luhanska Reserve and the Triokhizbensky Steppe Reserve, “which had been established to protect fragments of floodplains and riparian forests on the Donets River and the sandy steppe”.¹¹⁷

One of the most important example of the War's tremendous effect on the Ukrainian environment is Russia's destruction of Nova Kakhovka Dam in June 2023. The dam's destruction is recognized as the largest ecologic disaster in Europe as it resulted in “extensive flooding along the lower Dnipro and contamination of waters of this river and the Black Sea”.¹¹⁸ Henceforth it will also lead to catastrophic and irreversible environmental consequences in the long-run. Ostap Semerak, the former Ukrainian Minister of Ecology, recognized the situation as the most severe ecological catastrophe since Chernobyl disaster.¹¹⁹ According to the Ukrainian resources, at least 5000 km² wildlife area was seriously disaffected.¹²⁰ As a result of flooding, natural ecosystems were destroyed. To put it in another words, biodiversity and habitats for numerous species of plants and animals were destroyed.¹²¹ By explosion, 19.9 billion cubic meters of water released and flooded 77 settlements, more than 100,000 hectares (247,000 acres) of agricultural lands, nature parks, and forests.¹²² The explosion and destruction of the Dam “has been a major ecological and humanitarian disaster”.¹²³ Due to the collapse of the Dam, thousands of fish and nearly 20.000 animals were killed. The flooding of nature parks and preserves also destroy flora and fauna that have been rare in content.

Destruction and collapse of the Nova Kakhovka Dam gives damage to the ecological balance in the Black Sea that further result in environmental problems. The collapse of the Dam “on the Dnipro River on June 6, 2023 caused massive flooding downstream, which carried organic wastes, hundreds of tons of oil, landmines, and unexploded ordnance into the Dnipro River Delta and the Black Sea”.¹²⁴

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*, p.4.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid*, p.1

¹¹⁹ Joubert, op.cit, p. 111

¹²⁰ Shanini, Shebanina, Kormyshkin, Drobitko and Chernyavskaya, p.466

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² Hryhorczuk, Levy, Prodanchuk, Kravchuk, Bubalo, Hryhorczuk and. Erickson, op.cit, p.7

¹²³ *Ibid*, p.8

¹²⁴ *Ibid*, p.5

For instance, the Sviatoslav's White Coast National Nature Park, the Kinburn Spit Regional Landscape Park and the Yagorlytska Bay wetlands included into two sections of the Black Sea Biosphere Reserve were damaged.¹²⁵ Also flood resulted in spread of rubbish and silt into the Black Sea.¹²⁶ Highly contaminated and polluted water containing sewage, chemicals and mines "spread across the northern Black Sea and reached cities of Odesa and Chornomorsk, both on the eastern Black Sea coast".¹²⁷ Because of the flood, vast volumes of fertilizers, fuel, lubricants and sewage were released. These pollutants reached the Danube by passing the Dnipro River and entered the Black Sea. The contaminants affected over 7.300 kilometers square of the Black Sea area.¹²⁸

The reservoir area was destructed due to decomposition of large numbers of dead animals.¹²⁹ Uncontrolled water was released from the reservoir "covering an area over of 2.100 km² and the flooding of the lower Dnipro Valley".¹³⁰ The flood that contaminated the Dnipro River, also contaminated "the Black Sea with fragments of buildings, human waste (there were thousands of holiday plots without sewage systems on the islands on the Dnipro), fuel and artificial fertilizers and other chemicals stored in warehouse".¹³¹ Farms, infrastructure and land were destroyed. "Pesticides, chemicals, oil, sewage, deceased animals, and fish, along with debris from cemeteries" were carried.¹³² Contaminated anthrax including other toxic materials from at least two animal burial sites can be recognized as another threat, risk for Ukraine.¹³³ 150,000 tonnes of oil from the Dam also polluted water resources. Nearly "300 tonnes of lubricants remain within the facility, potentially causing severe harm to the Black Sea's flora and fauna".¹³⁴ Over 150 tons of machine oil, large amounts of organic wastes and unknown number of landmines carried by flood polluted the Danube River. "Many of pollutants, wastes, and landmines were carried downriver into the Black Sea."¹³⁵ So, it is estimated that by the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam, water flowed into the Black Sea may contain significant amounts of heavy metals.¹³⁶ Because of the enclosed character of the Black Sea seawater is renewed very slowly. Henceforth, "accumulating heavy metals threaten to reduce the populations of certain species of animals and algae that exist in the Black Sea, and contaminate the food chain".¹³⁷

Moreover it is acclaimed that destruction of the Nova Kakhovka Dam

¹²⁵ Shanini, Shebanina, Kormyshkin, Drobitko and Chernyavskaya, op.cit, p.466

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.468.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ Tirino, op.cit, p.4.

¹²⁹ Ber, op.cit, p.5.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² Joubert, op.cit, p.111

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ Hryhorczuk, Levy, Prodanchuk, Kravchuk, Bubalo, Hryhorczuk and Erickson, op.cit, p.8

¹³⁶ Shanini, Shebanina, Kormyshkin, Drobitko and Chernyavskaya, op.cit, p.470.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

could disaffect measures taken in mitigation and fight against climate crisis in Ukraine, in the region and beyond. Firstly, flooding of large areas could result in release of important amount of carbon dioxide. Secondly water released by the Dam explosion "washed away topsoil but spread pollutants such as heavy metals, overall reducing the ability of ecosystems to absorb and retain carbon".¹³⁸ Furthermore destruction of the dam threatens the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant due to the fact that the Dam was "the primary source for its supply of cooling water".¹³⁹

Illich Iron and Steel Works and Azovstal in Mariupol, the Avdiivka Coke and Chemical Plant and the Azot chemical plant in Sievierodonetsk have to be mentioned separately. Because they have been worst polluters of Ukraine¹⁴⁰ and more importantly in these areas actual fighting has been took place. For example, artillery fire caused soil degradation. Moreover "formation of craters, the construction of field fortifications, the use of heavy armored equipment and the penetration of harmful substances into the ground" caused soil degradation.¹⁴¹ The contamination of soil was also caused by decomposing of dead bodies of humans and animals. Also garbage of soldiers were another reason for the contamination problem.¹⁴²

Air pollution is increased in Ukraine as a result of bombing, destruction of fuel storage facilities, attacks on industrial facilities, movement of military equipment, building destruction and wildfires.¹⁴³ Water is polluted directly and indirectly by the warfare. Freshwater resources are polluted chemically directly by military operations through "dumping of ammunition and war equipment, decomposition of ammunition, and release and leaching of explosive residues".¹⁴⁴ The military activities also indirectly disaffect environment through giving damage to industrial facilities. Rivers such as lower Dnipro, Donets and its tributaries are disaffected by warfare mainly because of pollution. The Donets River can be given as example for the 2022 hostilities' damage to the environment. Hundred tanks and armored vehicles were destroyed. Furthermore some of these tanks and vehicles "remained in the river along with human corpses, ammunition, fuel and batteries"¹⁴⁵ that resulted in pollution of water. Chemical contamination is one of the consequences of the war. Usage of munitions, chemical spills caused by damage to industrial facilities and waste sites, oils' and lubricants' leaks and spills cause chemical contamination.¹⁴⁶ Soil contamination is another environmental problem

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.468.

¹³⁹ Tirino, op.cit, p.4.

¹⁴⁰ Ber, op.cit, p.3.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ Hryhorczuk, Prodanchuk, Kravchuk, Bubalo, Hryhorczuk and B. Erickson, op.cit, p.3

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p.4

¹⁴⁵ Ber, op.cit, p.3.

¹⁴⁶ Hryhorczuk, Levy, Prodanchuk, Kravchuk, Bubalo, Hryhorczuk and Erickson, op.cit, p.6

caused by the war. Physical disturbance from the “excavation of tunnels and trenches, compaction by large-scale movements of troops with machinery, and cratering by explosives”¹⁴⁷ are resulted in soil contamination. Landmines and unexploded ordnance also cause soil contamination. April 2023 figures indicate that nearly 174.000 square kilometers were contaminated with landmines and nearly one third of the Ukrainian soil was culminated by unexploded ordnance including “artillery shells, grenades, mortar shells, cluster munitions, rockets, missiles, and improvised explosive devices”.¹⁴⁸ Deep and wide craters are created by bombs, mines and shells that resulted in destruction of the fertile topsoil and inhabitants.¹⁴⁹

Landscape and habitat distribution is another devastating consequences of the war. Warfare also disaffects Ukraine’s protected areas such as national parks and natural preserves. 10 national parks, 8 reserves, 2 biosphere reserves have been under the control of Russia.¹⁵⁰ Landscape destruction, shelling, wildfires, deforestation, pollution lead to destruction of these protected areas. These natural regions are also contaminated with destroyed military equipment and other remnants of war. Thus, structure and function of terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems have been disaffected by these military activities.¹⁵¹ Nearly 20% protected natural areas are devastated by the war.¹⁵² And approximately 44 % of Ukraine’s most important natural areas are affected by the war.¹⁵³ Nearly 600 animal species and 750 plant species are under threat of extinction.¹⁵⁴ Steppe eagle, black stork, brown bear, Eurasian lynx, and barn owl, due to military activities in their locations, habitats are on the verge of extinction.¹⁵⁵

Ukraine has four nuclear plants and some of the nuclear power plants are located in the regions of armed conflict. It was reported that Chernobyl, Zaporizhzhia and Southern Ukraine nuclear power zones have been affected by war.¹⁵⁶ In the Chernobyl exclusion zone gamma radiation is 9.56uSv7hour which is higher than standards. Heavy military equipment movement, bombardment and fires disturbed the cesium-contaminated topsoil.¹⁵⁷

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant also continues to threaten environment of both Ukraine and Europe including Türkiye. It was seized by Russian military forces and has been under Russian occupation. The Plant

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ Mammadov, Luhovyi, Starodubets, Kalynychenko and Trybat, op.cit, p. 447.

¹⁵⁰ Valentina Romano, “Understanding the Environmental Cost of Ukraine War”, Euractive, pp.1-7, p.2.

¹⁵¹ Hryhorczuk, Levy, Prodanchuk, Kravchuk, Bubalo, Hryhorczuk and Erickson, op.cit, p.6

¹⁵² Romano, op.cit, p.2.

¹⁵³ Algan and Karalezli Aydoğan, op.cit, p.56

¹⁵⁴ Joubert, op.cit, p. 110

¹⁵⁵ Hryhorczuk, Levy, Prodanchuk, Kravchuk, Bubalo, Hryhorczuk and Erickson, op.cit, p.6

¹⁵⁶ Algan and Karalezli Aydoğan, op.cit, p.55

¹⁵⁷ Mammadov, Luhovyi, Starodubets, Kalynychenko and Trybat, op.cit, p. 448

has been under sporadic shelling. Moreover, its external electrical power has been destructed in a periodical manner. It has been under threat of disruption to its water supply.¹⁵⁸ There has been potential release of radiation from the Plant as well.

The areas under the Black Sea Biosphere Reserve (UNESCO Biosphere Reserve) were also damaged by the clashes as they were located in the battlefield. It was “seriously degraded and highly polluted”.¹⁵⁹ The Reserve has been an important environmental source as it contains “largest fragments of natural sagebrush steppe and salt marshes in Ukraine in the Yavorlyk Kut peninsula”.¹⁶⁰ The Russian forces with their military equipment and activities transformed Dzharylhach Island, that is “one of the last fragments of wild sandy beaches on the Black Sea, into a military training ground and covered with sand the strait connecting the Dzharylhach Bay with open waters”.¹⁶¹ Damages to Kinburn Split of the Black Sea Biosphere Reserve represents damage given to the Black Sea. To Kozak, Russia consciously gives long-term damages to fauna and flora of the region through its military activities like movement of wheeled transport, fires of forest caused by military activities and shelling.¹⁶² It has to be highlighted that the Split was rich in biodiversity with including species mentioned in the Ukrainian Red Book. The coastal areas and the mouth Dniro River that have been important for waterfowl are seriously damaged by the warfare. Shelling and wildfires resulted in destruction of “pine forests, dry grasslands, salt marshes, and wetlands in the Kinburn Peninsula”.¹⁶³

The Black Sea is not immune from landmines and unexploded ordnance risk as it is estimated that Russia planted approximately 400 to 600 explosive mines along Ukraine’s Black Sea coast line.¹⁶⁴ Mines threaten the ecological balance and ecosystem of the Black Sea. As they contain explosives and heavy metals, they constitute a source of danger, risk to the environment. The mines threaten marine life.

Submarines’ usage of sonar threatens safety of animals. Sonar disaffects animals’ echolocation abilities which are crucial for their navigation and communication.¹⁶⁵ Henceforth they become vulnerable to outside effects.

Black Sea has also been polluted by submerged military equipment through releasing chemical compounds, rocket fuel residues and heavy metals

¹⁵⁸ Hryhorczuk, Levy, Prodanchuk, Kravchuk, Bubalo, Hryhorczuk and Erickson, op.cit, p.7

¹⁵⁹ Kozak, op.cit, p. 110

¹⁶⁰ Ber, op.cit, p.5.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² Kozak, op.cit, p. 111.

¹⁶³ Ber, op.cit, p.4.

¹⁶⁴ Lord Mark Lancaster, Troubled Waters - How Russia’s War in Ukraine Changes Black Sea Security?, 020 DSCFC 23 E – Original: English – 2 May 2023, p.9

¹⁶⁵ Tirino, op.cit, p.5.

into the water. According to the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources of Ukraine, the seabed of the Black Sea is “littered with 607.114 tons of military waste from destroyed tanks, combat vehicles and missiles”.¹⁶⁶

Ukrainian War's one of the most serious consequences is the pollution of the Black Sea and Azov Sea¹⁶⁷. Marine pollution is caused by warfare and emissions of toxic substances. Water resources are seriously vulnerable and are disaffected severely by military activities, warfare. For instance Ukraine's major ports like Odesa in the Black Sea are attacked by Russia. These attacks on the coastline of the Black Sea “have caused oil spills and other incidents of water pollution”.¹⁶⁸

Algan and Aydoğın highlight the fact that crucial water resources flowing into the Black Sea are situated within the borders of Ukraine which “raises concerns about the environmental impacts of the conflicts in this region”.¹⁶⁹ Ukraine's economic activities' dependence on heavy chemical industry and weight of nuclear energy increase potential threat concerning environmental impacts of the War for not only Ukraine but also for the region. The War may result in *envirocide* in regional and global domain in the medium and long run.¹⁷⁰

As it was mentioned before there have been chemical facilities in the cities at the coast of the Black Sea. Henceforth any possible attack on these grounds can lead to pollution “as a result of damage to the production facilities and infrastructures during the war, by chemical mixing with the surface and ground waters as well as polluting the Black Sea”.¹⁷¹ For instance, attacks near the Dnieper and Donets River flowing to the Black Sea resulted in environmental problems like releasing of nitric acid, liquid ammonia, burning of fuel that can lead to “pollution of the Black Sea by the atmosphere and hinder the fight against the climate change”.¹⁷²

The War disaffects several activities regarding the Black Sea like fishing due to abandoned sea mines and destruction of some maritime industrial vessels.¹⁷³ War deteriorated marine complexes because of infrastructure construction, “extraction of building materials, conducting military exercises, changes in the status of protected natural areas”.¹⁷⁴ Especially occupation areas of Crimea and the Above Coast in the Donetsk and Donbas regions led to deterioration of the marine ecosystems.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p.4.

¹⁶⁷ Shanini, Shebanina, Kormyshkin, Drobitko and Chernyavskaya, op.cit, p.466.

¹⁶⁸ Hryhorczuk, Levy, Prodanchuk, Kravchuk, Bubalo, Hryhorczuk and Erickson, op.cit, p.4

¹⁶⁹ Algan and Karalezli Aydoğın, op.cit, p. 49.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid*, p.53

¹⁷² *Ibid*, p.53-54.

¹⁷³ *Ibid*, p.57

¹⁷⁴ Tirino, op.cit, p.2.

Oil products' waste and fuel spread by naval operation in the Black Sea gave harm to the Black Sea environment. These contaminants and wastes resulted in surface film which prohibited light's penetration; exchange of heat, oxygen and moisture.

In terms of devastating impacts of the War in the sea; “chemical pollution, loud noise, physical damage to habitats from shelling and fortifications, and curtailment of conservation activities” can be given as examples.¹⁷⁵ Warfare techniques such as navies' usage of sonar system to detect underwater vessels have detrimental effects on dolphins in the Black Sea. Hundreds of dolphins were found dead in the shores of the Black Sea due to harmful effects of sonar, phosphorus incendiaries causing burns on their bodies.¹⁷⁶ Between February and March 2022, it was estimated that “a distressing 5,000 dolphins perished in the Black Sea”.¹⁷⁷ Noise pollution was estimated of one the reasons for dolphin mortality.

III. Türkiye, Black Sea and the Environment

Türkiye and the Black Sea Region

Türkiye has been one of the important, major and powerful actors of the Black Sea region. For instance, she is recognized as the most prominent member of the NATO in the region.¹⁷⁸ To Weaver, Türkiye “could be called the fourth pole in the region after Russia, the US and the EU”¹⁷⁹ because she was quite influential and had role in establishing regional cooperation especially through institutions like BSEC and the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group.¹⁸⁰ Türkiye, to Weaver, is “the guardian of access to the sea itself”.¹⁸¹

The Black Sea politics has been influential in Türkiye's recognition as one of the major powers in the region. However, Türkiye's dependence on the Sea in terms of economy, tourism, politics have been under threat, risk especially because the Black Sea's environmental degradation which augmented by the Russian-Ukrainian War.

To put it in another words, before the Russian-Ukrainian War, Türkiye has already faced the environmental problems of the Black Sea like pollution and decrease in biological diversity. For instance, Türkiye's amount of commercial fish catches in one year dropped from 295 000 tons in 1989 to 66000 tons in 1990.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁵ Hryhorczuk, Levy, Prodanchuk, Kravchuk, Bubalo, Hryhorczuk and Erickson, op.cit, p.4

¹⁷⁶ Romano, op.cit, p.2.

¹⁷⁷ Joubert, op.cit, p. 110

¹⁷⁸ Weaver, op.cit, p. 3

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid*.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid*, p.32

¹⁸¹ *Ibid*, p. 120

¹⁸² Zonn, Fashchuk, and Ryabinin, op.cit, p.420.

Domestic waste and contaminants from agriculture have been one the major drivers of the pollution on the Black Sea's Turkish coast. Industrial complexes and urbanization pollute rivers flowing to the Black Sea. Moreover the coastal areas of the Black Sea region have problems regarding deforestation. In addition to domestic and industrial waste, oil waste coming from high sea pollute the Black Sea.¹⁸³

Environmental degradation of the Black Sea has not been limited with the Basin itself. The Sea of Marmara is polluted by the Black Sea's contaminants flowing from Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and Russia.

Türkiye and the International Cooperation in the Black Sea

Türkiye's historical role in establishing cooperative relations in the region indicates the fact that Ankara has been keen on cooperation. Several environmental problems such as droughts, decrease in water resources, decline in biodiversity and "*transit passage of oil tankers through the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits*"¹⁸⁴ in a way result in Türkiye's more embracement of access and use of environmentally friendly policies.

With the end of the Cold War, Türkiye generated an initiative to boost cooperation, integration and harmony among the Black Sea's states. Ankara aimed to maintain and sustain peace, stability and good neighborhood policies.¹⁸⁵ It was estimated that through the notion of economic cooperation, the Black Sea would be immune from potential conflicts.¹⁸⁶

However by the Russian-Ukrainian War of 2014 and its negative impacts on the stability, environmental security, need of regional cooperation in the Black Sea becomes more urgent. For instance, as it was mentioned before, Ukraine has implanted approximately 450 mines in Odesa and near cities for defence. Türkiye "*detonated all the mines they have found before they reach the Marmara Sea and the Aegean Sea*".¹⁸⁷ Moreover mines also pollute the environment and gives damage to biodiversity, ecosystems.

As a basin that has faced enormous amount of environmental problems, the Black Sea needs and requires environmental protection regime. There have been certain attempts and already existing institutions to maintain and sustain international cooperation. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation can be given as an example. The BSEC is the "*most organized and largest regional*

¹⁸³ Ökmen, op.cit, p.174

¹⁸⁴ Çiğdem Üstün, "Turkey Between Environmental Protection and Energy Security", Insight Turkey, vol. 14, No. 2, 2012, pp.177-192, p. 177.

¹⁸⁵ Davut Han Aslan and Muhammadqosim Sharapov, "Turkey and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)", ZNUV, 34, 2014, pp. 126-136, p.126

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid*, p.127

¹⁸⁷ Algan and Karalezli Aydoğan, op.cit, p.57

organization" in the Black Sea Basin.¹⁸⁸ It was established in 1992 in Istanbul by the summit declaration on the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. The founding members of the organization are Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Georgia, Moldova, Romania and Türkiye.

The fundamental aim of the BSEC is prompting democracy through economic cooperation. Through foundation of the BSEC, regional security was aimed to be established.

Environment has also been among cooperative domains of the BSEC. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation has separate section on protecting the Black Sea environment. A special working group was established to take related measures, to implement projects to protect environment.

The Member States' agenda on cooperation and discussion includes several topics like preservation of the Black Sea and its marine environment; conservation, protection, improvement, recovery and rational use of environment and natural resources; elimination of single use plastic; minimization of the negative impacts on the environment and exclusion of the overexploitation and illegal use of natural resources; green, resilient and low carbon growth; air quality legislation; waste management strategies; increase of protected areas; and the new updated National Determined Contributions for mitigating the climate change effects.¹⁸⁹

The main environmental policies, main drivers of the BSEC can be found in the Bucharest Convention, Odessa Declaration, and Strategic Action Plan for the Protection and Rehabilitation of the Black Sea.¹⁹⁰ Also Black Sea Environment Programme established by the Black Sea Strategic Action Plan (1996) is another main driver of the Black Sea's environmental protection.¹⁹¹ Later, the Black Sea Action Plan was adopted including related protocols and final declaration.

Convention on the protection of the Black Sea against Pollution (Bucharest Convention, 1992) has to be mentioned due to the fact that it "*is a pioneering initiative sets a sound basis for protection of the Black Sea against pollution by means of international cooperation*".¹⁹² The Convention's main drivers were the Black Sea's chemical pollution and "*severe eutrophication of the northwestern shelf*".¹⁹³ The application and implementation of the Bucharest Convention

¹⁸⁸ Selçuk Çolakoglu, "Security Structure of the Black Sea Region in the Context of New Challenges", Insight Turkey, Vol. 9, No. 1, p.144-154, p.144

¹⁸⁹ Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Official Website, <https://www.bsec-organization.org/areas-of-cooperation/environmental-protection>

¹⁹⁰ Ökmen, op.cit, p.182.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid*, p.188

¹⁹² Köse, Taner and Erkan, op.cit, p. 106.

¹⁹³ Tim O'Higgins, Andrew Farmer, Georgi Daskalov, Stale Knudsen and Laurence Mee, "Achieving

has been under the responsibility of the Black Sea Commission. The Bucharest Convention, specifies major and fundamental directions of protection the environment in the Black Sea region. It was prepared under auspices of the UN Environmental Programme. It was signed by Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Türkiye and Ukraine. Three protocols were also accepted as a framework of the Convention: Protocol on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution Caused by Land based resources, Protocol on the Cooperation in Emergency against Pollution of the Black Sea by oil and other harmful substances, Protocol on the Prevention of the Black Sea pollution by Damping. With the Bucharest Convention, the regional states of the Black Sea commenced to discuss and elaborate the goal and need of economic development “without degrading the environment by focusing on the sustainable development”.¹⁹⁴ However Üstün acclaims that the Black Sea’s states’ desire to prosper and develop in economic terms lead to ignore environmental issues and problems of the Black Sea.¹⁹⁵

Strategic Action Plan For the Environmental Protection and Rehabilitation of the Black Sea were signed in 1996 as a result of destruction of the sea’s unique natural habitat by human activity.¹⁹⁶ It has been one of the plans that includes regional, national and international plans, programs and projects. It encompasses measures related with emergency problems of the Black Sea basin. It is envisaged to make cooperation under headings of decreasing pollution, governance of vital resources in terms of fishing and maintaining biodiversity, sustainable societal development of the coastal region.¹⁹⁷

Odessa Declaration of 1993 has to be highlighted as well. It was developed by framework of the Bucharest Convention. It was signed by foreign ministers of 6 coastal states. It includes articles under certain headings like Hazardous Substances, Pollution Caused by the Ships, Natural Resources, Evaluation of the Environmental Impact.¹⁹⁸ Odessa Declaration aims to specify general politics, rules and regulations to use and protect the resources of the Black Sea. In fact the Declaration, develops the concepts mentioned in the Bucharest Convention.¹⁹⁹ For this reason, the Black Sea Environment Programme was established to realize related articles for 1993-96 term. The Programme prepared related mechanisms to monitor implementation of the Bucharest Convention.

Good Environmental Status in the Black Sea: Scale Mismatches in Environmental Management”, Ecology and Society , Sep 2014, Vol. 19, No. 3, page NA

¹⁹⁴ Üstün, op.cit, p. 179.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ Tirino, op.cit, p.3.

¹⁹⁷ Erdem, op.cit, p.611.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.610

¹⁹⁹ Ökmen, op.cit, p.179.

BSEC’s related mechanisms, goals, principles and activities on the environmental protection can be found in the “BSEC Economic Agenda: Towards an Enhanced BSEC Partnership” of 2012. The Agenda’s goal number 5 is named as “Environmental Protection and Conservation”. The main mechanism in protecting environment is BSEC Working Group on Environmental Protection. It is mentioned in the official website of the BSEC that the Working Group meets every second year or whenever it might find it necessary. However although the official text represent the will and desire to cooperate, in reality or in practice the amount/degree of cooperation is quite low. The BSEC Ministers responsible of the environmental affairs met only three times: 2006, 2011, 2012.²⁰⁰

The BSEC aimed cooperation in the fight against the climate crisis. BSEC Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for the Black Sea was adopted by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 15 December 2017. BSEC Economic Agenda includes several strategies concerning mitigation and adaptation measures.

The BSEC has Working Group on Cooperation in Environmental Protection. One of the goals of the Working Group is to collect, share related information on related issues especially related projects of the member states.²⁰¹

To Noyan and Güney, success of the BSEC mainly depends on “concreteness and effective implementation of common projects”.²⁰² And to Noyan and Güney, the BSEC is recognized as an active organization on environmental cooperation.

There have been of cooperation examples in the Black Sea Region including Türkiye. Multinational conventions like the UN Environment Programme’s Program for Environmental Management and Protection of the Black Sea dated 1982, Mediterranean Action Plan - The Genoa Declaration dated 1985 can be given as examples. In terms of international cooperation and indication of Türkiye’s desire and goal to cooperate Bucharest Convention for the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution of 21 June 1992 has a crucial place. Moreover Strategic Action Plan for the Environmental Protection and Rehabilitation of the Black Sea can also be added.

There has been certain attempts for recovery of the Black Sea. One of the Agenda 21’s most important decision Regional Environmental Programme

²⁰⁰ Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Official Website

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

²⁰² Sumru Noyan and Meltem Güney, “Two decades of cooperation in the Black Sea Region: the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and its future”, J. Black Sea/Mediterranean Environment, Vol. 18, No.2, 2012, pp.102-113, p.104

can be given as an example.²⁰³

The Organization includes all countries from the wider Black Sea region. In fact it is the sole organization that includes all six littoral states.²⁰⁴ Inter-governmental meetings and parliamentary meetings have been common devices and tools used in cooperative dimensions of the Organization. However the Black Sea Commission Secretariat situated in Istanbul, has not made yet any declaration on effects of war on the Black Sea environment and coastal areas.²⁰⁵

IV. Prospects for Future

Longterm Effects of the Environmental Destruction of Ukraine and the Black Sea

Unfortunately, it is too difficult to estimate the real amount of damage given to Ukraine and the Black Sea by the Russian-Ukrainian War. But environmental effects of the War will be comprehensive for Ukraine and the Black Sea. It is estimated that numerous ecosystems “*may never recover their former biodiversity*”.²⁰⁶ Because environmental security has been under threat and risk and it may be difficult “*or impossible to rehabilitate in the long term and short term*”²⁰⁷.

First of all, the Nova Kakhovka Dam's destruction will disaffect not only Ukraine but also entire region. Irrigation system's collapse will result in huge problems in irrigation of agricultural lands in the three oblasts of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk due to lack of water supply. Henceforth there has been a probability of emergence of desertification and land erosion.²⁰⁸

Worsened climate crisis caused by indirectly or directly by war, is another dimension that will seriously disaffect ecosystems of Ukraine and the Black Sea. Explosions, military vehicle movement, fires and pollution directly raise greenhouse emissions.²⁰⁹ Moreover damaged infrastructure, “*use of energy from harmful resources, the number of refugees fleeing their homes for protection, humanitarian aid and deforestation*” indirectly deepen the climate crisis.²¹⁰ Hence climate crisis will be another factor that in the both short-run and long run might compel Türkiye and other regional states to cooperate for adoption and mitigation. Türkiye comparing with the neighboring states, “*is in a relatively advantageous*

²⁰³ Ökmen, op.cit, p.172

²⁰⁴ Çolakoglu, op.cit, p.144-154

²⁰⁵ Algan and Karalezli Aydoğan, op.cit, p.64

²⁰⁶ Joubert, op.cit, p. 108

²⁰⁷ Algan and Karalezli Aydoğan, op.cit, p.50

²⁰⁸ Hryhorczuk, Levy, Prodanchuk, Kravchuk, Bubalo, Hryhorczuk and Erickson, op.cit, p.8

²⁰⁹ Algan and Karalezli Aydoğan, op.cit, p.59

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

position” in climate crisis affairs.²¹¹ Because of global warming, Türkiye has not immune to risks of climate crisis. For instance, due to global warming, migration routes of fish in Türkiye have been changed, as “*warming of sea water has led to anchovies finding refuge in the much cooler northern regions of the Black Sea*”²¹². With the Russian-Ukrainian War, climate driven environmental destruction will be accelerated. The particular negative impacts will be increase in drought frequency, floods and loss of biodiversity in the Black Sea Basin. Moreover erosion, flooding, coastal inundation and saltwater intrusion can be recognized as risks that Türkiye may face in the future regarding coastal regions' importance in high population density, in industrialization in the Black Sea region.

Areas around Bakhmut or Avdiivka were also environmentally destroyed by intense warfare. In the long-run these areas may not be suitable for any human activity because unexploded ordnance remain in the soil, and soil was highly contaminated with chemicals and metals.²¹³ The war's effects will be seen in the long-term as “*the flooding of mines in the Donbass is causing land subsidence and the salinisation of soil and surface water*”.²¹⁴

The Black Sea will further be disaffected by the war through emergence of additional dead-zones. Moreover the destruction of populations and plants, some animal species' decreased population can also be given additional effects of the war in the long run. In the case of attacking of nuclear power plants and explosion of nuclear power plants radioactive pollution in and around of the Black Sea will be emerged.²¹⁵

Reconstruction planning like restoration of ecosystems and natural resources are possible agenda items in international cooperation regarding post-war recovery of the Black Sea, renaturalisation of Ukraine, restoration of biodiversity. By the figures of February 2023, Ukraine's reconstruction will cost nearly 383 billion Euros.²¹⁶ Henceforth, international cooperation will be an urgent matter. Environment in this “new” and changed context can provide impetus for regional cooperation. “*Water conservation, public planning, awareness raising, developing partnerships, improving disaster or crisis management*” will be possible items on cooperation agenda.²¹⁷ Cooperation on environmental dimension and institutions, organizations focused on environmental concerns can facilitate political dialog and awareness of regional problems on environmental domains. On the other hand it might be used as an additional

²¹¹ Albayrakoglu, op.cit, p. 59.

²¹² *Ibid.*, p. 62-63.

²¹³ Ber, op.cit, p.4.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.6.

²¹⁵ Algan and Karalezli Aydoğan, op.cit, p.56

²¹⁶ Romano, op.cit, p.2.

²¹⁷ Pop, op.cit, p.74.

political device for further isolating Russia in the region.

The environmental problems' transboundary nature has been common concern for regional states. The neighboring and coastal states like Romania, Bulgaria and Türkiye will be disaffected from the deteriorating nature of the Black Sea as they "*economically and ecologically reliant on the Black Sea*".²¹⁸ However this situation increases the chances of regional cooperation and establishing of RSC. To put it in another words, environmental securities of the regional states are interrelated. Türkiye as indicating its importance in regional politics can be effective of the Black Sea's regionalization and establishment of RSC. International organizations like BSEC can perceive environmental concerns as priority. The Commission on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution can be given as an example.

Ecocide and Ukraine's Related Activities

Ukraine and certain Western NGOs acclaimed the fact that Russia, by its military attacks and related activities committed ecocide, war crimes concerning environmental degradation in Ukraine. War crime according to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) includes environmental damage. Rome Statute's Article 8 (2)(b)(iv) stipulates that an intentional attack to natural environment by being aware of the fact that it would cause severe, widespread and long term damage to environment constitute war crime. Because this kind of attack would be excessive comparing to military advantage anticipated.²¹⁹ Moreover Articles 35 and 55 of Protocol I of Geneva Conventions prevent deliberate and unintentionally widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment. Article 56 of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention, recognizes destruction of dams as a weapons of mass destruction and war crime.

It has to be underlined that ecocide was recognized as a crime in 2001 by Ukraine. However it has to be mentioned that ecocide has not been accepted as an international crime by the ICC. The ecocide's process of recognition as a international crime besides genocide, war crime, crimes against humanity, aggression has continuing albeit slowly. The UN and related international legal mechanisms do not have widely accepted definition of the term. However, there have been attempts to define the term. Furthermore, Russia's crimes against the environment galvanized momentum regarding definition and recognition of ecocide.

Moreover, Ukraine takes some legal steps regarding Russia's destruction of environment. For instance by the end of 2022, the Office of the Prosecutor General "*conducted procedural management in more than 190 criminal*

²¹⁸ Joubert, op.cit, p. 111.

²¹⁹ Rome Statute.

proceedings regarding crimes against environment".²²⁰

Ukraine has made preparations regarding Russia's paying of reparations for the crimes including environmental damage. For example, in July 2022, website called EcoZagroza was launched by the Ministry of the Environmental and Natural Resources to record Russia's environmental crimes. According to the figures given by EcoZagroza, during the summer of 2023, Russian invasion and military activities caused approximately euro 52.4 billion environmental damage including air pollution, waste pollution, water and soil pollution.²²¹ According to the figures of Ukraine's Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources dated 30 June 2023, war's damage to the environment amounted to 56.4 billion US dollars.²²²

Conclusion

Irreversible and significant environmental harm have been one of the effects and outcomes of the Russian-Ukrainian War on Ukraine, on the Black Sea and its ecosystems. Henceforth as one of the coastal states of the Basin, Türkiye has been under comprehensive risk including environmental destruction, damage and problems. The Black Sea so do Türkiye has already felt environmental problems however by the War the scale and severity of problems have increased.

The War's prominent environmental risks on Türkiye will be increase in pollution; further degradation of water, air and soil quality; further loss of biodiversity, rise of climate crisis' effects. Moreover there has been potential threats on human life and environment both on local and regional levels because of Russia's seizure and control of the Chornobyl and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plants.

Türkiye and other littoral states of the region have been the actors with high vulnerability. Environmental problems in the region have had wider security implications with the effect of the war. Henceforth several urgent issues such as restoring biodiversity and ecosystems will be on the agenda of not only Ukraine but also the region including Türkiye.

Due to the common concerns of environmental degradations and problems, and related perceptions regarding politics and security in the region, RSC can be established in the Black Sea. International cooperation, legitimate agreements are needed in environmental realms. Actual and potential damages to the Black Sea and far more beyond, together with the ecocide momentum can increase the chances of regional cooperation to protect and rehabilitate the Black Sea. However, Russia's exclusion from this

²²⁰ Kozak, op.cit, p.109

²²¹ Tirino, Top.cit, p. 52.

²²² Hryhorczuk, Levy, Prodanchuk, Kravchuk, Bubalo, Hryhorczuk and Erickson, op.cit, p.8

possible framework. Ecocide and other war crimes related with destruction of environment can take attention of the public opinion on the Black Sea's destructed ecosystem. Hence, general awareness can be raised regarding environmental degradation, areas on cooperation.

PROBABLE ISTANBUL EARTHQUAKE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES AS A NATIONAL RISK

Ali Bilgin Varlık*

Introduction

The proven history of settlement in Istanbul dates back approximately 3 thousand years, and its history as a capital city dates back to 1600. The city has always preserved its feature of being a geopolitical, economic, and cultural centre of the regions covering the approaching lines of movement and communication between the Asian and European continents. Due to this feature, it became the capital of the empires that played a major role in the domination of the Old World and a crossroads where tribes met. Nevertheless, thanks to this award, it has become a center of attraction for the great powers dominant in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

The city, which started urban life much earlier than its contemporaries, has hosted a large density of people in every period. In every period, cosmopolitan life has diversified the human structure of the city and enriched its social, political, and economic texture. Due to the features mentioned above, Istanbul is among the most populated cities in the world. As detailed in the 'findings' section, this situation brings with it the problem of unplanned urbanization and many other issues. This structure puts a possible Istanbul earthquake in a difficult position. The measures taken against a possible Istanbul earthquake are problematic in terms of time, possibility, and effectiveness. This problematic structure needs to be defined first. After the issue's social, political, economic, and psycho-social dimensions are revealed, alternative plans should be developed.

Methodology

Although this article mainly adopts a qualitative research method, quantitative and empirical data are included to the extent required by the scope. The issue has been tried to be addressed with a multidisciplinary approach. Istanbul Province and its districts were used as the review unit. As the level of analysis, individuals, Istanbul Province and Türkiye were taken as the basis.

Open sources had to be used in the review. In this respect, the article has the problem of confirming definitive findings with weak sources. The main reason for this deficiency is that all relevant official institutions throughout

* İstanbul Arel University, İİBF, International Relations Branch, Türkiye. E-mail: bilginvarlik@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0002-5265-2321

the country have not addressed the issue with a national campaign approach to overcome this issue, which constitutes the main vulnerability of the study. The main purpose of this article is to extend this understanding to the state, academia, civil society, and the public.

The article consists of three main parts. The magnitude of the issue has been tried to be revealed under the subheading ‘Findings’. In this section: 1) The size of Istanbul, 2) The sensitivity of Istanbul to possible earthquakes and 3) The inadequacy of the measures taken are discussed respectively. In the second part (Analysis), the main causes of the problem are briefly mentioned at the individual, city, and country analysis levels. The third chapter (Discussion and Suggestions), deals with the synthesis based on these analyses. In this section, the rationality of the “selective rarefaction” thesis is proposed.

Findings

Size of Istanbul

According to TURKSTAT/TUIK (Türkiye Statistical Institute) 2021 data, Istanbul, which has a population of 15,840,900,¹ ranks fifteenth among the world’s largest megalopolises.² This number corresponds to 18.71% of the country’s population. Istanbul is the province that receives the most immigration in Turkey. This number corresponds to 18.71% of the country’s population. Istanbul is the province that receives the most immigration in Turkey. According to the 2016 report of the Directorate of Immigration Management, Istanbul ranks first in Turkey in terms of the number of registered Syrians (438,861 people).³ As of 23.11.2023, 565,082 foreigners registered in the city with a residence permit (GİB, 2023). Although there is no clear data about the number of illegal residents, it is suggested that the number of illegal residents exceeds the number of legal residents. The Mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality stated that the total number of legal and illegal residents reached 2.5 million.⁴ Again, this number does not include the number of people who migrated to Istanbul due to the earthquake that occurred on February 6, 2023, and directly affected ten eastern provinces of Turkey.

It would not be a wrong inference to accept that the current population of Istanbul is around 20 million. From this perspective, the city’s population is Romania (19.9 million), the Netherlands (17.6 million), Belgium (11.7

million), Greece (10.3 million), Czechia (10.5 million), Portugal (10.3 million), Sweden (10.6 million), Hungary (10.2 million), Belarus (9.5 million), Austria (9 million), Switzerland (8.9 million), Serbia (7.2 million), Bulgaria (6.7 million), Denmark 5.9 million, Finland (5.6 million), Slovakia (5.8 million), Norway (5.5 million), Ireland (5.1 million), Croatia (4 million), Bosnia and Herzegovina (3.2 million), Moldova (3.4 million), Albania (2.8 million), Lithuania (2.7 million), North Macedonia (2.1 million), Slovenia (2.1 million), Latvia (1.8 million), Estonia (1.3 million), Montenegro (0.6 million), Malta (0.5 million), Iceland (0.4 million) – more than thirty European states.⁵

Constituting 31% of Turkey’s economy as of 2019, Istanbul leaves many countries in the world behind with its economic size.⁶ Despite the economic recession in 2021, the city meets 54.4% of Turkey’s GDP (Gross Domestic Product).⁷ It ranks second after Kocaeli in terms of GDP per capita with 140 thousand 698 TL.⁸ Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (İTO)’s “100 of Istanbul Economy” research shows that as of 2022, Istanbul will account for 48.2 percent of Turkey’s tax revenues and 48.7 percent of its total foreign trade volume, and that foreign capital companies will It shows that 62 percent of the population is attracted to Istanbul.⁹ In this respect, Istanbul alone produces more national income than the total of 68 provinces in Türkiye.¹⁰

It is indisputable that the problems of the city, whose general characteristics have been mentioned above, are as large and complex as the size of Istanbul. The price of Istanbul’s extremely important contributions to Turkey is that it faces many economic, social, and cultural problems such as long-standing chronic internal migration, long-term migration from foreign countries and unplanned migration. Unplanned urbanization, traffic chaos, pollution in the seas, loss of agricultural lands, cultural alienation and unequal income distribution are just some of the other costs of this magnitude that must be endured. In the last twenty years, this situation has worsened incomparably with previous periods. President Erdoğan, who was the Mayor of Istanbul for a period, admitted that he “betrayed” this city.¹¹ Beyond any

⁵ Worldometer, European Countries by population (2023), <https://www.worldometers.info/population/countries-in-europe-by-population/> (Access 16.05.2024).

⁶ Pelin, Yenigün Dilek, Istanbul Economy: Istanbul Economy with Latest Data (1st Quarter 2021) [Istanbul Ekonomisi: Son Verilerle İstanbul Ekonomisi (1. Çeyrek 2021)], <https://ipa.istanbul/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/son-verilerle-i-istanbul-ekonomisi-2021-1-c-eyrek.pdf>, 2022, (Access 16.05.2024).

⁷ TURKSTAT, Gross Domestic Product by Province, 2021. <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/>, 8 December 2021 (Access 16.05.2024).

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ İTO (Istanbul Chamber of Commerce), 100 of Istanbul Economy, <https://ito.org.tr/tr/haberler/detay/itodan-istanbul-ekonomisinin-100u-arastirmasi>, 2022, (Access 16.05.2024).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Hürriyet.com.tr., Erdoğan: We betrayed this city and we are still betraying it, October 21, 2017, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/son-dakika-erdogan-biz-bu-sahre-ihanet-ettik-hala-da-ihanet-ediyor-40618271>, (Access 16.05.2024).

¹ TURKSTAT (2021). Address-Based Population Registration System Results, 2021.

² World City Populations 2023. <https://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities> (Access 16.05.2024).

³ GİB (T.R. Immigration Administration). (2016). 2016 Türkiye Migration Report, p. 77, https://www.goc.gov.tr/kurumlar/goc.gov.tr/YillikGocRaporlari/2016_yiik_goc_raporu_haziran.pdf (Access 16.05.2024).

⁴ BİA Haber Merkezi. (28 Temmuz 2022). <https://bianet.org/haber/imamoglu-istanbul-da-2-2-5-milyon-yabanci-var-goc-idaresi-hayir-1-3-milyon-265145> (Access 16.05.2024).

oppositional context, this statement is important as it is the statement of the mayor, who has the most comprehensive knowledge of the city's problems.

In addition, another important issue - which is sometimes overlooked but is brought up from time to time - is that such concentration of economic, technological, industrial, and human resources in a region creates serious vulnerabilities in terms of human, urban and military security. In this respect, in the event of threats that involve more than one action -such as war, terrorist attacks, floods or large fires that will affect the entire city- there is a danger that Turkey will face losses that it cannot easily be compensated.

In summary, every issue to be addressed on the scale of Istanbul requires evaluations on the scale of Türkiye. Based on this context, it is understood that Istanbul's problems can only be seen on a nationwide basis; It is concluded that the problem can be resolved with the joint efforts and common sense of the state, academia, civil society, and the public.

Istanbul's Vulnerability to Earthquakes

Located between earthquake zones Istanbul is one of the most vulnerable regions of Türkiye. Records show that Istanbul experienced big-scale earthquakes in 447, 542, 1296, 1509, 1719, 1766, 1894, 1912, 1935, 1963 and 1999.

Istanbul is located near the Marmara fault system, which is part of the major North Anatolian fault line that forms a transform boundary between the Eurasian and Anatolian plates. The North Anatolian fault is a horizontal slip fault produced by the lateral movement of two sides in opposite directions. The Anatolian plate, squeezed between the Arabian and Eurasian plates, slowly advances counterclockwise. The North Anatolian fault line fringes in the Marmara Sea basin, forming a complex fault system - in the north, middle and south.¹²

This system has produced at least thirty-four earthquakes of an estimated magnitude of 7.0 or higher in the last 2,000 years.¹³ According to Elizabeth Angell (2014: 510), a serious earthquake takes place every sixty years on

¹² A. A. Barka, The north Anatolian fault zone. In: *Annales Tectonicae*. pp 164–195, 1992; D. Kalafat, Ayal Traces of the North Anatolian Fault (NAF) in Marmara [Kuzey Anadolu Fayı (KAF)'nın Marmara'daki Ayak İzleri]. H. Turoğlu ve M. F. Döker (Eds.), *Istanbul's Disaster Vulnerability Symposium Proceedings [İstanbul'un Afetlerden Zarar Görebilirliği Sempozyumu Bildiriler Kitabı]* (p. 24-28). İstanbul, 2011; C. Yalıtırak, Tectonic evolution of the Marmara Sea and its surroundings, *Mar Geol*, 190, 493–529, 2002.

Murat Şahin, Cenk Yalıtırak, Fatih Bulut & Aslı Garagon, Stress change generated by the 2019 İstanbul-Silivri earthquakes along the complex structure of the North Anatolian Fault in the Marmara Sea. *Earth Planets Space*, 74 (167) (2022), <https://earth-planets-space.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40623-022-01706-2> (Access 16.05.2024).

¹³ Elizabeth Angell, A Seismic Cityscape: Earthquakes in İstanbul's History. *History of Istanbul*, Vol 1., 2015, p. 510, <https://istanbultarihi.ist/396-a-seismic-cityscape-earthquakes-in-istanbuls-history> (Access 16.05.2024).

average.¹⁴ Similarly, Murat Şahin et al. draw attention to two major earthquakes at a magnitude above 7 that have occurred in the last 500 years.¹⁵ The probability of an Istanbul earthquake on the Central Marmara fault is recorded as once every 250 years. “Considering that the last major Istanbul earthquake occurred in 1766, earthquake experts state that the risk of major earthquakes on the Middle Marmara Fault has increased” (haberturk.com, 6 March 2023).¹⁶ There are various assessments in this direction.

This ambiguity arises from projections based on different data-gathering estimations about expected mobility. Some of the predictions in this context are based on modelling fault activity, and some are based on the frequency of earthquakes in the past, as determined by paleoseismological evidence and historical records. According to the projection made in 2000, which is based on historical records and whose margin of error is essentially unpredictable, the probability of an earthquake of magnitude 7.0 or higher in Istanbul in the next 20-30 years is around 60-70%.¹⁷

Although it is possible to deepen and diversify this discussion, what will be said will not reject the predictions that an earthquake may occur in the near future. As a matter of fact, no statement has been found so far from earthquake experts and earth scientists that an earthquake will not occur in Istanbul. Current data indicate that since the Marmara earthquake will occur at a shallow depth of 15-20 km, its destructiveness will be high even though the area it covers is narrow (Sepanta & Tufan, 2021, 94).¹⁸ Earth Scientist Prof. Dr. Naci Görür pointed out that the Marmara fault is about to break and that if this rupture occurs, it will produce an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.2. If the other fault breaks together, this intensity may reach 7.5-7.6.¹⁹

Istanbul's building inventory is over middle age. According to the data prepared on a district basis by the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Earthquake and Environment Branch Directorate (Possible Earthquake Loss Estimates Booklets), there are 1 million 160 thousand buildings in Istanbul.²⁰

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Murat Şahin et al. *Earth Planets Space* 74 (167) (2022).

¹⁶ haberturk.com, Istanbul earthquake map: Which districts does the fault line pass through in Istanbul? [2023 İstanbul deprem haritası: İstanbul'da fay hattı hangi ilçelerden geçiyor?] 6 March 2023, <https://www.haberturk.com/istanbul-deprem-risk-haritasi-2023-istanbul-da-fay-hatti-hangi-ilcelerden-geciyor-istanbul-depremi-ne-zaman-olacak-3576788/4> (Access 16.05.2024).

¹⁷ Elizabeth Angell, *History of Istanbul*, Vol 1., 2015, p. 510; Murat Şahin et al. *Earth Planets Space* 74 (167) (2022).

¹⁸ Naimi Sepanta & Tarık Tufan, Examination of urban transformation works and precautions taken in response to the possible Istanbul earthquake [Olası İstanbul depremi ile yapılan kentsel dönüşüm çalışmaları ve alınan önlemlerin irdelenmesi], *Aurum Mühendislik Sistemleri ve Mimarlık Dergisi*, (2021) 5 (1), 89-101. <https://www.idealonline.com.tr/IdealOnline/pdfViewer/index.xhtml?uId=139772&ioM=Paper&preview=true&isViewer=true#pagemode=bookmarks> (Access 16.05.2024).

¹⁹ haberturk.com, Istanbul earthquake map: Which districts does the fault line pass through in Istanbul?

²⁰ İBB a (Earthquake and Ground Investigation Branch Directorate) [Deprem ve Zemin İnceleme Şube

The number of buildings built before 1980 is 263665. The number of buildings constructed between 1980-2000 is 555304. The total number of buildings constructed before 2000 is 818969. This number corresponds to 71.6% of the buildings in Istanbul. At this point, it should be noted that there are different evaluations regarding the number of buildings and people that will be affected by the possible earthquake. For example, according to Polat in an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.5 or more in Istanbul, 491 thousand buildings will be damaged and the number of people living in these buildings is 6.2 million people.²¹

When we narrow down the scale of analysis a little more, it is possible to say that the regions that will be most affected by a possible Marmara earthquake are -in a very general definition- the southwestern part of the city, but also include Sultanbeyli, Maltepe, Kartal and Tuzla on the Anatolian side. On the European side of the city, the coastal areas of Fatih, Gaziosmanpaşa, Bağcılar, Bayrampaşa, Güngören, Bakırköy, Bahçelievler, Başakşehir, Zeytinburnu, Avcılar, Küçükçekmece, Esenler, Büyükçekmece and Silivri are defined as “very risky” areas (Map 2.). In summary, three districts on the Anatolian side and 15 districts on the European side are high-risk areas.

In the projection based only on the very risky districts on the European side, it is seen that the total population is close to seven million, which corresponds to approximately 44% of the population of Istanbul (Table 1). These districts are also the regions where unplanned urbanization is most intense.

Table 1. Populations of Districts on Highly Risk in Earthquake

District	Population	Ratio to Istanbul Population	District	Population	Ratio to Istanbul Population
Esenyurt	983.571	6,18%	Fatih	368.227	2,31%
Küçükçekmece	808.957	5,09%	Zeytinburnu	292.616	1,84%
Bağcılar	740.069	4,65%	Güngören	282.692	1,78%
Bahçelievler	594.350	3,74%	Büyükçekmece	277.181	1,74%
Başakşehir	514.900	3,24%	Bayrampaşa	275.314	1,73%
Gaziosmanpaşa	495.998	3,12%	Bakırköy	226.685	1,42%
Avcılar	452.132	2,84%	Silivri	217.163	1,37%
Esenler	445.421	2,80%	Total	6.975.276	43,85%

Source: İstanbul Population, 2023.²²

Müdürlüğü), Possible Earthquake Loss Estimates District Booklets [Olası Deprem Kayıp Tahminleri İlçe Kitapçıkları], 2021, <https://depremezmin.ibt.ibb.istanbul/guncelcalismalarimiz/#olasi-deprem-kayip-tahminler-le-ktapiklari>

²¹ Ali Can Polat, 491 thousand buildings will be damaged in an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.5 or above in Istanbul [İstanbul'da 7.5 ve üzeri şiddetli bir depremde 491 bin bina hasar alacak], Cumhuriyet, 20.02.2023 <https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/istanbulda-75-ve-uzeri-siddetli-bir-depremde-491-bin-bina-hasar-alacak->, (Access 16.05.2024).

²² Population of Istanbul [İstanbul Nüfusu], İlçelere Göre İstanbul Nüfusu, 2023, <https://www.nufusu.com/il/istanbul-nufusu>, (Access 16.05.2024).

Accordingly, if an earthquake of magnitude 7.5 (Mw) occurs, it is evaluated that a total of 194,344 buildings may be moderately and severely damaged, and their distribution is as follows (Table 2.):

- Districts where 10,000 or more buildings may be moderately or severely damaged: Fatih (15528), Küçükçekmece (12834), Bağcılar (10622) and Esenyurt (10242).

- Districts where buildings between 5000-9999 may be moderately and severely damaged: Silivri (9306), Büyükçekmece (8696), Bahçelievler (7954), Tuzla (7126), Avcılar (7039), Pendik (6940), Bayrampaşa (5855), Bakırköy (5482) and Zeytinburnu (5334).

- Districts where buildings between 3000-4999 may be moderately or severely damaged: Esenler (4943), Eyüp (4935), Sultanbeyli (4706), Beyoğlu (4383), Maltepe (4315), Beylikdüzü (4275), Ümraniye (4265), Kartal (4074), Üsküdar (3980), Başakşehir (3667), These are Güngören (3360), Ataşehir (3350), Beykoz (3312), Kadıköy (3139), Adalar (3050) and Sancaktepe (3039).

- Districts where buildings between 900-2999 may be moderately or severely damaged: Sarıyer (2955), Gaziosmanpaşa (2808), Sultangazi (2110), Kağıthane (2096), Çatalca (2020), Arnavutköy (1988), Beşiktaş (1304), Şişli (1283), Çekmeköy (1127) and Şile (902).

If a 7.5 magnitude earthquake occurs at night, which is the worst-case scenario, the death toll is expected to be 14145. Again, under these conditions, the total number of people who will need treatment under hospital conditions (including those with pain injuries) is 47699 (Table 2.).

Table 2. Losses and Damages That May Occur in an Earthquake

S. Nu.	District	Buildings that will be medium and severely damaged	The ratio of buildings to be medium and severely damaged to total buildings (%)	Deaths	Seriously wounded	Patients need treatment under hospital conditions	The total of the patients need treatment under total hospital conditions
1	Adalar	3050	48	76	61	217	278
2	Arnavutköy	1988	6	0	0	34	34
3	Ataşehir	3350	12	89	47	330	377
4	Avcılar	7039	27	465	239	1385	1624
5	Bağcılar	10622	25	1179	625	3148	3773
6	Bahçelievler	7954	34	1633	879	4261	5140
7	Bakırköy	5482	46	1046	581	2701	3282
8	Başakşehir	3667	14	71	45	287	332
9	Bayrampaşa	5855	28	520	340	1394	1734
10	Beşiktaş	1304	8	26	14	99	113
11	Beykoz	3312	7	25	16	112	128
12	Beylikdüzü	4275	34	52	276	1456	1732
13	Beyoğlu	4383	16	217	150	609	759

Probable Istanbul Earthquake and Its Consequences as A National Risk

14	Büyükcçekmece	8696	28	288	154	885	1039
15	Çatalca	2020	7	4	2	25	27
16	Çekmeköy	1127	5	1	0	18	18
17	Esenler	4943	21	638	352	1687	2039
18	Esenyurt	10242	26	1003	543	2789	3332
19	Eyüp	4935	14	168	110	525	635
20	Fatih	15528	36	1484	985	3897	4882
21	Gaziosmanpaşa	2808	10	140	83	418	501
22	Güngören	3360	31	754	415	1965	2380
23	Kadıköy	3139	13	190	93	592	685
24	Kağıthane	2096	7	84	44	275	319
25	Kartal	4074	13	176	87	553	640
26	Küçükçekmece	12834	32	1515	925	4079	5004
27	Maltepe	4315	15	234	130	706	836
28	Pendik	6940	14	195	101	707	808
29	Sancaktepe	3039	10	48	24	216	240
30	Sarıyer	2955	6	33	21	141	162
31	Silivri	9306	18	58	27	246	273
32	Sultanbeyli	4706	14,4	73	38	300	338
33	Sultangazi	2110	7	57	27	217	244
34	Şile	902	4,8	0	0	0	0
35	Şişli	1283	7	55	27	172	199
36	Tuzla	7126	26	268	169	808	977
37	Ümraniye	4265	9	42	17	250	267
38	Üsküdar	3980	10	95	42	365	407
39	Zeytinburnu	5334	33	668	374	1767	2141
40	Toplam	194344	18,52	14145	8063	39636	47699

Source: İBB a.²³

Analysis/Evaluation

Inadequacy of precautions taken

The measures taken to eliminate these vulnerabilities in Istanbul are mainly reactive or superficial. Improved pre-emptive and preventive measures are highly expensive, insufficient in number and require a long time. We can classify these measures into two categories: pre-earthquake and post-earthquake measures.

Precautions taken before the earthquake

The main effort within the scope of pre-earthquake measures is the strengthening of the buildings. In this context, the “Istanbul Renewing Reinforcement Project”, carried out by the General Directorate of KİPTAŞ, one of the subsidiaries of IMM (The Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality), is an important step in this regard, but it has limited benefits since it only covers the strengthening of buildings, does not include overpasses and underpasses that are likely to be destroyed or damaged, and does not bring new regulation

²³ İBB a. Earthquake and Ground Investigation Branch Directorate [Deprem ve Zemin İnceleme Şube Müdürlüğü], Possible Earthquake Loss Estimates District Booklets [Olası Deprem Kayıp Tahminleri İlçe Kitapçıkları], 202, <https://depremezmin.ibb.istanbul/guncelalismalarimiz/#olasi-deprem-kayip-tahminler-le-ktapiklari> (Access 16.05.2024).

to the existing unplanned urbanization.

In the early stages of the work initiated in 2020, the main problem encountered in the realization of the project was the rejection of the public due to the concern of being displaced from their homes. At this stage, it is noteworthy that there are more opponents than supporters of the project. In the words of IMM President Ekrem İmamoğlu; “In the rapid screening studies for earthquake resistance initiated since 2020, seventy thousand of the one hundred thousand houses visited did not accept IMM”.²⁴

The size of the building inventory that needs to be retrofitted is too large for this organization to handle alone. In the words of KİPTAŞ General Manager Ali Kurt; After the Eastern Anatolia earthquake that occurred on February 6, 2023, there was a two-fold increase in applications in this regard, and at the current stage, residents of 416 thousand buildings (1 million 650 thousand people) have applied for the retrofit project (KİPTAŞ, 2023). As of January 2023, the cost of reinforcement has been determined as 16 thousand TL per m².²⁵ It is very difficult for applicants to cover this amount and the costs are increasing daily. Considering that the number of building reinforcement projects carried out by KİPTAŞ in the 2020-2023 period is only 1661, it turns out that the period needed to meet the need, which is currently four times this amount, is at least twelve years.

A significant part of the legislation within the scope of the measures to be taken before the earthquake is regulated by the “Building Earthquake Regulation”, and until today [1947, 1953, 1961, 1968, 1975, 1998, 2007].²⁶ The regulation currently in force (Official Gazette Date: 18.03.2018 Official Gazette Number: 30364 Duplicate), has been revised eight times since 2018. Since these regulations cannot be applied retroactively, they can provide limited benefits.

Unplanned urbanization in Istanbul should not be considered only based on residences. TMMOB (Union of Chambers of Architects and Engineers of Türkiye) states that: “I. and II. industrial facilities within the scope of class non-sanitary establishments and the natural gas pipelines, LPG pipelines intertwined with them, fuel stations established and operated within residential areas without adhering to no standards, bottled gas sales dealers, etc. exist together”.²⁷ (, 1017).

²⁴ KİPTAŞ, Istanbul Renewing Reinforcement Project Introduced [İstanbul Yenileniyor Güçlendirme Projesi Tanıtıldı], 17.03.2023, <https://www.kiptas.istanbul/haber/istanbul-yenileniyor-guclendirme-projesi-tantld> (Access 16.05.2024).

²⁵ *Ibid*

²⁶ AFAD, Türkiye Building Earthquake Regulation [Türkiye Bina Deprem Yönetmeliği], 2018, <https://www.afad.gov.tr/turkiye-bina-deprem-yonetmeliği>, (Access 16.05.2024).

²⁷ TMMOB, Istanbul Earthquake Report [İstanbul Deprem Raporu], 2017, https://www.tmmob.org.tr/sites/default/files/rapor_2017_son.pdf (Access 16.05.2024).

Precautions to be taken after an earthquake

Precautions to be taken after the earthquake include the use of safe recovery areas/temporary settlement areas, search and rescue activities, establishment of living spaces consisting of tents and containers, operation of hospitals, repair of damaged infrastructure facilities (passages, bridges, roads, electricity, and gas networks, etc.), removal of debris etc. It covers a large number of activities that need to be coordinated with each other. Here, without evaluating each of them, only some determinations about the prominent issues that form the basis of the thesis of the article are included.

The first thing that draws attention in this regard is the inadequacy of safe assembly areas/temporary settlement areas in terms of rescue and first aid materials, equipment and materials to meet hygiene and toilet needs, and the existing ones have been lost or looted over time. In addition, it is seen that some security assembly areas/temporary settlement areas cannot be protected and development is carried out in these areas. In TMMOB's Istanbul Earthquake Report; it was stated that the 470 earthquake-gathering areas detected after the 1999 earthquake decreased to 77 in 2016.

After the expected earthquake, transportation needs are among the first-priority problems. According to TMMOB's (2017) report, it is stated that 71640 kilometres, which corresponds to approximately 12% of the emergency transportation road network of approximately 622 thousand kilometres in Istanbul, is occupied as a parking lot by İSPARK [Istanbul Parking Enterprises Trade. Inc.].

Sufficient studies have not yet been carried out or shared with the public on alternative plans to meet the basic needs of the city, especially water, electricity, telecommunications, and health after the expected earthquake. For example, any study on how many of the 54 hospitals affiliated with the Ministry of Health, 16 hospitals affiliated with universities and 162 hospitals operated by the private sector in the city have been strengthened against earthquakes has not been shared with the public.

According to the Health Statistics Yearbook 2020 (2021: 3), the total bed capacity of these hospitals is 46382. According to the current scenario mentioned above (Table 2.), the total number of people who will need hospital treatment is 47699. Similarly, there are projections that it will take three years to remove the 25 million tons of debris that will appear after the earthquake.²⁸ While the recycling rate of debris is 80% in developed countries, this rate is 25% in Türkiye. This situation necessitates the storage

²⁸ İBB b ((Earthquake and Ground Investigation Branch Directorate) [Deprem ve Zemin İnceleme Şube Müdürlüğü], Debris Management Plan [Enkaz Yönetim Planı], 2021, <https://depremezmin.ibt.istanbul/guncelcalismalarimiz/#enkaz-yonetim-planı> (Access 16.05.2024).

of 6.25 million tons of debris.

Conclusion and Suggestions

As a result, although it is possible to increase the examples presented above, the picture drawn so far reveals the fact that it is not possible for Istanbul to develop measures against potential earthquakes only with its own resources. Another observation that this view reveals is that even if we include the opportunities provided by the central administration against a possible Istanbul earthquake, Istanbul-centered measures will not produce sufficient solutions in earthquake conditions. In summary, since it is not possible to complete the ongoing strengthening and reconstruction activities in a sufficient time, it is clear that radical measures are needed to minimize the city's losses in a possible earthquake.

Within the framework of these predictions, two main conclusions are reached. The first of these is to develop measures against a possible Istanbul earthquake with common sense across the country and with all elements of national power. The issue should be addressed in terms of Turkey's major security problems. This threat can be met by fulfilling all the requirements of an all-out struggle. The second conclusion is that the measures to be developed against a possible Istanbul earthquake cannot be solved with measures limited to the Istanbul scale.

The solution to the problem at the country level -on the scale of Istanbul- is possible by realizing two interrelated projects. The first project is aimed at eliminating unplanned urbanization in the city. The first step to be taken in this regard is to immediately evacuate unlicensed areas that are not open to development in the city and demolish buildings that violate the current law. The answer to the question of political or national concerns in this regard should be answered in favour of public security and the protection of Istanbul. Sensitivity to this issue, which has been ignored until now, should be regained throughout the country. It is considered that signing a joint declaration on this issue by all political parties will eliminate vote concerns. The police and law enforcement organizations should be restructured for demolition and evacuation activities in this context and the legislation on this subject should be strengthened. In the reconstruction of the city, priority should be given to the places most vulnerable to earthquakes, not to gain profit. Building strength and ground reinforcement should be considered together. Additional budget should be allocated to relevant ministries by saving their existing budgets for the strengthening, reconstruction or relocation of weak public buildings in this region. This time, the state is expected to make a sacrifice similar to the earthquake tax collected from the public in the previous Marmara earthquake (1999), and the outdated understanding that "there is no saving on reputation" should be abandoned.

It is not possible to realize this project, which requires large-scale expropriation and involves many activities, especially the reorganization of areas called national gardens, parks, and gardens, with the resources of IMM alone.

The second project aimed at solving Istanbul's unplanned urbanization problem involves redesigning the city with selective sparsity. Selective rarefaction refers to the relocation of some sectors and groups to other locations outside the city. Without doing a detailed study on this issue, the first thing that comes to mind is what kind of concept Istanbul will be restructured. For example, redesigning the city within the framework of a structure focused on culture-art-tourism could be a course of action. One of the most striking examples in this regard are London and Paris. Both cities compete with Turkey's total income from this sector with their tourism revenues, and in some years, they surpass Turkey. This potential is abundant in Istanbul. Within the framework of such a main concept, incentives should be considered first for the retired and unemployed masses who do not produce goods and services in the city to return to their hometowns. These incentives should also be strengthened with economic sanctions that make it difficult for these groups to stay in the city. Necessary infrastructure and incentives should be in force for the transportation of industrial branches like textiles, chemicals, etc. to the coastal areas with low earthquake probability in the southern parts of Anatolia. Thus, it will be easier for Turkey's exports in these areas to expand to the Middle East, North Africa, and Eastern Mediterranean markets. In addition, the population density created by a total of 57 universities in the city, 13 of which belong to the state and 44 of which belong to foundations, is remarkable. In this context, moving foundation universities that do not have a campus to various provinces of Anatolia will contribute to reducing population density and unplanned urbanization.

To realize both of these projects, all relevant organizations of the central government, especially the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Kandilli Observatory, TÜBİTAK, General Directorate of Electrical Power Resources Research Administration, etc., official specialized organizations such as Türkiye Chamber of Architects and Engineers, Türkiye Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges, etc., relevant the non-governmental organizations, and universities need to work together. As a result, it should not be forgotten that radical solutions are required to deal with a radical problem such as an earthquake. Considering that the destruction of Istanbul, which is the most important centre of the country with its economic gains, will mean the destruction of Turkey. This burden, which is not considered today, will have to be carried out in the conditions where the earthquake occurred, and this will be much greater than the difficulties encountered now.

EARTHQUAKE AND FRIENDSHIP CONSOLIDATION: JAPAN'S DISASTER COOPERATION EFFORTS IN TÜRKİYE

Kıvılcım Erkan*

Introduction

The relations between Japan and Türkiye can be characterized as amicable, yet underdeveloped. The bilateral trade between the two countries has been dwindling and neither Japan nor Türkiye is the other's main trading partner. Türkiye has been increasingly importing manufactured goods from China and Korea at the expense of Japan.¹ Türkiye also suffers a trade account deficit with Japan as the main imports from Japan are high-value-added goods. On the security front, there has not been much cooperation except for a project to train Afghan police officers in cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2011 in the post-conflict reconstruction process of Afghanistan. Japan provided the funds to finance the project and dispatched instructors to Türkiye for police training.² While Japan is revising its antimilitarist stance and minimalist security and defense postures, it continues to be anchored in the Western security and defense frameworks, Türkiye on the other hand is moving away from a Western-oriented foreign and security policy towards a Eurasianist direction developing closer ties with Russia and China. The diverging stances of the two countries may complicate future cooperation in the security and defense areas.

Cultural interactions between the two countries have been gaining some substance in recent decades mainly through cultural institutes.³ In general, the people in two countries tend to have a favorable image of the other.⁴

* Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Nevşehir Hacı Bektaş Veli University, Nevşehir, Türkiye.

¹ Ali Akkemik, "Is Turkey Turning Its Face Away From Japan to China and Korea? Evidence from Trade Relations", *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 21, no. 1, 2016, pp. 45-62.

² MOFAJ, "2014 ODA White Paper, Japan's International Cooperation", https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/hakusyo/14_hakusho/column/column07.html (Access: 15.05.2024)

³ This situation might be the result of the recent popularization of public and cultural diplomacies in the foreign policies of various states. In Türkiye, Japanese language and culture is introduced since 1998 through the Turkish Japanese Foundation located in Ankara. In the last decade, Japanese cultural centers are increasing in Istanbul and Izmir. In Japan, besides the Tokyo Mosque Directorate of Religious Affairs Cultural Center and the Yunus Emre Institute, there are several other small-scale cultural centers in Osaka, Kyoto and Tokyo.

⁴ An academic study conducted on the images of Japanese and Turkish university students about the other country revealed that the general image that Turkish students have of the Japanese and Japan is of hard work and high technology. For Japanese students, Türkiye's rich cuisine and history seem to have constituted their image of the country. See: Cahit Kahraman, "Asya'nin İki Ucundan Görüşler: Türkiye-Japonya Algisi", *Pamukkale University Journal of Social Sciences Institute*, no. 28, 2017, 28-73.

Furthermore, the two countries do not have any historical problems or conflicts. Japan considers Türkiye as a diplomatically important country through which it can extend its influence in the Middle East and Central Asia regions.

Earthquake-related cooperation is an area keeping relations between the two countries dynamic. Natural disasters create enormous physical, economic social, and psychological damage in a country and pose major risks of reverting development efforts. According to Türkiye's Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (DEMP)⁵, "*Türkiye ranks third in the world in terms of human loss in earthquakes and eighth in terms of the number of people affected. On average, every year there is at least one earthquake with a magnitude between 5 and 6.*"⁶ Earthquakes are among the biggest threats to human security and economic development in Türkiye.

Disaster cooperation and disaster diplomacy have become a new area of focus for International Relations scholars. There is a growing literature on how disaster cooperation affects bilateral relations between countries. The main question that the International Relations (IR) literature tries to address is whether disaster cooperation can transform conflictual relations between states into peaceful ones. The disaster cooperation literature does not however say much about how disasters affect existing peaceful relations. Disaster cooperation may have the potential to strengthen friendly but unsubstantial bilateral relations between countries that do not have major historical, economic, and security-related disputes. Moreover, disaster-related aid is an important feature of public diplomacy. Türkiye-Japan relations can be a good example for these arguments. The chapter provides an account of how Türkiye and Japan consolidate bilateral ties through disaster cooperation. The chapter begins by explaining the growing importance of disaster cooperation in international relations. This is followed by an overview of Japan's disaster cooperation and diplomacy. The final part examines the evolution and features of Japan's comprehensive earthquake-related assistance in Türkiye.

Disaster Cooperation in International Relations

Natural and man-made disasters have been recognized as important non-traditional security threats in the international realm in the post-Cold War world. The United Nations (UN) became active in raising awareness about disasters at the international level in the 1990s. Such initiative was brought about by the fact that in developing countries natural disasters disrupt economic and social life and exacerbate poverty. As the UN's interest in

⁵ In Turkish: Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı (AFAD)

⁶ Ministry of Interior of Türkiye Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency, "AFAD ve Tarihiçesi" (AFAD and Its History), <https://www.afad.gov.tr/afad-hakkinda> (Accessed: 10.05.2024)

humanitarian issues was growing at that time, natural disasters became naturally a major concern. The UN declared the 1990s the 'International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction' with the adoption of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 44/236 in December 1989. The main concern was to reduce the destructive impact of disasters in the developing world. Accordingly, certain targets were set for the committed states including preparing national assessments of natural disasters, preparing mitigation plans, and creating early warning systems at the local, regional, and national levels.⁷

Next, the UN put in place a series of institutions and networks to promote information exchange and cooperation between states on disaster mitigation and humanitarian aid. With the adoption of UNGA resolution 46/182 in 1991, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) was established with a mandate to coordinate humanitarian assistance. The main tools brought under the mandate of OCHA were the UN Consolidated Appeal (CAP), a UN Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF), an Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), and an Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). The earthquakes that happened in Mexico in 1985 and Armenia in 1988 witnessed the overflow of foreign search and rescue teams handicapped by problems of coordination and effective utilization of rescue operations. As a result, under the framework of UNOCHA, The International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) was established in 1991 with main goal of coordinating the various international urban search and rescue teams voluntarily dispatched to earthquake zones. The INSARAG has guidelines establishing the rules and principles of cooperation in search and rescue efforts.⁸

Besides INSARAG, the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC Team) was established under the OCHA framework to dispatch teams to deliver post-disaster assistance. UNDAC team is required to establish an On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC) at the aid recipient country to coordinate international assistance and exchange of information between the government of the aid recipient country and the aid providers. In addition to functioning as an information exchange platform, OSOCC assesses the needs such as sanitation and healthcare in disaster-hit areas.⁹ Japan contributes relief and rescue teams to

⁷ Francesco Pisano, "About the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction", *La Houille Blanche*, no. 2, 1998, pp. 68-69, <https://www.shf-lhb.org/articles/lhb/pdf/1998/02/lhb1998029.pdf> (Access: 01.05.2024)

⁸ INSARAG, "Background" <https://www.insarag.org/about/background>. (Access: 03.05.2024)

⁹ UN OCHA, "On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC) 2018 Guidelines" https://www.insarag.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/OSOCC_Guidelines_2018_English_2.pdf (Access: 17.05.2024)

both UNDAC and INSARAG.¹⁰

By the time when the international decade of disasters was coming to an end, the United Nations declared a new 'International Strategy for Disaster Reduction' (ISDR) in November 1999. The main goal of this strategy is to assist disaster-prone countries in incorporating disaster risk management into their national development policies. In the long run, it also aims to strengthen countries' resilience against disasters and improve social, economic, and environmental well-being.¹¹

Following the ISDR, The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) became the main international strategy for disaster risk reduction between 2005 and 2015. The HFA required countries to build institutional capacity for disaster risk reduction (DRR) and early warning systems, reduce the underlying risk factors, strengthen disaster preparedness, and raise awareness of disasters through knowledge and education. In 2005, the International Recovery Platform (IRP) was established to gather and disseminate various knowledge on post-disaster recovery, drawing on Hyogo Prefecture's recovery efforts following the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. The IRP is currently comprised of 17 governments, UN agencies, and other organizations.¹²

The implementation results of the HFA showed that in most countries disaster risk reduction was not well integrated into national development plans through institutions, legislation, and policies. The underlying risk factors were not insufficiently addressed and consequently the physical and economic impact of disasters continued to be at critical levels. These results led to the adoption of a new instrument in 2015: the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.¹³

The Sendai Framework requires states to develop national strategies for disaster risk reduction and aims to reduce the human and economic damage caused by disasters in concrete numbers by 2030. It also promotes international cooperation between developed and developing countries on disaster management.¹⁴ The Sendai Framework also clearly states the importance of "Build Back Better" and the International Recovery Platform (IRP). The outcomes of the conference were reflected in the "2030 Agenda

¹⁰ Yosuke Okita, "UNOCHA's Coordination in International Disaster Response and its Contribution from Japan: Focusing on Emergency Phase after Natural Disasters" *Kokusai Kyouryoku Kenkyu*, vol. 22, no. 1, 2006, pp. 22-31, <https://dl.ndl.go.jp/view/prepareDownload?itemId=info%3Andljp%2Fpid%2F8277555&contentNo=1> (Access: 08.05.2024)

¹¹ ADRC, "What is the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR)?" https://www.adrc.asia/publications/LWR/LWR_abridged/preface2.pdf (Access: 20.05.2024)

¹² International Recovery Platform, <https://recovery.preventionweb.net/> (Access: 21.05.2024)

¹³ UNDRR, "Hyogo Framework for Action", <https://www.preventionweb.net/sendai-framework/Hyogo-Framework-for-Action> (Access: 11.05.2024)

¹⁴ UNDRR, "Sendai Framework at a Glance", <https://www.preventionweb.net/sendai-framework/sendai-framework-at-a-glance> (Access: 01.05.2024)

for Sustainable Development" adopted at the UN Summit in September of the same year, and the perspective of "disaster reduction" was included in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).¹⁵

The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) serves as the coordinating office for international organizations involved in disaster reduction (UN agencies, the World Bank, regional organizations, etc.). In addition to serving as the secretariat for the UN World Conference on Disaster Reduction, the UNDRR is engaged in various disaster awareness-raising activities, including the preparation of the World White Paper on Disaster Reduction.

The UN also facilitates the exchange of scientific information in earthquake research. Under the framework of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), The International Platform for Reducing Earthquake Disaster (IPRED) is an international platform for research collaboration on seismology and earthquake engineering. Japan is the main supporter of this initiative. From Türkiye, the Istanbul Technical University is a partner institution.¹⁶

In summary, international cooperation for disaster management has been growing in the past three decades with the UN occupying a central role as the main international organization with a humanitarian mandate. The UN is trying to raise awareness of disaster risk reduction and the importance of disaster preparedness while at the same time promoting international collaboration on rescue, relief, and scientific research.

Japan's Disaster Diplomacy and Cooperation

Parallel to the aforementioned international developments, Japan made disaster cooperation an important pillar of its foreign policy. This move serves a dual purpose. First, Japan has increased its presence and visibility in the mitigation of a global issue thereby responding to the international criticism that Japan had been playing a limited role in global and international crises. This move is also consistent with the Japanese state identity as a "peace state" or "civilian power" as endorsed by various Japanese politicians and policy-makers. Second, disaster cooperation is an effective tool for public diplomacy, and a great means to create a positive image in assistance-receiving countries. Japan is an earthquake-prone country that has accumulated much knowledge on earthquakes and construction technology and, therefore has the potential to be a leader in forming and spreading international standards in earthquake response at the global and regional

¹⁵ MOFAJ, "Disaster Prevention: Japan's Approach", <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/bunya/disaster/initiative.html> (Access: 17.05.2024)

¹⁶ UNESCO, International Platform for Reducing Earthquake Disaster, <https://www.unesco.org/en/ipred> (Access: 23.05.2024)

levels.

Japan is promoting disaster cooperation at the global, regional, and bilateral levels. Japan was the host country for the first three world conferences on disaster risk reduction (Yokohama in 1994, Kobe in 2005, and Sendai in 2015). Japan also makes ideational contributions to the development of international standards on disaster management. The Sendai Framework for Disaster Reduction incorporated many of Japan's arguments, including the mainstreaming of disaster reduction, the importance of investment in disaster reduction in advance, and "Build Back Better" perspective.¹⁷

Japan is actively promoting regional cooperation on disaster management in Asia. The Asian Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC) was established on July 30, 1998, in Kobe, Hyogo Prefecture following a proposal from Japan for the creation of a system that would function as a disaster reduction center in the Asian region. The ADRC has twenty-four member states including Türkiye and five observer states. ADRC activities encompass information sharing on the latest news about disasters and disaster prevention efforts in the member states through the website, human resources development through disaster prevention seminars and training programs as well as inviting foreign researchers to the center, and organizing and building community capabilities by disseminating knowledge to communities on disasters and support for Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs).¹⁸

Like Japan, the Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN) region is prone to natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and typhoons, and has suffered extensive and devastating damage in the past. In particular, the countries along the Indian Ocean coast suffered serious damage from the massive tsunami that followed a major earthquake off the coast of Sumatra, Indonesia in 2004. Subsequent major disasters have occurred repeatedly, including the 2008 cyclone in Myanmar and the 2013 typhoon (Typhoon Yolanda) in the Philippines. The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) which became effective in 2009 is a binding agreement to promote regional policy on disaster prevention and mitigation.¹⁹ To support this effort, Japan introduced the "Japan-ASEAN package to strengthen disaster prevention" at the Special Summit Meeting between Japan and ASEAN in December 2013. The package included 300-billion-yen worth of ODA to be granted in the next five years and human resources development assistance for one thousand

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ ADRC, "Asian Disaster Reduction Center Overview" <https://www.adrc.asia/publications/annual/04/04jp/pdf/1-1.pdf> (Access: 20.05.2024)

¹⁹ ASEAN, "AADMER Work Programme 2021-2025", <https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/AADMER-Work-Programme-2021-2025.pdf> (Access: 28.05.2024)

people. At the same summit meeting, Japan announced disaster cooperation as one of the four issue areas of the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF).

²⁰

JICA signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center for Disaster Management (AHA Center) on October 12 2023 to promote cooperation in disaster response in the ASEAN region, including the operation of a disaster information management system. JICA has played a central role in disaster risk reduction cooperation in Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and other ASEAN countries. Through disaster cooperation, Japan aims to deepen ASEAN integration and increase the connectivity between Japan and ASEAN.²¹

Japan has bilateral cooperation initiatives with Indonesia, the USA, India, and China. Under an agreement between the leaders of Japan and Indonesia in 2005, a Joint Commission on Disaster Reduction was established, co-chaired by the Ministers of Disaster Management of the two countries. The committee held expert discussions on areas such as tsunami early warning and building earthquake resistance, and in 2006 compiled guidelines for the formulation of comprehensive and effective measures to mitigate disaster damage in Indonesia.²² The Cabinet Office of Japan signed a Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) in December 2014 with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) of the United States, with the Ministry of Home Affairs of India in September 2017 intending to develop cooperation. Based on MOUs, Japanese governments held meetings with their counterparts in India and the US for information sharing and knowledge exchange. The Trilateral Ministerial Meeting on Disaster Reduction between Japan, China, and Korea is held once every two years on a rotating basis since 2008 with similar goals to bilateral cooperation²³

Japanese cooperation in the field of disaster reduction can be broadly divided into two areas according to the stage of the disaster: disaster prevention and emergency assistance. Disaster prevention cooperation aims at building capacity to prevent disasters and includes disaster-resistant infrastructure development and human resource development. Emergency

²⁰ MOFAJ, "ASEAN-Japan Special Summit (Summary)", https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/page3_000594.html (Access: 28.05.2024)

²¹ JICA, "Strengthening Partnership with ASEAN for Disaster Response -Memorandum of Cooperation signed with ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance in Disaster Management" https://www.jica.go.jp/information/press/2023/20231020_11.html (Access: 01.06.2024)

²² Government of Japan, Cabinet Office, "Bilateral Cooperation in Disaster Management: Disaster Management Cooperation with Indonesia", https://www.bousai.go.jp/kokusai/kyoryoku/kyouryoku_nikoku.html (Access: 05.06.2024)

²³ Government of Japan, Cabinet Office, "Bilateral and other disaster prevention cooperation", <https://www.bousai.go.jp/kokusai/bilateral/index.html> (Access: 20.05.2024)

assistance is given after the disaster occurs and involves the dispatch of relief units, emergency aid, and the provision of basic materials.²⁴ Japan carries out these activities through the tools of relief units and Official Development Assistance (ODA). Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is the main organization with the mandate to implement ODA and emergency humanitarian aid after the emergence of a disaster in a foreign country. Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) plays a major role in financial cooperation in the field of disaster reduction.

Japan started to make human contributions to overseas disaster relief efforts in the late 1970s. Starting from 1979 under the supervision of JICA, medical units were sent to disaster areas. In April 1982, under the umbrella of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFAJ) and JICA Japan Medical Team for Disaster Relief (JMTDR) was established. Japan dispatched relatively small medical units to the big earthquake in Mexico in September 1985 and the volcanic eruption disaster in November 1985. After participating in overseas relief activities, there was a strong interest in Japan to develop a comprehensive relief team. The result was the enactment of the Japan Disaster Relief Law (JDR Law) in August 1987.²⁵

The JDR Law authorizes the overseas dispatch of international emergency relief teams in response to requests from the governments of disaster-stricken countries or international organizations, especially in underdeveloped countries. The law was enacted to provide for measures necessary to dispatch international emergency relief teams in response to requests from the governments of disaster-stricken countries or international organizations, etc.²⁶

International Emergency Relief Teams are composed of five types of teams (rescue teams, medical teams, infectious disease control teams, specialist teams, and Self-Defense Forces units). The MOFAJ, in cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, determines the type of team and its activities based on the nature of the request from governments or international organizations. Since the enactment of the Law, the first expert team was dispatched for flood damage in Venezuela, a total of one hundred forty-five teams have been dispatched to forty-five countries and regions until December 2017.²⁷

²⁴ Government of Japan, Cabinet Office, Japan's International Disaster Reduction Cooperation <https://www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/hakusho/h19/bousai2007/html/honmon/hm01040303.htm> (Access: 20.05.2024)

²⁵ JICA, "International Emergency Relief and JICA" https://www.jica.go.jp/Resource/publication/pamph/ku57pq00002iqnxw-att/pamphlet_jdr.pdf (Access: 20.05.2024)

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ MOFAJ, "30th anniversary of the Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) Act" <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/000346514.pdf> (Access: 10.05.2024)

Japan is a major provider of ODA around the developing world. Japan's ODA Charter was revised in August 2003 and "disasters," which had not been mentioned before, were included as one of the issues to be tackled through ODA. In January 2005, Japan proposed the "Disaster Reduction Cooperation Initiative" to incorporate the perspective of disaster reduction when providing development assistance. Based on this initiative, Japan has provided cooperation for disaster reduction through ODA to support self-help efforts and human resource development in disaster-prone underdeveloped countries.²⁸ In February 2005, a new "Medium-Term Policy on Official Development Assistance" was released, which included "poverty reduction" and "addressing global-scale problems," as priority issues to be addressed. The policy also clarified that ODA will be utilized for disaster reduction efforts in the future.²⁹

ODA for disaster reduction is broadly classified into (1) technical cooperation such as the acceptance of trainees, dispatch of experts, and international emergency assistance, (2) grant assistance, and (3) loan aid. Currently, 48% of Japanese ODA for disaster cooperation is allocated to grant assistance, 45% to loan aid, and the rest covers technical cooperation and trainee admission fees.³⁰

Japan's Disaster Relief Cooperation in Türkiye (1993-2023)

Türkiye is located in a very seismically active region. The major earthquakes that hit the Marmara region on 17 August 1999, Van province in 2011 (magnitude 7.1), and Kahramanmaraş on 6 February 2023 caused large numbers of casualties and great economic loss. Seismologists expect a major destructive earthquake to happen in Istanbul. Türkiye's vulnerability to earthquakes has increased due to the complexity of its urban structure.

In Türkiye, laws and organizations have historically been developed based on lessons learned from major earthquakes. Disaster management is integrated into Türkiye's national development plans, including the eleventh plan (2019-2023). Currently, The Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (DEMP) is the main state organization in charge of disaster prevention, mitigation and post-disaster recovery efforts. The Presidency carries out its activities through Provincial Disaster and Emergency Directorates directly responsible to the governor and Disaster and Emergency Search and Rescue Union Directorates in eleven provinces.³¹

²⁸ Government of Japan, Cabinet Office, Japan's International Disaster Reduction Cooperation <https://www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/hakusho/h19/bousai2007/html/honmon/hm01040303.htm> (Access: 20.05.2024)

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ MOFAJ, "Disaster Management Cooperation Initiative with Official Development Assistance (ODA)" https://www.bousai.go.jp/kokusai/kyoryoku/kyouryoku_oda.html (Access: 20.05.2024)

³¹ Ministry of Interior Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency, op. cit.

The main vision of DEMP is to build a society resilient to earthquakes. In line with “Integrated Disaster Management System”, a new disaster management model has been put into practice in Türkiye in which, priority has been given to “risk management” from “crisis management”. This risk management approach envisages the identification of hazards and risks and taking measures to reduce their destructive impacts before the occurrence of a disaster. The integrated approach also ensuring effective response and coordination in the process of post-disaster recovery.³²

Japan's disaster cooperation efforts in Türkiye should be understood within the broader framework of Japan's ODA policy toward the country. Japan extends ODA to Türkiye given its geopolitical importance. The following is stated in a MOFAJ report on the evaluation of Japanese ODA to Türkiye in 2023:

*Turkey is a geopolitically important regional power, and, in addition to its important role in regional security as a NATO member nation, it is actively developing multilateral diplomacy with Europe, the US, Russia, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Maintaining a close relationship with Turkey is important to Japanese diplomatic strategy.*³³

According to MOFAJ, Türkiye is contributing to regional stability in the Middle East by hosting large numbers of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq.³⁴ Türkiye is considered to be a pro-Japanese country which extended help to Japan in difficult times including the evacuation of Japanese citizens stranded in Tehran in 1985 during the Iran-Iraq war. The deceased Prime Minister Abe acknowledged Türkiye's help in the release of a Japanese journalist captured by Islamist terrorists in Syria in 2018. Japan also views Türkiye as a partner country through which it can extend its presence and outreach in the Middle East, the Balkans, and Central Asia. Under the third-country training programs financed by ODA, Türkiye, and Japan held joint projects in the Balkans, South East Asia, Afghanistan, and Caucasus. Japan is considering expanding such “triangular cooperation” with Türkiye.³⁵

Japan considers ODA as a tool to consolidate bilateral relations between Türkiye and Japan. One of the long-term goals of Japan's assistance is to support sustainable development in line with Türkiye's own national development goal of entering the top ten economic powers of the world. In that context, disaster mitigation is a core area of Japan's assistance policy.³⁶

³² *Ibid.*

³³ MOFAJ, “Third Party Evaluation Report JFY2022: Evaluation of Japan's ODA to Turkey”, January 2023, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/evaluation/FY2022/pdfs/Turkiye.pdf> (Access: 01.06.2024), p. iv.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

³⁶ MOFAJ, Republic of Turkey: Country Development Cooperation Policy”, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/000072324.pdf>, September 2018, (Access: 01.06.2024)

Japan tries to assist in building national administrative capacity for disaster management, improving scientific and technological capacity concerning earthquakes, building earthquake-resilient cities through urban development, and raising awareness of earthquakes through education. Japan has been among the major donors to Türkiye ranking within the top five from 2011 to 2020. Yen loans make up the largest share of the aid (697.1 billion yen), followed by grant aid (5.307 billion yen) and technical cooperation (46.695 billion yen) in 2020.³⁷

Türkiye has been receiving Japan's ODA since 1971, while assistance in the field of earthquake disaster management started in 1993 and has continued until today. Japan's disaster-related assistance to Türkiye was strengthened after the Marmara and Düzce earthquakes in 1999. JICA and the JBIC are the main actors tasked with implementing the projects and providing funds, respectively. There has been a wide range of cooperation in earthquake and seismic engineering, earthquake observation technology, disaster prevention planning, and disaster education in schools and public organizations. Japan's disaster relief assistance efforts from 1993 until 2007 have been broadly concentrated on the following five areas.³⁸

1. Strengthening earthquake observation networks and enhancing research capacity in the field of earthquake disaster prevention (1993-2006): strengthening earthquake prediction capacity and provision of earthquake-related equipment to the Istanbul Technical University (ITU) laboratories.
2. Emergency Relief and Reconstruction Assistance for the Marmara Earthquake Disaster: Provision of emergency relief assistance comprising the dispatch of an international emergency relief team (rescue teams, medical teams, and expert teams) and 23.6-billion-yen worth of reconstruction loan aid to repair and remove damaged houses, construct temporary and permanent housing, support disaster victims, and restore the Sakarya University (June 2000 to August 2002).
3. Seismic Hazard and Vulnerability Assessment of Istanbul: A Basic study of the possible hazards that Istanbul may suffer in the event of a future earthquake and recommendations to mitigate the damages.
4. Raising Disaster Awareness of Administrative Officials: JICA conducted a series of programs aimed at raising disaster awareness among administrative officials including local domestic training, short-term expert dispatch, and training in

³⁷ MOFAJ, “Official Development Assistance (ODA) Data by Country 2021,” <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/100384974.pdf#page=196> (Access: 10.05.2024)

³⁸ JICA, “Review Study on Technical Cooperation in the Field of Earthquake Disaster Mitigation in Türkiye Report”, <https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/11994555.pdf>, June 2007, p. 29.

Japan (2001-2008).

5. Seismic Reinforcement of Istanbul Long Bridge: Dispatch of experts for transferring technology for seismic retrofitting of large bridges (1999-2006) and a special loan aid worth ¥12 billion given in 2002 to implement seismic strengthening of the First and Second Bosphorus Bridges, the New Istanbul Earthquake Fault Location and Fault Movement Distance, the Old Golden Horn Bridge, and its accompanying viaduct.³⁹

Since 2014, Japan and Türkiye have been conducting dialogues on disaster reduction and in 2018, they signed a MOC to enhance cooperation between Japan and Türkiye and vis-à-vis third countries in the field of disaster management.⁴⁰ Improvement Program for Disaster Prevention and Preparedness continues to be one of the components of Japan's development aid to the country. There have been four major ODA projects conducted in Türkiye in recent years: Disaster Risk Management Capacity Building Project for Local Government Officials (2022-23), Capacity Building Project for the Development of a Master Plan for Disaster Risk Management in Metropolitan Bursa Project (2021-24), Subject-specific training in the field of disaster prevention and preparedness (2021) and Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security in the Field of Disaster Prevention and Countermeasures (2021). All these projects are aimed at contributing to Sustainable Development Goal 11 "sustainable cities and communities".⁴¹

On February 6, 2023, two major magnitude 7-class earthquakes (magnitude 7.8 and magnitude 7.5) occurred in southeastern Türkiye near the Syrian border. In the series of aftershocks that followed, more than fifty-five thousand people were reportedly killed and more than a hundred thousand injured, including those in Syria.⁴² In Türkiye, thirty-seven thousand buildings collapsed, and over two hundred thousand buildings were heavily damaged.⁴³ Japan was among the countries that assisted Türkiye the most. Japanese assistance has five main components:

1. Dispatch of international emergency relief teams: dispatch of a search and rescue team of seventy-four people, a medical team to a field hospital set up in Ozeri District, Gaziantep Province, southeastern Türkiye, and an Emergency Medical Team (EMT)

³⁹ JICA, *ibid.*, pp. 29-33.

⁴⁰ MOFAJ, "Republic of Turkey Country Development Cooperation Policy", <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/000072324.pdf>, September 2018, p. 20, (Access: 01.06.2024).

⁴¹ MOFAJ, "Business Development Plan for Turkey From April 2021", <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/000072325.pdf> (Access: 01.06.2024)

⁴² UN OCHA Reliefweb, "The devastating impact of the recent earthquakes on Turkey's minorities", 18 May 2023, <https://reliefweb.int/report/turkiye/devastating-impact-recent-earthquakes-Turkiyes-minorities> (Access: 20.05.2024)

⁴³ British Red Cross, "Türkiye (Türkiye) and Syria earthquake 2023: a year on", 18 April 2024, <https://www.redcross.org.uk/stories/disasters-and-emergencies/world/Turkiye-syria-earthquake>.

with surgical functions and an inpatient ward was dispatched. An expert team of eleven people was dispatched to the site to confirm the condition of damaged buildings and infrastructure and provided technical advice for restoration and reconstruction. One Self-Defense Force B-777 special transport aircraft was dispatched to the area to transport materials and equipment necessary for the activities of the above-mentioned international emergency relief team and medical team. Based on a request from the Turkish government and NATO, KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft was dispatched 4 times carrying a total of 89.5 tons of disaster relief supplies (tents and insulation tools for tents).

2. Dispatch of JICA expert team: A JICA expert team was dispatched who dealt with recovery and reconstruction from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. The team advised the Turkish central government and affected local governments about the initial stages of recovery and reconstruction, formulation of reconstruction plans, implementation of reconstruction projects, and other preparations, based on Hyogo Prefecture's experience in earthquake reconstruction.
3. Emergency relief supplies support: Emergency relief supplies (tents, blankets, sleeping pads, etc.) were provided.
4. Financial support: Emergency assistance totaling approximately US\$48.5 million in humanitarian aid was provided for the disaster through international organizations and Japanese Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

Support for recovery and reconstruction: A grant aid totaling 5 billion yen for debris removal and provision of medical equipment and heavy machinery, and a loan aid totaling 80 billion yen to support the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the affected areas were provided. In conjunction with this financial assistance, technical cooperation utilizing Japan's expertise, including assistance in formulating reconstruction plans, technical assistance for earthquake reinforcement of public buildings, and assistance in strengthening disaster waste management capacity, including debris disposal is provided.⁴⁴

To commemorate the earthquake, the JICA Türkiye office published a booklet collecting the impressions of Turkish and Japanese volunteers who participated in Kahramanmaraş earthquake relief efforts. Almost all the Turkish volunteers who helped the JICA team with search and rescue and other relief efforts mention the positive impact of Japanese assistance.

⁴⁴ MOFAJ, "Overview of the earthquake with epicenter in southeastern Turkey and Japan's support", 9 August 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/Turkiye/page24_002294.html (Access: 01.06.2024)

Furthermore, the current head of the JICA office Türkiye Daisuke Watanabe mentions disaster cooperation will lead to further cooperation between the two countries in the future.⁴⁵

Conclusion

Although Japanese and Turkish people hold positive images of one another, the economic, security, and cultural relations between the two countries do not have much substance. Japan's disaster-related assistance efforts in Türkiye, on the other hand, have strengthened the bilateral ties between the two countries. Since the end of the 1980s, the United Nations has been developing mechanisms and standards to tackle disasters in the developing world based on the belief that disasters setback development efforts and exacerbate poverty. In that context, UN developed organizations, rules, and institutions to promote information exchange, scientific cooperation between states, collection of funds, coordination during the delivery of humanitarian aid. The UN also developed international standards on disaster management through three world conferences on disaster management. The last one is the Sendai Framework which proposed new ideas on post-disaster recovery.

As the international community has been developing new mechanisms and standards on disaster management with the UN playing a central role in its humanitarian mandate, Japan emerged as a disaster cooperation superpower due to its wealth of knowledge in the area as technologically advanced and a disaster-prone country. Japan made disaster diplomacy and cooperation a feature of its foreign policy, which is commensurate with its state identity as an active civilian power. The tools of Japan's disaster cooperation are ODA and international emergency relief teams. Japan contributed to the development of global standards for disaster mitigation by supplying ideas derived from its own experiences. Japan also supports disaster management efforts in Asia as a leading country.

A core element of Japan's development cooperation with Türkiye is disaster management. Indeed, Japan's earthquake cooperation in Türkiye has a long history and is multi-dimensional and comprehensive. Japan has been extending ODA to Türkiye to consolidate bilateral relations and to build a positive image of Japan. For Japan Türkiye is a geopolitically important country providing regional stability in the Middle East especially, in the recent decade, through hosting refugees. At the same time, Japan aims to capitalize on Türkiye's influence in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia in the framework of cooperation in third countries. In that scheme, Japan and

Türkiye cooperate in delivering development aid to other countries. Another goal of Japan's ODA to Türkiye is to contribute to Türkiye's national development goal of entering within the top ten economically developed countries. Japan supports sustainable development efforts and disaster relief aid plays a central role in that context

Starting from the early 1990s, Japan's disaster cooperation aimed at developing administrative, scientific, and technological capacity for the management of earthquakes, and building earthquake-resilient cities and communities through urban planning and education. In times of major destructive earthquakes such as the ones that happened in Marmara and Düzce in 1999 and in Southeastern Anatolia in 2023, Japan dispatched emergency and post-conflict reconstruction assistance, becoming one of the biggest supporters of Turkish people in difficult times. Japan's disaster relief aid may generate positive feelings among the targets of the aid and Turkish state officials, however its impact on public perceptions of Japan at the societal level is unknown. It is unclear to what extent Turkish society is aware of Japan's assistance. Future studies should address how Japan's disaster-related activities are received by the people in Türkiye systematically and scientifically.

⁴⁵ JICA Türkiye Office, "In the Memory of Kahramanmaraş Earthquakes" Mart-March 2024, https://www.jica.go.jp/turkish/overseas/Turkiye/information/topics/2024/_icsFiles/afieldfile/2024/04/04/Memorial.pdf (Access: 01.06.2024)

RISKS POSED BY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES FOR
TÜRKİYE DURING THE EUROPEAN UNION
HARMONIZATION PROCESS

Pelin Yoğun¹

World War II caused great destruction in Europe. European cities were destroyed and Europe's economic and human capital was greatly damaged. The idea of forming a union was born in order to re-establish the European balance of power and ensure permanent peace and economic cooperation in Europe.² The Treaty of Rome was signed on 25 March 1957, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The aim was the integration and development of Europe in economic, political and social fields.³

In this integration adventure of Europe, the issue of environmental protection became an area that required states to cooperate, as it had a global nature. The consequences of environmental problems go beyond the borders of states. Therefore, states have difficulty finding solutions to global environmental pollution with unilateral solutions. That's why international cooperation is essential.⁴ This cooperation may have positive results for some states due to their structures. On the other hand, for some states, it may cause high costs or a decrease in competitiveness in industrial production.⁵ In cases where the cost of the budget to be allocated to environmental protection is too high for states, which are the main actors of international relations, states accept global environmental policies in their domestic policies either by convincing their citizens or by taking coercive measures.⁶

The European Community Commission's first declaration on the environment was published in 1971. In this declaration, it was proposed to prepare a comprehensive action plan in the field of environmental protection, based on articles 100 and 235 of the EEC agreement.⁷ In 1972, the United Nations conference on the human environment was held in Stockholm. This

¹ Öğretim Görevlisi, Hakkâri Üniversitesi, Yüksekova meslek Yüksekokulu.

² Desmond Dinan, Avrupa Birliği Tarihi, Çev: Hale Akay, İstanbul, Kitap yayınevi, 2008, pp. 43.

³ Esra Çayhan, Düünden Bugüne Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri ve Siyasal Partilerin Konuya Bakışı, İstanbul, Boyut Kitapları, 1997, pp. 35.

⁴ Gökhan Orhan, Yasemin Kaya, Semra Cerit Mazlum, "Uluslararası Çevre Rejimleri: Oluşturulması, İşleyişleri ve Özellikleri", Uluslararası Çevre Rejimleri, Gökhan Orhan, Semra Cerit Mazlum, Yasemin Kaya (ed.), Bursa, Dora Yayınları, 2017, pp. 4.

⁵ Orhan, Mazlum, Kaya, *ibid.*, p. 9.

⁶ Sezai Özçelik, "Uluslararası Çevre Rejimleri ve Aktörler: Devletler, Hükümet Dışı Aktörler, Uluslararası Örgütler, Uluslararası Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları ve Çok Uluslu Şirketler", Uluslararası Çevre Rejimleri, Gökhan Orhan, Semra Cerit Mazlum, Yasemin Kaya (ed.), Bursa, Dora Yayınları, 2017, pp. 36.

⁷ Sevim Budak, Avrupa Birliği ve Türk Çevre Politikası, İstanbul, Bükre Yayınevi, 2000, pp. 114.

conference was a guide in the transformation of the European Union's environmental policie.⁸

It was decided to prepare environmental action plans as the first step of the environmental protection policy. In total, seven different environmental action plans were prepared for EEC environmental protection. The First Environmental Action Plan of the EEC (1973-1976) aimed to prevent the source of environmental pollution. It also included preventing the use of resources that would harm the ecological balance, planning settlement in cities and making regulations in the use of land. The Second Environmental Action Program (1977-1981) was an expansion of the first program. It was envisaged that the Commission would continue to prepare environmental legislation. Additionally, “*Environmental Impact Assessment (ELA)*” was brought to the agenda for the first time in this program.⁹

In the Third Action Plan (1987-1992), the need to establish mechanisms to prevent environmental pollution and environmental destruction was emphasized. It was also stated that the industry that pollutes less and uses fewer resources should be encouraged, non-recyclable waste should be used sparingly, and dependence on nuclear energy, coal and oil should be reduced.¹⁰

With the Maastricht Treaty, which came into force in 1993, the European Economic Community was renamed the European Union and gained a new legal dimension.¹¹ Articles 130r, 130s, and 130t of the Community, which concern the protection of the human environment, were expanded by the Maastricht Treaty. In addition, it was decided to carry out activities at the international level to prevent environmental problems under the environmental title of the Maastricht Treaty.¹²

In the Fourth Action Plan (1993-2000), which coincided with the period when the Community gained a new legal character, it was underlined that preventive measures should be taken before the environment was destroyed and that international measures should be taken.¹³

In the Fifth Action Plan (2002-2010), the concept of sustainability was discussed. Issues such as the recycling of waste materials, climate change,

⁸ <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/surdurulebilirlikalkinma.tr.mfa#:~:text=5%2D16%20Haziran%201972%20 tarihleri,Insan%20Çevresi%20Bildirisi%20kabal%20edilmiştir> (Access: 16.06.2024).

⁹ Cihan Dura-Hayriye Atık, Avrupa Birliği, Gümrük Birliği ve Türkiye, İstanbul, Nobel Yayıncılık, Aralık 2015, pp. 437.

¹⁰ Mehmet Samet Erdem, Fusun Yenilmez, “Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği Uyum Sürecinde Çevre Politikalarının Değerlendirilmesi”, *Optimum Ekonomi ve Yönetim Bilimleri Dergisi*, 2017, Cilt 4, Sayı 2, pp. 100-101.

¹¹ Çayhan, ob.cit, p. 351.

¹² The Treaty on European Union, https://european-union.europa.eu/institutions-law-budget/law/find-legislation_en (Access: 12.06.2024).

¹³ Erdem, Yenilmez, ob.cit, p. 100-101.

pollution of water resources and balanced consumption of water, air pollution, degradation of coastal areas, consumption of natural resources and protection of biodiversity have now become issues to be emphasized. In this context, policies began to be implemented such as recycling activities, minimizing the use of plastic, preventing unnecessary water consumption, using energy resources economically, and encouraging the use of renewable energy sources such as solar energy. In the Sixth Action Program (2001-2010), measures were taken for climate change, protection of biodiversity, economical use of natural resources and recycling of waste. This program was launched under the name “*Environment 2010: Our Future, Our Choice*”.¹⁴

The Seventh Environmental Action Plan (2013-2020) was declared with the slogan “*Better Living Within the Boundaries of the Planet*”. New concepts were used in this plan. The necessity of transition to a low carbon economy has now been expressed. A green economic model in which resources were used efficiently should have been adopted. The need to take precautions against the climate change problem was emphasized.¹⁵

In addition to the EU's environmental action plans, the Kyoto Protocol, which was signed in 1997 and entered into force in 2007, became binding for Europe and Türkiye regarding environmental protection. In fact, Türkiye became a party to the protocol in 2009. It was not included in the Annex-B list, which includes the obligation to reduce and limit greenhouse gas emissions. Still, Türkiye was involved in discussions on reducing greenhouse gas emissions around the world. It required that the amount of greenhouse gases emitted by countries into the atmosphere be reduced to the amount they emitted in 1990. According to the protocol, countries committed to reduce their emission rates by 5% between 2008 and 2012. Legislation to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases emitted from industry, motor vehicles and heating would be rearranged. Environmentalism would be the basic principle in transportation and garbage storage. Biodiesel fuels would be used instead of fossil fuels. Waste processes would be rearranged in high energy-consuming enterprises such as cement, iron-steel and lime factories. More taxes would be collected from those who consumed more fuel and produced more carbon. Thus, it was aimed to take precautions against the climate change crisis.¹⁶

On November 4, 2016, the Paris Climate Agreement came into force. According to this Agreement, the global temperature increase would be kept below 2 degrees. Again, according to the Treaty, each country would determine its own carbon emissions reduction targets. Whether these goals

¹⁴ Erdem, Yenilmez, *ibid.*, p. 101-102.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 102-103.

¹⁶ <https://iklim.gov.tr/kyoto-protokolu-i-35> (Access: 13.06.2024).

were achieved or not would be reviewed every five years.¹⁷

In order to discuss the binding nature of the EU's environmental policies for Türkiye, it is first necessary to examine Türkiye's candidacy process and negotiations for EU membership. Türkiye applied for partnership with the EEC on July 31, 1959.¹⁸ The EEC Council of Ministers accepted Türkiye's application and proposed a partnership agreement that would be valid until the membership conditions were met. This partnership was signed on 12 September 1962 under the name Ankara Agreement. Relations with the EEC continued to be developed. Türkiye's candidacy was officially approved at the EU Heads of State and Government summit held in Helsinki on 10-11 December 1999. The Accession Partnership document was prepared for Türkiye. A National Program was prepared to implement the priority reforms included in the accession partnership document. This document was reviewed by the EU in 2003, 2005, 2006, 2008. The national program was updated in 2003, 2005 and 2008 according to EU harmonization laws. Between 2002 and 2004, 8 harmonization packages were accepted in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. At the conference held in Luxembourg on October 3, 2005, Türkiye's EU accession negotiations started.¹⁹

In April 2003, Türkiye's environmental obligations in EU harmonization laws were expressed in the EU's revised Accession Partnership Document. Accordingly, Türkiye should have ensured that the EIA directive came into force and was implemented. In addition, legislation should be prepared and implementation activities should be initiated on issues such as ensuring water quality, preventing pollution, ensuring waste management, and ensuring nature protection. The environment and climate change chapter was opened to negotiation on 21 December 2009, during the Swedish term presidency. With this chapter, Türkiye entered the process of harmonizing its environmental protection policies with EU laws. EU Integrated Environmental Adaptation Strategy (UCES) was created.²⁰

In fact, Türkiye had created a provision regarding environmental protection in Article 56 of the 1982 Constitution. This article states "*Everyone has the right to live in a healthy and balanced environment. It is the duty of the state and citizens to improve the environment, protect environmental health and prevent environmental pollution. The state is obliged to ensure that everyone lives in physical and mental health.*" In 1983, environmental law no. 2872 had already been enacted. This law aimed to prevent water, soil and air pollution. Law No. 2873, enacted in 1983,

aimed to protect national parks.²¹

Although Türkiye has legal legislation regarding environmental protection, changing production activities have brought about new discussions about environmental protection in Europe. These can be summarized as taking precautions against climate change, recycling waste, reducing plastic use, protecting biodiversity, using renewable energy resources, zero emission policy, and creating sustainable cities. Türkiye makes regulations on these issues within the scope of the EU Integrated Environmental Harmonization Strategy. In the negotiations on the environment chapter in 2009, the things Türkiye had to do included industrial pollution control and risk management, water conservation framework law, and preparation of river basin protection action plan.²²

How these regulations were reflected in the Turkish press and what risks the process of adaptation to these environmental strategies poses for Türkiye has been a matter of discussion. While, on the one hand, it is necessary to make regulations on a vital issue such as the environment and human health, on the other hand, the risks that the implementation of these regulations in accordance with the standards set by the EU may pose for Türkiye appear to be an issue that needs to be investigated. The discussions reflected in the Turkish press regarding the EU's environmental harmonization laws between 1990 and 2009, when environmental policies became international, will provide information about the risks.

Türkiye's attitude towards the Kyoto Protocol was discussed in the June 17, 2008 issue of Cumhuriyet newspaper. According to the news, the Confederation of Employer Associations of Türkiye (TİSK) argued that different practices should be imposed on Türkiye from the sanctions imposed on other countries, considering the cost that joining the Protocol would bring to Türkiye's economy and industry. According to the statement made by TİSK, according to World Bank data, Türkiye's per capita emission amount in 2004 was 3.2 tons of CO₂. The European average is 8.4 tons and the world average is 4.3 tons. In this case, Türkiye's average is less than both the world and European emission average. Despite these rates, TİSK argued that it was not fair for Türkiye to be under the same emission reduction obligation as developed countries. They argued that Türkiye should accept the Kyoto Protocol only with different practices from EU countries in accordance with the development level of its own industry. Otherwise, practices would negatively affect the Turkish economy as they would increase

¹⁷ <https://iklim.gov.tr/paris-anlasmasi-i-34> (Access: 14.06.2024).

¹⁸ Çayhan, ob.cit, p. 36.

¹⁹ https://www.ab.gov.tr/turkiye-ab-iliskilerinin-tarihcesi_111.html (Access: 14.06.2024).

²⁰ <https://webdosya.csb.gov.tr/db/cygm/icerikler/ucses-belges--20180125144313.pdf> (Access: 17.06.2024).

²¹ Muhammed Yunus Bilgili, "Anayasal Bir Hak Olarak Çevre Hakkı", Çankırı Karatekin Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Cilt 6, Sayı 2, pp. 580-581.

²² <https://webdosya.csb.gov.tr/db/cygm/icerikler/ucses-belges--20180125144313.pdf> (Access: 17.06.2024).

the costs of the developing Turkish industry.²³ The risk factor we encounter here is the unequal situation that will arise when countries at different development levels are subject to the same sanctions regarding environmental protection. Turkish public opinion also demanded that this risk be taken into consideration.

An article on waste recycling was published in the newspaper's 27 December 2009 issue. In this article, according to the report titled "*Treasure in the Trash*" prepared by the Istanbul Chamber of Independent Accountants and Financial Advisors, the value of waste that is thrown away and not recycled in Türkiye reaches 1 billion 100 million lira annually. According to the report, only 2 million lira of the daily waste such as paper-cardboard, metal, glass, plastic, textile and wood, worth 5 million lira, can be recycled. It is said that the number of licensed waste recycling facilities should be increased in order to recycle waste. However, it is stated that the installation cost, excluding the building, for a medium-sized recycling facility reaches 100 million dollars. Due to this cost, it takes time to create facilities.²⁴ According to public opinion, the financial burden of the waste recycling step of environmental protection posed a risk to the country's economy.

In the publication dated June 6, 2001, it is stated that the treatment facility of the Izmir Yatağan Thermal Power Plant will be completed with a delay of one and a half years and that due to this delay, wastes that will endanger agricultural lands, tourist areas and human life are spread into the environment. The cessation of production activities at the thermal power plant, which had to be closed until the treatment plant was established within the scope of the Environmental Action Plan, would negatively affect the economy and cause unemployment. For this reason, the power plant continues its activities even though it does not have a treatment facility.²⁵

Protecting natural areas in order to preserve ecological balance had an important place in environmental action plans. Discussions about drying wetlands and damaging the ecological balance were also reflected in the press. In Türkiye, 1 million 300 thousand hectares of wetlands were destroyed from 1950 to 1998. The 27 thousand hectare Amik Lake, home to a wide variety of rare birds, was drained to obtain agricultural land. Aynaz Swamp, Regma Swamp, Avlan Lake, Karagöl and Güvenç Lake were also dried. The President of the period, Süleyman Demirel, stated that they had to dry the swamps and wetlands where different bird species lived. Malaria was a very important and widespread problem. At that time, swamps had to be drained to prevent the spread of the disease. But now there are other methods to

²³ Cumhuriyet, 17.06.2008, p.13.

²⁴ Cumhuriyet, 27.12.2009, p. 2.

²⁵ Cumhuriyet, 6.06.2001, p. 6.

protect nature and prevent the spread of diseases.²⁶ Therefore, it can be said that lack of scientific knowledge and medical inadequacy in the 20th century pose a risk of environmental destruction.

It was reported in the press that the Friends of the Earth Platform, formed by environmental organizations and voluntary organizations, would hold a meeting in Istanbul on 4-6 February 1994. This meeting would include the measures to be taken to protect the environment. In the same period, a tender was opened for the Mersin Akkuyu nuclear power plant. It brought with it environmental health debates. Rıza Akçalı, then Minister of Environment, warned that the actions of environmental groups could go too far and endanger Türkiye's industrial investments.²⁷

Discussions about the project prepared to extract gold with cyanide in the Eastern Black Sea were also reflected in the press. The ore to be mined in Artvin is small size gold. Small-sized gold can only be dissolved with cyanide. It was argued that cyanide harms natural life and human health and will destroy nearly 500 endemic plant species in the Artvin-Rize region if the necessary precautions are not taken. Sabri Karahan, general manager of Cominco mining company, which has been continuing mineral exploration in Artvin Kafkasör since 1987, stated that 10 million dollars were spent for the project from 1987 to 1995. He also stated that 4.2 trillion liras would be reflected in the lives of the people of Artvin, and 15 trillion liras would indirectly contribute to the country's economy.²⁸

In the news titled "*Distorted economy pollutes the environment*" dated March 24, 1993, the report prepared by the OECD upon Türkiye's request was included. According to the report, it was emphasized that population growth rate, migration movements, infrastructure deficiencies, lack of housing and green areas, disturbances in the balance of payments, foreign debts, energy need and very high economic growth rate increased environmental pollution. It was underlined that environmental pollution could be prevented only if an environmental policy specific to Türkiye was created by taking into account inter-regional coordination and differences.²⁹

In 1993, it was reported in the press that the world's largest solid waste disposal facility would be established in Istanbul. In the news dated August 18, 1993, the press statements of the then Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, stating that Istanbul's garbage problem would be solved, were included. The striking point in the news was that a 35 million dollar loan agreement was made with the World Bank for this solid waste disposal facility. It was stated that half of

²⁶ Cumhuriyet, 3.02.1998, p. 18.

²⁷ Cumhuriyet Sanat, Kültür, Magazin, Televizyon, 02.02.1994, 75. Yıl, Sayı: 24955.

²⁸ Cumhuriyet, 11.07.1995, p. 20.

²⁹ Cumhuriyet, 24.03.1993, p. 3.

this loan is an environmental loan with a maturity of 17 years with a grace period of 5 years, and the other half is an environmental loan with a maturity of 8 years with a grace period of 1.5 years.³⁰

In 2007, the environmental damage caused by improper waste management was again reflected in the press. It is criticized that the waste that has been kept for a long time in İkitelli Fatih Sultan Mehmet Han treatment facilities in Istanbul is released into the environment without taking precautions. It was stated that these wastes released into the environment endangered environmental health and precautions should be taken.³¹ In another news article in the same newspaper, warnings were made that transporting water from the Kızılırmak River to meet Ankara's water needs would damage agricultural areas, disrupt the ecological balance, and increase the population of harmful insects such as mosquitoes and ticks.³² In 2007, it was reported in the press that an investment of 70 million Euros was required to implement environmental policies. It is also stated that 51 million of this amount should be allocated to water and wastewater investments.³³

In the publication of Cumhuriyet newspaper numbered 26 April 1991, the "Environmental Policies for Türkiye" report of the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) was included. In the report: *"In essence, it is the production-consumption of goods and services that causes environmental pollution. In this sense, every economic activity causes environmental pollution. On the other hand, preventing environmental pollution and cleaning the pollution created also requires a cost, that is, the use of scarce resources. This means giving up the production of other goods that will use the same resources. In short, there is a same-directional relationship between production increase and environmental pollution. Moreover, since the resources allocated to environmental protection will be covered by the resources allocated to other investments, a decrease in the Gross National Product (GNP) growth rate and a slowdown in growth should be expected to occur in total investments. For these reasons, inconsistent slogans such as 'We both grow and protect the environment' ignore the environmental problem and mislead the public. Since it is against the laws of economics to produce or consume without creating any waste or residue, to take environmental protective/cleaning measures without using any resources or input into the laws of physics, it is not possible to protect the environment without making any sacrifices in terms of production-consumption and GNP increase. Then the right question should not be 'production or environment' but 'How much production/growth and how much environmental protection?' Having identified the problem in this way, SHP offered the 'polluter pays' principle as a solution proposal. Environmental sources and the degree of pollution will be determined by physical and chemical measurements. According to these measurements, businesses that*

³⁰ Cumhuriyet, 18.08.1993, p.14.

³¹ Milliyet, 15.08.2007, p. 2.

³² Milliyet, 06.08.2007, p. 13.

³³ Milliyet, 14.02.2007, p. 8.

cause environmental pollution will take the necessary measures.³⁴

According to the news published in Milliyet newspaper on August 26, 2007, it was said that global warming and thirst would cause a decrease in production in sectors such as agriculture, textile, food, dye and leather. It was reported that the decrease in water resources would lead to a decrease in agricultural products, a decrease in employment in agriculture and internal migration in the Central Anatolia, Aegean, Marmara and Mediterranean regions. It was underlined that both the public sector and the private sector should take precautions for this. It was stated that a national water law should be prepared and structures that would provide single-handed management of water should be established in the public sector. It was said that the private sector should produce with green and clean energy.³⁵

In the progress report published for Türkiye on November 8, 2016, the EU gave serious warnings to Turkey about environmental protection. The report stated that no progress had been made in controlling pollution caused by the industrial sector. It was also stated that a significant amount of financial resources should be allocated to prevent this pollution. Additionally, it was stated that limited progress had been made in air, water quality and nature protection.³⁶

As a result, international cooperation in environmental protection is important as environmental pollution has gained a global dimension. The EU had prepared action plans on environmental protection and carefully monitored the implementation of these action plans by the member countries. Türkiye's candidacy for the EU was officially approved at the summit held in Helsinki in 1999. In 2003, the EU's revised accession partnership document for Türkiye included measures to be taken regarding environmental protection. The measures to be taken within the framework of EU legislation on environmental protection were also the subject of discussion in the Turkish press. Based on the discussions in Cumhuriyet and Milliyet newspapers, possible risks that may arise for Türkiye in the process of harmonization with the EU's environmental protection legislation stand out. The first of these risks was seen as the financial burden that the budget allocated to environmental protection would bring to the economy. Additionally, the financial burden will have a negative impact on employment in the industrial sector. Another risk was ignoring the directly proportional relationship between countries' environmental pollution depending on the development level of their industries, and applying the same sanctions to less polluting countries as to more polluting countries. In other words, the fact

³⁴ Cumhuriyet, 26.04.1991, p. 9.

³⁵ Milliyet Kariyerim, 26.08.2007, p.10.

³⁶ Milliyet, 11.11.2006, p. 8.

that Türkiye did not have an environmental protection plan according to its own special conditions was seen as a risk factor by the public.

ANALYSIS OF PLASTIC WASTE IMPORTS FOR RECYCLING ON THE EXAMPLE OF TÜRKİYE

Ali Bilgin Varlık*

Introduction

The damage caused by plastic waste to the environment has reached global rates. Recycling processes for plastic waste are quite limited and expensive, and the recycling ratio can be achieved at deficient levels even in developed countries. However, recycling plastic waste and its use in industry has created an international industrial but rather commercial sector.

Until recently, Türkiye was positioned as a global importer country in this sector. Despite persistent efforts to restrict this import within the scope of Greenpeace Mediterranean's "Let Türkiye Not Be a Plastic Dump" project, this issue has not been brought to the public agenda enough in Turkish media until recently. With the Communiqué dated 31 December 2021 in the Official Gazette, Number: 31706 (p. 28) titled "Communiqué on Import Control of Wastes Kept under Control for the Protection of the Environment (Product Safety and Inspection: 2022/3)", the import of waste in the ethylene polymer group which has the largest share in plastic waste imports, and, most frequently used in daily life, is prohibited. The fact that 74% of the approximately 660 thousand tons of plastic waste imported by Türkiye in 2020 was subject to the ban with this communiqué revealed the fact that how Türkiye has been a waste dump for developed European states, especially the UK, until recently.

In this chapter, the recycling industry of plastic waste is analysed in general terms and the speculations on this issue are investigated through the example of Türkiye. To explain this basic research question, respectively; first, the framework of the problem is drawn by scrutinising the global scale of pollution caused by plastic waste and the limitations of the recycling industry. International conventions developed against plastic pollution are included in this framework to the extent of the scope of the review. Subsequently, the answer to the question "Although the recycling and recovery rates were quite low even in countries with high-tech recycling industries why Türkiye was a major part of this sector as an importer until recently?" is searched.

Unlike the PR arguments used by the sector representatives, an

* İstanbul Arel University, İİBF, International Relations Branch, E-mail: bilginvarlik@gmail.com
ORCHID: 0000-0002-5265-2321

assessment is made based on Immanuel Wallerstein's "World Systems"¹ theory; the centre-periphery relationship and the new imperialism phenomenon. The assessment also covers environmental, human security and economic aspects of the problem. The chapter discusses the functioning of the global waste trade through the importer and exporter level of analysis and examines Türkiye's position as an importer country.

What is the Global Plastic Waste Problem?

Problems created by plastic waste

Plastic waste is a direct source of two problems within the scope of environmental pollution. These are; It is plastic pollution and the carbon emissions created in areas where plastic waste is stored or accumulated. These two problems alone or together;

- 1) Physically occupy the land and sea habitats
- 2) Disrupt and change the ecological balance by polluting the environment
- 3) Cause health problems through the affected animals or people exposed to improper use of plastic containers.
- 4) Directly endangers around 500 species in the seas.

To these, we should add the environmental pollution caused by the hazardous technologies used during recycling. Disposal by burning cause air pollution and destruction by burial causes pollution in underground water resources. Those who work in the recycling sector are generally disadvantaged groups such as children, and the poor are heavily exposed to pollution but have limited access to sanitation and decontamination.

Apart from the above, it is necessary to include the greenhouse gas emissions that occur during plastic production within the scope of the plastic waste problem. The plastic production sector uses 4-8% of the world's oil and gas production.² As of 2012, the volume of greenhouse gases caused by plastic production on a global scale is 400 million tons, which corresponds to 1% of the total greenhouse gas emissions in the world.³

Reasons that make recycling difficult

There are three main reasons behind the plastic waste recycling problem. These are the increase in plastic garbage production, technological and economic limitations in recycling, and political, administrative, and legal

¹ Immanuel, Wallerstein, *The capitalist world-economy*, Cambridge University Press, 1979.

² OECD, *Improving Markets for Recycled Plastics Trends, Prospects and Policy Responses* (Policy Highlights), 24.05.2018, p. 6, <https://www.oecd.org/env/improving-markets-for-recycled-plastics-9789264301016-en.htm>, (Access 01.06.2024).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

inadequacies to reduce or overcome the plastic waste problem.

The first of these is that the production speed of plastic materials is high, plastic has widespread usage areas, and these products turn into waste in a short time because they are mostly disposable. The main reason why plastic waste is produced in large amounts and at a rapid pace must be sought in the production models and lifestyle dictated by the global economic system. The basis of the production models introduced by the global economy system, which fuelled this increase in plastic waste, originated from the thesis of Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992) and Milton Friedman (1912-2006) that since the late 1980s, growth would be achieved by increasing the supply rather than the demand in the economy, and therefore consumption should be fuelled. The lifestyle brought by this mode of production is not only economic but also stems from Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony which covers social and cultural values.⁴ As a result of this mode plastic waste production has become widespread, not only in the developed economies but also in the semi-periphery and surrounding economies. As a result of this situation, plastic waste production, which was relatively manageable on a global scale in the 1950-1970 period, increased threefold in the 1970-1990 period, while in the early 2000s, the amount of plastic waste produced reached an amount greater than the total produced in the last 40 years.⁵ As a matter of fact, 350 and 360 million tons of plastic were produced in 2017 and 2018, respectively.⁶ OECD,⁷ referring to EMF's,⁸ assumption that there will be a 5% annual increase, predicts that 1.6 billion tons of waste will be produced in the world in 2050. The UN Environment Program⁹ assess that this figure could be 1.1 billion tons.

The second reason is that a significant portion of this waste mass, which is called plastic in a very general definition, is difficult and expensive to recycle or cannot be recycled due to commercial concerns and the limitations of existing technologies.¹⁰

According to the internationally accepted classification of the UN

⁴ Anne Showstack, *Sassoon, Hegemony. Bottomore, Tom; Harris, Laurence; Kiernan, V.G.; Miliband, Ralph* (Ed.). *The Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, Blackwell Publishers, 1991.

⁵ UN Environment Programme, *Our planet is choking on plastic*, 2023, https://www.unep.org/interactives/beat-plastic-pollution/?gclid=CjwKCAiAlp2fBhBPEiwA2Q10D30rhvwSZGKIIno6Z-HtmDr1HZC4294WYuqGAcGufjTvTEabjr_FUhoChogQAvD_BwE2023 (Access 01.06.2024).

⁶ Rodrigo A. Muñoz Meneses, Gerardo Cabrera-Papamija, Fiderman Machuca-Martínez, Luis A. Rodríguez, Jesús E. Diosa, Edgar Mosquera-Vargas, *Plastic recycling and their use as raw material for the synthesis of carbonaceous materials*. *Heliyon*, 8 (3), <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405844022003164>, 2002, p. 1, cited from www.plasticseurope.org (Access 01.06.2024).

⁷ OECD, op. cit., p. 4.

⁸ EMF, *Rethinking the future of plastics and catalysing action*, 2017.

⁹ UN Environment Programme, op. cit.

¹⁰ John, Hocevar, *Circular Claims Fall Flat: Comprehensive U.S. Survey of Plastics Recyclability*, Washington, D.C: Green Peace, 20202, p. 5, <https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Greenpeace-Report-Circular-Claims-Fall-Flat.pdf>. (Access 01.06.2024).

Environment Programme,¹¹ plastic waste is classified into six categories based on its chemical structure. These are:

- 1) Polyethylene terephthalate (PET): Water bottles, dispensing containers, biscuit trays
- 2) High-density polyethylene (HDPE): Shampoo bottles, milk bottles, freezer bags, ice cream containers
- 3) Low-density polyethylene (LDPE): Bags, trays, containers, food packaging film
- 4) Polypropylene (PP): Potato chip bags, microwave dishes, ice cream tubs, bottle caps, single-use face masks.
- 5) Polystyrene (PS): Cutlery, plates, cups
- 6) Expanded polystyrene (EPS): Protective packaging, hot drink cups

Some research has shown that only PET, and HDPE can be recycled within commercial limits, while the rest can be used in other industrial sectors by preserving the chemical form of the material. For example, only 5% of the 51 million tons of plastic waste produced in the USA in 2021 could be recycled.¹² When we look at the issue on a larger scale, we see that the world's plastic waste production in the period between 1950 - 2018 was 6.3 billion tons, of which only 9% could be recycled and 12% could be converted into energy by burning.¹³ The fact that plastic wastes have a very long lifespan to spontaneously decompose in nature exacerbates this problem.¹⁴

Another reason that contributes negatively to the first and second problem areas is that, with the help of technologies developed in recent years, new plastic production has become much cheaper than plastic produced by recycling.¹⁵ This situation has led to a move away from economically expensive recycling technologies, and nature must pay the price. On the other hand, the fact that plastic containers are easy and cheap to reproduce instead of recycling them has a financial cost. The UN Environment Program estimates that this cost is around 80-120 billion dollars annually. According to this program, 85% of containers, including disposable ones, which constitute 36% of plastic waste, are abandoned to nature, and it is predicted

¹¹ UN Environment Programme, op. cit.

¹² [www.theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/oct/23/us-plastic-waste-recycled-2021-greenpeace), "Only 5% of plastic waste generated by US last year was recycled, report says", 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/oct/23/us-plastic-waste-recycled-2021-greenpeace> (Access 01.06.2024).

¹³ Geyer, R, J. Jambeck and K. Law, Production, use, and fate of all plastics ever made, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Science Advances, Vol. 3, p. e1700782, OECD, op. cit., p. 6; The Economist, "The known unknowns of plastic pollution", 3.03.2018.

¹⁴ OECD, op. cit., p. 7.

¹⁵ Hocevar, op.cit., p. 5.

that plastic waste in this context will increase by 19% by 2040.¹⁶

The third obstacle to the recycling problem of plastic waste is that efforts to protect the environment on a global scale have not been able to create regimes and rules that can prevent negligence to pollution and inefficiency in putting effective and quick measures into practice. For example, the Basel Convention, which introduced regulations on international trade of environmentally harmful and hazardous substances for the first time within the scope of the UN Environment Programme, was prepared on March 22, 1989, and it was only possible to enter into force four years later (May 5, 1992), and its text and annexes were updated in 2019.¹⁷ Similarly, the ninth meeting of the Rotterdam Convention, which's preparations started in 1998, was held in 2019,¹⁸ and the ninth meeting of the Stockholm Convention, which's preparations started in 2001, was held in 2019.¹⁹ It seems that the studies "continue at full speed" in the comfort of the UN.

On the other hand, although it continues at a slow pace, the regulations introduced by regional and global organizations, especially the UN and OECD, with the participation of many international organizations and non-governmental organizations, have been responded to by very few states in practice. Especially in geographies where developing economies and underdeveloped democracies are common, these regulations have not been adequately implemented due to local political preferences or corruption, ignorance, or insensitivity of administrative officials. The main problem here is that plastic waste is seen not as a hazardous tool that pollutes nature, but as a commercial commodity.

Plastic Waste Recycling Industry on a Global Scale

OECD notes the problematic structure of the plastic waste recycling market with four features:²⁰ First, the market and its liquidity volume are limited. Second, trade flows in this sector are small compared to total plastic waste. Third, production and market prices are highly variable. Finally, global plastic recycling rates are low and the share of recycled plastics in the plastic products market is below 10%

Looking at the issue from a close-scale perspective, Geyer et al.'s research show that as of 2015, only 14-18% of global plastic waste could be recycled, 24% was burned and converted into energy, and the remaining 58-62% was

¹⁶ UN Environment Programme, op. cit.

¹⁷ Basel Convention-, Text of the Convention, 2019, <http://www.basel.int/>, <http://www.basel.int/TheConvention/Overview/TextoftheConvention/tabid/1275/Default.aspx> (Access 01.06.2024).

¹⁸ Rotterdam Convention, Text of the Convention, 2019, <http://www.pic.int/TheConvention/Overview/TextoftheConvention/tabid/1048/language/en-US/Default.aspx> (Access 01.06.2024).

¹⁹ Stockholm Convention (2019). Text of the Convention, 2019, <http://chm.pops.int/TheConvention/Overview/TextoftheConvention/tabid/2232/Default.aspx> (Access 01.06.2024).

²⁰ OECD, op. Cit., p. 10; UN Environment Programme, op. cit.

either buried or left for free circulation in nature.²¹ As mentioned above, there are differences in the recycling rates of polymer types included in the plastic waste classification. For example, according to 2014 data from the USA, the recycling rate of PET and HDPE, which are in the first and second stages, is 19.1% and 10.5%, respectively, while this rate is 1.3% for PS and it is 0.8% for PP.²²

Table 1. Importers and Misgovernance Rates of Plastic Waste Exported by the USA and the UK

Importing State (Misgovernance of Plastic Waste)	USA Plastic Waste Exports		UK Plastic Waste Exports
	2010-2018 (million kg/thousand tons)	2019 (million kg/thousand tons)	2019 (million kg/thousand tons)
Bangladesh (87%)	4	4,5	0
China (74%)	12.284	89,6	71,6
India (85%)	892	85,5	11,4
Indonesia (81%)	370	24,3	22,5
Malaysia (55%)	535	60,6	40,0
Mexico (12%)	265,4	36,9	0
Pakistan (86%)	4	5,0	7,1
Philippines (81%)	15	7,9	0,36
Senegal (82%)	0	7,8	0
Thailand (73%)	178	27,2	1,2
Türkiye (16%)	51	29,2	153,9
Vietnam (86%)	447	3,2	0,02
Other* (> 5%)	15.234	436,3	320
Canada**	1.432	151,4	0,02
South Korea**	100	31	4,5

Explanation:

* Total of states with Misgovernance rate greater than 5%

** Also, the exporting state

Source: The Last Beach Cleanup, <https://www.lastbeachcleanup.org/plastic-waste-exports>

Databases:

BASE. Plastic Waste Exports (U.S. Census Bureau data)

U.K. Plastic Waste Exports (HM Revenue & Customs data)

Country Waste Mismanagement Rates (Jambeck et. al, 2015)²³

UN Environment Program

According to UN COMTRADE, it is seen that the countries that produce the waste mostly take measures within themselves regarding the recycling of plastic waste.²⁴ For example, as of 2015, only 4% (12 million tons) of the total 300 million tons of waste was exported to a limited number of countries.²⁵

²¹ Geyer et al. op. cit., p. 10.

²² OECD, op. cit., p. 10.

²³ Jambeck, J.R., Andrady, A., Geyer, R., Narayan, R., Perryman, M., Siegler, T., Wilcox, C., Lavender Law, K., "Plastic waste inputs from land into the ocean", *Science*, 347, (2015), 768-771, <http://jambeck.engr.uga.edu/> (Access 01.06.2024).

²⁴ UN COMTRADE, United Nations Statistics Division - Commodity Trade Statistics Database, 2018.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

Since it includes registered exports, the accuracy of this data should be taken with caution. However, as of 2016, China ranked first in waste imports with 8 million tons (60% of world plastic waste imports).²⁶ Although there is no reliable data on the operations of developed economies to get rid of plastic waste, according to the table presented with the evidence by the network page "The Last Beach Cleanup", the countries that were among the importers of plastic waste exported by the USA and the UK between 2010 and 2019 are presented in Table 1.

Considering the positions of importing countries in the UN's human development index (Table 2.) and the technological developments of these states, excluding China, it becomes clear that what is called the plastic recycling industry is essentially nothing more than a "garbage disposal operation". That is why, in the introduction of the chapter, plastic waste recycling is defined as a commercial sector rather than an industry.

Table 2. Ranking of Plastic Waste Importing States in the UN Human Development Index

Importing State (Misgovernance Rate in Garbage)*	Human Development Rankings (2022)	Importing State (Misgovernance)	Human Development Rankings (2022)
Bangladesh (%87)	129	Pakistan (%86)	161
China (%74)	79	Philippines (%81)	116
India (%85)	133	Senegal (%82)	170
Indonesia (%81)	114	Thailand (%73)	66
Malaysia (%55)	62	Türkiye (%16)	48
Mexico (%12)	86	Vietnam (%86)	115

Resources:

* Mismanagement Rate in Garbage: Jambeck et al., 2015

** Human Development Ranking: UNDP 2022²⁷

However, the market has shrunk significantly after China banned the import of plastic waste under the title of Customs Tariff Statistics Position (GTIP) 3915 as of 31.12.2018.²⁸ In fact, it is proven by around 60 investigation documents that China does not recycle, but burns and buries most of the plastic waste it imported.²⁹ This situation affects the plastic waste exports of developed economies. In other words, developed economies conduct operations to get rid of plastic waste to developing or underdeveloped economies which have poor situational awareness of environmental protection and mostly crippled democracies, authoritarian, or

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ UNDP, Human Development Insights, 2022, <https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/country-insights#/ranks> (Access 01.06.2024).

²⁸ Resource Recycling, From Green Fence to red alert, A China timeline, February 13, 2018.

²⁹ Hocevar, op. cit., p. 32.

totalitarian regimes.

Türkiye's Situation in Plastic Waste Imports

Türkiye's plastic waste imports and plastic waste recycling capacity dilemma

To better understand Türkiye's position in importing plastic waste for recycling it is necessary to first look at the data revealing the extent to which the country can recycle the plastic waste it produces. According to the classification made on a global scale, Türkiye's mismanagement record in plastic waste recycling is 16%.³⁰ In our opinion, the accuracy of this rate is quite controversial due to the lack of reliable data on the size of the plastic waste recycling sector and the volume of plastic waste produced within the country. Even if we accept this data as correct, it may seem surprising at first glance that a state that cannot recycle 16% of its total plastic waste imports plastic waste, but this situation is not unique to Turkey. For example, as of 2019, China, which could not recycle 74% of plastic waste in its country, and India, which could not recycle 85%, ranked second and fourth, respectively, in plastic waste imports from the USA and the UK.

Questions to be answered in the import–recycling capacity dilemma

It is necessary to explain the rationality of states whose capacity to recycle plastic waste in their own country is problematic, importing plastic waste from other states by paying an economic price. The first main question that comes to mind to explain this situation, which also needs to be asked through law and therefore places responsibility on prosecutors:

“What are the reasons why Türkiye, which has a low plastic waste recycling percentage and is among the states that cannot recycle a significant portion of the waste in its own country or converts it into energy by burning, which is the most inefficient and environmentally damaging method of recycling, imports plastic waste from abroad?”

Supplementary questions that will help find the answer to this basic question are:

1. Are the plastic wastes imported by Turkey imported because they are not available in sufficient quantities in Turkey?
2. How much profit is obtained from recycling imported plastic waste? In other words; (How many dollars were spent on imports + How many dollars is the cost of recycling) – How many dollars is the turnover

³⁰ UN Environment Programme, op. cit.; The Last Beach Cleanup, Listing of 60+ Investigations and Articles on Plastic Waste Exports, <https://www.lastbeachcleanup.org/plastic-waste-exports> (Access 01.06.2024).

obtained from the sale of these?

3. By what methods were imported plastic wastes recycled? What is the size and relative ratio of the methods used in recycling in tons? What is the ratio of “Green Washing (pretending as if making recycling)” in recycling?

4. How much plastic waste was transferred to Türkiye unregistered?

The problem of identification of plastic waste import and recycling industry

In order to make a sound evaluation of this sector, information is needed about the total trade volume, profitability rate, employment it provides, and the current and future costs of the environmental and humanitarian problems it causes. However, it is not possible to obtain this information under Türkiye conditions. The reason for this should be sought in the fact that economic life in Turkey consists of three layers: registered, unregistered, and illegal.

The informal and illegal economic layers are highly entangled. As a matter of fact, this issue first came to the fore in 2018 when Gökçe Saracoğlu's news about plastic waste sent from England to Türkiye was published in The Guardian.³¹ In 2021, the Izmir Branch of the Green Peace Organization brought to the agenda the unregistered plastic waste brought from Italy.³² In 2022, as a result of the research that Journalist Kit Chellel started by placing a GPS device in three of TESCO's recycling bins in London, it was published on Bloomberg that one of these plastic waste bins came to Adana/Türkiye.³³ While TESCO and the British Government remained silent about this news, the Turkish Government denied it.³⁴ Information regarding an investigation on this matter has not been made public. Although the existence of many plastic waste dumps, particularly in Adana, Izmir and Istanbul originating from foreign state transfers is revealed, a quantitative analysis has not been made due to the uncertainty of the sector.

Trend of Turkey's plastic waste imports

With a rough assessment, it is possible to follow the trend of Turkey's recent plastic waste imports through two main breaking points. The first of

³¹ Gökçe, Saracoğlu, “Turkey's plastic waste imports from the UK are booming – but at what cost?”, The Guardian, 18 Oct 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/18/uk-plastic-waste-imports-to-turkey-boom-but-at-what-cost> (Access 01.06.2024).

³² Sedat, Gündoğdu, “Atık Oyunları”, Greenpeace Akdeniz, 2022, p. 8, <https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1bERAY9pnOsEzYiuhOYLmF8t5ukFZztVV> (Access 01.06.2024).

³³ Kit, Chellel, & Wojciech, Moskwa, A Plastic Bag's 2,000-Mile Journey Shows the Messy Truth About Recycling, 29.03.2022, <https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2022-tesco-recycle-plastic-waste-pledge-falls-short/> (Access 01.06.2024).

³⁴ Greenpeace Türkiye, “Basın açıklaması: Adana Plastik Atık İthalatı”, 1.,04.2022, <https://www.greenpeace.org/turkey/basin-bultenleri/basin-aciklamasi-adana-plastik-atik-ithalati/> (Access 01.06.2024).

these is the reflection of the vacuum on Türkiye caused by China's imposed restrictions on plastic waste imports as of 2018. The second breaking point is Türkiye government restriction brought by "Communiqué on Import Control of Wastes Kept under Control for the Protection of the Environment (Product Safety and Control: 2022/3)" published in the Official Gazette dated December 31, 2021, Number 31706.

After China imposed restrictions on plastic waste imports starting from 2018, the gap created by this state in the relevant market was filled by importing states, including Turkey. Regarding the European Statistical Office (Eurostat), (2020) Assoc. Dr Sedat Gündoğdu (2022) from Çukurova University Faculty of Fisheries restrictions on plastic waste imports imposed by Malaysia, Vietnam and Thailand after China, Türkiye became Europe's new plastic waste route. According to Eurostat data, the amount of plastic waste sent to Türkiye from European countries increased 196 times from 2004 to 2022. Turkey imported 656,960 tons of plastic waste from Europe alone in 2020 [according to the data of the General Directorate of Environmental Impact Assessment, Permit and Inspection, this figure is 775,342 tons]. 209.642 tons of this amount belonged to the UK alone which indicates a 36% increase compared to the previous year [2019]. Germany became the third exporter with 136.083 tons, an increase of 102%.³⁵

Although the explanation of the impact of the restriction on plastic waste imports imposed by China only over the amount of plastic waste imported from the UK does not reflect the whole picture, it gives a rough idea of the picture in terms of the general situation. In 2018, when China stopped importing plastic waste, 105 thousand tons of the 611 thousand tons of plastic waste that the UK exported abroad were imported by Malaysia (68% increase compared to the previous year) and 80 thousand tons by Turkey, which corresponded to a 33% increase compared to the previous year.³⁶

Continuing the UK example, if we look at the situation in 2021, according to UK Trade Information System data, it is seen that approximately 18% of the waste imported by Turkey in 2021 comes from the UK, and this rate corresponds to 23% of UK exports.³⁷ In terms of tonnage, this means that Turkey imported 123 thousand 39 tons of plastic waste from the UK in 2021.³⁸

³⁵ Gündoğdu, op. cit., p. 7.

³⁶ BBC News, "Türkiye nasıl İngiltere'den en çok plastik çöp alan ikinci ülke haline geldi?" 1.01.2019, <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-46727841> (Access 01.06.2024).

³⁷ Merve, Kara-Kaşka, "Türkiye'nin plastik atık ithalatı durdu mu?" BBC Türkçe, 23.03.2022, <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-60846662#:~:text=%C3%87evresel%20Etki%20De%C4%9Ferlendirmesi%2C%20%C4%B0zin%20ve,685%20bin%20443%20tona%20indi> (Access 01.06.2024).


³⁸ *Ibid.*

When we look at the issue from an EU perspective, it is seen that the EU's plastic recycling average is 38% as of 2020,³⁹ in other words, the rate of unsuccessful governance in plastic recycling is 62%. Considering that between 2010 and 2022, plastic waste production per capita in the EU increased by 23% (+6.5 kg. increase per capita) and reached 34.6 kg., and 13.0 kg. of it can be recycled.⁴⁰

When multiplying the remaining (34.6-13 = 21.6) amount by the EU population (446.828.803),⁴¹ we get (21.6 x 446.828.803 = 9.651.502.144.8) the amount of plastic waste that cannot be recycled is approximately 97 thousand tons. However, it is not possible to evaluate how much of this amount could have been sent to Türkiye through unregistered/illegal means, considering the high corruption record of Türkiye (Türkiye ranks 101st among 180 countries in the world corruption rankings with 36 points out of 100)⁴² it is possible to reach a conclusion of serious concern.

When we move the analysis scale to Turkey's total plastic waste import data, it is seen that despite the relative decrease of 11% in 2021 compared to the previous year, there were significant increases in the 2017-2021 period (Graph 1.).

Graph 1. Turkey's Plastic Waste Imports (2017-2021)



Source: Produced from the data of the General Directorate of Environmental Impact Assessment, Permit and Inspection.

³⁹ Eurostat, "Plastic packaging waste: 38% recycled in 2020", 20.10.2022, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-20221020-1> (Access 01.06.2024).

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Eurostat, "Population on 1 January", 17.10.2022, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00001/default/table?lang=en> (Access 01.06.2024).

⁴² Transparency International, 2022, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021?gclid=EAIaIQobChMll-bzjfTn_QIVmthRCh0A2QLbEAAAYAAEgLRLPD_BwE (Access 01.06.2024).

According to the Plastic Waste Management report published by the Court of Accounts in January 2022, based on the latest 2021 data, the increasing trend in the import of plastic waste in recent years “is due to the increase in the number of licensed waste processing facilities and the emergence of the opportunity to supply cheap raw materials”.⁴³ I think it would be appropriate to reconsider this assessment, which does not take into account the withdrawal of China, the world’s largest importer, from the market.

Conclusion

Plastic waste causes environmental pollution on a global scale. This situation caused by the increase in plastic waste production, technological and economic limitations in recycling, and inadequate and incorrect governance in recycling. The fact that plastic waste consists mostly of disposable containers significantly reduces the recycling rate. Add to this the fact that the production of new plastic materials is easier and cheaper than recycling and the increasing effect of the global capitalist system based on the consumption economy on plastic waste, and it becomes clear how difficult the solution to the problem has become.

Recycling rates of plastic waste without causing harmful effects on the environment are quite low even in states with advanced technologies in this field. The fact that only two types out of six categories of plastic waste are economically recyclable, reveals the fact that the remaining categories of plastics are to be either physically broken into pieces or burned into energy.

The Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm processes carried out within the scope of the UN Environment Programme, and the efforts of other international organizations, especially the OECD, are not sufficient to prevent plastic waste disposal. Poor governance of states and illiteracy of societies are effective in this. On the other hand, the dimensions of the plastic waste sector on a global scale are not fully known. This market is generally imperfect and unstable. The top five imports from the USA and the UK in 2019 are; Türkiye, China, Canada (also an exporter of plastic waste), India and Malaysia. When the governance capacity, democratization level and human development criteria of importing states are examined, it is seen that they have serious problems in at least one of these criteria. The geographical proximity of the EU, which has serious problems in plastic waste production and occupies a large volume, creates a potential threat to Türkiye.

Türkiye’s plastic waste import issue has problematic features that require research and investigation on its own. The basic question here is why Türkiye,

which is insufficient to recycle its plastic waste, is among the largest importers in the world. It does not seem possible to solve Türkiye’s plastic waste problem without getting an answer to this question, which should be researched not only in the academic field but also in the courts.

There have been two main breaking points in Türkiye’s plastic waste import trend. The first of these is the impact of China’s restrictions on plastic waste on Türkiye’s plastic waste imports. This vacuum left by China was filled by East and Southeast Asian states such as Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand as well as Türkiye. The second breaking point is the restrictions imposed by the “Communiqué on Import Control of Wastes Kept under Control for the Protection of the Environment (Product Safety and Control: 2022/3)”, which came into force in 2022. Although it is not yet known what effect these restrictions will have, it is considered that official figures will not fully reflect the situation unless unregistered/illegal imports are prevented in the coming period.

⁴³ T.C. Sayıştay Başkanlığı (T.R. Court of Accounts), Plastik Atık Yönetimi Sayıştay Raporu (Report on waste management), January 2022, p. 7, <https://sayistay.gov.tr/reports/download/3961-plastik-atik-yonetimi> (Access 01.06.2024).

PART IV.
SOCIETAL AND DOMESTIC RISKS AND THEIR IMPACTS
ON TÜRKİYE

SOCIETAL RISKS OF GLOBALIZATION

Fazilet Ahu Özmen Akalın*

Introduction

Globalization has become one of the most influential and controversial issues of the 21st century. It is observed that with globalization, the world economy, communication methods, and cultural and social structures are changing and transforming. Along with globalization, it is seen that many risks and negatives are increasing in our living spaces. These risks and negatives are especially evident in economic, social, political, and environmental areas. Every year at the World Economic Forum held in Davos, Switzerland, these risks are discussed, analysed and solutions are sought. The main theme of this study is to address the societal risks emerging with globalization and defined as global risks by the World Economic Forum (WEF). The concept of societal polarization, included in the list for the first time as a societal risk in the 2024 forum (in previous years, it was mentioned together with erosion of social cohesion) will be discussed in the study. Analysis of other societal risks is also extremely important. However, in this study, only societal polarization will be discussed. Other risks will be the subject of further studies. In the study, firstly, the concept of globalization will be briefly defined; then Ulrich Beck's and Anthony Giddens's concept of risk society will be examined, and finally, the societal risks mentioned in the World Economic Forum held in Davos, specifically the risk of societal polarization will be studied and analysed with its causes and possible solution policies to combat these risks will be briefly presented.

Definitions of Globalization

Globalization is a deep, diverse, and multidimensional concept. There are many definitions of globalization. It is remarkable that economists, political scientists, and sociologists define globalization differently within the literature. There are various perspectives on when and by whom the multidimensional concept of globalization was first used. Briefly discussing these perspectives would be useful.

According to one point of view, as mentioned Kivılcım in her article, the concept of globalization was first introduced by British economist W. Foter in 1833 when he analysed the global distribution and usage of resources. The term was later mentioned in The Economist magazine on April 4, 1959¹.

* Associate Prof, İstanbul Kent Üniversitesi, Social Work Department, Türkiye.

¹ Fulya Kivılcım, "Küreselleşme Kavramı ve Küreselleşme Sürecinin Gelişmekte olan Ülke Türkiye Açısından Değerlendirilmesi", Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler Dergisi, Cilt 5, Sayı 1, 2013, pp.221-222

According to another perspective, the concept of globalization was first used in an article titled “Towards New Education” in 1930 to explain the role of individuals in education². Yet another perspective credits French economist François Perroux as one of the first to use the term. Perroux used the term “mondialisation” (worldization in French), also translated as mundialization, in his publications in the 1960s. All these definitions highlight the economic nature of globalization³. Although many researchers perceive globalization as an economic concept, it is known to have significant impacts in social, political, cultural, and environmental spheres as well. Particularly from the mid-20th century onward, sociologists begin to study in detail the concept of globalization.

For example, the British sociologist Anthony Giddens in his book “The Consequences of Modernity” defines globalisation as “the intensification of social relations throughout the world, linking distant localities in such a way that local happenings are formed as a result of events that occur many miles away and vice versa⁴”. By this definition we can understand that Giddens defines globalization as the core processes that have substantially enhanced the interconnectedness of different localities across the globe. In his book “Runaway world: How globalization is reshaping our lives”, he points out that “Globalization is political, technical and cultural, as well as economic⁵”. As can be understood from this definition, globalization has evolved far beyond its economic dimension.

According to him, there are 4 dimensions of globalization. The first dimension is the world capitalist economy. The second dimension of globalization is nation state system. The third dimension is the world military order and the fourth is industrial development⁶. Through globalisation, several economic, political and social facts appear and they play an important role in the construction of this new global order.

Another important sociologist, German sociologist Ulrich Beck, defines globalization as “the processes through which sovereign national states are crisscrossed and undermined by transnational actors with varying prospects of power, orientations, identities, and networks⁷”. He argues that globalization has transformed the old categories of political action away from

² Sandu Cuturela, “Globalization: Definition, Processes and Concepts,” Romanian Statistical Review Supplement, Romanian Statistical Review, Vol. 60, No. 4, November 2012, pp. 137-146 (Access: 23.05.2024)

³ Paul James & Manfred B. Steger, “A Genealogy of ‘Globalization’: The Career of a Concept”, Globalizations, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2014, pp. 417-434, DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2014.951186

⁴ Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990, p. 64

⁵ Anthony Giddens, *Runaway world: How globalization is reshaping our lives*. New York, Routledge, 1999.

⁶ Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, pp. 70-77

⁷ Ulrich Beck, *What is Globalisation*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000, p.11.

the nation-state⁸. These innovations lead not only to some transformation in the economic order but also in the social and cultural order. He also argues that globalization has multiple dimensions, including information, ecological, economic, production, and cultural globalization⁹. A new societal system emerges through the processes of globalization, leading to the appearance of new risks. It is important to emphasize that this new economic and social order which appears under the influence of a transnational system leads to new risks. Beck has a negative point of view about globalization because it causes important risks in societies.

Another German sociologist who focuses more on the negative aspects of globalization rather than the positive aspects, like Ulrich Beck, is Zygmunt Bauman. The concept of globalization has been explored in several of Bauman’s books, including “Globalization: The Human Consequences” published in 1998 and “Liquid Modernity” published in 2000. In “Globalization: The Human Consequences”, Bauman discusses how globalization affects individuals and societies, leading to changes in relationships, identities, and institutions. He argues that globalization has both positive and negative consequences, impacting people’s lives in various ways. Generally, globalization is viewed by Bauman as a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that has transformed the way we live, work, and interact with one another on a global scale.

Bauman defines globalization as a highly stratifying form of social organization which divides as much as it unites... what appears as globalization for some means localization for others; signalling a new freedom some, upon many others it descends as an uninvited and cruel fate¹⁰. He argues that globalization divides as much as it unites, creating an ever-widening gulf between the haves and the have-nots. Rather than the hybrid culture we had hoped for, globalization is creating a more homogenous world. So globalization can be seen as a mixing of populations and cultures in a singular world market. He argues that globalization has led to the fluidity and mobility of people, capital, and ideas, blurring the boundaries between nations and creating a sense of global citizenship. Mobility is a key stratifying principle in this new global order. This mobility has the power to create some social risks that the world is under their influence.

It can be observed that Bauman has a negative point of view about globalization as Ulrich Beck does. As Bordani emphasizes in his article,

⁸ William E. Kilbourne, “Globalization and Development: An Expanded Macromarketing View”. *Journal of Macromarketing*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2004, pp. 122-135. (Access: 25.05.2024)

⁹ *ibid*, pp.123-125

¹⁰ Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences*, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 2013, p. 2

according to Bauman, negative globalization undermines the rights and identity of minorities, power has been spread all over the planet¹¹. It is no longer “localized” in one precise place. The conditions of uncertainty, loneliness, and fear for the future of the global citizen do not find a solution in the institutions: thus, “*society is no longer protected by the state: it is exposed to the rapacity of forces it does not control*”¹².

In another book, “Liquid Modernity,” published in 2000, Bauman further explores the concept of globalisation in the context of modern society, characterized by fluidity, uncertainty, and instability. He examines how globalisation has transformed the way people perceive and experience the world, shaping their sense of belonging and identity. So, globalization has also an impact on societal structures and individual identities. He emphasizes that globalisation has led to the undermining of traditional social institutions and the rise of individualism and consumerism¹³. He also highlights the unequal distribution of power and resources in the globalised world, leading to poverty, insecurity, social inequality and marginalisation¹⁴.

Overall, Bauman views globalization as a double-edged sword, presenting both opportunities and challenges for individuals and societies. He warns against the risks of unrestrained globalization and advocates for greater attention to the ethics and consequences of global interconnectedness. So globalization is seen by him as a process in which individuals and societies are forced to live in a constantly changing, uncertain world.

As can be understood from these definitions, both Anthony Giddens and the two German sociologists Ulrich Beck and Zygmunt Bauman have focused on the negative aspects of globalization and have pointed out that this new process poses serious dangers and risks to the world. Besides all these definitions, there are of course other sociologists who define globalization differently. However, their common belief is that globalization has more negative aspects than positive ones, and as time progresses, it creates serious problems and risks in the world. Global risks are discussed at the World Economic Forum held in Davos every year and their effects on the world are examined. It is seen that these risks are widespread in economic, social, political, and environmental areas and acquire new characteristics every year. Before discussing the social impacts of globalization, it would be useful to examine the concepts of “risk society” and “world risk society” developed by Ulrich Beck and the concept of risk developed by the British

¹¹ Carlo Bordoni, “Introduction to Zygmunt Bauman”, *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, Vol. 3, No. 277, 2016, pp. 281-289. <https://doi.org/10.3917/rip.277.0281> (Access: 20.05.2024)

¹² *ibid.*, p. 283

¹³ Emma Palese, “Zygmunt Bauman. Individual and society in the liquid modernity”, SpringerPlus, Vol. 2, No.191, 2013, pp.1-4 (Access: 20.05.2024)

¹⁴ Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000.

sociologist Anthony Giddens.

The concepts of Risk and Risk-Society

Before discussing risk society, it would be appropriate to define the root and meaning of the word “risk” The word “risk” comes from the Latin word “*risicum*”, and it is noted that its use dates back to before modernity. In his article, Çuhacı emphasizes that Niklas Luhmann identified the word “risk” as being used in the German language in the mid-16th century, and in English from the second half of the 17th century¹⁵. In the dictionaries of the Turkish Language Association, the equivalent of the word “risk” is stated as “*riziko*”, and it is defined as the danger of suffering harm¹⁶.

Ulrich Beck defines risk society in his famous book “Risk Society”, published in 1992, “*as a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation itself.*”¹⁷ This definition emphasizes that risks are a result of the processes of modernization. Beck mentions that although risks existed in pre-modern times, today’s risks are a product of industrialization, which is also considered as result of modernity. These risks are more dangerous than those in pre-modern times as they are products of human actions¹⁸. In advanced modernity, the social production of wealth is systematically accompanied by the social production of risks¹⁹.

Therefore, Beck’s theory of risk society highlights the fact that risk society is a model of society generated by modernization and industrialization. This risk society defined by Beck is characterized by environmental, cultural, social, and scientific dangers and threats created by industrialization²⁰. On the other hand, in the risk society described by Beck, unknown and unintended consequences become a dominant force in history and society²¹. This uncertainty deeply affects societies and creates anxiety about the future of humanity. This has been worsened by technological advances and globalization, resulting in new risks that are often invisible, unpredictable, and uncontrollable. Risks emerging in certain regions spread worldwide and become increasingly difficult to control. In this sense, risk society is becoming a “world risk society”²². This new type of society is shaped by new types of

¹⁵ Ayşe Çuhacı, “Ulrich Beck’in Risk Toplumu Kuramı”, *İstanbul University Journal of Sociology*, Cilt 3, Sayı 14, 2012, p. 134

¹⁶ <https://sozluk.gov.tr> (Access: 25.05.2024)

¹⁷ Ulrich Beck, *Risk society: Towards a New Modernity*, London, SAGE Publications, 1992, p.21.

The book was firstly published in 1986, after the Chernobyl disaster in German under the name *Risikogesellschaft*. “*Risikogesellschaft*” was published in English as “*Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity in 1992*”.

¹⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 20-21

¹⁹ *ibid.*, p. 19

²⁰ Çuhacı, *op.cit.*, p.136.

²¹ Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*, p. 22.

²² *ibid.*, p.23

risks, where there is a growing global anticipation of a global catastrophe²³. These perceptions of global risk are characterized by 3 features: de-localization, incalculability, and non-compensability²⁴.

Beck's theory of world risk society highlights the interconnectedness and interdependence of global societies, and the need for collective action and cooperation to mitigate the risks facing humanity. It underscores the importance of rethinking our approaches to risk management and governance in order to navigate the complexities of a rapidly changing and interconnected world²⁵. In a world risk society, risks such as climate change, pandemics, financial crises, and technological disasters are no longer localized concerns but have the potential to affect populations on a global scale. Beck argues that these risks are created and amplified by modern technologies and globalized economies, leading to a situation where traditional risk assessments are inadequate and outdated.

In Anthony Giddens's risk analysis, similar views to Ulrich Beck's can be found. Some even believe that Giddens popularized Beck's concept of risk society. Giddens views risks as a product of modernity and states that modernity creates a culture of risk. Unlike Beck, Giddens approaches the concept of risk in terms of security and trust. According to Giddens, a risk society is a society increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety) which generates the notion of risk²⁶. By this definition, risk emerges as a social reality that affects both our present and future, leading us into uncertainty in the world we live in.

Giddens expresses his perspective as follows: *"Modernity is a risk culture. I don't mean by this that social life is inherently more risky than it used to be; for most people that is not the case. Rather, the concept of risk becomes fundamental to the way both lay actors and technical specialists organize the social world."*²⁷ He adds that *"Modernity reduces the overall riskiness of certain areas and modes of life, yet at the same time introduces new risk parameters largely or completely unknown to previous eras."*²⁸ As understood from this definition, Giddens, like Beck, states that there are new risks in the modern world we live in and that these new risks are actually invented by people. Modern societies encounter risks such as pollution, emergent illnesses, and crime, which are consequences inherent to the process of modernization. Giddens explains the dominance of new risks made by men by making a distinction. He distinguishes two kinds of risk: external risks and

²³ Ulrich Beck, "Living in a World Risk Society", *Economy and Society*, Vol.35, No.3, 2006, p. 333.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 333-334

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 338-344

²⁶ Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*, Cambridge, Polity: Reprint Edition, 2000, pp. 27-28

²⁷ Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991, pp. 3-4.

²⁸ *ibid.*

manufactured risks. According to him, the first two hundred years of the existence of industrial society were dominated by what one might call external risk: "External risk is the risk of events that may strike individuals unexpectedly (from the outside, as it were) but that happen regularly enough and often enough in a whole population of people to be broadly predictable, and so insurable."²⁹

On the other hand, there are manufactured risks³⁰. Manufactured risks are marked by a high level of human agency involved in both producing and mitigating such risks. *"Manufactured risk is risk created by the very progression of human development, especially by the progression of science and technology. Manufactured risk refers to new risk environments for which history provides us with very little previous experience."*³¹ As manufactured risks stem from human activity, theorists like Giddens and Beck maintain that societies are capable of evaluating the extent of both present and impending risks.

Influenced by the works of Beck, Giddens looks at the interrelationship of trust, risk, and danger. In modern societies, trust is derived from the socially organized knowledge in the form of abstract systems. The disembedding mechanisms have provided large areas of security, at the same time creating a new array of risks. Giddens posits that, *"The possibility of nuclear war, ecological calamity, uncontrollable population explosion, the collapse of global economic exchange, and other potential global catastrophes provide an unnerving horizon of dangers for everyone."*³² The risk is everywhere, irrespective of persons or space. Giddens has also tended to approach the concept of a risk society more positively than Beck, suggesting that there *"can be no question of merely taking a negative attitude towards risk. Risk needs to be disciplined, but active risk-taking is a core element of a dynamic economy and an innovative society."*³³

The theses of Beck and Giddens largely converge, as both connect the rise of risks to the profound transformation of society. However, Giddens' perspective diverges from Beck's specifically concerning the notion of trust, which Giddens holds in high regard³⁴. He argues that it is imperative for global expert knowledge to restore the lost confidence, acknowledging that risk can also be interpreted as an opportunity, with significant implications for achieving desired outcomes³⁵.

²⁹ Anthony Giddens, "Risk and Responsibility." *The Modern Law Review*, Vol. 62, No. 1, 1999, p.4, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1097071>. (Access 28.05 2024).

³⁰ *ibid.*

³¹ *ibid.*

³² Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, p. 125.

³³ Anthony Giddens, *Runaway World: How Globalization Is Reshaping Our Lives*, New York, Routledge, 2003, p. 35

³⁴ Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, pp.79-100

³⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 130-150

It can be said that according to Anthony Giddens risk is an inherent aspect of modern society. In their works, he posits that as society becomes increasingly globalized and complex, individuals are exposed to a multitude of potential risks and uncertainties. These risks can arise from various sources, such as environmental threats, economic instability, or technological advancements. He emphasizes that individuals must navigate these risks by making informed choices and taking proactive measures to mitigate potential harm. He introduces the concept of “reflexivity,” which refers to individuals’ ability to critically assess and adapt their actions in response to changing circumstances³⁶. Through reflexivity, individuals can minimize the negative impacts of risk and enhance their control over their lives.

After defining globalization and risk societies, the final section of the study will address the societal³⁷ risks believed to be caused by globalization. Among these societal risks, the concept of “societal polarization” highlighted at the World Economic Forum held in Davos will be discussed in more detail.

Societal Risks of Globalization

As seen in the analysis of risk and risk society made by Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck, global risks emerge as a result of modernity and globalization. One of the most striking points in the views of both sociologists is the unpredictability and uncertainty of the risks that humans themselves create in today’s global and modern societies. Humanity is constantly faced with the possibility of encountering a new risk or danger at any moment and in any place.

The World Economic Forum (WEF) defines global risk as “*the possibility of the occurrence of an event or condition which, if it occurs, would negatively impact a significant proportion of global GDP, population or natural resources.*”³⁸ So a global risk can be defined as any problem that negatively impacts the global community and the environment, potentially in a catastrophic way, including environmental problems, political crisis, social issues, and economic crisis.

The negative impacts created by these global risks affect the entire world and threaten every place equally. As sociologists have pointed out, a risk that begins in one place can quickly spread to another place. When we look at the

³⁶ Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, pp. 36-45

³⁷ In the Report of World Economic Forum, “societal” is used instead of “social”.

According to Webster’s Dictionary, “societal” means “pertaining to large social groups or to their activities, customs, etc.,” whereas “social” means “relating to the life, welfare, and relations of human beings in a community. Carol YY. Lin, Jeffrey Chen, (2016). “Definition and Comparison of Societal Innovation and Social Innovation. In: *The Impact of Societal and Social Innovation*”. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1766-7_2 (Access: 30.05.2024)

In this study, the word “societal” used in the WEF will be utilized. Researchers prefer to use both words in studies related to the topic. Generally, it is believed that these two words have similar meanings.

³⁸ https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_The_Global_Risks_Report_2024.pdf, p. 95. (Access: 1.04.2024)

social issues prevailing worldwide today, it can be seen that some of them have become dominant with the influence of globalization. Global problems, unlike international problems, are growing and spreading worldwide as a result of interdependence and interconnectedness, making it even more difficult to take precautions against these risks³⁹.

Global risks that deeply impact societies are discussed and analysed in detail in the World Economic Forum each year held in Davos. This year, 2024, 10 global risks were identified as the biggest and most dominant risks in the world. These risks are presented in the table below with 2-year and 10-year timelines. It is noted that environmental risks such as air pollution and extreme weather events; economic risks like inflation; technological risks such as misinformation and cyber insecurity; and social risks including societal polarization and involuntary migration are among the most significant risks.

The 124-page report published by the World Economic Forum provides detailed information about the global risks that the world is facing, and the definitions of each risk are given in the final pages of this report⁴⁰. The report identifies societal polarization and involuntary migration as well as inflation, erosion of human rights, inequality or lack of economic opportunity, infectious diseases, insufficient public infrastructure and services, and unemployment as other societal risks.

As stated in the introduction of the study, this section will only focus on societal polarization. Discussing specifically societal polarization is considered useful among the societal risks emerged as a result of globalization. The issue of other societal risks, as involuntary migration, will be discussed in a different study. Furthermore, the Report’s emphasis on societal polarization compared to other societal risks demonstrates how important this risk is as a new global risk in the world. There are various definitions of societal/social polarization made by social scientists. If we take a look at some of these definitions:

Societal polarization is defined in the Global Risk Report 2025 as “*ideological and cultural divisions within and across communities leading to declining social stability, gridlocks in decision-making, economic disruption, and increased political polarization.*”⁴¹ According to Caves, social polarization is the segregation within a society that emerges when factors such as income inequality, real-estate fluctuations and economic displacement result in the differentiation of social groups from high-income to low-income. It is a state and/or a

³⁹ John.L. Seitz, Kristen A. Hite, *Global Issues: An Introduction*, Fourth Edition, John Wiley and Sons, West Sussex, 2012


⁴⁰ <https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-risks-report-2024/>

⁴¹ *ibid.*, p.97

tendency denoting the growth of groups at the extremities of the social hierarchy and the parallel shrinking of groups around its middle⁴². As a result, polarisation can be understood as a process of sharpening differences between groups in society that can result in increased tensions. It is a potential amplifying cause of the diverse psychological and social factors that make people vulnerable to radicalisation.

Table 1. Top 10 Global Risks

Please estimate the likely impact (severity) of the following risks over a 2-year and 10-year period.



Source: World Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey 2023-2024.

It is observed that serious studies on polarization are being conducted by L'EFUS.⁴³ The BRIDGE Project is one of them⁴⁴. In this project, it is

⁴² Roger W. Caves, *Encyclopedia of the City*, Routledge, London, 2004, p. 616 in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_polarization#cite_note-1 (Access: 22.05.2024)

⁴³ The European Forum for Urban Security (Efus) is the only European network dedicated to fostering discussion, cooperation and support among local and regional authorities in the field of crime prevention and urban security. Founded in 1987, it brings together nearly 250 cities and regions from 17 countries. <https://efus.eu/uncategorized/bridge-building-resilience-to-reduce-polarisation-and-growing-extremism/>. (Access: 25.05.2024)

⁴⁴ BRIDGE (Building resilience to reduce polarisation and growing extremism) is a project carried out with the EFUS to raise awareness among local actors and strengthen their capacity to reduce individual and collective vulnerability to radicalisation while at the same time mitigating the phenomenon of polarisation. Efus is the leader of the project in partnership with local authorities and associations: Brussels

observed that the issue of polarization in pluralistic democracies is addressed, and serious analyses are carried out in an article written by Austrian political scientist Markus Pausch⁴⁵. Pausch emphasizes the concept of social solidarity erosion, defined as a societal risk in previous summits before the World Economic Forum of 2024, highlighting the existence of social solidarity erosion in many countries before the formation of societal polarization. This lack of solidarity has led to political, economic, and cultural divisions and polarizations in many countries, resulting in unexpected events (for example, the yellow vests protests in France creating divisions within society).

Pausch explains that at the heart of polarization lies differences, which can also be on an identity level. For example, according to Brandsma's definition, polarization is related to the construction of identity: *"Polarization is defined as a thought construct based on a preconceived notion of identities - the identities of others who are presented as being "different". This phenomenon involves communication and thought based on "us vs. them."*⁴⁶ These divisions are seen to lead to different social cleavages in society, resulting in risks such as conflict, internal strife, crime, and violence, which continue to emerge and persist in societies.

On the other hand, Pausch attributes polarization to both structural and ideological causes⁴⁷. These causes can also give rise to new risks with potential consequences. Structural causes mainly stem from the structure and culture of a society. For example, in European societies, structural causes can include socio-economic inequalities, gender inequalities between women and men, inequalities experienced by ethnic and religious minorities, and inequalities in access to political rights. It can be said that the fundamental cause behind structural causes that lead to polarization lies in the principle of inequality.

Pausch argues that when these structural causes are combined with ideological beliefs, polarization is strengthened. Ideologies that can lead to social and political polarization are emerging as more marginal and extremist ideologies⁴⁸. These may include extreme left and extreme right ideologies. A new example of extreme nationalist can be given. A neo-fascist protestation took place on May 11 in Paris. According to information shared by FranceInfo, at least 600 far-right protesters gathered in the heart of the capital. This was an annual manifestation organized by the "Committee of

(BE), Departmental council of Val d'Oise (FR), Düsseldorf (DE), Government of Catalonia (ES), Genk (BE), Igoumenitsa (GR), Leuven (BE), Reggio Emilia (IT), Region of Umbria (IT), Rotterdam (NL), Terrassa (ES), Stuttgart (DE), Vaulx-en-Velin (FR), Ufuq (DE), Real Instituto Elcano (ES). (<https://efus.eu/bridge-en/>) (Access : 25.05.2024)

⁴⁵ Marcus Pausch, "Polarization in Pluralist Democracies: Considerations about a complex phenomenon", https://www.fisu.it/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/BRIDGE_polarisation-in-pluralist-democracies_Contribution_Markus_Pausch_EN.pdf (Access: 25.05.2024)

⁴⁶ *ibid*, p.3.

⁴⁷ *ibid*, pp.5-7

⁴⁸ *ibid*, p.6

May 9”, in homage to a former GUD (Groupe Union Défense) militant who died 30 years ago. The protestation has caused great concern within French society⁴⁹.

Pausch also states in his statements that some polarizations can lead to positive outcomes in societies. To explain this, he makes a comparison “benign polarization” and “pernicious polarization”⁵⁰. In pluralist societies where benign polarization occurs, the process progresses by establishing what Pausch calls a “dialogue” with political authorities and, as a result, democratic and liberation processes begin to unfold for different poles. Some of the consequences of this process include granting the right to vote, integrating minorities into society, and promoting more equality.

Another type of polarization, pernicious polarization, can lead to more dangerous consequences and new risks in societies. For example, negative situations such as violent extremism can emerge as a result of a dialogue established with political authority. This violence can in turn lead to extremely negative situations such as state terrorism, an authoritarian political system, terrorism, and civil war. In this type of polarization, political differences lead to a loss of trust and quickly spread between the two camps. As Brandsma points out, the group solidifies and a “us vs them” mindset emerges⁵¹.

The Report of the World Economic Forum mentions that “divisive factors such as political polarization and economic hardship are diminishing trust and a sense of shared values. Societal polarization, alongside Economic downturn, is seen as one of the most central risks in the interconnected “risks network”, with the greatest potential to trigger and be influenced by other risks⁵²”.

The loss of trust pointed out by Pausch overlaps with Giddens’ concept of trust. In his studies, Giddens often points out that social actors lose their trust in the system in the face of risks and emphasizes the need to rebuild trust in order to protect and escape from risks. Therefore, the issue of trust plays an important role in combating global risks such as polarization. It is also a crucial component of social interactions and relationships. In his book “The Consequences of Modernity”, Giddens argues that trust is essential for individuals to navigate the complexities of modern society. Without trust, social interactions can become strained, and society can become fragmented.

According to sociologists, communication tools and social media play a significant role in the formation and spread of societal polarization. The

⁴⁹ https://www.francetvinfo.fr/politique/reportage-vous-n-etes-que-des-fachos-plusieurs-centaines-de-militants-d-ultradroite-manifestent-a-paris_6538370.html (Access: 25.05.2024)

⁵⁰ Pausch, op.cit, pp.9-11

⁵¹ *ibid*, p.9

⁵² <https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-risks-report-2024/>, p.16 (Access: 25.05.2024)

World Economic Report of 2024 clearly indicates a serious relationship between misinformation and societal polarization, stating that they feed off each other. This is explained in the Report with the following sentence: “Many countries are still struggling to regain lost years of progress that arose from the COVID-19 pandemic, creating fertile ground for misinformation and disinformation to take hold and polarize communities, societies and countries.”⁵³ Political leaders in power try to conduct their own policies by spreading fake news or creating a lack of information, in an attempt to suppress opposition groups. Pausch points out that social divisions can aid politicians in maintaining power⁵⁴. They achieve this by undermining their opponents and critical voices and by exploiting the media, which plays a significant role in the polarization process, to their advantage. It can be said that pernicious polarization is tied to the strategies of communication et these strategies have the power to manipulate the public.

According to Marc Lynch, digital media, and more specifically social media platforms, have the potential to contribute to social polarization⁵⁵. Social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Clubhouse, and Instagram are sometimes used by social groups to spread and share their own ideas, and sometimes to manipulate society. This situation not only demonstrates polarization within society, but also has the potential to lead to new polarizations in society. The widespread prevalence of misinformation and fake news today can be attributed to the presence and power of social media.

The Report of World Economic Forum 2024 emphasizes clearly the relationship between misinformation/disinformation and societal polarization. The Report states that “Misinformation and disinformation and Societal polarization are seen by GRPS respondents to be the most strongly connected risks in the network, with the largest potential to amplify each other. Indeed, polarized societies are more likely to trust information (true or false) that confirms their beliefs.”⁵⁶ Another point indicated by the Report about the impact of misinformation is that societies may become polarized not just in their political affiliations but also in their perceptions of reality, presenting a substantial challenge to social cohesion and mental health. The Report mentions that “When emotions and ideologies overshadow facts, manipulative narratives can infiltrate the public discourse on issues ranging from public health to social justice and education to the environment. Falsified information can also fuel animosity, from bias and discrimination in the workplace to violent protests, hate crimes and terrorism.”⁵⁷

⁵³ *ibid*, p.13

⁵⁴ Pausch, op.cit, p.9

⁵⁵ Marc Lynch, “How the Media Trashed the Transitions”, Journal of Democracy. Vol. 26, No 4, 2015, pp. 90–99

⁵⁶ <https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-risks-report-2024/>, p.20

⁵⁷ *ibid*.

The Report indicates that there are also other risks associated with societal polarization. For example, environmental risks as extreme weather, lack of economic opportunity, involuntary migration are seen as other risks that contribute to the emergence of societal polarization. The report analyses in particular the lack of economic opportunity, which is a new entrant to the global risks list. It is listed among the top 10 risks over the next two years and is expected to worsen in perceived severity over the longer term. Alongside unemployment as a primary driver, GRPS respondents believe that a lack of economic opportunity arises from a complex combination of other global risks. The Report emphasizes that “*This includes short-term economic risks, such as Economic downturn and Inflation, and pressing societal risks such as Erosion of human rights, intrastate violence and societal polarization*”⁵⁸.

When looking at the studies related to polarization and analysing the report’s findings on this issue, it can be seen that societal polarization, defined as a global risk, will pose a very serious threat worldwide in the short and long term if measures are not taken depending on its causes. Societal polarization, which is related to many global risks and feeds on these risks, has the potential to cause political divisions, an increase in extreme right or extreme left ideological views, hate crimes, criminality, and many other negative social events in societies. Scientific research and social policies produced by states and international organizations to minimize these risks are of great importance.

Conclusion

The information shared in both the report and the analyses of sociologists studying polarization, specifically societal polarization, show that new global risks have emerged as a result of globalization in societies. In the Report of World Economic Forum 2024, societal polarization and involuntary migration stand out among societal risks. Specifically, political conditions, multicultural structures in societies, people losing trust in states and other political actors, climatic conditions, economic instability, and misinformation are highlighted as the main causes of societal polarization.

Increasing polarization in societies, based on religious, ethnic, or national factors, is seen not only as a risk but also as a social phenomenon that will have long-lasting effects on the world. Although the consequences of this social phenomenon and risk on societies and the world system are visible, there is also a strong possibility of causing unexpected disasters. The consequences of these risks can also be psychological. In societies that have lost trust in the system, psychological disorders such as anxiety, fear, and anguish can occur. These emotional disorders, which social psychologists and psychologists have the tendency to define as pathological, can lead to social-

⁵⁸ *ibid*, p. 57.

psychological consequences in the long term such alienation, isolation, loneliness. For these reasons, Anthony Giddens emphasizes the importance of trust in his analyses. Trust is a crucial factor in individuals’ ability to cope with risks and dangers. Societies that have lost trust in their system and political authorities are always at risk of experiencing various negative consequences. Social scientists emphasize the rebuilding of people’s trust in political authorities in combating global risks. On the other hand, reminding and rebuilding the importance of social solidarity, social cohesion and unity can benefit societies in dealing with these risks. It is important to always remember the significance of solidarity and unity in protecting and saving a society from internal and external threats, without forgetting the importance Émile Durkheim placed on social solidarity in his sociological analysis.

IMPACTS OF MIGRATION ON TÜRKİYE

Tolga Otabatmaz*

Introduction

The concept of migration is based on “relocation”. Throughout history, human beings have relocated for a number of reasons such as famines, wars, environmental conditions and diseases. Therefore, by migrating, human beings leave the place where they live permanently or temporarily and enter another space and socio-cultural environment. In the new environment, they become both an agent of and subject to change.

The concept of migration, which is one of the most important causes of social change, is one of the most significant problems in the world today. On one hand, people migrate from rural areas to cities or from underdeveloped countries to developed countries in order to have a better life, and on the other hand, they go to other countries *en masse* to ensure their safety of life due to internal turmoil and wars. Migration is not only a population movement and has a number of effects on the new settlements. One of the most important effects of migration is its impact on social structure. In this context, it is inevitable that migration to Türkiye will also have effects on the change of social structure. Throughout history, there have been migrations to Türkiye from Balkan countries and Caucasia. These migrations continued after the Second World War, from Bulgaria in 1989, during the war in Yugoslavia between 1992 and 1995. In 2011, due to the civil war in Syria, migration towards Türkiye has become a phenomenon that will affect the social structure, economy and security. The ethnic and cultural structures of migrants and the places they come from are also important factors in terms of social cohesion and integration with the society in the new places.¹

In the study, firstly, migration will be defined from a conceptual point of view and the reasons for migration will be revealed, and then the effects of migration on Türkiye in terms of economic, social and security will be analysed within the framework of Syrian migrants. At this point, it should be noted that no nation is targeted and only through Syrian migrants the effects of migration on Türkiye are described.

Conceptual Framework

In recent years, there has been an intense migration mobility in the world.

* Dr., T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Türkiye.

¹ Mim Sertaç Tümtaş, Cem Ergun, “Göçün Toplumsal ve Mekânsal Yapı Üzerindeki Etkileri”, Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt 21, Sayı 4, 2016, pp. 1347-1348.

These migration movements intensely affect the social, political, economic and cultural lives of both source and destination countries. In this context, it can be said that there are very few phenomena that are as effective as migration on civilisation.²

Migration should only be considered in its own terms because there is no fundamental difference between the structural causes of irregular migration and of regular migration. Migration, whether regular or irregular, is initially primarily a project and there is a decision to leave. However, migration can only become “irregular migration” when it is set in motion on the chosen route.³ Migrants fleeing wars and oppression on the one hand, and inequality on the other, have started to unite under the subject of migration. As a result, asylum and irregular migration have begun to be regarded as interrelated rather than legally separate issues.⁴

The concept of migration is analysed from a wide perspective and has no specific definition. The definitions of the concept of migration examined by different disciplines are also different, so it is difficult to make a general definition. For example, it is being studied within the frame of political reasons and its effects on politics in political science, economic reasons and economic effects in economics, cultural effects in sociology, and its effects on changes in the settlement area in geography.⁵

When migration defined in terms of results, it can be explained as a population movement that has geographical, economic, cultural, social and political consequences.⁶

To summarise, migration is essentially a movement of relocation and there are reasons for it, it has two types, internal and external, and has a profound impact on every aspect of human life.⁷

Contemporary migration trends can be analysed under four main headings. Firstly, migration has gained a global dimension (the number of sending countries is increasing, which causes a change in the cultural structure of the destination countries, and migration takes place worldwide), secondly, migration is accelerating (the potential of migration phenomenon is increasing and this situation causes countries to develop policies related to

² Demetrios P. Papademetriou, “Managing International Migration Better: Principles and Perspectives for Gaining More from Migration”, *Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century: A New Deal or a Continuing Dialogue of the Deaf?*, Demetrios P. Papademetriou (Ed.), Lisbon, MPI, 2006, p. XV.

³ Thematic Meeting on The root causes of irregular migration, Towards a Common Understanding and Solutions, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Paris, 2018, p. 4.

⁴ Maurizio Ambrosini, *Irregular Immigration in Southern Europe, Actors, Dynamics and Governance*, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, p. 2.

⁵ Abu Torab Rasooly, *Afgan Göçmenlerinin Sosyo-Ekonomik ve Kültürel Özellikleri Üzerine Bir Analiz, İstanbul Örneği*, (Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi), İstanbul, Marmara Üniversitesi, 2020, p. 9.

⁶ İnan Özer, *Kentleşme, Kentleşme ve Kentsel Değişim*, Bursa, Ekin Kitabevi, 2004, p.11.

⁷ Rasooly, op.cit, p. 11.

migration), migration is diversifying (there has been a change in the type of people migrating and its diversity has increased, so that there are no longer only people migrating for work, but also people migrating for different purposes), migration is becoming feminised (while men used to migrate more in the past, nowadays women migrate more than men in the context of labour migration).⁸

Migration is a multidimensional and complex phenomenon; therefore, the factors influencing migration are also multidimensional and complex.⁹ In this context, there are a number of periodic and structural types of migration that are effective in the emergence of migration crises on a global scale. These are migration flows caused by economic integration, migrations caused by wars and civil wars, security-oriented policies of nation states and the resulting migrations, and migrations caused by climate change.¹⁰

To put it briefly, there are two dimensions underlying migration movements. The first one is the push-pull model and the socio-economic reasons considered in connection with this model, and the second one is the factors that arise mainly due to ecological or political reasons and constitute the causes of forced migration.¹¹ According to Rasooly, the reasons for migration can be classified in three groups, namely, natural reasons, economic reasons and political reasons.¹²

Regardless of the reason, migration leads to great transformations in the place of migration. While people themselves change both during the migration process and as a result of migration, they also cause changes in the places they come. In other words, migration causes changes in urban spaces and the socio-economic structure of the city.¹³ In order for the changes experienced in places to be considered within the scope of migration, the change experienced must create an impact by being within a meaningful distance and continuity.¹⁴

Human beings are at the centre of social change. They both affect and are affected by social events. In other words, human element is the most important element of social change. Change is a process that starts and

⁸ Stephen Castles, Mark J. Miller, *Göçler Çağı, Modern Dünyada Uluslararası Göç Hareketleri*, çev. Bülent Uğur Bal, İbrahim Akbulut, İstanbul, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008, p. 12.

⁹ Erol Tümertekin, Nazmiye Özgüç, *Ekonomik Coğrafya/Küreselleşme ve Kalkınma*, İstanbul, Çantay Kitabevi, 2011, p. 408.

¹⁰ Muzaffer Bımay, “Küresel Göç Krizleri ve Uluslararası Göçlerin Geleceğine İlişkin Bir Değerlendirme”, *Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Cilt 12, Sayı 2, 2022, p. 94.

¹¹ Mim Sertaç Tümtaş, *Türkiye’de İç Göçün Kentsel Gerilime Etkisi: Mersin Örneği*, (Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi), Muğla, Muğla Üniversitesi, 2007, p. 12.

¹² Rasooly, op.cit, p. 9.

¹³ Tümtaş, Ergun, op.cit, p. 1349.

¹⁴ Sema Erder, *Refah Toplumunda Getto*, İstanbul, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006, p. 23.

develops. In this context, time is also an important factor in change. In addition, every change takes place in a certain geographical area, so the dimension of space is one of the most important elements of change. In this context, it can be said that change has three elements as human, time and space.¹⁵ The combination of these three elements constitutes the basis of social change. As mentioned above, the most important factor triggering this change is migration.

Spaces have been an important factor in the formation of identities, political and social belonging throughout history. Space has been one of the essential elements in the formation of unions or differences such as belief, homeland, nation, ethnicity. There is a direct relationship between the survival and development of such structures and their adaptation to the space in which they exist. In this context, failure to adapt to spatial conditions has an important role in the development, erosion or collapse of political systems or civilisations. Technological developments have also started to deteriorate the relationship between human beings and space in favour of human beings. This deterioration has brought many negative effects on human beings in the medium and long term.¹⁶ Large-scale mass migrations have had an accelerating and deepening effect on the deterioration of the relationship between people and space.

What makes human beings and human related things meaningful and valuable is the bond they have established with space. Migration is an element that damages the bond between human and space. From the human perspective, migration causes change and transformation in the world of meaning and value of the individual and society. The human being and everything related to it in both the abandoned and newly settled place are affected by this change and transformation.¹⁷

In this context, migration triggers change and transformation in social structure and space. Migrants relocate not only themselves but also the socio-cultural characteristics of the region they come from to their new places of settlement and create cultural interaction. Migration causes contact and communication between people who are culturally and geographically different from each other, as well as mutual influence of behavioural patterns and the formation of new ideas.¹⁸ The most important factor in cultural interaction is whether migrants have socio-cultural differences with the people in the new place where they migrate, because this difference plays a decisive role in their integration into the new social structure. Where socio-

¹⁵ İsmail Doğan, *Sosyolojik Kavramlar ve Sorunlar*, Ankara, Pegem Akademi Yayıncılık, 2012, p. 224.

¹⁶ Celaleddin Çelik, "Göç, Kentleşme ve Din", *Din Sosyolojisi*, N. Akyüz, İ. Çapcıoğlu (Ed.), Ankara, Grafiker Yayınları, 2012, pp.298-299.

¹⁷ Süleyman Ekici, Gökhan Tuncel, "Göç ve İnsan", *Birey ve Toplum*, Cilt 5, Sayı 9, 2015, pp. 9-10.

¹⁸ Doğan, *op.cit.*, p. 202.

cultural differences are big, interaction and harmonisation are more difficult. The profile of the social structure stands out as the main determinant at this point.

There is a difference between the attitude towards voluntary migration movements and the attitude towards forced migration. This is so because the socio-cultural effects of forced mass migration are deeper and more traumatic.¹⁹

There is a mutual relationship between migration and culture. Migrants affect the culture of their destination and are influenced by the culture of that place. In this context, migration stands out as one of the main causes of cultural interaction and change.²⁰ Through this interaction, the seeds of change and transformation are sown, but in societies where interaction is problematic, problems of segregation and assimilation are observed, while in societies where interaction is not problematic, social change is observed as a result of integration. On the other hand, the cultural diversity brought by migration is accepted up to a point, but this diversity becomes a problem after a certain point as it can threaten social identity and culture by directly changing the ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic composition of the population.²¹

Migration and Türkiye

As migration has become a global problem, migration movements have also become a security problem. Security problems are addressed separately on the basis of state, society and individual. In this context, while the security of the state and society comes to the forefront in countries receiving migration, human-based security comes to the fore from the perspective of migrants and refugees.²² Today, economic and environmental problems and migrations have caused the concept of security to expand from its military meaning during the Cold War to include national and cultural areas.²³

According to the Copenhagen School, social security is "a society's insistence on its basic character even under changing conditions and possible or real threats." In the political, economic, environmental and military fields the object of reference is the state, but in social security the object of

¹⁹ Sibel Çetiner, "Uluslararası Göçün Sosyo-Kültürel Etkilerinin Değerlendirilmesi: Türkiye Örneği", *Mustafa Kemal Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Cilt 18, Sayı 47, 2021, pp. 2-3.

²⁰ Kemal H. Karpat, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Etnik Yapılanma ve Göçler*, çev. Bahar Tırnakçı, İstanbul, Timaş Yayınları, 2013, p. 9.

²¹ Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century", *International Affairs*, Vol. 67, No. 3, 1991, p. 447.

²² Doğu Şimşek, Ahmet İçduygu, "Giriş: Uluslararası Göç, Politika ve Güvenlik", *Toplum ve Bilim Dergisi*, Sayı 140, pp. 9.

²³ Ole Waever, "Societal Security: The Concept", *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre (Ed.), London, Pinter Publishers Ltd., 1993, p. 24.

reference is society. Social security reduces the objects of reference to two common units. These are the state and society. Security is influenced by dynamics at the personal and global system levels.²⁴ International migration causes people with different religion, language and culture to live together in a country. This is not an easy process and brings about social problems that are becoming increasingly difficult to solve.²⁵ In this framework, migration causes significant problems both for migrants and the country they migrate, regardless of whether migration is regular or irregular.²⁶

Technological innovations and ease of transportation facilitate migration and play a role in making it a global problem.²⁷ There may be different routes that migrants use when travelling to the destination country. For example; West African Route, West Mediterranean Route, Central Mediterranean Route, Eastern Route, Western Balkan Route, Black Sea Route, Eastern Border and routes such as Greece, Albania are used.²⁸ Mediterranean countries are more affected by this situation. Türkiye, Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain are particularly affected. These countries have become the target of migration flows in recent years due to their geographical location and socio-economic attractiveness.²⁹

Upon analysis, it will be seen that Türkiye features a special situation. This is so because there is neither only forced migration nor voluntary migration. At the same time, Türkiye applies an open door policy and people without official documents such as passports and ID cards are also granted entry. In addition, citizenship is granted in return for the purchase of real estate worth USD 400,000 or more.³⁰ As of 2023, it was announced that more than 357,000 properties were sold, and it can be predicted that this figure may increase even further. In addition, it is not known how many of the real estate buyers have acquired Turkish citizenship. Again, as of 2023, more than 238,000 Syrians have obtained citizenship (people from other countries are not included in this number).³¹ Türkiye currently presents an image where irregular, regular, paid citizenship, forced and voluntary migrants are all present and mixed together.

²⁴ Barry Buzan, Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 212-213.

²⁵ Taylan Akkayan, *Göç ve Değişme*, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1979, p. 21.

²⁶ Onur Yağcıoğlu, *Göç Sorunu Bağlamında Türkiye-Avrupa İlişkileri*, (Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi), İstanbul, Beykent Üniversitesi, 2017, p. 8.

²⁷ Çetiner, op.cit, p. 2.

²⁸ Yener Şişman, Bora Balun, "Transit Göç ve Türkiye", *Anadolu Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Cilt 21, Sayı 2, 2020, p. 66.

²⁹ Gökay Özerim, *Avrupa'da Göç Politikalarının Ulusüstüleşmesi ve Bir Güvenlik Konusuna Dönüşümü: Avrupa Göç Tarihinde Yeni Bir Dönem mi?*, *Ege Stratejik Araştırmalar Dergisi*, Cilt 5, Sayı 1, 2014, p. 26.

³⁰ <https://www.invest.gov.tr/tr/investmentguide/sayfalar/acquiring-property-and-citizenship.aspx> (Access 08.05.2024)

³¹ <https://www.dunya.com/gundem/bakan-yerlikaya-238-bin-55-suriyeli-vatandaslik-aldi-haberi-713813> (Access 05.05.2024)

Türkiye has extensive land and sea borders with its neighbouring countries. Due to the socio-economic and political situation in the source countries, Türkiye has become both a destination country and a transit country for migrants wishing to reach the EU. Türkiye has approximately 3,000 km of land borders and 8,333 km of sea borders. This situation shows the difficulty of the situation Türkiye faces in terms of irregular migration and poses the problem of protecting these borders. Türkiye's eastern borders are entry points and western borders are exit points.³²

The relationship between migration and growth is a complex problem. Causality is the first problem in this regard. For example, in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries, resource-rich, growing New World countries became a magnet for migration from countries in Europe where there was a surplus of labour. Here we can say that it is usually the opportunities and rapid growth in the destination country that encourage migration.³³ There are four main reasons for irregular migration movements towards Türkiye. These include the intention of people experiencing problems and conflicts in their countries to go to neighbouring countries with safer and have better living standards, Türkiye's geographical location and convenient position for people intending to go to European countries, people intending to go to Europe turn to Türkiye due to strict security measures, Türkiye has better economic conditions compared to neighbouring countries.³⁴ Moreover, a significant proportion of people entering Türkiye illegally intend to stay in Türkiye.³⁵

Migration movements to Türkiye during the Ottoman and modern Türkiye periods have different characteristics. During and after the establishment of modern Türkiye, migration trends were experienced in line with the global migration movements of that period. Until the 1980s, migration to Türkiye was based on kinship and culture.³⁶ Between 1923 and 1950, there was an intense wave of migration from the Balkans to Türkiye.³⁷ These migrations were followed by German scientists of Jewish origin who came

³² Ahmet Apan, "Türkiye'de ve Avrupa'da Düzensiz Göç Gerçeği: Türk Göç Politikasının Evrimi", *Türk İdare Dergisi*, Sayı 486, 2018, p. 32.

³³ Andres Solimano, "International Migration and The Global Economic Order", Policy Research Working Paper, International Migration and the Global Economic Order, An Overview, The World Bank, No.2720, November 2001, p. 15.

³⁴ Taşkın Deniz, "Uluslar arası Göç Sorunu Perspektifinde Türkiye", *Türkiye Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, Cilt 181, Sayı 181, 2014, p. 184-185.

³⁵ Serdar Ünal, "Türkiye'nin Beklenmedik Konukları: "Öteki" Bağlamında Yabancı Göçmen ve Mülteci Deneyimi", *Journal of World of Turks*, Vol.6, No.3., 2014, p. 68.

³⁶ Ahmet İçduygu, *Syrian Refugees in Turkey: The Long Road Ahead*, Washington DC, Migration Policy Institute, 2015, p. 3.

³⁷ Ahmet İçduygu, Sema Erder, Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, *Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Göç Politikaları, 1923-2023: Ulus-Devlet Oluşumundan Ulus-Ötesi Dönüşümlere*, MiReKoc Araştırma Raporları 1/2014, TÜBİTAK 1001_106K291, Eylül 2009, İstanbul, MiReKoc (Koç Üniversitesi Göç Araştırmalar Merkezi), 2014, p. 140.

to Türkiye during the Second World War.³⁸ Between 1950 and 1960, internal migration flows were observed and between 1960-1980 Türkiye became a source country sending labour abroad.³⁹ After the 1980s, Türkiye started to experience changing migration trends. In this context; people from Iraq, Bulgaria, former Soviet Republics and Iran (after the revolution) started to come to Türkiye.⁴⁰ After the First Gulf War, Türkiye became a transit country and the citizens of Türkiye's close and distant neighbouring countries started new migration flows in order to go to European countries. This influx, which started with Afghans and Iranians, continued with Iraqis and people from other countries.⁴¹

Since the beginning of the civil war in Syria in 2011, Türkiye has become the target of external migration flows to an unprecedented extent. This civil war has also caused an unprecedented influx of migrants for the European Union. Türkiye has been exposed to the negative consequences of this situation and has rapidly become a country of irregular migration. This has had consequences on Türkiye's economy, security, public order, cultural and social situation and employment.⁴²

The diversity in forced migration caused by conflicts and political uncertainties as well as social and cultural developments in Türkiye's neighbouring countries or in countries in the region can be easily observed in Türkiye's migrant profile and numbers. In addition to Middle Eastern countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, Syria and Iraq, Türkiye is already hosting different groups from Africa and Asia. According to official figures, the number of Syrians alone is more than 3 million as of May 2024. It is very difficult to establish accommodation centres for these people and to provide shelter for all of them. Therefore, 98.5% of these people live outside the accommodation centres and in close contact with the Turkish people.⁴³ After the 2011 Syrian crisis, the number of migration flows and migrants Türkiye has faced is more than the total number of migrants Türkiye experienced between 1923 and 2011.⁴⁴ In the statement made by the Minister of Interior in October 2023, it was stated that there were 4.711.622 people. These figures give the number of regular migrants in Türkiye and do not include those who

³⁸ Yücel Namal, "Türkiye'de 1933-1950 Yılları Arasında Yükseköğretime Yabancı Bilim Adamlarının Katkıları", *Yükseköğretim ve Bilim Dergisi*, Cilt 2, Sayı 1, 2012, p. 15.

³⁹ Giulia Bettin, Seçil Paçacı Elitok, Thomas Straubhaar, "Causes and Consequences of the Downturn in Financial Remittances to Turkey: A Descriptive Approach", *Turkey, Migration and the EU: Potentials, Challenges and Opportunities*, Seçil Paçacı Elitok, Thomas Straubhaar (Ed.), Hamburg, Hamburg University Press, 2012, p. 135.

⁴⁰ Ahmet İçduygu, Damla B. Aksel, *Irregular Migration in Turkey*, Ankara, International Organization for Migration in Turkey, 2021, p. 12.

⁴¹ İçduygu, Erder, Gençkaya, op.cit, p. 318.

⁴² Apan, op.cit, p. 13.

⁴³ <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638> (Access 02.05.2024)

<https://www.goc.gov.tr/uluslararasi-koruma-istatistikler> (Access 02.05.2024)

<https://www.goc.gov.tr/duzensiz-goc-istatistikler> (Access 02.05.2024)

⁴⁴ Apan, op.cit, p. 17.

are in Türkiye illegally.⁴⁵ Of the 4.711.622 regular migrants, 3.115.536 are Syrians⁴⁶ and the rest are from other countries.

During the humanitarian crisis in Syria, Türkiye implemented an open door policy. As time passed after Türkiye's open-door policy towards Syrians, the tendency of Syrians to stay in Türkiye increased, and the fact that they have different language, culture and lifestyle with the society caused problems. All Syrians in Türkiye receive free health care. There are health centres in camps and accommodation centres, and those who cannot be treated in these centres are referred to hospitals. In Türkiye, Syrians are able to meet their basic needs and have access to free education and health services. Significant steps have been taken to develop social cohesion programmes and to make use of psychological and social services. The high number of patient applications and birth rates of Syrians are criticised by citizens of the Republic of Türkiye. The longer Syrians stay in Türkiye, the higher the costs of migration incurred by the Turkish state and people.⁴⁷ After the outbreak of the civil war in Syria and the subsequent influx of Syrians to Türkiye, the Turkish population has suffered negative economic and social impacts. This negative situation has not only been experienced by the Turkish population, but also by other neighbouring countries that, like Türkiye, have allocated financial resources and social services.⁴⁸

In 2022, the then Minister of Family and Social Services stated that since the beginning of the war in Syria, Türkiye has spent approximately 45 billion dollars on refugees using its own resources. It is also estimated that this amount may be higher when the contributions of international organisations are included.⁴⁹ In the same period, the main opposition party stated that 50 billion dollars had been spent for Syrian migrants and that Türkiye's total expenditure had reached 250 billion dollars due to the broken relations with Syria, the influx of migrants, the halt in trade and security expenditures.⁵⁰ At this point, there are criticisms in the Turkish society that while providing aid to the aforementioned group, the poor segments of Turkish society are pushed to the background.

The money brought by the Syrians to Türkiye initially stimulated the

⁴⁵ <https://www.goc.gov.tr/icisleri-bakani-ali-yerlikaya-duzensiz-gocmenler-yeni-goc-rotasi-arayisina-girdi> (Access 02.05.2024)

⁴⁶ <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638> (Access 02.05.2024)

⁴⁷ Çetiner, op.cit, pp. 16-17.

⁴⁸ Nicole Ostrand, "The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Comparison of Responses by Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States", *Journal on Migration and Human Security*, Vol.3, No.3, 2015, p.8.

⁴⁹ <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/bakan-yanik-turkiye-siginmacilara-kendi-oz-kaynaklarindan-yaklasik-45-milyar-dolar-harcamistir-42175239> (Access 03.05.2024)

⁵⁰ <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/suriyelilerin-turkiyeye-faturasi-50-degil-250-milyar-wp7087192> (Access 03.05.2024)

economy, revitalised the market and increased sales, but on the other hand, it also led to an increase in the prices of goods and services. This is most evident in housing prices. As Syrians have bought or rented houses, house prices have increased. While the rise in housing prices has been economically profitable for homeowners, it has created insurmountable costs for low-income families to live in a high-priced house. As it is understood from here, both risk and opportunity are intertwined in economic terms. Another effect of this situation is the high cost of living. The increase in demand has led to a general increase in prices, including basic foodstuffs. Therefore, inflation in cities bordering Syria such as Gaziantep, Kilis and Hatay has exceeded the average inflation rate in Türkiye.⁵¹

There is an important relationship between migration and unemployment. With external migration, employment opportunities have decreased and unemployment rates have increased. Intensive migration towards Türkiye has also led to an increase in unemployment.⁵² One of the most frequently mentioned economic issues is the illegal employment of Syrians in sectors such as industry, agriculture and small-scale enterprises. Illegal labour has resulted in Syrians being deprived of rights such as insurance and compensation and exploited. Even though the employment of Syrians as illegal workers in the unskilled labour market provides economic gains to the employer, it has made it difficult for the workers to compete with cheap labour, which has led to the emergence of an employment problem.⁵³ This cheap labour caused by Syrians has affected the local people in the middle and lower segments economically. Competition with cheap labour has led to a decrease in wages. Local people in the middle and lower segments have been adversely affected by rising food and rent prices. Since the money brought by the Syrians has also run out, the purchasing power has also decreased and this has had a negative impact on the markets.⁵⁴ This situation has led to a decrease in the wages received by local people from time to time, as well as causing them to be dismissed from work. In addition, the spread of child labour has also been experienced with the migration of Syrians.⁵⁵

Migrants' lack of possessions and their desire to possess increase the

⁵¹ Yusuf Sayın, Ahmet Usanmaz, Fırat Aslangiri, "Uluslararası Göç Olgusu ve Yol Açtığı Etkiler: Suriye Göçü Örneği", Sosyal ve Ekonomik Araştırmalar Dergisi, Cilt 18, Sayı 31, 2016, p. 9.

⁵² Rümeyza Çelik, İrmak Arslan, "Göç ve İşsizlik Arasındaki İlişki Ampirik Bir Uygulama", Sosyal Siyaset Konferansları Dergisi, Sayı 74, 2018, pp. 73-74.

⁵³ Şafak Kaypak, Muzaffer Bımay, "Suriye Savaşı Nedeniyle Yaşanan Göçün Ekonomik ve Sosyo-Kültürel Etkileri: Batman Örneği", Batman Üniversitesi Yaşam Bilimleri Dergisi, Cilt 6, Sayı 1, 2016, p. 97.

⁵⁴ Erol Özdemir, "Suriyeli Mülteciler Krizinin Etkileri", Uluslararası Kriz ve Siyaset Araştırmaları Dergisi, Cilt 1, Sayı 3, 2017, pp. 125-127.

⁵⁵ Mehmet Duruel, "Suriyeli Sığınmacıların Türk Emek Piyasasına Etkileri Fırsatlar ve Tehditler", Uluslararası Ekonomik Araştırmalar Dergisi, Cilt 3, Sayı 2, 2017, p. 215-218 and Hakan Ömer Tunca, Ahmet Karadağ, "Suriye'den Türkiye'ye Göç: Tehditler ve Fırsatlar", Kara Harp Okulu Bilim Dergisi, Cilt 28, Sayı 2, 2018, p. 56-59.

possibility of risk-taking. This increased level of risk-taking brings about adversities in the political and social spheres.⁵⁶ During and after the events in Syria, Türkiye has taken the initiative in issues such as the admission of Syrians to the country, meeting their needs and their integration with the society. The growing tendency among Syrians to stay in Türkiye has caused problems due to their differences in language, culture and lifestyle with the Turkish society.⁵⁷

While some of the Syrians arriving in Türkiye have been accommodated under supervision and in temporary accommodation centres, the majority of them have dispersed into the country without any supervision. In the cost calculation of this migration, which increases the burden of the Turkish people, the expenditures made for those under supervision are often taken into account, while the unsupervised masses are not included in this calculation. The high proportion of women and children among Syrians migrating to Türkiye has led to new problems in the social life of the country. In cities with a high concentration of Syrians, tensions have emerged in neighbourhood relations and marriages. Due to the increase in marriages with Syrian women in these cities, the number of divorces has increased.⁵⁸ In addition, cases of second marriages and polygamy have started to be observed in these cities and divorces have increased accordingly.⁵⁹ One of the negative effects of migration is the issue of security. In addition to the security problems experienced due to the lack of cohesion and cultural differences and integration within the country, the possibility of people affiliated with terrorist organisations being among the migrants during illegal border crossings and the possibility of these people committing crimes also increase security concerns.⁶⁰ As a matter of fact, both radical religious, PKK and other groups have come to Türkiye to carry out terrorist acts and have carried out some of the bloodiest attacks in the history of Türkiye.⁶¹

Conclusion

Culture is an important medium that connects people to each other and is the bond that ensures harmonisation. Inhabitants of the same society have a higher tendency to harmonise with each other than foreigners, but the same

⁵⁶ Ekici, Tuncel, op.cit, pp. 11-12.

⁵⁷ Özdemir, op.cit, p. 116.

⁵⁸ Ekici, Tuncel, op.cit, p. 18.

⁵⁹ Suriyeli Sığınmacıların Türkiye'ye Etkileri, Rapor No: 195, ORSAM, TESEV, Ankara, 2015, pp. 16-32.

⁶⁰ Özdemir, op.cit, pp. 130-131.

⁶¹ <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/ankaradaki-patlamada-ikinci-canli-bombanin-kimligi-belirlendi-40038532> (Access 03.05.2024)

<https://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/diyarbakir-suruc-ve-ankara-da-3-kilit-isim-2227391>

(Access 03.05.2024)

<https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/reghanli-saldirisi-sanigi-memet-gezerin-ifadeleri-ortaya-cikti-yemek-hazir-diye-gelen-telefonla-araclar-patlatildi/2641611> (Access 03.05.2024)

<https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/clmgndprxg8o> (Access 03.05.2024)

is not true for people who migrate. Harmonisation and culture present a very important issue as it directly affects the inhabitants of that country. The migrants' level of adaptation to the destination varies according to the duration of their stay in that location. In general, the adaptation process is partially completed at the end of 4-5 years. Their permanent settlement is completed at the end of 10 years and their expectations from the host country's institutions increase.⁶²

One of the inevitable consequences of migration is the ethnic and cultural diversification of societies. Migration causes states to face the reality of hosting people with a more diverse ethnic structure, different cultures, religions and languages. However, xenophobia or nationalist sentiments rapidly increase and rise in societies receiving high numbers of migrants. As a result of migration movements, changes and transformations are experienced in the social and spatial structure. Especially in cases of forced and mass migration, changes and transformations in social and spatial structure reach significant dimensions.⁶³ If the destination country is socio-economically inadequate and already suffers internal problems, migration makes living conditions even more difficult.⁶⁴ Moreover, while migration brings together different cultures and social groups, it also leads to problems of security and social cohesion. It may also cause the risk of social and spatial segregation.⁶⁵ Migrants see almost everything in the destination as conducive or obstacle to power.⁶⁶ The fact that migrants have such an understanding prepares the ground for changes in the environment in the new place where they settle.

Migrants are both agents of and subject to transformation. In this context, numerous natural beauties, cultural values and historical monuments without much meaning and value for migrants are negatively affected by this transformation process.⁶⁷ Cities can not be reduced to buildings and people only; they have their own cultures, identities and lifestyles. The sociological traumas experienced by those migrating from Syria to Türkiye during the adaptation process due to ethnic and cultural differences stand before us as examples of incompatibility.⁶⁸ Just like cities, countries also have their own identities and lifestyles. Due to regular and irregular migrants coming to Türkiye, there is a danger that Türkiye's unique identity, way of life and

⁶² Ayşe Tuğ, "Mülteci Davranışı ve Toplumsal Etkileri: Türkiye'deki Suriyelilere İlişkin Bir Değerlendirme", *Tesam Akademi Dergisi*, Cilt 2, Sayı 2, 2015, p. 34.

⁶³ Tümtaş, Ergun, op.cit, p. 1352.

⁶⁴ Tümtaş, Ergun, *ibid.*, p. 1354.

⁶⁵ Onuncu Kalkınma Planı, T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Strateji ve Bütçe Başkanlığı, Ankara, 2013, p. 12.

⁶⁶ Semran Cengiz, "Göç, Kimlik ve Edebiyat", *Zeitschrift für die Welt der Türken*, Vol. 2, No.3, 2010, p.188.

⁶⁷ Ekici, Tuncel, op.cit, p. 16.

⁶⁸ Kaypak, Bimay, op.cit, p. 87.

demography will be disrupted. The rising Syrian population in Türkiye, especially in cities and towns along the Syrian border, has led to increased tensions.⁶⁹

Studies on whether migration increases crime rates due to social changes show that in societies experiencing rapid social changes, traditions, norms and rules of behaviour are disrupted and, importantly, adults tend to commit crimes.⁷⁰ The increasing number of migrants, the difficulty in meeting their needs and the involvement of some migrants in illegal activities have influenced public attitudes toward them.⁷¹

The concept of migration in general, and illegal migration in particular, has the potential to constitute an obstacle to the understanding of the nation-state. In this context, migration is at the forefront with its negative characteristics.⁷² In recent years, the number of people forced to relocate due to conflicts, violence and persecution in the world has reached a record high. Türkiye continues to be the country hosting the largest number of refugees in the world.⁷³ According to the International Organisation for Migration, if the increase in the number of migrants over the last 50 years continues at the current rate, the number of international migrants could rise to 405 million by 2050.⁷⁴ The presence of migrants, whose proportion to Türkiye's population is quite high, has a significant impact on social, cultural and economic issues such as health, education, housing and employment.⁷⁵ The rapid increase in the population of migrants has created new economic and social problems. The environment prepared by this problem has brought along the formation of a sense of nationalism based on the perception and fear of losing what one has. These feelings nourish polarisation and tensions and prepare the ground for an exclusionary process.⁷⁶

According to the report published by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in 2022, there are 281 million migrants (3.6% of the world population) in the world as of 2020. In 2019, there were 272 million migrants (3.5 per cent of the world population).⁷⁷ The number of migrants has increased by 9 million in just one year and is likely to increase further in the

⁶⁹ Ostrand, op.cit, p.9.

⁷⁰ Larry J. Siegel, Brandon C. Welsh, *Juvenile Delinquency: Theory, Practice, and Law*, USA, Cengage Learning, 2009, p. 126.

⁷¹ Ünal, op.cit, 2014, p. 68.

⁷² Reyhan Atasü Topcuoğlu, "Göç Yazınındaki Düzenli ve Düzensiz Göç Kavramları: İnsan Hakları Temelinde Bir Kavramsal Sorgulama", *İnsan Hakları Yıllığı*, Cilt 34, 2016, p. 8.

⁷³ <https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-turkey> (Access 02.05.2024).

⁷⁴ Apan, op.cit, pp. 15-16.

⁷⁵ Bora Balun, Osman Kurter, İsmail Hakkı Dinçay, "Göç Yönetimi ve Göçlerin Türkiye'deki Sosyoekonomik Yaşama Etkilerine İlişkin Akademisyen Görüşleri", *Üçüncü Sektör Sosyal Ekonomi Dergisi*, Cilt 58, Sayı 1, 2023, p. 879.

⁷⁶ Ekici, Tuncel, op.cit, p. 17.

⁷⁷ World Migration Report 2022, IOM, Geneva, 2021, p. 3.

coming period due to famine, drought, the effects of epidemics, climate change, economic differences between countries and wars. This increase will bring about various problems.

The problematic relations between Türkiye and Syria since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, and the continuation of the war, have made it almost impossible to deport Syrians arriving in Türkiye. Moreover, persons subject to the readmission procedure by the European Union due to the readmission agreement have been returned to Türkiye. The burden on the Turkish economy is growing due to the return and accommodation of stateless persons and Syrians in Türkiye, compounded by the European Union's failure to deliver the assistance promised under the readmission agreement.

Türkiye hosts the largest number of regular and irregular migrants in the world. Syrian migrants in particular, and migrants in general, have a negative impact on Türkiye's economy and cause increased crime rates. It is not known whether they are members of any terrorist organisation or not. Therefore, they have become in a position to impact national security and even caused the bloodiest terrorist incidents in the history of Türkiye. They experience cultural adaptation problems and pose a demographic threat. In this context, Türkiye is considered to be facing a socio-economic and cultural threat, which calls for urgent measures. Firstly, the measures to be taken must be in accordance with human rights. Secondly, in addition to the measures to be taken within the country, it is important to solve the problems at the source of migration. It is believed that the measures to be taken at the source of migration can prevent migration at least to some extent.

SPATIALIZATION OF MIGRATION, RAISING NEW WALLS, AND THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL MIGRATION AS A RISK FACTOR ON TÜRKİYE

Güneş Koç*

Introduction

In this paper, I discuss the spatialization of displaced people and the migration politics of national states in response to irregular migration. Migration and new border regimes will be discussed focusing on the global risk impact for Türkiye. Irregular migration will be explored using securitization as a worldwide risk factor and its effects in Türkiye.

Wendy Brown's (2010)¹ concept of the wall describes it as a transition of a sovereign national state towards a one without sovereignty. The vanishing sovereignty of national states is discussed citing the post-Westphalian process and the establishment of the national states as sovereign entities.

The wall symbolizes a national states' securitization of its borders and the question about the spatialization of irregular migration. Space becomes an integral part of irregular migration in which the question of the actors involved, such as national states, is if they are controlling the regulation of space and population. Human mobility, as an irregular migration road, is a question of spatialization and sovereignty of national states. The spatialization of migration will be discussed in relation to the national states' need for sovereignty and securitization, which symbolizes the raising of new walls. The camp and the dangers of the refugee roads symbolize space as a question of exclusion and inclusion, which are related to the legal questions of membership to the national state and citizenship of the same.

The question of a national states' sovereignty and refugee mobilization will be debated relating to Brown's discussion of the wall and sovereignty of the national states as well as concerning the concepts of camp and the postcolonial structure of globalization, which, on the one hand, demands globalization of the capital flow and on the other hand strikes against the people's movement as an anti-globalization tendency of the national states. The space as a place of securitization and exclusion will be discussed, with examples of irregular human mobility from various locations worldwide, such as refugee settlements and will also include national states' political decision-

* E-mail: kocgunes@gmail.com ORCID: 0000-0002-2454-8631

¹ Brown Wendy, *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010. Ceuta border fence, Wikipedia, Ceuta border fence - Wikipedia (Access 25.06.2024).

making.

Camp, as an approach to the biopolitical global governance of states, and the questions of agency concerning the spatialization of irregular human mobilization and the agency question, will be debated.

Walls, national states, and spatialization of irregular human mobilization

Walls are not a new phenomenon in national states. Walls protecting territory have existed since the Middle Ages and have served many functions, such as protection from an enemy and as a symbol of the state's border. Since the Treaty of Westphalia, which established the principles of national sovereignty, walls have become the main actors of most national states, and have become different signs of territorial control and division, as well as a sign of ideological blocks. The Berlin Wall, built during the Cold War, exemplified this division. The separation of Germany into East and West was a symbol of the territorial and ideological blocks communism and capitalism. The fall of the wall in 1989, and the unification of Germany, was symbolic of the end of separate ideologies and the uniting of a liberal market economy.

Walls are also symbolic of dividing ideological blocks between North and South Korea and were established as a consequence of the civil war between North and South Cyprus, which divided the island into two nations and now regulates the entrance between both states.

Wendy Brown (2010)² discusses in the book "Raising New Walls, Vanishing Sovereignty", the spatialization of migration, and raising new borders in order to control irregular human trafficking and the illegal smuggling of weapons and drugs. New walls are symbolic for Brown, mainly to protect national states' borders from irregular migration and illegal forms of trafficking. According to Brown, they also symbolize the vanishing sovereignty of the national states that led to the separation of the states from the sovereignty. To this end, the state's sovereignty cannot stop the capital movements of the neoliberal economy.

In the case of irregular human mobilization, walled-out communities are subject to the border regimes of national states, which can be demonstrated by the biopolitical reading of sovereign power and its territorial reign over the population. Walls of sovereign power can be illustrated as a symbiotic relationship with camp and camp as the space of human mobilization to regulate the space beyond the borders.

In Agamben's (1998)³ discussion of camp; camp is defined as a political

² Brown Wendy, *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010. Ceuta border fence, Wikipedia, Ceuta border fence - Wikipedia (Access 25.06.2024).

³ Agamben Giorgio, *Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics, 1998.

term that describes it as the "Nomos of the Modern"; the space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule, and as a biopolitical reign of sovereign power. In the term camp, the state of exception of national states is where the law of said state is also abolished. The political concept of the camp can be studied from the perspective of postcolonial theories in terms of space, where space and law correlate with each other.

The concept of Achil Membe (2003)⁴ makes a biopolitical reading of the Camp and Border, which references the biopolitical discussions on the racialization of living space and dead space. Membe defines it as necropolitics; "contemporary forms of subjugating life to the power of death" (p. 92). Regarding that, the biopolitical reading of irregular human mobilization of displaced people in terms of spatialization of space can be discussed as a place of making life to live and space as a place of making life not to live.

About the road and the space

The irregular human mobilization of displaced people, when it comes to the securitization of borders as a global regime of migration management, is controlled by the border spaces and their processes, such as refugee camps, border zones, and detention centers. Heather L. Johnson (2014)⁵ discusses irregular migration from the aspect of securitization and security-oriented border control practices and how non-citizens confront these practices. Johnson's approach does not characterize border spaces as exceptional, abject, and exclusionary. Still, it develops a radical political agency, which re-imagines the global non-citizen as a transgressive and influential figure and argues for an understanding of politics as everyday contestation. Virilio (1986)⁶ defines these spaces as 'speed boxes' in which mobility is re-shaped, redirected, slowed, and control over migration is retaken by capturing time and space.

Contrary to Johnson, the notion of the 'Camp' by Agamben (1998)⁷ defines borders and boundaries of the spaces as firm, impassable barriers, not only to mobility but also to political agency and subjecthood. The spatiality of migration has a temporal dimension, and migrants shape space in terms of their mobility, such as in their immobility, rather than in crossing the physical borders and fences (Agier 2011)⁸. On the one hand, space is the road to the

⁴ Membe Achille, *Necropolitics*. *Public Culture* 15 (1): 11-40, 2003, Durham/London: Duke University Press.

⁵ Johnson Heather L., *Borders, Asylum and Global Non-Citizenship: The Other Side of the Fence*, Cambridge University Press, 2014.

⁶ Virilio, P. (1986). *Speed and Politics: An Essay on Dromology*. New York: Semiotext(e).

⁷ Agamben Giorgio, *Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics, 1998.

⁸ Agier, Michel (2011). *Managing the Undesirables: Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

border and fences; on the other hand, it has a temporality and is also managed by the national states with borders such as walls, barriers, and fences. Space is also placed on the other side of the fence, barrier, or wall where the control of the national states over irregular migration with detention centers, camps, and border zones takes place.

The road toward the border is a space of insecurity and can mean being excluded from the law, which in itself contains insecurity as an integral part. The camps and the refugee roads can be gripped as spaces of political spatialization of the displaced people and are excluded from the national state's sovereignty. In this context, the spatialization of refugee roads and camps are political spaces that represent racialized segregation as well as segregation based on level of wealth and national status. Camp, as a political space, symbolizes the representation of the in-between, between belonging to the national state and exclusion from the it; between statelessness, between law and lawlessness.

Spatialization of displaced people and the sovereignty question

The refugee question is about the wall and border, which is a significant telling point about the refugee movement against the wall and the security instances of national states. The detention centers, the pushbacks, being subjected to a national state's violence by border security make the path of the non-citizen, which has many stages of the subjectivation of violence in terms of the state's control over border sovereignty. The sovereignty question of the state includes different stages of exclusion and belonging. Border policies have aspects of control of border security at many stages, including elements of the control of sovereignty at many levels. This can include excluding a sovereign power's mechanisms of border control and sovereignty over the border. It is, moreover, a question about border security regarding inclusion or exclusion of the refugees and, in an extended term, human mobility into the territories of the national state. The refugee movement, with reference to the inclusion of refugees into the belonging of national states, has the aspect of total exclusion of the refugee's entrance into the national states' territory. This can be demonstrated with pushbacks and tightening of the borders; not allowing the refugees to enter through the national states borders, but also through pushbacks and total exclusion from the national states' territory. Detention centers mark the second stage of the refugee question, which is a step towards the entrance of refugees into the national states' borders. These can often be exemplified by the camp, as the space of semi-inclusion into the borders of a sovereign power. Total exclusion from the borders symbolizes the confrontation of the national state, with the total alien seen as the state's enemy. Total exclusion is demonstrated with aspects such as disallowing entrance into the borders of the states as well as pushbacks.

The border policy of a national state can have different aspects in the process of inclusion or exclusion. From allowing a refugee inside the states' border, allowing a refugee to reside outside the state's border, or in the example of total exclusion; not allowing non-citizens to enter the border of the state at all. In the first and second example a non-citizen can be included in the law of sovereignty, whereas in the last example, it would be excluded completely from the law, and space, of sovereignty.

Border policies and border management of the national states often start with camps, detention centers, and spatial and temporality-based processes of inclusion of non-citizens. This is often seen as being in limbo within the borders of national states. Waiting can include the space as a place of unending temporality and the space of unrecognized others and non-citizens to make them enter the borders or let them stay, only to return them. The stage after the camp includes a long wait until the process of belonging to a national state happens, which is the process of being subject to the national laws. The space of inclusion or exclusion poses the question of belonging, such as there is a spatialization of time until inclusion into the states' territory happens, and territorial law means inclusion into the different stages of belonging to the national states' law. Belonging to the national states' law is a process of spatialization, both political and economic. Political spatialization includes the process of belonging in terms of the recognition of another, such as economic inclusion and political inclusion. At different stages of belonging, this includes the recognition of the other within the national state. Since refugee movements are diverse, belonging to a national state's territory is also dependent upon the inclusion into an economic space and political integration of the refugee as a migrant into the national state. Living permission, working permission, and inclusion mechanisms at many different levels, such as belonging to discourses, include the participation of refugees as migrants, as recognized by others with steps of belonging to the national states' political space. Sovereignty includes the political spatialization of displaced people, with inclusion and exclusion and the process of time and space, in deciding the time (when) and space (where) refugees are permitted to reside within the boundaries of the state territory, while they are still classified as aliens.

Sovereignty and the New Walls - Spatialization of the displaced people beyond the borders and through the borders

As Brown (2010)⁹ discusses in her book "Raising New Walls and Vanishing Sovereignty," the new walls rising between national states demonstrate borders used to increase the control of the sovereign power over

⁹Brown Wendy, *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010. Ceuta border fence, Wikipedia, Ceuta border fence - Wikipedia (Access 25.06.2024).

illegal human mobility. Brown questions national states' rising walls within the last twenty years and concludes that they manifest in vanishing sovereignty since national states can no longer conduct sovereignty over the states' territory. Walls are still a barrier to the securitization of national states.

After the Cold World and Apartheid, European walls and South African walls began vanishing. However, new walls are rising to separate countries by their ethnic division, to blockade countries' borders from migration, and to divide the rich and poor. Brown (2010)¹⁰ discusses borders in the example of racial separation, constructing new countries' identities and separating the wealthy from the masses. Examples of walls include the United States behemoth at its southern border, the Israeli wall through the West Bank, the post-apartheid South African internal maze of walls and checkpoints, the electrified security barrier on its Zimbabwean border, the ten-foot-high concrete post structure of Saudi Arabia along its border with Yemen, the barriers between India and Pakistan to prevent refugees from Pakistan migrating towards India, the wall between Bangladesh and Burma as well as the wall in disputed the Kashmir territory (Brown 2010, p. 2)¹¹. Uzbekistan fenced Kyrgyzstan in 1999, and Turkmenistan fenced out Uzbekistan. There are other examples of border walls, such as between Botswana and Zimbabwe, Thailand and Malaysia, Egypt and Gaza, Iran and Pakistan, Brunei and Limbang, and China and North Korea (Brown 2010, p. 8, 19)¹².

Walls are signs of control with checkpoints and further mechanisms of barriers that symbolize postcolonial hegemonic relations and the rising distinction between the global north and south, between rich and poor countries. At the same time, they symbolize the sovereign powers' legitimacy over their territory and the national states' identity as a part of the territorial identity. The examples of walls in the postcolonial and post-socialist world order underline national sovereignty and national identity which should be based upon national territorial sovereignty.

The wall, the fence, and the barrier raise different forms of questions about the border and provide different aspects of the border between national states' sovereignty and illegal migration. The wall is a question about globalization and the tendencies against globalization. Globalization as a concept inherits aspects of national states and aspects of human mobilization, culture, commodity, and capital. Globalization attracts strains between national interests and the global market, between the nation and the state,

¹⁰ Brown Wendy, *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010. Ceuta border fence, Wikipedia, Ceuta border fence - Wikipedia (Access 25.06.2024).

¹¹ Brown Wendy, *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010. Ceuta border fence, Wikipedia, Ceuta border fence - Wikipedia (Access 25.06.2024).

¹² Brown Wendy, *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010. Ceuta border fence, Wikipedia, Ceuta border fence - Wikipedia (Access 25.06.2024).

between the subject's security and capital movements (Brown 2010, p. 8)¹³.

The examples of walls in the post-socialist and post-apartheid eras represent the weak sovereignty of the new national states and new hegemonic world order. New walls have also been raised with the increasing refugee crises since the Syrian War and the rising conflicts in the Middle East. Still, September 11 played a role in raising new walls as securitization of national states. Morocco – The Spanish border was formed in the city of Melilla with a border fence, which was built in 1998 and is one of two Spanish cities in North Africa.

Another city in North Africa is Ceuta, which forms part of the Morocco-Spain border. The border of the Ceuta was constructed in 1993 and is 2.5 meters (8.2 ft) high and 8.4 km (5.2 mi) long. The border was increased in height in 1995, to 3 meters (9.8 ft) and increased again in 2005 to 6 m (9 ft 10 in to 19 ft 8 in) (Ceuta border fence - Wikipedia)¹⁴. Spain constructed both borders to prevent smuggling and stop migrants from entering Europe (Nahlah, Stephanie, 25.09.2018)¹⁵. The Bangladesh–India border is an international border running between Bangladesh and India. The eight divisions of Bangladesh and the Indian states are divided through it. Saudi Arabia constructed the Saudi–Yemen barrier along part of its border with Yemen. It is fitted with electronic detection equipment. Construction of the fence started in 2004. The fence was extended in 2006, 2007, and 2008 (Saudi–Yemen barrier - Wikipedia)¹⁶. Similarly, in 2012, Greece installed a 12.5 km fence at its Turkish borders and extended it to 40 km at the border with Türkiye in 2020 (CBC News, 19.09.2020)¹⁷.

After the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan, Turkish authorities planned to add another 64 km to a border wall between the Turkish and Iranian border, which was started in 2017 and is currently 295 kilometers long (İran-Türkiye sınırı, Wikipedia Özgür Ansiklopedi)¹⁸. In the country's south, another wall is built at the Syrian border. Three-metre-high slabs are being installed to stop illegal migration. At the same time, the giant Lake Van was guarded in 2021 by the Coast Guard against the migrant influx (Daily News,

¹³ Brown Wendy, *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010. Ceuta border fence, Wikipedia, Ceuta border fence - Wikipedia (Access 25.06.2024).

¹⁴ Ceuta border fence, Wikipedia, Ceuta border fence - Wikipedia (Access 25.06.2024).

¹⁵ Nahlah Ayed, Stephanie Jenzer, Spain built fences 20 years ago to keep migrants away. Here's how that worked out, CBC News, 25.09.2018.

¹⁶ Saudi–Yemen barrier, Wikipedia, Saudi–Yemen barrier - Wikipedia (Access 25.06.2024). Sudan: Tigray refugees settle in but worry about missing relatives, reliefweb, 02.03.2021, Sudan: Tigray refugees settle in but worry about missing relatives | World Food Programme (wfp.org) (Access 25.06.2024).

¹⁷ Greece plans to build wall along Turkish border to deter migrant crossings, CBC News, 19.09.2020.

¹⁸ İran-Türkiye sınırı, Wikipedia Özgür Ansiklopedi, İran-Türkiye sınırı - Wikipedia (wikipedia.org) (Access 25.06.2024).

26.04.2022)¹⁹. “This is the first time that the Coast Guard has served in a lake or region in the east,” Süleyman Soylu, Minister of Interior of the Republic of Türkiye, stated. “The Coast Guard has a lot of experience in the Mediterranean and the Aegean Seas on preventing migrants [from entering]. We want to take the benefit of this experience.” he added (Daily News, 26.04.2022²⁰; Euro News, 20.08.2021²¹).

The wealth gap; the distinction between rich and poor, is creating gated communities in different parts of the world, such as in Latin American countries, where rich people wall poor people out from their territories. Examples of that are in South Africa and in southwestern cities of the US near the wall with Mexico (Brown 2010)²².

White middle-class neighborhoods are separated in Padua, Italy, from the so-called ‘African ghetto’ with a wall that was built in 2006. It was built following the decision of the municipality of Padua to fence in a particular area of the city arguing reasons of law and order (Musiani, 10.25.2007)²³. The residence Via Anelli, in which mainly regular and irregular prostitutes, mostly of African origin, live should be separated from the Arcella neighborhood by the wall (Musiani, 10.25.2007)²⁴. Another example of a gated community wall is between Suite and Shiite neighborhoods in Baghdad, which separates the religious minorities (Bright, 2007)²⁵.

There are other fences and walls planned to be constructed and extended, such as between Bolivia and Paraguay (Moura, Garcia-Navarro, 16.05.2013)²⁶. Between the border of the United Arab Emirates and Oman, the United Arab Emirates is designing a wall (GlobalSecurity.org)²⁷. Another example is the fence of Kuwait in the demilitarized zone at its borders with Iraq. The Mexican border wall, along the Mexico-United States border, was

¹⁹ Wall along Türkiye-Iran border to complete in 2023: Minister, Daily News, 26.04.2022, Wall along Türkiye-Iran border to complete in 2023: Minister - Türkiye News (hurriyetdailynews.com) (Access 25.06.2024).

²⁰ Wall along Türkiye-Iran border to complete in 2023: Minister, Daily News, 26.04.2022, Wall along Türkiye-Iran border to complete in 2023: Minister - Türkiye News (hurriyetdailynews.com) (Access 25.06.2024).

²¹ Türkiye builds a border wall to stop refugees from Afghanistan, Euro News, 20.08.2021, Türkiye builds a border wall to stop refugees from Afghanistan | Euronews (Access 25.06.2024).

²² Brown Wendy, *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010. Ceuta border fence, Wikipedia, Ceuta border fence - Wikipedia (Access 25.06.2024).

²³ Musiani Francesca, *The Padua Wall: Immigration, Conflict, And Integration*, Ideas For Peace, 10.25.2007, *The Padua Wall: Immigration, Conflict, and Integration – Ideas for Peace* (Access 25.06.2024).

²⁴ Musiani Francesca, *The Padua Wall: Immigration, Conflict, And Integration*, Ideas For Peace, 10.25.2007, *The Padua Wall: Immigration, Conflict, and Integration – Ideas for Peace* (Access 25.06.2024).

²⁵ Bright Arthur, *Baghdad’s Sunni / Shiite security wall*, *The Christian Science Monitor*, 2007, *Baghdad’s Sunni/Shiite security wall - CSMonitor.com* (Access 25.06.2024).

²⁶ Moura Paula, Garcia-Navarro Lulu, *Brazil Looks To Build A 10,000-Mile Virtual Fence*, npr, 16.05.2013.

²⁷ UAE Security Wall / Security Fence, GlobalSecurity.org, UAE Security Wall / Security Fence (globalsecurity.org).

built after a decision by the U.S. Congress in 1978. Donald Trump announced in October 2023 that the wall construction should be restarted and constructed as an additional 20-mile border wall (Mexico–United States border wall, Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia)²⁸.

The walls have different purposes. They can aim to separate a rich gated community from poor people and workers, they can underline ethnic or religious division, and also prohibit the migration of walled-out ethnic or religious entities. In many cases, by raising new walls, barriers, or even extending walls, they are representing the deterrence of asylum seekers, which is a mix of ethnic, religious, poor, smuggled, or enslaved people. Walls also prevent other forms of illegal smuggling, such as drugs and weapons, but walls are, from the aspect of securitization theory, mostly representative of the attempted prevention against the danger of terror.

Conflict and displacement

Worldwide, Türkiye, Colombia, Pakistan, Uganda, and Germany have the highest number of refugees. The top five countries that have displaced people account for 68% of them: The Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela, Afghanistan, South Sudan, and Myanmar. While in four of these countries, the refugees are mainly fleeing their home country because of war and political conflicts, in Venezuela, it’s because of the economic and political crises (Venezuelan Refugee Crisis, WorldData)²⁹.

Türkiye hosts 3.7 million displaced people, Colombia 1.7 million (Fleming, 18.06.2021)³⁰, both Pakistan and Uganda host approximately 1.5 million displaced people respectively (Statista, 07.06.2024)³¹, and Germany hosts approximately 1.3 million (MacroTrends³²).

The vast majority of the world’s refugees, 76%, are hosted by low and middle-income countries. Türkiye, Iran, and Colombia are currently among the largest host countries (International Rescue Committee, 19.06.2023)³³. Worldwide, the highest number of Syrian refugees are displaced in Türkiye;

²⁸ Mexico–United States border wall, Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia, Mexico–United States border wall - Wikipedia (Access 25.06.2024).

²⁹ Asylum application and refugees from Venezuela, Venezuelan Refugee Crisis, WorldData, Refugees from Venezuela: Figures and development (worlddata.info) (Access 25.06.2024).

³⁰ Fleming, Sean, *This is the global refugee situation, in numbers*, World Economic Forum, 18.06.2021, UNHCR report: How many refugees are there in the world? | World Economic Forum (weforum.org) (Access 25.06.2024).

³¹ Refugee population in Pakistan 2011-2022, Statista, 07.06.2024, Statista Research Department (Access 25.06.2024).

³² Germany Refugee Statistics 1960-2024, MacroTrends, Germany Refugee Statistics 1960-2022 | MacroTrends (Access 25.06.2024).

³³ Weltflüchtlingstag 110 Millionen auf der Flucht: das sind die Fakten, International Rescue Committee, 19.06.2023, 110 Millionen auf der Flucht: das sind die Fakten | Rescue, (Access 25.06.2024).

after Türkiye, it is Lebanon and Jordan (Dyvik, 01.03.2024)³⁴. Türkiye hosts 4 million refugees (reliefweb, 19.06.2021)³⁵. 3.6 million Syrian nationals have temporary protected status in Türkiye (reliefweb, 19.06.2021)³⁶. In Southeast Türkiye, there are seven formal camps, and the vast majority of Syrian refugees live in urban areas (Kaya, 05.07.2023)³⁷, along with close to 320,000 persons of concern who are from other nationalities (Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Türkiye, UNHCR Türkiye, The UN Refugee Agency)³⁸. The number of formally registered refugees that Jordan hosts is 755,238. It is estimated that the actual number is likely much higher. Of 83% of refugees living in urban areas, 46.2% are children under the age of 17. Most of Jordan's refugees are from Syria (The UN Refugee Agency, p. 1, 06.04.2021)³⁹. Lebanon hosts 1.5 million Syrian refugees and is the country with the highest number of refugees per capita worldwide (Human Rights Watch, 05.07.2023)⁴⁰.

New wars and political conflicts make more people mobilize, which also requires an increasing number of refugee camps and detention centers to host refugees fleeing from the conflict fields. The Russian invasion of Ukraine forced 6,554,800 refugees to escape the war worldwide (Operational Data Portal)⁴¹. The three biggest receiver countries hosting Ukrainian refugees are Russia (1.2 million), Germany (1.1 million), and Poland (956 thousand) (Loft, Brien, 08.03.2024)⁴².

According to an estimation by the UN, as of April 30, 2024, around 1.7 million refugees are sheltered in school buildings that are managed by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Since October 2023, after the start of Israeli counter-air strikes in Gaza against Hamas due to the ongoing conflict, there has been a

³⁴ H. Dyvik Einar, Syrian refugees – major hosting countries worldwide in 2022, statista, 01.03.2024, Syrian refugees by country 2022 | Statista, (Access 25.06.2024).

³⁵ Syrian Refugee Crisis: Facts and How to Help, reliefweb, 19.06.2021, Syrian Refugee Crisis: Facts and How to Help - Türkiye | ReliefWeb, (Access 25.06.2024).

³⁶ Syrian Refugee Crisis: Facts and How to Help, reliefweb, 19.06.2021, Syrian Refugee Crisis: Facts and How to Help - Türkiye | ReliefWeb, (Access 25.06.2024).

³⁷ Kaya, Ayhan, Syrians in Türkiye. Facts, Discourses, Challenges, and Prospects, bpb: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 05.07.2023 Syrians in Türkiye | Türkiye | bpb.de (Access 25.06.2024).

³⁸ Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Türkiye, UNHCR Türkiye, The UN Refugee Agency, Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Türkiye – UNHCR Türkiye (Access 25.06.2024).

³⁹ Refugee Camps Explained, USA for, The UN Refugee Agency, 06.04.2021, Refugee Camps | Definition, facts and statistics (unrefugees.org) (Access 25.06.2024).

⁴⁰ Lebanon: Armed Forces Summarily Deporting Syrians. Donors Should Ensure Funding Doesn't Contribute to Rights Violations, Human Rights Watch, 05.07.2023 Lebanon: Armed Forces Summarily Deporting Syrians | Human Rights Watch (hrw.org) (Access 25.06.2024).

⁴¹ Ukraine Refugee Situation, Operational Data Portal, Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation (unhcr.org) (Access 25.06.2024).

⁴² Loft Philip, Brien Philip, Ukraine: UK aid and humanitarian situation 2022 to 2024. Research Briefing, Europe International Development, Ukraine: UK aid and humanitarian situation 2022 to 2024 - House of Commons Library (parliament.uk), 08.03.2024, Ukraine: UK aid and humanitarian situation 2022 to 2024 - House of Commons Library (parliament.uk) (Access 25.06.2024).

displacement of 75% of Gaza's total population. (Statista Research Department, 07.05.2024)⁴³.

The biggest refugee camps worldwide

The population of the Atme Camp, located at the zero point of the Syrian border with Türkiye, has reached 1.5 million. While the camp, which is known as the largest refugee camp in the world, has more than double the population of the Kutupalong camp in Bangladesh and the Dadaap camp in Kenya, it is a human tragedy on the one hand, but it also poses a security threat of the same magnitude for Türkiye on the other hand. Strategy and security experts give important warnings about Atme (Sözcü, 16.07.2020)⁴⁴. From April 2011, since the start of the War in Syria, until February 25, 2013, Türkiye established 17 camps in eight provinces to provide safety and shelter to tens of thousands of refugees, three-quarters of whom are women and children (UNHCR, BM Mülteci Örgütü Türkiye, 25.02.2013)⁴⁵.

Kenya, Jordan, Bangladesh, and Sudan host some of the largest refugee camps in the world, which are home to more than 6.6 million refugees. While more or less 4.5 million refugees live in planned and managed camps, approximately 2 million are sheltered in self-settled camps (The UN Refugee Agency, 06.04.2021)⁴⁶. The Bidibidi Refugee camp is in Northwestern Uganda and hosts over 270,000 South Sudanese fleeing the civil War in South Sudan (Bidibidi Refugee Settlement - Wikipedia⁴⁷; Altman 14.02.2018⁴⁸). Until 2017, it was the largest refugee settlement but in 2018, a refugee camp in Bangladesh became the largest refugee camp worldwide. In the Kutupalong refugee camp in Bangladesh, there are more than 600,000 Rohingya Muslim refugees from neighboring Myanmar (formerly Burma), and it is the largest of its kind in the world (Roos, 5 Large Nations With No Homeland)⁴⁹.

⁴³ Number of internally displaced refugees in Gaza after Israeli air strike October 2023, Statista Research Department, 07.05.2024, Palestinian territories: number of internally displaced refugees in Gaza after Israeli air strike 2023 | Statista, (Access 25.06.2024).

⁴⁴ Dünyanın en büyük mülteci kampı artık Türkiye sınırında: Atme Kampı tehdit oluşturuyor, Sözcü, 16.07.2020, Dünyanın en büyük mülteci kampı artık Türkiye sınırında: Atme Kampı tehdit oluşturuyor - Sözcü (sozcu.com.tr) (Access 25.06.2024).

⁴⁵ Suriyeli Mülteciler İçin Kurulan Türkiye Adıyaman Kampında Hayat Devam Ediyor, UNHCR, BM Mülteci Örgütü Türkiye, 25.02.2013, Suriyeli Mülteciler İçin Kurulan Türkiye Adıyaman Kampında Hayat Devam Ediyor – UNHCR Türkiye (Access 25.06.2024).

⁴⁶ Refugee Camps Explained, USA for UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency, 06.04.2021, Refugee Camps | Definition, facts and statistics (unrefugees.org) (Access 25.06.2024).

⁴⁷ Bidibidi Refugee Settlement, Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, Bidibidi Refugee Settlement - Wikipedia (Access 25.06.2024).

⁴⁸ Altman BY M.J., Rohingya Crisis: A Firsthand Look Into the World's Largest Refugee Camp, World Food Program USA, 14.02.2018, Rohingya Crisis: The World's Largest Refugee Camp | World Food Program USA (archive.org) (Access 25.06.2024).

⁴⁹ Roos Dave, 5 Large Nations With No Homeland, 5 Large Nations With No Homeland | HowStuffWorks, How Gypsies Work | HowStuffWorks (Access 25.06.2024).

The four most significant refugee camps are located in Kenya and make up the Dadaab complex; Kakuma, Hagadera, Dagahaley, and Ifo. Kakuma refugee camp is the biggest, hosting over 184,000 people. Most of the refugees come from South Sudan, followed by Somalia, and there are refugees from 20 other nations. The most significant number of displaced people at Kakuma fled their homes as a result of the Civil War (Refugee Council USA, 03.09.2020)⁵⁰. Hagadera refugee camp, established in 1992, is stationed in Southeastern Kenya and is the second largest refugee camp worldwide, hosting over 100,000 refugees. The most significant number of refugees stationed at this camp are Somalis (Refugee Council USA, 03.09.2020)⁵¹. The third biggest refugee camp, Dagahaley, has a population of nearly 90,000. It was built in the 1990s to host refugees fleeing from the Somali Civil War. The population of the camp is dense, and there are prospects of it being closed off by the Kenyan government (Refugee Council USA, 03.09.2020)⁵². Ifo is the fourth biggest refugee camp in Kenya, the oldest of the four refugee camps. It was established in 1991 within the Dadaab complex. It is a strongly overcrowded camp and is in a flood-prone area (Refugee Council USA, 03.09.2020)⁵³.

Zaatari is a refugee camp located in Northern Jordan and hosts over 80,000 refugees, mainly from Syria. The Azraq refugee camp is located near Azraq in Jordan, and was built for refugees fleeing the Syrian Civil War. It opened in April 2014. By August 2019, the number of hosted refugees was close to 40,000 (Azraq refugee camp - Wikipedia; The UN Refugee Agency, Refugee Camps)⁵⁴. Yida refugee camp is located in South Sudan and was established after South Sudan's independence from Sudan in the aftermath of two civil wars. The Sudanese citizens sought refuge at the Yida refugee camp. Unlike other refugee camps, the Yida refugee camp is an unplanned settlement built after the 2nd Sudanese Civil War (Refugee Council USA, 03.09.2020)⁵⁵. In February 2022, a refugee camp, Um Rakuba, was established in Sudan to settle the refugee influx from Ethiopia's Tigray region to eastern Sudan. Approximately 20,000 refugees live in Um Rakuba (reliefweb,

⁵⁰ Hale Enrique, The 7 Largest Refugee Camps In The World, Refugee Council USA, 03.09.2020, The 7 largest refugee camps in the world – Refugee Council USA (Access 25.06.2024).

⁵¹ Hale Enrique, The 7 Largest Refugee Camps In The World, Refugee Council USA, 03.09.2020, The 7 largest refugee camps in the world – Refugee Council USA (Access 25.06.2024).

⁵² Hale Enrique, The 7 Largest Refugee Camps In The World, Refugee Council USA, 03.09.2020, The 7 largest refugee camps in the world – Refugee Council USA (Access 25.06.2024).

⁵³ Hale Enrique, The 7 Largest Refugee Camps In The World, Refugee Council USA, 03.09.2020, The 7 largest refugee camps in the world – Refugee Council USA (Access 25.06.2024).

⁵⁴ Azraq refugee camp, Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia, Azraq refugee camp - Wikipedia (Access 25.06.2024).

⁵⁵ Hale Enrique, The 7 Largest Refugee Camps In The World, Refugee Council USA, 03.09.2020, The 7 largest refugee camps in the world – Refugee Council USA (Access 25.06.2024).

02.03.2021)⁵⁶.

Border regimes and Türkiye's location within the border regimes

Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, and Greece are located within the border regimes receiving migration mainly from the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa). Türkiye has on the one hand, its land borders to Syria, Iraq, and Iran, as well as its Mediterranean Sea border, and on the other hand its border to Greece, mainly via the Aegean Sea, and Bulgaria, through the land road. This makes it a prime receiving and transit country for the migration flow of displaced people from the MENA regions to European countries such as Germany, England, France, Italy, and Scandinavian countries that receive the main refugee flow.

Securitization of the border has a significant impact that starts with the border control settings of the national state, such as refugee camps, border zones, and detention centers. Border regimes create spatialization of displaced people, such as with irregular human trafficking, and border controls, which are spaces of the national states where the control and discipline of irregular human trafficking happens. Particular border spaces, such as refugee camps, border zones, and detention centers are controlled and managed via global and national border regimes (Johnson, 2014)⁵⁷.

The other aspect of securitization is that international organizations and agencies within the humanitarian crisis interact with national states to regulate human smuggling and human trafficking. Global non-citizens are subject to the border regimes of national states, with border management zones visible on walls, barriers, and fences. At the same time, international organizations and international treaties between national states conduct illegal human trafficking in the regulation of the relationships between each national state, mainly in the name of securitization. International treaties and international organizations acting in the field of the securitization of national states mainly regulate border management with organized protection of the borders, resettlement of refugees, and organized turn backs of irregular migration into third countries and countries of origin.

International organizations such as Frontex are acting in the name of national states and undertaking actions to prevent irregular migration. As part of Frontex, the European Union has conducted Operations Hermes, Aeneas, Nautilus, Poseidon, and Triton to help the Italian state, which has a high concentration of migrants on its borders. These operations started in 2012

⁵⁶ Saudi–Yemen barrier, Wikipedia, Saudi–Yemen barrier - Wikipedia (Access 25.06.2024). Sudan: Tigray refugees settle in but worry about missing relatives, reliefweb, 02.03.2021, Sudan: Tigray refugees settle in but worry about missing relatives | World Food Programme (wfp.org) (Access 25.06.2024).

⁵⁷ Johnson Heather L., *Borders, Asylum and Global Non-Citizenship: The Other Side of the Fence*, Cambridge University Press, 2014.

and aimed to prevent irregular migrants from Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria from reaching Italy by crossing the islands of Sicily, Lampedusa, and Sardinia. A budget of 4 million Euros was allocated for these operations (Yiğittepe, Çaykara, 2019: 88)⁵⁸. The organizations that Türkiye works with, within the scope of international cooperation are IMO, UNHCR, and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). On May 28, 2012, Türkiye signed an agreement with Frontex to work together to prevent irregular migration and signed with the European Union and many countries' Readmission Agreements (such as Greece, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, and Belarus) (Yiğittepe, Çaykara, 2019: 90)⁵⁹. The goal of the Readmission Agreement is to send migrants back to their source countries (Yiğittepe, Çaykara, 2019: 90)⁶⁰. Türkiye signed an international treaty with the EU for migration which came into force after the Türkiye-EU summit on March 18, 2016. The agreement is publicly known as the 'March 18 Agreement' and the 'Migrant Agreement'. On November 15, 2015, officials had previously met at summits and agreed to support Türkiye in taking in refugees fleeing the civil war in Syria and to implement the Joint Action Plan on cooperation to prevent irregular migration flows to the EU. The 'Migrant Agreement' was created to support Türkiye by hosting Syrian refugees in Türkiye and prevent irregular human trafficking from Türkiye toward Europe (BBC News, 03.03.2020)⁶¹. Between February 27 and March 27, there was a refugee incident between the Turkish and Greek borders, in which Türkiye opened its borders towards Greece. According to the report of the Edirne Governorship, "147,132 asylum seekers have crossed to Greece since February 27, 2020. A total of 3 migrants lost their lives, and 214 migrants were injured as a result of Greek intervention. During this period, seven thousand and 96 migrants were injured for various reasons and taken to hospital to receive medical assistance" (Edirne Governorship) (Çoban, 27.02. – 27.03.2020)⁶². In February 2024, European Union lawmakers passed a landmark reform of the blocs' asylum system to reduce irregular migration, which is due to take effect in 2026 (Woolrych, 13.02.2024)⁶³.

⁵⁸ Yiğittepe Levent, Çaykara Yusuf Halit, Göç ve Göçmen Kaçakçılığı Suçları: Türkiye ve İtalya Örneği, 30.04.2019, <https://doi.org/10.29249/selcuksbmyd.523310> (Access 25.06.2024).

⁵⁹ Yiğittepe Levent, Çaykara Yusuf Halit, Göç ve Göçmen Kaçakçılığı Suçları: Türkiye ve İtalya Örneği, 30.04.2019, <https://doi.org/10.29249/selcuksbmyd.523310> (Access 25.06.2024).

⁶⁰ Yiğittepe Levent, Çaykara Yusuf Halit, Göç ve Göçmen Kaçakçılığı Suçları: Türkiye ve İtalya Örneği, 30.04.2019, <https://doi.org/10.29249/selcuksbmyd.523310> (Access 25.06.2024).

⁶¹ Mülteci krizi: Türkiye ile AB arasındaki 'göçmen anlaşması' neleri kapsıyordu?, BBC News Türkçe, 03.03.2020, Mülteci krizi: Türkiye ile AB arasındaki 'göçmen anlaşması' neleri kapsıyordu? - BBC News Türkçe (Access 25.06.2024).

⁶² Çoban Fırat, 27 Şubat-27 Mart 2020 Haber Derlemesi Türkiye-Yunanistan Sınırında Neler Oldu? GAR Göç Araştırmaları Derneği.

⁶³ Woolrych Katharine, European Parliament agrees on stricter EU migration rules, Politics Europe, 04.10.2024 The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, Explained | HIAS, (Access 25.06.2024).

Examples of border violence

As stated in the example of the refugee incident between the borders of Türkiye and Greece, border violence and pushbacks are, in many cases, enacted violence used in the name of securitization by national states. Barriers or walls are the first visual and embodied barriers which are combined with agreements and treaties between the European Union and other countries, such as between the EU and Türkiye; to send refugees back or to keep refugees outside of the European Union's borders. However, as the border is an embodied exclusion and barrier of the alien, there are also direct treatments of refugees such as pushbacks and the refusal to rescue refugees searching for help.

Pushbacks are a part of spatialization, mainly on the sea road, a method used to exclude refugees from the national states' borders and send them back to an unknown target. Ignoring refugees, allowing them to drown, as Alarm Phone has announced in its registered notices, is another form of the spatialization of displaced people, which is also a withdrawal of the border police's responsibility in terms of not recognizing the main human desire when calling for help. Pushbacks and firing upon migrants became a part of border politics at the western shores of irregular human mobilization. There are many different methods used, such as refugees being pushed back by the border police, firing upon or beating refugees. Some examples of the incidences can be found at Greece's borders, but in diverse forms, also at the US-Mexican borders. The international organizations that are acting in the name of humanitarian aid are also making treaties to send refugees back and acting in the name of the national states.

As developments in recent years have shown, the Greek government is pushing refugees from the Aegean coast outside its borders. These pushbacks are systematically carried out. Frontex states that it is not responsible for these pushbacks, that it had no knowledge of them, and that these actions did not take place, so it rejected this feedback (Alarm Phone Aegean Archive)⁶⁴. Alarm phone registered a year of systematic violence and repatriation in the Aegean Sea. The actions were carried out between February 24, 2020, and March 5, 2021. According to the Alarm Phone report there were 125 distress calls, and in 79 searches, human rights violations were detected. The Greek authorities generally perpetrated these human rights violations. Alarm Phone also reported that the Turkish authorities are not helping and that Frontex and NATO boats have, in some cases, witnessed these cases of abuse and violence; they also did not intervene.

⁶⁴ Alarm Phone, The border crimes continue - two years of systematic violence in the Aegean region! Collection of attacks and human rights violations against people on the move from March 2020 until April 2022 (Alarm Phone Aegean Archive) (Access 25.06.2024).

Most pushbacks happened at the Turkish and Greek borders, but some have happened in the Aegean Sea. In situations at sea, the Greek Coast Guard vessels and masked men from Greece are reported to have attacked passengers. Those who have been subjected to these attacks have reported that they were exposed to the current while having their boats towed back to Turkish territorial waters, putting them in imminent danger. Physical violence by the Greek Coast Guard by opening fire at sea with military ammunition was also among the reported incidents. According to Alarm Phone's report and recently observed developments, after reaching the Greek coast, many people were given lifebuoys and thrown overboard (Alarm Phone Aegean Archive)⁶⁵.

Additionally, the securitization policies of national states against refugees have shown different forms of violence. On June 24, 2022, there was a deadly crackdown by Moroccan and Spanish security forces against sub-Saharan Africans attempting to cross the border from Morocco into the Spanish enclave of Melilla. More than 70 people remain missing, and at least 37 Black sub-Saharan African people and hundreds of others were injured during the incident (Amnesty International, 24.06.2024)⁶⁶. As stated in these examples, the refugee policies enforced by Western nations, particularly within the framework of securitization, along with the pushbacks and violence against migrants at the Turkish-Greek border, demonstrate that the fundamental migration strategies of national states and the EU are based on viewing migrants as threats and reducing them to mere survival in response to this perceived threat. In this sense, the policies of national states are based on not permitting migrants through the border based on the belief that they are a threat and also increasing micro-nationalisms. There are still records of people being found dead in Turkish waters with their life buoys even after being rescued by the Greek Coast Guard, reaching the Aegean islands, and applying for refugee status (Alarm Phone Aegean Archive)⁶⁷.

On January 15, 2021, in the case of Rhodes, and on October 20, 2020, in the case of Crete, refugees requested help from the Greek police due to bad weather conditions, but the Greek police did not provide this help and sent the refugees back. Refugees also asked the Greek police to search for six people who had fallen into the sea, but the Greek police did not fulfill this

⁶⁵ Alarm Phone, The border crimes continue - two years of systematic violence in the Aegean region! Collection of attacks and human rights violations against people on the move from March 2020 until April 2022 (Alarm Phone Aegean Archive) (Access 25.06.2024).

⁶⁶ Merida, Jesus, Morocco/Spain: Reveal fate of migrants who remain missing two years after deadly Melilla border incident, Amnesty International, 24.06.2024, Morocco/Spain: Reveal fate of migrants who remain missing two years after deadly Melilla border incident - Amnesty International (Access 25.06.2024).

⁶⁷ Alarm Phone, The border crimes continue - two years of systematic violence in the Aegean region! Collection of attacks and human rights violations against people on the move from March 2020 until April 2022 (Alarm Phone Aegean Archive) (Access 25.06.2024).

search and rescue request. The Turkish coastguard have also refused to rescue boats in distress. Alarm Phone's records show that many migrants who were supposed to return to Türkiye by land in the Evros region, after being released by Greek border guards, have not been seen or heard from since. There were also cases reported where the Turkish army terrorized refugees, forcing them to return to the Greek border, where the Greek Coast Guard had pushed them back. According to the Alarm Phone's report, UNHCR has identified more than a hundred suspected cases of pushbacks pending investigation by the Greek authorities (Alarm Phone Aegean Archive)⁶⁸.

Violence against irregular migrants is perpetrated by human smugglers or other groups that exert control over refugees, with numerous instances occurring along the US-Mexican border. The abuse of refugees happens not just on the Mexican side of the border, where the refugees are attempting to enter the border of the US, but also inside US borders, which, according to reports of refugees, is also undertaken by the US police and border officers (The Guardian, 21.10.2021)⁶⁹. There are official government documents, reported in the news, about misconduct and abuse of many types, including sexual abuse, which reflect documents and reports about the abuse carried out by 'customs and border protection (CBP) officers, border patrol agents, and immigration and customs enforcement (ICE) officials, primarily between 2016 and 2021 in the USA' (Human Rights Watch, 21.10.2021)⁷⁰. Other reports record the death of migrants on the migration roads, such as the dead bodies of irregular migrants discovered by the US border officers at the deserted and inhospitable US-Mexican border (Yeung, 19.08.2022)⁷¹.

Border violence is state violence against irregular migration and can appear in different forms, using different methodologies, such as in the case of Greece using gas grenades to block migrants from entering the border and, in an extreme form, also using gunshots against migrants. The injuring or killing of migrants are among examples which have been registered in recent years, such as the example of the death of a migrant in March 2020 after the

⁶⁸ Alarm Phone, The border crimes continue - two years of systematic violence in the Aegean region! Collection of attacks and human rights violations against people on the move from March 2020 until April 2022 (Alarm Phone Aegean Archive) (Access 25.06.2024).

⁶⁹ Pilkington Ed, US border agents engaged in 'shocking abuses' against asylum seekers, report finds, The Guardian, 21.10.2021, US border agents engaged in 'shocking abuses' against asylum seekers, report finds | US immigration | The Guardian (Access 25.06.2024).

⁷⁰ Lamparski John, US Records Show Physical, Sexual Abuse at Border, Newly Obtained Documents Reveal Need for Justice, Reform, Human Rights Watch, 21.10.2021, US Records Show Physical, Sexual Abuse at Border | Human Rights Watch (hrw.org) (Access 25.06.2024).

⁷¹ Yeung Peter, The other Death Valley: hundreds of migrants are dying in remote Texas deserts, The Guardian, 19.08.2022, The other Death Valley: hundreds of migrants are dying in remote Texas deserts (Access 25.06.2024).

border police in Greece opened fire (Haber3, 04.03.2020)⁷². Also, in Türkiye, there are examples of the shooting of migrants, which happened with the increasing securitization of the national states' borders and with increasing hostility against migration within the national state. Irregular migrants coming from the Iran–Turkish border arrived in Van, went towards Siirt, entered the military area, and were shot down after being warned by officers. In the shooting, two irregular migrants died, and 21 irregular migrants were injured (Mardin Life, 27.06.2021).⁷³ Another case in Türkiye happened in Van; after the Gendarmery warned the irregular migrants to stop, they opened fire upon irregular migrants inside a bus. One child died, four people were seriously injured, and 12 people were harmed (Yavuzylmaz, 22.06.2024).⁷⁴

These examples highlight state violence against irregular migrants, demonstrating that “warning” them to “stop” and bringing them under the control of the state power often serves as a pretext to harm the lives of non-citizens.

Vanishing sovereignty and the global risk factors of illegal human trafficking for the Turkish state

Securitization studies state that national states are dealing with increasing global risk factors including illegal human trafficking, human smuggling, international drug mobilization, and terror threats that weaken a national states' sovereignty. Securitization studies put, from a realist perspective, the interests of the national state at the center. The strengthening of a states' borders, the increasing control over said borders, and human mobilization play an essential role (Taureck 2006)⁷⁵.

Wendy Brown's concept of weakening sovereignty and the wall argues that the strengthening of border controls actually weakens states. This is interpreted from the view of international capital movements, demonstrating that in the new capitalist world order, the sovereignty of nation states is weakened by the hegemonic shifts driven by these economic forces. In both this and the previous concept, the current global world order is creating irregular human mobilization and non-citizens due to wars and political regimes, among other reasons, and these become the push factors for human mobilization from the global south towards the global north.

⁷² Yunan polisi mültecilere ateş açtı: 1 ölü, 5 yaralı, Haber3, 04.03.2020.

⁷³ Askeri bölgeye giren düzensiz göçmenlere ateş açıldı: 2 ölü 21 yaralı, Mardin Life, 27.06.2021, Askeri bölgeye giren düzensiz göçmenlere ateş açıldı: 2 ölü 21 yaralı (ilkha.com) (Access 25.06.2024).

⁷⁴ Yavuzylmaz Yusuf, Ahmet Yaşar Ocak'ın Osmanlı İslam Analizi, Her Taraf Türkiye'nin Habercisi, 22.06.2024, Van'da mültecileri taşıyan midibüse ateş açıldı: 1 çocuk öldü, 12 kişi yaralandı (hertaraf.com) (Access 25.06.2024).

⁷⁵ Taureck, Rita, Securitisation Theory and Securitisation Studies. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 9, 2006, pp. 53-61, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800072>
Yunan polisi mültecilere ateş açtı: 1 ölü, 5 yaralı | Güncel (haber3.com) (Access 25.06.2024).

As discussed in this paper in the different examples, the raising walls of the national states, such as fences, walls, and barriers, are supported as border regimes by international treaties; treaties between national states, and bilateral and multilateral treaties. Furthermore, international organizations such as Frontex, acting in the interests of the national states, manage irregular migration in the name of the national states and the European Union by organizing resettlements in third states and organized turnbacks. Border violence, such as pushbacks or attacking the refugees with guns, is a violation of human rights committed by national states. Non-citizens, the stateless people, are in those cases subjected to border violence of these national states. Even if the illegal migrants overcome the borders of the national state and survive the threats of the migration roads, they are at the mercy of the deadly border violence carried out by the national state. The non-citizens' spatialization occurs between and within the borders and within the border regimes of national states such as camps, detention centers, and border zones and being subjected to the many shades of the migration roads. International treaties, national states, and international organizations act to securitize the weakening sovereignty of the national states.

As a receiving and transit country of migration, Türkiye interacts with the European Union and third states, mainly from the MENA region, and is subject to international treaties and national discourses about migration, which also includes the regulation of migration within and towards Türkiye. Türkiye received the most significant number of refugees since 2013, after the Syrian war, and the state discourses of the governing AKP party were to welcome the refugees escaping from the war with ‘the religious rhetoric used to encourage assistance to Syrian “Muslim brothers and sisters”’ (Go'zdziaik, Main, 115)⁷⁶. The regime change in Afghanistan on August 15, 2021, and the Palestine–Israel war since October 7, 2023, challenged the borders of Türkiye again with the new refugee flow from these additional conflict zones.

According to the UN, since August 2021, after the regime change in Afghanistan, more than 1.6 million Afghan refugees have escaped their country, and the number of Afghans within the neighboring countries has reached 8.2 million people. Türkiye received over 300 thousand Afghans (Noorzai, Paimani, 16.12.2023)⁷⁷. At the same time, it is fair to state that in Türkiye, xenophobia against migrants has risen, as is also the case among many European Countries where migration has caused a shift to further right wing politics. The welcoming discourses of the state, as was the case in 2013,

⁷⁶ Go'zdziaik El 'zbieta M., Main Izabella, *Debating Religion and Forced Migration Entanglements*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2023.

⁷⁷ Noorzai Roshan, Paimani Farkhunda, Türkiye'deki Afgan sığınmacılar sınırışı edilmekten korkuyor, VOA, 16.12.2023, Türkiye'deki Afgan sığınmacılar sınırışı edilmekten korkuyor (voaturkce.com) (Access 25.06.2024).

turned society hostile towards migrants. This hostility is shaped mainly by the nationalist parties' dialogue against migration but also by the hostility among the citizens of Türkiye. As it states, in the examples of hate attacks, pogroms, hate speech via social media, and hate murders, there are a lot of xenophobic discussions and mobilizations against existing migrants in Türkiye as well as against the potential for new migration towards Türkiye (Koç, 2021)⁷⁸.

Conclusion

This paper attempted to analyze some of the effects of global risks such as illegal human trafficking from the aspect of the national states' sovereignty question and its weakening sovereignty. Securitization of the borders of national states is an effect of global risk factors such as irregular human mobilization. In the discussion of Wendy Brown's "Rising New Walls", border control regimes, and border violence are used by the state. Türkiye's role in the global crisis and risk management of illegal human mobilization is discussed from the point of view of Türkiye's geographical location within the world as a receiving and transit country of irregular human mobilization. The spatialization of displaced people is another viewpoint of this paper's content, which was attempted to be discussed.

The concept of spatialization of displaced people is used within the paper in the context of migration, which is used as the road of non-citizens from the country of origin to the country of target. Irregular human mobilization between national states is spatialized with border regimes, which are discussed concerning existing international treaties, treaties with third nations, camps, border zones, detention centers, and international organizations conducting migration with the regulation of illegal human trafficking but also with organized turnbacks.

This paper included a discussion about the aspects of humanitarian organizations. As discussed in the example of Frontex, international organizations, acting in the name of national states, manage irregular human mobilization with organized turnbacks and in the interests of the national states' border policies. A further outcome of the national states' management of irregular human mobilization is border violence, which is, as stated in some cases, pushbacks and police violence against non-citizens.

As the recent EU law states, there is an increasing impact of border controls and a demand from national states for the prevention of migration towards Europe. Türkiye is one of the countries with the highest level of migration and is located within the international global migration route between the MENA - region and European Countries. Walling its borders

⁷⁸ Koç Güneş, Derrida's Concept of Hos(t)pitality and Hate Crime in Türkiye, *Journal of Business Diversity*, 2021.

against migration from the MENA region is one of the methods Türkiye developed to manage irregular human mobilization. As a transit country, international treaties with Frontex, European countries, and the EU have made Türkiye a border management country to prevent migration towards European countries.

This paper does not attempt to discuss the prospects of migration and irregular human mobilization, especially the mobilization of displaced people towards Türkiye. It also does not try to provide answers to the challenges of the global migration crisis as a global risk factor. It instead tries to question migration and illegal human mobilization from the aspect of the border regimes, 'vanishing' or 'weakening' sovereignty and spatialization of displaced people versus non-citizens concerning the national states' governance of borders. However, Türkiye seems to be located within a nexus of the global crisis of irregular human mobility because of the wars and other push factors that make Türkiye's borders suffer under the questions and difficulties of manageability of irregular human mobility. The impact of migration as a global risk factor remains a question for Türkiye regarding securitization, global international relations, national and international political agencies, national and international political society, and irregular migrants as political agencies.

PART V.
FAST-GROWING RISKS AND THEIR IMPACTS ON
TÜRKİYE

A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF MEDIA ENGAGEMENT IN
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

Ahmet İlkey Ceyhan*

Introduction

Politics plays a significant role in society, and political communication is one of the cornerstones of this process. In democratic political systems, the opinion of the “public” is vital in determining the state administration and organizing politics. The primary objective of politics is to create public opinion. Therefore, the media has become an essential factor in politics today. Political actors use the media effectively to communicate their policies and views to the masses, gather support, and maintain power. However, the media’s influence on politics is not limited to the transmission of information; it also plays a significant role in perception management. The digitalization of communication structures and their rapid diffusion through technological development have led to the expansion of communication and media structures, increasing the capacity of information retention and quality. These factors have necessitated the digitalization of politics and the shaping of a new understanding of political communication. Media is an institution located at the very center of the social structure.

For this reason, it has the power to influence the political structure and every aspect of society. The main reason for this is that the media is society’s primary information source. Through news, analyses, comments, and debates, the media enables political actors to convey their messages to the masses and shape the public’s views on political issues.

This study will try to reveal the change in the structures of political communication strategies in the age of digitalized communication and show how political phenomena and processes are directed within the media.

Mass Media and Political Socialization

Communication is a difficult concept to define. This is because the concept of communication oscillates between material and immaterial reality, defining these realities and, in the process of defining them, creating both itself and alternative meanings. Generally speaking, the phenomena called communication tools, especially conventional communication tools (newspapers, television, etc.), are at least tangible, instrumental extensions of

* Assoc. Prof. of Political Communication, Istanbul Kent University, Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences, Head of the Department of Public Relations and Advertising, Istanbul, Türkiye. E-mail: ilkay.ceyhan@kent.edu.tr

the media. In the digital environment, however, the structure of these phenomena has also become blurred. Digital media, which can be programmed in various ways, have invited more or less radical claims that the boundaries between material and immaterial reality can be shifted by mental means. In addition, media provide access to a wide range of natural, possible, and barely imaginable worlds, independent of time-space relations, in different material environments. However, despite all these communication features and the extraordinary flexibility of digital technologies, these technologies owe their existence to specific social uses, like any tool or technology. This raises an important question: Do mass media help to build and sustain communities, or do they undermine our sense of community and connection with others? The means of communication are only possible with people and socialization. The development of communication is determined as much by technology as by the perceptual, cognitive, and interactive capacities of the human body and the skills developed through socialization and education. Paxson defines mass communication as:

“Mass media provide us with reproductions of images and sounds. We can view performances and events that we cannot attend in person. We can see landmarks and works of art from all around the world. We can watch historic events, such as presidential inaugurations and wars. Though easy to take for granted today, this ability to observe or witness from a distance is a relatively recent phenomenon in the thousands of years of human existence.”¹

The approach within this definition is that communication structures not only produce content from scratch but also reproduce, store, and present some existing content in the same way. It is also the dissemination of information and the extension of the potential for access to information across time and space, regardless of the presence and number of participants in the communication. However, David Buckingham defines communication as follows :

“The media do not offer us a transparent window on the world. They provide channels through which representations and images of the world can be communicated indirectly. The media intervene; they provide us with selective versions of the world rather than direct access to it.”²

The modes of production of communication lead the way from individual processes of expression to social communication. Van Dijk defines communication structures as ‘the age of networks’, which is the functioning of the 21st century. Through social and media networks, people sharing social life shape individual, organizational, and community forms of organization

¹ Peyton Paxson, “Mass Communications and Media Studies: An Introduction”, 2nd Edition, Bloomsbury Academic, 2018, pp.17

² David Buckingham, Media Education; Literacy, Learning and Contemporary Culture (Cambridge, England: Polity, 2003), pp.1.

and create mass society. Modern communities are, therefore, interconnected through constant interaction and the use of structural networks. This interconnectedness provides people with a continuous flow of information and access to communication. However, with new technological developments, the media have the opportunity to expand their reach. This expanding media capacity leads people to use it in the context of social, economic, political, and cultural interests.

Given all these structures, examining the relationship between the media and politics is necessary. The media processes information. Ceyhan defines the structure of the media as follows:

“The media, as the first element, creates an environment for discussion that permeates every individual and institution in society, facilitating the discussion of social events and the revelation of their outcomes. Secondly, this discussion environment necessitates processes that lead to aligning ideas and thoughts within the political sphere or resolving conflicts in a democratic setting. This is particularly crucial for fostering mutual understanding between society and political power, allowing for expressing ideas, scrutiny of existing political structures and thoughts, and ultimately influencing political processes. Thirdly, the media’s control over political power as a societal instrument cultivates trust between society and the political institution in managing public affairs and formulating public decisions.”³

The media is a factor that influences both political and social functioning. It is at the center of the formation of final public opinion and many other phenomena, such as social interest, sensitivity, taste, etc. The media helps to convey the messages of political actors to the public. Political actors try to get their messages across through news, analysis, commentary, and debate. The media inform the public about social and political issues and help convey political actors’ views to the public while simultaneously conveying the views of social actors to political powers and institutions. This mutual transfer of information ensures both the socialization of individuals and the formation of social awareness and participation.

Political Communication: A Complex Bridge

As mentioned above, politics is directly related to communication and society. The first reason is that individuals involved in political processes are part of society and live in social processes. The second reason is that the political process is directly related to the concept of persuasion. Political power and institutions must persuade the public to come to power or maintain their power structures. This persuasion influences social attitudes and behaviors and transforms social interactions into political practice. Therefore, political authorities and institutions are essential to socialization

³ Ahmet İlkey Ceyhan, 2016, “Diplomasi uygulamalarında medyanın etkisi: Medya diplomasisi” in “Küresel ve bölgesel sistemde devlet ve devlet dışı aktörler”, Ed: T. Anı and F. Pirinççi, 2016, Dora Yayıncılık, pp.982

and social functioning, influencing and being influenced by public decision-making processes. Communication is, therefore, at the heart of this structure. To secure their power structure, political authorities and institutions must seek public consent and base their legitimacy on this consent. This obligation is essential for convincing the public and implementing government policies without objection. From this point of view, the political process is part of the public decision-making process: gaining legitimacy by leading decision-making processes and the effort to participate in this decision-making process. This process is the basis of liberal democratic states. These processes are also the basis of political communication.

Despite different definitions, political communication is analyzed from three perspectives. The first perspective defines political communication as a political process based on meaning through the exchange and flow of messages and information. The second perspective analyses political functioning and the media as institutions. In this institutional functioning, political power, institutions, and the media interact horizontally. However, at the same time, they are also involved vertically, separately, and jointly in disseminating and processing information and ideas to the masses of citizens. The third perspective sees political communication as the communicative activities of social movements. According to this perspective, all communication activities of citizens, political authorities, political institutions, civil society organizations, social movements, and interest groups are defined as political communication. All these definitions show that the concept of political communication covers a wide range of areas, such as citizenship, social movements, political campaigns, political power and institutions, and the functioning of the media. At the center of this inclusiveness are two important institutions: politics and the media. Perloff defines this situation as follows and provides an explanation of political communication:

“Although politics and media overlap, they are fundamentally different institutions. Politics is allocating resources and decision-making by representatives elected to serve constituents’ needs. Media are organizations powered by technologies that intercede between the communicator and message recipients, diffusing opinions through public space and dramatizing political debate. Building on these definitions and scholarship in the field, I define political communication as a complex, communicative activity in which language and symbols, employed by leaders, media, citizens, and citizen groups, exert a multitude of effects on individuals and society, as well as on outcomes that bear on the public policy of a nation, state, or community.”⁴

To understand the concept of public policy of a nation, state, or community, it is essential to comprehend the consequences of the situation,

⁴ Richard M. Perloff, “The Dynamics of Political Communication: Media and Politics in a Digital Age”, Routledge, 2nd Edition, 2018, pp.12

in this case, environmental and personality effects of the people in the society. People can relate to the liberal democratic process in three ways – as insiders, semi-insiders, or outsiders. The distinction is crucial for understanding the relationship between political processes and the media. Eric Louw defines this relationship as follows:

“Insiders are politically active, privy to policy debates, and engaged in both the “policy” and “hype” dimensions of the political game. Political insiders are always a small minority of the population. They play both “elite politics” (i.e. strategizing, planning and policy, and organizing power) and “mass politics” (i.e. impression management). However, because liberal democracy promotes the belief that mass citizens (voters) control the political system, the “insider” elites must constantly deflect attention away from the existence of a two-tiered system of insiders (the ruling elite) and outsiders (the ruled). The existence of insiders is not equivalent to a conspiracy because, firstly, intense competition for limited numbers of insider positions militates against conspiracy.

Secondly, the political game has become a large industry, and the sheer size militates against conspiracy. Becoming an insider does not require “conspiring”; it requires choosing to become politically active and then mastering the rules of the game (e.g. learning the practices and discourses of insider engagement and how to “manage” outsiders and semi-insiders).

Thirdly, the policy elite is divided into factions who, though they collaborate on some issues, are in competition with each other on other issues;

-Semi-insiders are aware of “the game” political elites play and aware of policy issues on the agenda but are not privy to insider discussions of policy or strategy. Semi-insiders are involved in “mass politics” as informed spectators of the game. Political insiders include parliamentarians, policy staffers, senior bureaucrats, senior intelligence advisors, senior judiciary members, political party insiders, spin doctors, and insider intellectuals (advisors). Semi-insiders include (some) journalists, public opinion pollsters, political party “outsiders” (rank-and-file party members), and analysts and pundits (intellectuals);

-Political outsiders are the citizens/ electorate who are passive consumers of the myths, hype and images disseminated by the mass media. They consume what semi-insiders (journalists) and insiders (spin doctors) construct and disseminate to them. Most citizens appear content to be passive outsiders – their participation in the political process being limited to voting occasionally for those candidates pre-selected and pre-packaged by political parties. (Many are choosing not to engage in such limited ‘participation’ as ever-growing numbers opt not to vote.) A minority of citizens and organized interest groups who become politically active may become semi-insiders due to their engagement with the political process. In some contexts, organized interest groups may become semi-insiders or even (temporary) insiders; for example, Trade Union leaders may become insiders when labour parties are in power. Interest groups trying to influence the policy process often employ lobbyists because they know how to

access insiders.”⁵

Political communication differs from others in that it focuses on both the media and political institutions. It involves intersecting two social institutions with philosophical frameworks, organizational imperatives, and social roles. It, therefore, serves as a complex bridge between the two institutions. However, political communication can influence individuals' thoughts, perspectives on political power and institutions, emotions, attitudes, and behaviors. Political advertising and campaigns aim to influence these processes in individuals. It is an attempt to persuade and to translate that persuasion into behavior that benefits the political power and institution. In addition, political communication has a broad impact on public opinion, public change, the communication of demands for change to political power and institutions, political activism, and social policy. Perloff describes the impact of political communication at both the individual and institutional levels in seven separate articles:

- “1. Complex communicative activity bridging political and media institutions.*
- 2. Emphasizes symbols, language, and diverse constructions of political symbols.*
- 3. Fundamentally a mediated experience.*
- 4. Centered on technology, online technologies influence messages' delivery and reception.*
- 5. Revolves around diverse, multifaceted media, with highly charged intersections among entertainment, news, facts, and opinion.*
- 6. Involves interplay among three key players: leaders, media, and citizens.*
- 7. Operates worldwide, with commonalities across borders and differences as a function of a country's economic and political structures.”⁶*

Political communication has many different actors. It has the task of conveying infinite messages from these different actors. These messages are simultaneously sent, interpreted, understood, misunderstood, internalized, and understood differently by each individual, depending on biases, institutional goals, group values, and political objectives. However, political communication is the domain of embolism. Political power and institutions use words and symbols to influence people to think and act in ways they would not otherwise think or act. These symbols and words carry social life's cultural and psychological elements, such as justice, freedom, equality, patriotism, flag, etc. They are rich concepts that contain elements. They can give people hope, unite different groups, and ensure social unity. The unifying power of symbols can also have divisive features, depending on the

⁵ Eric Louw, “The Media and Political Process”, 2006 Sage Publications, pp.17-18

⁶ Richard M. Perloff, “The Dynamics of Political Communication: Media and Politics in a Digital Age”, Routledge, 2nd Edition, 2018, pp.13

purposes of political powers and institutions.

Political communication mediates between society and political power and institutions. The media transforms politics by applying its judgments and rules, and in the same way, political power and institutions seek to transform the media. Social benefits and sensitivities are also involved in this double transformation activity, creating a triple transformation effect. In such a structure, the media play the role of mediator. With this role, the media plays a central role in politics, influencing political power and institutions and performing a functional activity for the political elite. However, the same centrality of the media also applies within society. It ensures the dissemination of true and false information, integrates young citizens into social activities, ensures socialization by bringing together social values and social approaches of the day, and creates a public space where individuals from all walks of life can participate.

Political Engagement by Entertainment: Digitalization of Politics and Media

Digitalization has necessitated an effective change in political communication, as in any other field. By expanding social communication networks, digital communication has made it possible to create a common opinion and share it more easily. Digitalization has profoundly impacted social, organizational, and political life by changing the nature of exchange. From the political communication perspective, political power and institutions must adapt to the change in digital communication processes and a media concept that affects all social elements. This adaptation takes place through four functions of the media. The first element is the media's function of informing society. The media serves as a platform where society can discuss ideas, evaluate positive and negative elements, and reach a particular conclusion through discussion. At this point, the media is responsible for storing the information given, ensuring the accumulation and use of existing information, and creating a perspective by ensuring the reproduction of information. Political power and institutions use the information function of the media through political communication. The second element is the media's function of creating intellectual activity. The media create a social field of thought with the information they convey. This field of thought is instrumental in forming a typical public thought. Political power and institutions try to influence this field through political communication. The third element is the function of the media in bringing together individuals who are separated in time and space and allowing them to create a common thought. The media enables the flow of information, the creation of thought activity, and the resulting decisions to be translated into behavior. Political power and institutions also want to influence these structures and try to participate in social organization and behavior by using the media.

The fourth element is the function of the media as a means of transmission. This function ensures that society is informed about political facts and developments. In addition, society observes the social and political environment through the media. However, the media is an agenda-setting instrument. It allows society to discuss and reflect on the day's critical issues. For society to function, the media exposes problems, opens them up for discussion, and enables the development of solutions. In addition, to ensure democratic functioning, the media convey the views and opinions of political power and actors. In this way, the media helps society follow the political processes, learn about them, and make decisions by participating in them. Thylstrup defines this situation as follows:

“Mass digitization is, first and foremost, a professional concept. While it has become a disciplinary buzzword used to describe large-scale digitization projects of varying scope, it enjoys little circulation beyond the confines of information science and such projects. (...) Indeed, it has even attained the status of a cultural and moral imperative and obligation. Today, anyone with an Internet connection can access hundreds of millions of digitized cultural artefacts from the comfort of their desk—or many other locations—and cultural institutions and private bodies add thousands of new cultural works to the digital sphere every day. Mass digitization is forming new nexuses of knowledge and new ways of engaging with that knowledge. What at first glance appears to be a simple act of digitization (the transformation of singular books from boundary objects to open data sets) reveals, on closer examination, a complex process teeming with diverse political, legal, and cultural investments and controversies.”⁷

Communication processes should be broader than the flow and/or exchange of information. Communication is much more than that. It defines social tastes, develops the expressions of the time, and can entertain. I only mention TV series, paid content platforms such as Netflix, Disney +, and Amazon Prime, and video platforms such as YouTube. Also Facebook, X (Twitter), TikTok, Instagram, LinkedIn, etc. In addition to social media platforms, correspondence platforms such as WhatsApp and Telegram are also included in this structure. In addition to the platforms already mentioned, there are gaming platforms such as Discord, Twitch, Steam, Reddit, etc. As we can see, digitized communication channels have created various platforms, and individuals can benefit from many platforms depending on their area of interest. These structures are also referred to as entertainment media, but it should be remembered that media are platforms that perform the entertainment function. Carpini puts it this way:

“While the sociopolitical impact of entertainment media is often subtle and/or unintended (for example, as with many online games such as World of Warcraft, movies such as Slumdog Millionaire, or television shows such as the original version of the Peruvian telenovela, Siplemente Maria), increasingly the potential power of

⁷ Nanna Bonde Thylstrup, “The Politics of Mass Digitization”, The MIT Press, 2018, pp.1

entertainment media has not been lost on those interested in influence various publics through entertainment media include both government and non-governmental organization sponsorship of ‘pro-social’ programming, as well the use of entertainment media to reach voters/constituents by elected official and candidates for office.”⁸

The entertainment function of the media is an essential tool of political power and institutions. The entertainment function of the media provides social motivation and cultural and social interaction. For this reason, political power and institutions use the entertainment function of the media to direct individual behavior to the desired point. The aim is to interact with individuals by bringing together the facts of the natural world and the information directed by the entertainment function of the media and to change their behavior accordingly. Carpini continues his definition as follows:

“Broadly speaking, these extant efforts can be broken down into three loosely chronological though overlapping and competing views: (1) those that see entertainment media as particularly effective genres for reinforcing deep-seated, semi-conscious and hegemonic values; (2) those that see such media at best a distraction from politics and at the worst a cause of disengagement and (3) those that see entertainment media as an alternative venue for many of the same process of learning and opinion formation that occurs through traditional news and public affairs genres.”⁹

The entertainment aspect of media is not only a tool for political communication but also an application that can be seen in governmental and/or supranational institutions. For example, Bill Clinton played the saxophone on The Arsenio Hall Show during his election campaign.¹⁰ Barack Obama ran his 2008 presidential campaign through his website and social media.¹¹ Donald Trump ran his 2016 presidential campaign, starting with Fox News and continuing with social media.¹², and the gamification of the process by which Istanbul Metropolitan Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu received his mandate under the name “Mazbata Online.”¹³ (Certificate of Election Online) in the highly controversial 2019 local elections in Türkiye are examples of how digitalization has expanded political communication into

⁸ Michael X. Delli Carpini, “Entertainment Media and the Political Engagement of Citizens” in “The SAGE Handbook of Political Communication”, Ed. Holli A. Semetko and Margaret Scammell, SAGE Publications, 2012, pp.9

⁹ *Ibid.* Pp.11

¹⁰ Robert L. Savage, “Changing Ways of Calling for Change: Media Coverage of the 1992 Campaign”, American Review of Politics, Summer 1993, Vol:14, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15763/issn.2374-7781.1993.14.0.213-228>, pp.218

¹¹ Pew Research Center, Report: “How the Presidential Candidates Use the Web and Social Media”. At <https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2012/08/15/engagement-citizens/>, Access date: 01.06.2024

¹² Mitchell T. Bard, “From Fox News to Fake News: An Anatomy of the Top 20 Fake News Stories on Facebook Before the 2016 Election” in “Communication in the Age of Trump”, Ed. Arthur S. Hayes, Peter Lang, 2018, pp.105-126

¹³ Sputnik News Türkiye, “Reportage with Emre Şenkal, the creator of “Mazbata Online” game”. News Date: 12.04.2019. At: <https://tr.sputniknews.com/turkiye/201904121038742428-mazbata-oyununun-yazilimcisi-ikinci-bolumde-yeni-karakterler-var/>, Access Date: 01.06.2024

many areas.

As we can see from the examples above, the use of the entertainment function of the media by political powers and institutions is part of the effort to convey the messages created by competing political ideas, facts, and political and social powers to target audiences. Therefore, all actors using these elements must accept this structure's language, rules of relationships, functioning, and interests. Gamification is an image and value creation process in terms of political communication, but it is not a direct device of political power, institution, or state. These functions provide political power and institutions with a tool to reach the broadest segment of society and ensure that the designed message is simple, transparent, entertaining, and reaches the target audience directly. In addition, the feedback of the designed messages can be constantly monitored, and the message can be reshaped accordingly to be in line with the target. When the entertainment function of the media is combined with political communication processes, it produces alternatives to the ideas and actions of the social majority and develops new perspectives.

Conclusion

Digitalization changes social dynamics, cultural memory structures, institutionalization, and organizational forms. Political communication structures, political power, and institutions have also kept pace with this change. This is because digitalization does not refer to arbitrary or individual changes but to social, political, and imperative changes.

Political communication, utilizing many features of the media, transfers the power-oriented messages of political powers and institutions into the digital space with the help of cultural and political memory institutions, aiming to create ideological and behavioral changes in individuals. In this way, political communication intertwines with the media, creating a new social order where technical and ideological continuities merge with new ideals and possibilities. This order is a highly complex operation. It ensures the flow of information and establishes an information-based relationship between the media and political powers and institutions and an information-based relationship between the media and society. Thus, it creates a shared political and social memory.

The integration of media and political communication and their growing influence through digitalization profoundly impacts social and political functioning. Traditional and digital media serve as essential intermediaries shaping public opinion and influencing political processes. The media bridges the gap between political power, institutions, and individuals through various functions, such as informing the public, generating intellectual activity, facilitating social organization, and conveying messages. The strategic use of

media, especially its entertainment function, has become a powerful tool for political actors to reach a wider audience, humanize their personalities, and make their messages more relatable and memorable.

Digitalizing politics through media participation reflects a broader trend towards a more networked and dynamic political environment. Emphasizing the versatility and power of the media as a platform for political expression and participation shows that political communication is moving beyond traditional boundaries and becoming more interactive and participatory. As political power and institutions continue to adapt to these changes, the importance of understanding and harnessing the multifaceted capabilities of the media will become even more significant. This ongoing evolution highlights the need for constant analysis and adaptation of political communication strategies to navigate and influence the ever-changing media environment effectively.

DIGITAL MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION PRACTICES OF GEN Z IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Duygu Aydın Aslaner*

Introduction

Technological advancements have brought about notable improvements in societies, yet they also pose certain risks. The era of artificial intelligence (AI) represents a profound technological evolution, with an ever-growing array of AI tools profoundly shaping the field of communication. Digital media platforms, driven by AI algorithms and machine learning, play a pivotal role in directing individuals' digital communication. Amongst various demographic groups, Gen Z in Turkey emerges as a key cohort most profoundly affected by the age of artificial intelligence, poised to influence this era significantly through the technology they produce.

Considering these dynamics, this study aims to explore how the digital media and communication practices of Gen Z, constituting 24.5% of Turkey's population¹ and active participants in the digital realm, have evolved. Furthermore, it seeks to elucidate the risks and opportunities presented by artificial intelligence for this generation.

This study is structured into three main parts. Firstly, a literature review is conducted to provide insights into the subjects of artificial intelligence, digital communication, digital media, and Gen Z. Secondly, a research design is developed to investigate the changes in digital media and communication practices among Gen Z, as well as to examine the associated risks and opportunities arising from artificial intelligence. Lastly, the findings derived from the research are presented and discussed.

Definition, History, Advantages and Disadvantages of Artificial Intelligence

Technological developments play a critical role in shaping societal norms and individual behaviors. Notably, the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) tools into daily life significantly impacts the digital practices of younger generations. AI, with its social and individual innovations, sparks debate about its advantages and disadvantages, necessitating a thorough exploration

* Assoc. Prof., Istanbul Kent University, Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences, Department of Public Relations and Advertising, Türkiye.
E-mail: duygu.aydinaslaner@kent.edu.tr (orcid.org/0000-0003-1924-1472)

¹ Duygu Aydın Aslaner, *Dijital Çağda Türkiye'de Kuşaklar ve Alışveriş*, Ankara, Akademisyen Kitabevi, 2019, p.146.

of its definition, historical context, and implications.

In its broadest sense, artificial intelligence refers to a system and technology capable of mimicking human intelligence, performing tasks that typically require human cognitive abilities, such as reasoning, understanding, generalizing, and learning from past experiences”.² Artificial intelligence’s ability to make decisions, learn and self-suggest, in other words, instill knowledge, depends on previous experiences and acting with care.”³ Stuart Russell and Peter Norving explain artificial intelligence in four different categories in their book “Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach” published in 1994. These categories are thinking humanly, thinking rationally, acting humanly, and acting rationally.⁴ In the “Digital Transformation Report” prepared by the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce in 2021, the concept of artificial intelligence is expressed as follows:

“The use of artificial intelligence is the beginning of a brand-new era. Artificial intelligence is not a product of a simple technological change, but a revolutionary innovation that will shape and manage the future and change the entire era. Artificial intelligence not only has the feature of human muscle power but is also used in many jobs that require creativity such as vision, strategy, feasibility study, development, decision-making, guidance, design, modeling, updating, diversity, and sustainability.”⁵

In the process until today, artificial intelligence has grown exponentially in different periods. The prehistoric period of artificial intelligence is based on Daedalus’ idea of creating artificial humans in Ancient Greek mythology. In the 19th century, Charles Babbage’s work on machines was an important turning point for artificial intelligence. In 1950, Shannon demonstrated that computers could play chess. In the same year, Alan Turing created a test to decide whether a machine is intelligent or not, based on the question “Can a machine think?”. The name Artificial Intelligence was first proposed at the Dartmouth Conference in 1956. The years 1965-1970 were a dark period for artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence studies began to gain momentum between 1970 and 1975, and as of 1980, it began to be used in large projects.⁶ Today, artificial intelligence studies and artificial intelligence-supported tools are experiencing their golden age.

Every technological development brings its advantages and disadvantages. The advantages and disadvantages of artificial intelligence are frequently discussed in literature. In this context, Borana (2016) explains the

² Jatinder Bali, Rohit Garg and Renu T. Bali, Artificial intelligence (AI) in healthcare and biomedical research: Why a strong computational/AI bioethics framework is required?” Indian Journal of Ophthalmology, 67, 2019, p. 3.

³ Rajendra Akerkar, Artificial Intelligence for Business, Switzerland, Springer, 2019, p.3.

⁴ Stuart Russell ve Peter Norving, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, United States, Pearson Education, 2010, p.3.

⁵ İstanbul Ticaret Odası, Dijital Dönüşüm Raporu, 2021, p.196.

⁶ Altınç Yılmaz, Yapay Zekâ, İstanbul, Kodlab Yayıncılık, 2017, p.13.

advantages and disadvantages of artificial intelligence as follows; (1) One of the biggest advantages of Artificial Intelligence is that its decisions are based on facts rather than emotions. (2) Individuals are more likely to be affected by external factors in the decision-making process. However, such a thing is not the case in artificial intelligence. (3) Human nature is programmed to meet certain needs (eating, drinking, sleeping), but artificial intelligence does not need such a chain of needs. (4) It does not allow time wasting. However, (1) Lack of common sense in artificial intelligence’s reasoning ability can create major problems. (2) Artificial intelligence can cause mass destruction if used in the wrong hands. (3) In case of any malfunction, the information it disseminates can be considered correct⁷. It is important for governments around the world to collaborate with the private sector, educators, technology revolutionaries, and policymakers so we can ensure we harness the potential of AI while mitigating its negative impacts.⁸ From business life to health, from education to communication, artificial intelligence, with its advantages and disadvantages, affects every aspect of our lives. At this point, the issue of digital media and communication, which are decisive in the dynamics of the digital world, should be examined on the axis of artificial intelligence.

Relationship Between Artificial Intelligence, Digital Communication and Media

The digital world is becoming more and more powerful each day by gaining new features. Within the current system, individuals’ openness to innovations enables them to easily adapt to every developing technology. Artificial intelligence, one of the greatest powers of digital capitalism today, is reshaping all fields repeatedly. Communication and media are the main areas it has transformed more. At this point, the relationship between the concepts of digital communication, media and artificial intelligence needs to be explained.

In his work “The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture/End of Millennium”, Manuel Castells calls society ‘network society’ and emphasizes that digital communication networks will form the backbone of our lives.⁹ The spread of digital computing to large masses and its integration into life has opened a new page in the history of technology. With its features such as global accessibility, complete independence from space, and synchronization with body movements, digital computing has become an integral extension of the human body. In this context, while all elements of daily life are becoming more homogeneous, mass media are becoming

⁷ Jatin Borana, Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Associated Technologies, Proceeding of International Conference on Emerging Technologies in Engineering, Biomedical, Management and Science [ETEBMS-2016], 5-6 March 2016.

⁸ Katie King, Using Artificial Intelligence in Marketing. United Kingdom, Kogan Page, 2019, p.39.

⁹ Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture/ End of Millennium, 2000.

increasingly widespread. Although face-to-face communication still seems to be an important type of communication in network society, mediated communication is increasingly replacing and complementing face-to-face communication. For the specified purpose, interpersonal and mass communication media are used.¹⁰ At this point, the boundaries between interpersonal communication and mass communication become increasingly invisible. With voice and image, the universal network of written digital communication is evolving.¹¹ In other words, interpersonal communication has become linked to digital tools. Social networks have also created a new type of interpersonal communication. Especially for the younger generations, the process of interpersonal communication and interaction has completely changed.¹²

Individuals who use digital media are both consumers and producers of news. This allows news to be produced by digital media users other than professional journalists. Digital media affects both communication between individuals and institutions, as well as thoughts and actions. Accuracy of information is one of the main elements of interpersonal communication.¹³ When information is repeated enough and there is consensus, a flow of thought occurs, and a strong meeting effect begins. Ideas, emotions, and views are transmitted as quickly and intensely as viruses when in the masses.¹⁴ Therefore, the responsibility of individuals in the digital field increases. Confirming the reliability and authenticity of information plays a role in preventing fake news that may occur. Artificial intelligence, which unlocks the digital universe, has become the only technology used in the creation of digital communication and media content.

The use of artificial intelligence appears as the harbinger of a brand-new era. Artificial intelligence is not a simple product of technological change, it is a revolutionary innovation that will completely shape the future.¹⁵ Before the 2020 COVID 19 Global Pandemic, the importance of artificial intelligence and machine learning, a branch of artificial intelligence, was not widespread the change in many dynamics during the epidemic and the increasing digitalization of the way of activity have led to greater awareness of artificial intelligence. Our living and working spaces will gain a different

dimension with artificial intelligence technologies in the near future.¹⁶ In this respect, perhaps one of the most important conditions for adapting to the current process should be to adopt more concrete pragmatic approaches instead of abstract and categorical approaches.¹⁷ Artificial intelligence integrates the young generation with the digital world more and more every day. At this point, the relationship between artificial intelligence and Gen Z needs to be explained.

Gen Z: Youth of Artificial Intelligence

The most important element shaping the daily life practices of Gen Z, born after 2000, is technology. For this generation born into the digital age, spending long hours in the digital world has become a part of their lives. Gen Z, which follows new technologies closely, also wants to experience these tools first.

Within digital media, social networks, shaped by artificial intelligence algorithms and machine learning, constantly regulate the flow of communication. For Gen Z, social networks are areas of both entertainment and socialization. Speed is the key point in their lives. In other words, “speed is in their souls, they expect everything (career, job, love, etc.) to happen quickly. They are stuck under the unbearable lightness and heaviness of living in the digital world. This generation is always within technology and creative.”¹⁸ Gen Z has an entrepreneurial spirit and is eager to learn new things. Artificial intelligence-supported tools are a unique means for Gen Z.

Research

In the research, artificial intelligence, communication, and news flow were examined from the perspective of Gen Z. The following research pattern was created to understand how the digital communication practices of Gen Z, which plays a key role in the age of artificial intelligence, have changed and what the risks and opportunities created by artificial intelligence are for this generation.

Research Method

This study aims to reveal the findings regarding the opportunities and risks perceived by Gen Z for artificial intelligence. The study utilizes the in-depth interview technique, one of the qualitative research methods. Firstly, a literature review was conducted, and an in-depth interview form was

¹⁰ Jan Van Dijk, *The Network Society*. United Kingdom Sage, 2020.

¹¹ W. Russell Neuman, *The Future of the Mass Audience*, United States of America, Cambridge University Press, 1991.

¹² Elza Venter, *Challenges for Meaningful Interpersonal Communication in a Digital Era*. HTS Theological Studies, 75(1), 2019, p. 1.

¹³ Gözde Dedeoğlu, *Teknoloji, İletişim, Yeni Medya ve Etik*, Bursa, Sentez Yayınları, 2016, p. 41-59.

¹⁴ Gustave Le Bon, *Psychology of Crowds*, United Kingdom, Sparkling Books Limited, 2009.

¹⁵ *Dijital Dönüşüm*, İstanbul Ticaret Odası, İstanbul, 2021, p. 106.

¹⁶ Ayşe Akyol and Gökçe Cebeci, “Pazarlama ve Dijitalleşme”, *Dijitalleşme Bağlamında İşletme Fonksiyonlarına Bakış*, Çolakoğlu N. & Aydın Göktepe (Ed) Arel Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2021, p.182.

¹⁷ Alev Sönmez, *Yeni Ekonomi*, İstanbul, Boyut Kitapları, 2001, p. 88.

¹⁸ Duygu Aydın Aslaner, *Dijital Çağda Z Kuşağının Markası Olmak: Z Kuşağının Giyim Markaları Üzerine Bir Araştırma*, *Dijital Çağda Z Kuşağı Gerçekleri*, Aydın Aslaner, D. and Aslaner A. (Eds.) İstanbul, Kriter Yayınları, 2021, p.4.

prepared in line with this scope. The questions are categorized into four main categories.

During the research, 41 questions were asked to the subjects. These questions include: 7 closed-ended questions about demographic information, 15 open-ended questions to reveal Gen Z's use of artificial intelligence-supported tools and their perceptions of the risks and opportunities of artificial intelligence, 14 open-ended questions about the risks and opportunities perceived by Gen Z for artificial intelligence in the digital communication process, and 5 open-ended questions for their views on risks and opportunities related to news flow in the media. Before the research, in-depth interviews were conducted with six people, and three unclear and complex questions were removed from the questionnaire. Subsequently, in-depth interviews were conducted with 20 members of Gen Z (10 female and 10 male). Interviews lasted an average of 45 minutes between January 25, 2024, and February 5, 2024. In the study, each participant was coded, and their names and surnames were not included.

The Problem Statement and Research Questions

In all studies conducted, there are some opportunities and risks identified for artificial intelligence. The main problem of this study is how the digital media and communication practices of Gen Z have changed and what the risks and opportunities created by artificial intelligence are for this generation. Based on this problem, the following research questions were created.

- Q1: Does Gen Z use artificial intelligence tools actively?
- Q2: What are the risks and opportunities that Gen Z perceives for artificial intelligence?
- Q3: What are the risks and opportunities that Gen Z perceives for artificial intelligence during digital communication?
- Q4: What are the risks and opportunities of artificial intelligence in the news flow process in digital media, according to Gen Z?

Participant Profile

Profiles of 20 Gen Z members with whom in-depth interviews were conducted and information on their usage practices in the digital media process; Gender, marital status, time spent on digital communication and preferred digital media platforms are listed in Table 1.

Purpose and Importance of the Research

It is seen that most of the artificial intelligence studies conducted in the academic field are discussed from the perspective of engineering science or focus on the global effects of artificial intelligence. It is seen that a limited number of studies have been conducted on the subject in terms of

communication science. In this context, this study is important in terms of revealing the views of Gen Z, which is thought to be most affected by the age of artificial intelligence, within the framework of communication science and offering a different perspective on studies to be carried out in the field of artificial intelligence.

Table 1. Participant Profiles

Participant	Sex	Marital Status	Occupation	Time spent on digital platforms in a day	Preferred platforms for digital communication
Z1	Female	Single	Student	9 Hours	TikTok, Instagram
Z2	Female	Single	Student	6 Hours	Instagram
Z3	Female	Single	Student	6 Hours	Instagram
Z4	Female	Single	Student	8 Hours	Instagram, YouTube
Z5	Female	Single	Student	5 Hours	Instagram
Z6	Female	Single	Student	6 Hours	Instagram, TikTok
Z7	Female	Single	Student	6 Hours	Instagram
Z8	Female	Single	Student	4 Hours	Instagram
Z9	Female	Single	Student	12 Hours	Instagram, X
Z10	Female	Single	Student	3 Hours	Instagram
Z11	Male	Single	Student	5 Hours	Instagram, X
Z12	Male	Single	Student	5 Hours	Instagram
Z13	Male	Single	Student	5 Hours	Instagram, X
Z14	Male	Single	Student	8 Hours	Instagram, TikTok, X
Z15	Male	Single	Student	10 Hours	Instagram
Z16	Male	Single	Student	9 Hours	Instagram
Z17	Male	Single	Student	11 Hours	Instagram, TikTok
Z18	Male	Single	Student	9 Hours	Instagram
Z19	Male	Single	Student	10 Hours	Instagram, YouTube
Z20	Male	Single	Student	11 Hours	Instagram

Limitations of the Study

The sample group of the research, members of Gen Z who were born after 2000 and use artificial intelligence tools, was determined by judgmental sampling. The opinions of 10 female and 10 male participants regarding the risks and opportunities of artificial intelligence in the digital communication process were revealed by the in-depth interview method, which is a qualitative research method. Quantitative research can be conducted by expanding the sample group of future studies in the field to evaluate it in terms of all generations and to reach more people in the research. At this point, the views of all generations on artificial intelligence may make it possible to present a more general perspective in terms of the communication discipline.

Research Findings

In the study, all Gen Z participants stated that they use artificial intelligence-supported tools. All participants stated that they use Chat GPT, the language model created by the Open AI company. The second is Midjourney, which produces images based on texts. The third is DALL-E,

which obtains images from textual recognition, also created by the Open AI company, and the fourth is the machine translation program DeepL. In addition, an attempt has been made to understand what the complex concept of artificial intelligence means for this generation. Answers of the participants regarding the subjects mentioned above can be found in Table 2.

Table 2. Definition of Artificial Intelligence by Gen Z


Participant	Artificial Intelligence Definition
Z1	I can define it as the mechanization of people and technology.
Z2	We can say that it is a tool that is strong in terms of technology and development concepts but has many ethical question marks.
Z3	It is an assistant we use when we want to use less neurons in our own brain.
Z4	Artificial intelligence is a superhuman ability that solves most of people’s needs, makes their jobs easier, and brings innovations and experiences.
Z5	It is our future and our truth.
Z6	I define it as the mechanization of people and technology.
Z7	A technology that makes our lives easier with its development.
Z8	“It is a tool that makes things easier for people, such as learning information and creating visuals without long searches.”
Z9	A technology that can imitate human intelligence with the support of artificial software.
Z10	Artificial intelligence is a simplified version of technology with codes written by humans.
Z11	A technology that uses human-generated resources as a data bank and mimics the characteristics of human intelligence using this data
Z12	Essentially, artificial intelligence is an effort to give machines the ability to think and act like humans. Artificial intelligence can improve its performance over time through analysis and observations.
Z13	We can briefly say that artificial intelligence is an application that enables computer systems to think/ behave like humans.
Z14	I can describe it as technology that imitates our intelligence.
Z15	It is the elixir of being timeless.
Z16	It is the biggest step of technology.
Z17	It is an aid we use when we want to use less neurons in our own brain.
Z18	A technology that mimics the human mind.
Z19	The greatest technological advance of our time.
Z20	It is an important tool that thinks like me and gives me ideas.

After their definitions of the concept of artificial intelligence, when the participants were asked whether they confirm the information they obtained from artificial intelligence tools, they stated that they were not sure about the reliability of the information in a field they did not master and that they checked the accuracy of this information. They stated that they confirmed the information from teyit.org, the Center for Combating Disinformation and X.

Participants were asked what the opportunities and potential risks created by artificial intelligence were. Accordingly, while Gen Z participants expressed the opportunities created by artificial intelligence as saving time,

saving energy, increasing creativity, and providing intellectual accumulation, they stated the risks of artificial intelligence as laziness, decrease in creativity, professional anxiety, ethics, confidentiality, and security problems. (See figure1).

Figure1. Opportunities and Risks of AI Stated by Gen Z



Members of Gen Z who participated in the research focused on deepfake created with artificial intelligence techniques. They also stated that the major risk in Gen Z artificial intelligence comes from deepfake. Participants expressed their opinions on deepfake as in the table below.

Table 3. Statements of Gen Z About Deepfake

Z1	“Deepfake must be used in a controlled and ethical manner, otherwise it appears as an attack on personal data.”
Z2	“Deepfake has the power to control a large part of society with great perception. This may cause a terrible scenario to begin.”
Z3	“I think deepfake can become a terrible advanced technology if not used correctly.”
Z4	“If deepfake is presented to users who are lack of awareness, it may be prone to misunderstandings.”
Z5	“My opinion changes depending on what it is done for. I really like what is being used in the field of music. (Although I do not find it ethical.) However, I find deepfake, especially in the field of politics, very dangerous.”
Z6	“I think deepfake is a technology that is very susceptible to being used in a harmful way.”
Z7	“Although I find the progress of artificial intelligence positive, deepfake seems very dangerous to me.”
Z8	“Deepfake poses a great risk, it must be audited.”
Z9	“It should only be used in the film and advertising industry, deepfake is not suitable for social dynamics.”
Z10	“A technology that, in the wrong hands, could even create a social movement.”
Z11	“I think deepfake technology violates personal rights, can lead people to propaganda, and will create

	<i>divisions in society.”</i>
Z12	<i>“Deepfake should be restricted because they can reach dangerous levels.”</i>
Z13	<i>“A technology that can manipulate perception is absolutely dangerous. It paves the way for disinformation to occur.”</i>
Z14	<i>“It is becoming more difficult to understand that something has been created by deepfake, and this is enough to raise danger signals.”</i>
Z15	<i>“I see it as the new danger of the digital age. Because we see these kinds of AI tools misused with bad intentions most of the time. This situation is the reason of misinformation we encounter.”</i>
Z16	<i>“In the wrong hands, Deepfake can affect society negatively. That is why it should be used with caution and control.”</i>
Z17	<i>“I believe that it will carry frightening risks for people with low digital literacy levels.”</i>
Z18	<i>“Deepfake can mislead people. That’s why I find it dangerous.”</i>
Z19	<i>“Deepfake can mislead people, slander or spread misinforming content because it manipulates images and sounds.”</i>
Z20	<i>“Deepfake is not a simple technology, it is a technology that simulates humans and that is why it is dangerous.”</i>

Artificial intelligence is involved in the communication process of Gen Z. At this point, the answers of the participants to the question “What are the artificial intelligence opportunities and risks perceived by Gen Z in the digital communication process?” are as follows:

Z1 “Artificial intelligence, on the one hand, saves our time and energy because it writes its own sentences in digital communication without us having to think. But in the long run, it may become unnecessary for us to think about it at all. This would be a big risk.”

Z2 “Examples of opportunities include speed of access to data and high-quality communication level. The disadvantages are that people get used to mechanization and become dependent on it, and face-to-face communication decreases.”

Z3 “Now, even the posts I will make for my own account are written by artificial intelligence. This is an opportunity for me, but in the long run, it may take away our ability to think.”

Z4 “Digital communication is carried out in an increasingly insecure environment, but at the same time it is rapidly absorbing us.”

Z5 “Artificial intelligence prepares all my content in digital media on my behalf. This is a great opportunity. However, sometimes my posts are not seen as sincere, and this is a risk.”

Z6 “An opportunity to speed up the writing process. As a risk, there may be distrust in the communication process.”

Z7 “Artificial intelligence is revolutionary in terms of communication. I find it very efficient in terms of speeding up transactions and overcoming language barriers. However, providing false information is a major risk.”

Z8 “The digital communication process has become completely familiar to us with social media and artificial intelligence algorithms. We are no longer open to any slow communication process. Face-to-face

communication is one of them. The most important opportunity is to reach everything I want and think about as soon as possible. In addition, the most important risk is that it limits the face-to-face communication process.”

Z9 “The internet was fast, artificial intelligence made everything faster. Communication is getting faster, but it is also becoming emptier.”

Z 10 “Now I even answer my e-mails with artificial intelligence support, I think this is the most important opportunity. The risk is that artificial intelligence actually thinks for me.”

Z 11 “Time management in communication is a huge opportunity for us.”

Z 12 “It gives me the opportunity to eliminate language barriers, especially when talking with my foreign friends. The risk is that my desire to make an effort to improve my foreign language is gradually decreasing.”

Z 13 “Sometimes I wonder what I should write and how I should express myself. At such times, artificial intelligence comes to my rescue. The risky part is that we become more dependent on the digital world over time.”

Z14 “The answer to many things I don’t know lies in artificial intelligence. When my friends ask something, I now ask the artificial intelligence instead of searching on search engines. This way I don’t get lost in piles of information. I would say the biggest risk is not thinking too much about a subject.”

Z15 “Artificial intelligence tools are accelerating digital communication. I used to think about a translation for half an hour, now I can write anything in a second.”

Z16 “I use artificial intelligence when exchanging information with my friends. So, I feel like everything is smoother. What I consider as a risk is that communication is increasingly surrendered to machines.”

Z 17 “I always had difficulty conveying things in writing, and artificial intelligence resolved this deficiency. But sometimes I prefer to ask artificial intelligence instead of generating ideas. That’s the risky part.”

Z18 “The decrease in emotion and depth in communication established solely with artificial intelligence causes communication to become less effective.”

Z19 “Artificial intelligence’s opportunity in digital communication is its speed, its risk is becoming numb in communication.”

Z 20 “It makes digital communication easier. It eliminates impossibilities. It plays with people’s minds, and I don’t think it poses any risks.”

Table 4 Opportunities and Risks of AI During the Communication Process by Gen Z

Opportunities and Risks of AI During the Communication Process by Gen Z	Opportunities	Risks
	Fast Data Flow	Decreasing of Face-to-Face Communication
	Easier Digital Communication	Barrier on Practice of Learning a New Language
	High Quality Communication	Lack of Thinking
	Overcoming Language Barriers	Lack of Trust in Communication
	Support on Written Communication	Insincere Content
	A Faster Process	Disinformation
	Saving Time	Mechanization
	Fast Communication	Digital Addiction
		Lack of Emotion and Depth in Communication

News is generally included in the digital sharing points of individuals in society. In this context, the following answers were reached based on the question “What are the risks and opportunities of artificial intelligence in the news flow process in digital media according to Gen Z?”

Participant **Z1** stated, “News in digital media contains a lot of misleading information. This situation has increased even more after the emergence of artificial intelligence.”

Participant **Z7** expressed, “If I’m curious about the truth, details, and importance of a news story shared by a friend on Instagram, I can check the agenda and confirm it.”

Participant **Z10** also stated their views on the topic, saying, “The deception of artificial intelligence is easier than human deception. Smart expressions operate the cycle of lies, falsehoods, and distortions in news. Unknowingly, we all get caught up in this cycle.”

Participant **Z12** explained their opinion as, “People sharing news with each other and the gradual involvement of artificial intelligence in news production process also leads us to face misleading news.”

Participant **Z14** added, “I conduct research from trusted sources. I do not confirm news via social networks without evaluating it.”

Participant **Z16** said, “Today, we are in a highly susceptible situation for disinformation. Unfortunately, we find ourselves in news that could be used to influence people, especially in more sensitive areas, and artificial intelligence has been effective in this process.”

Participant **Z17** mentioned, “I try to obtain news from reliable sources. I avoid passing on information that I haven’t verified.”

And participant **Z20** stated, “Thanks to artificial intelligence, news texts can be automatically written, speeding up the news while also providing a

platform for the circulation of false information among individuals.”

At this point, the participants expressed that artificial intelligence accelerates the process of news production and disinformation.

Result

Technology plays a critical role in social life and directs individuals’ behavior and thoughts. While Gen Z continues its dominance in their digital universe, they have encountered the new face of artificial intelligence technology. Gen Z, which has filtered the risks and advantages of artificial intelligence throughout this process, thinks that artificial intelligence is a necessary technology for their digital lives. In addition, Gen Z uses the dazzling opportunities of artificial intelligence to the fullest. They improve their digital skills with new tools in the digital world every day.

Artificial intelligence is an incredibly powerful technological advancement that is a time-saver for Gen Z. It is the intersection point of the digital age with transformation, which, if used correctly, supports intellectual accumulation, supports the development of society and individuals, and minimizes the energy spent. In addition, artificial intelligence has a structure that draws a fine line in the creativity process of Gen Z and affects the process both positively and negatively.

Today, Gen Z, which can read the fine details of artificial intelligence and use it in the best way, can also make sense of the risks of the future with its analytical intelligence. Gen Z sees artificial intelligence as having the potential to cause its generation to become increasingly lazy. However, this generation is left with the concern that they will lose their jobs in the face of artificial intelligence. Gen Z, which is faced with the privacy and security concerns created by artificial intelligence and will even create it, also sees that artificial intelligence brings with it ethical problems. At this point, according to Gen Z, the biggest threat of the age is “deepfake”, which can negatively affect the perception of society and individuals.

Gen Z, who thinks that artificial intelligence-supported tools enable the rapid transfer of data in the digital communication process, thinks that the communication process has become easier, and its quality has increased. Gen Z, who often resorts to artificial intelligence-supported tools because they enable them to overcome language barriers and support written communication, also thinks that they save time in this way. However, underlining that artificial intelligence has negative effects on face-to-face communication, Gen Z also states that individuals are becoming increasingly mechanized and digital addiction is increasing. According to them, this situation creates an insecure basis for the communication process. Insincere content, sharing, and constant help from artificial intelligence cause lack of thinking and decrease in language skills. According to Gen Z, emotion and

depth are gradually decreasing in the digital communication process due to artificial intelligence. This shows that the digital communication process of Gen Z is gradually changing and taking a different shape.

Gen Z, who can read the fine details of artificial intelligence and use it in the best way, also sees the negative effects of artificial intelligence at some points, as news is extremely fluid on networks. The news production and sharing process has accelerated with artificial intelligence in digital media. At this point, Gen Z is in the position of producing, consuming and distributing news. The fluid structure of the news leads to striking results in interpersonal communication, where individuals inform each other. Stating that disinformation has increased due to artificial intelligence, Gen Z is even taking action to check the news sent to them by their relatives.

The findings revealed that the digital media and communication practices of Gen Z have changed and that they must constantly confirm the rapidly flowing information produced by artificial intelligence tools. In addition, Gen Z stated that if artificial intelligence is used for good, it can provide intellectual accumulation for the development of society, but if it is misused, it will pose a major problem in society in terms of security and ethics.

As a result, all the opportunities and risks reflected show that artificial intelligence is dangerous, not the way it is used. Technology is on the verge of a breakthrough with artificial intelligence, and its impact is deeply felt in all areas. At this point, recommendations regarding the use of artificial intelligence should be underlined. First, the use of artificial intelligence must be ensured with certain legal regulations. In addition, every content produced with artificial intelligence-supported tools must carry the artificial intelligence label. Secondly, it would be appropriate to maximize artificial intelligence literacy in all societies. Having deterministic limits on the permission and production point of artificial intelligence will provide an important gateway to ensure its correct use. For all birds, especially the Z generation and the Alpha generation after it, it would be appropriate to minimize the stated risks of artificial intelligence and use its opportunities for the development of society.

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGNS IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Emine Kılıçaslan*

Introduction

The relationship between artificial intelligence and political communication develops primarily in the context of artificial intelligence supporting data-driven decision-making in political communication. Using bigdata, political actors can create global, regional, national and local public opinion, conduct perception management or determine the strategy of an election campaign. Methods using artificial intelligence in political communication support political actors to develop effective and accurate strategies.

Political actors are taking the first steps in political communication by using artificial intelligence algorithms, such as bigdata and cloud technology. In this context, the aim of this research is to explain political communication practices in the age of artificial intelligence.

Artificial intelligence, which we hear quite often today, is a field that describes machines that think and behave like humans. These machines, called artificial intelligence, can solve complex problems, make decisions and use language by imitating human intelligence. In this context, if these machines, which act similar to the human thought system, can solve a problem, make decisions and use language, we can talk about communication. These machines that can communicate can easily manage the political communication process.

The relationship between artificial intelligence and political communication is important primarily because artificial intelligence supports data-driven decision-making in political communication. By using big data, global, regional, national and local public opinion can be created, perception management can be carried out or the strategy of an election campaign can be determined. The importance of data-driven decision-making in political communication comes from the fact that it supports the development of effective and accurate strategies. The first steps of political communication in the age of artificial intelligence are being taken by political actors or artificial intelligence algorithms by using big data and cloud technology.

* Assoc. Prof. Dr., Mudanya University, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Department of Visual Communication Design.

In this context, these machines that can use language, solve problems and make decisions will have the ability to communicate about the flow of daily life as we know it. They will be able to solve everyday problems and provide services in many areas of working life. These machines will also be able to act as political actors and conduct political communication campaigns. As is known, political communication is a strategic communication process used by political actors to send political messages to the masses. In this process, the political message is designed, transmitted, received by the recipients and feedback is given. Artificial intelligence algorithms can carry out this process very easily. However, since they are not superior to natural intelligence, they may be limited in the emotional dimensions of both communication and the political communication process.

In light of this, our first two points of departure in this study are: In the age of artificial intelligence, will robots be the new political actors? Can artificial intelligence algorithms run a political campaign like a political actor? These will be the questions. For these reasons, this study will shed light on the new process. While these questions remain uncertain for now, it seems that artificial intelligence algorithms will take place in our lives as new political actors in the near future.

Understanding Political Communication

Academically, political communication is one of the disciplines under the umbrella of communication. The relevance of political communication to politics stems from its purpose. This purpose is generally equivalent to establishing sovereignty, ruling, and being in power. In order for political communication to achieve its goal, it must persuade the target audience. The ideological language jargon to be used in this persuasion is determined by the politician and his/her environment. Once the ideological language jargon is determined, it is sent to the target audience through various forms of communication. Therefore, every message sent by political communication has political content and is done within the framework of a specific strategy. People often do not notice these politically motivated messages. Sometimes they are open to notice and receive them immediately through opinion leaders. In both cases, there is influence.¹ In this context, the concept of political communication refers to an academic field in both theoretical and practical terms. Political communication is within the scope of “propaganda, political marketing, election marketing, public diplomacy, political public relations”. As an academic research field, political communication has scientific foundations, theories and methods. The intersection of political communication with fields such as communication, political science,

¹ Kılıçaslan, E., *Political Communication, Ideology and Media Relationship*, Çanakkale, Kriter Publishing House, 2008, pp. 13.

marketing, history and rhetoric stems from its multidisciplinary nature.

In Lasswell’s (1927) book on the alleged effects of propaganda, one of the first names in the field of communication and political communication, the questions of “who says what to whom” are accepted as the basic starting questions in the field of election communication studies of political communication.² In research in the field of political communication, Lasswell’s simple question technique determines the basic lines of analysis. This question technique compresses political communication into a narrow field. In this context, political communication is generally perceived as the speeches of political actors within the framework of political parties, elections and candidates. At its starting point, the literature on political communication focuses mainly on the process of producing messages created by political actors and disseminating them through traditional or new media, whereas in the past it has been confined to the framework of electoral communication. According to Norris, there are three different stages of communication in relation to campaigns:

- Pre-modern (mid-nineteenth century to the late 1950s),
- Modern (1960s-1990s)
- Post modern (1990s and later)³

In a narrow sense, political communication has emerged as a set of messages that political actors create directly or indirectly on politics. In the classical sense, policy makers, political organizations or all non-governmental organizations, states, international organizations, supranational organizations are the political actors of political communication and policy making processes. Non-political organizations that convey political messages also exist in the field of political communication. Civil society organizations in the field of political communication include think tanks, religious organizations, trade unions, environmental organizations, human rights organizations, LGBTI organizations or animal rights defenders or other interest groups. Like new social movements, journalists are among the important political actors in political communication processes. In this context, political communication is not only electoral communication but all political activities carried out in a wide range of fields.

When looking at political communication through definitions, it is necessary to take it out of the electoral processes and voting behavior patterns that the Positivist-Empirical approach squeezes it into. The Positivist-Empirical approach focuses on elections, voting and election rights, election

² Lasswell, H., *Propaganda Techniques in the World War*. New York, UK: Knopf, 1927, pp.667.

³ Pippa Norris., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

propaganda, party platforms, party preferences of voters, etc. Nimmo and Swanson defined the field of political communication as the paradigm of voter persuasion.⁴ Even if this definition is correct, it is still a narrow and technical definition. According to Aziz, “the concept of political communication is the communication carried out by political actors through the use of various types and techniques of communication in order to impose their ideological goals on certain groups, masses, countries or blocs in society and to transform them into action and put them into practice when necessary”.⁵

Today, political communication continues both theoretically and practically in a wide range of fields. Because the globalist approach of democratic political systems and developing media technology have changed the nature of political communication. Political communication has also turned towards the field of creating global public opinion. This situation has also developed the relationship between public diplomacy and political communication. Political communication has now gone beyond simple voting behavior. The increasing struggle for media space, whether by formal electoral political actors such as political parties or candidates, or by informal organizations such as new social movements or even terrorist groups, requires increasingly sophisticated models and theories to understand contemporary political communication.⁶

With the recent developments in the information sector, political communication, which has entered every aspect of private life through the internet and social media, has become too important for all political actors to be ignored. After written and visual communication tools, the internet and social media also reveal the importance of political communication for political actors in the context of reaching target audiences. In short, every content in print, visual and social media provides positive or negative support to the daily political functioning. This situation serves the functioning of the system. Today, it has become mandatory for political actors to take part in social media platforms. Political communication has ceased to be an election-oriented field of study. Uztuğ states that, “the dimensions of political communication should be handled as political campaign-election period-non-election time.”⁷ In this context, political communication is a set of activities in all areas of economy, politics, culture and daily life. According to Erdoğan, political communication “political superstructure activities aimed at legitimizing the system are kept on the dominant agenda. Activities other

⁴ Nimmo D. and Swanson L. D., “The Field of Political Communication: Beyond the Voter Persuasion Paradigm”, *New Directions in Political Communication A Resource Book*, der. Swanson L. D. ve Nimmo D., 7-47, Sage Publications, USA, 1990, pp.34.

⁵ Aziz A., *Political Communication*, Ankara, Nobel Publishing, 2003, pp.3-8.

⁶ Lilleker, D., *Key Concepts in Political Communication*. London, UK: Sage, 2006, pp. 67.

⁷ Uztuğ, F., “Political Communication Management”, Istanbul, MediaCat Publications, 2004, pp. 18.

than elections such as political ideology, system maintenance, political response and struggle are taken off the agenda, ignored and pushed aside”.⁸

In the modern period, political communication was dominated by television. In the post-modern period, political communication is also carried out through the internet and social media. In the postmodern period, political communication campaigns turn into “hypermedia campaigns” in addition to mass media campaigns. For example, Obama’s presidential campaign in 2008 is known as the first internet election. With the introduction of the internet and social media into people’s lives, political communication scholars have focused on how new media affect the relationship between political actors and public opinion. Accepting Habermas’ thesis that the emergence of mass media has led to a “re-feudalization” of the public sphere, some authors have seen the birth of the internet as the rise of a “new public sphere”.⁹ On the other hand, other authors have defended the “normalization thesis”. There are those who argue that politics on the internet is nothing more than “politics as usual”¹⁰ dominated by traditional, offline players. Bourdieu, on the other hand, emphasizes that “the experts, scientists and researchers, who are the constituent actors of political communication, have not only left their criticality behind as a result of their participation in power, but have also contributed to the transformation of political life into a pseudo-game by choosing to become “petty intellectuals”¹¹

As a result, every cultural and economic activity has a political dimension. Therefore, entertainment and children’s programs and news that do not accept the “politicization” of the media, which pretends to be objective and implies distance from ideology, can and should be classified and examined as political communication approaches. Therefore, when classifying communication according to the content of the message (news, entertainment, sports, advertising, music, etc.), it is important to remember that each of these classifications has ideological, political, economic and cultural dimensions. More importantly, when classifying communication according to the message as political communication, economic communication, cultural communication, we should not forget that we make this distinction only for analysis and make the mistake of giving each of them independence and autonomy from each other. Even the most innocent message carries economic, cultural, ideological and political dimensions and

⁸ Erdoğan, İ., *Communication, Introduction to Sovereignty and Struggle*, Ankara, İmge Publishing, 1997, pp. 190.

⁹ Dahlgren, P., & Sparks, C., *Communication and Citizenship: Journalism and the public sphere in the new media ages*. London, UK: Routledge. 1997, pp.67.

¹⁰ Margolis, M., & Resnick, D., *Politics as usual: The cyberspace “revolution.”* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2000, pp. 54.

¹¹ Bourdieu, P., *Homo Academicus*, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1989, pp.54-86.

meanings.¹²

The importance of political communication, which is one of today's popular fields, has increased even more with the rapid developments in the media sector. Apart from the political campaigns of political actors, political communication has started to spread locally, nationally and globally with every product, produced by the mass media. In this context, it has become necessary to look at the concept in a very broad framework. It is important to look at political communication as political processes and forms of communication that infiltrate every aspect of our daily lives, especially through the media, and to perceive it more broadly¹³

Political Communication Campaigns

Political communication campaigns are political communication processes that political actors carry out with the masses face-to-face or through any mass media. Political communication campaigns are carried out in the context of producing and communicating strategic political communication messages to target audiences and receiving feedback quickly. In the process of political communication campaigns, political messages are designed and communicated. Various communication tools are used in this process. Political communication campaigns are areas of action within the limited framework of the political communication field. In these areas, political actors send political messages to target audiences by using various mass media in certain periods. Political communication campaigns are sometimes carried out face-to-face in squares, while most of the time they are carried out using media tools such as television, radio, newspapers, internet, social media, rallies, brochures and posters. Political campaigns are strategic methods of political communication used by political actors and political parties to convey their policies, visions, promises and messages to voters and the public.

Political communication campaigns are organized communication activities, usually organized by a political party, candidate or a political movement to achieve a specific goal. These campaigns may be related to elections and involve various strategies of a particular candidate or party to persuade voters. Campaigns are conducted through public events, advertisements, social media, brochures and other communication tools.

The main objective of political campaigns is to attract the attention of voters, inform them, persuade them, and ultimately gain their support for a particular policy, candidate or party. Campaigns are usually strategically planned and executed to emphasize a particular message, promote the

¹² Aziz, *ibid*, p.170.

¹³ Kılıçaslan, *ibid*, p. 13.

candidate's or party's policies, gain an advantage over competitors and influence election results.

Trent and Friedenbergs (1991) study on "Political Campaign Communication", "electoral success is attributed to political discourse, television debates and political advertising. Political advertisements in election campaigns are only one of the tools of political communication. The purpose of political communication campaigns, especially in election campaigns, is that political actors want to get feedback by creating an impact on target audiences. These campaigns are usually carried out within the framework of perception management and continue with steps to change and shape the attitudes of the masses.¹⁴

While some approaches emphasize image in political communication campaigns, others emphasize the message. For example, Uztuğ (1999) focuses on image, brand and conceptualizes the candidate or party leader as a product.¹⁵ On the other hand, focuses on the message.

Since the mainstream theories in political communication studies belong to the early development years of mass communication, political communication campaigns are generally designed as linear communication. The best example of this is Lasswell. Lasswell's approach of who (candidate) conveys what (propaganda), through which channel, to whom (voter) and with what effect (attitude change) directly describes political communication.¹⁶

Shannon & Weaver's communication model is an engineering adaptation. The source (information giver) produces a message (the word on the telephone), the encoder or transmitter converts the message into signs to make it transmittable (the telephone converts sound into electrical vibrations), the channel is used as a means of transmitting the signs (the telephone cable), the decoder or receiver reconstructs the message based on these signs, the target is the person or object to whom the message is sent.¹⁷

Political communication campaigns are a process management that works as the image of the candidate, meeting with the masses in the campaign process, selecting political communication channels, creating attitude change in the electorate and persuading the electorate and the emergence of voting behavior. Linear campaigns usually focus on voting behavior. But they ignore the dynamics behind voting behavior.

¹⁴ Trent, Judith S. and Friedenbergs, Robert. *Political Campaign Communication: Principles and Practices*, Second Edition. Praeger Publishers, 1991, p.45.

¹⁵ Uztuğ, *ibid*, p. 18.

¹⁶ Lasswell, H., *Propaganda Techniques in the World War*. New York, UK: Knopf, 1927, pp.667.

¹⁷ Matterlart, Armand and Matterlart, Michéle, *History of Communication Theories*, Istanbul: İletişim, 1995, pp. 47.

When we look at holistic political campaign management, we see that it starts with an analysis of the social structure or the target audience, as opposed to a linear approach. First, the cultural, political and economic structure of the country is analyzed. The impact of the political changes that the society has undergone in the historical process on the society is investigated. The political agendas and details of the news in the media are analyzed. In this way, the agenda of the political communication campaign is determined. According to Dearing and Rogers, there are three types of agenda.

First one: News agenda. The importance of the news agenda is which issues are made important in the mass media.

Second: Public agenda. The public agenda shows the reflection of the priorities in the news agenda on society.

Third: the political agenda. The political agenda is how important issues in public opinion are reflected on the political agenda and their impact on political decision-making processes and the agenda of the executive power.¹⁸

In political campaigns, social, economic and political developments are important to draw a portrait of the social context that determines voter attitudes and behavior. Voter analysis is necessary to determine the voters' attitudes on the issues that make up the agenda. "Every attitude has a subject (object)".¹⁹ In political communication campaigns, it is very important to conduct voter analysis in order to understand political attitudes and the direction and intensity of these attitudes. In this context, political campaign objectives determine the direction of political communication analysis. The strategy of the campaign is necessary to determine the ways and means to be chosen to reach the target. The right mass communication tool should be chosen to determine the strategies used in political communication campaigns and the point from which the campaign started to the point it has reached and to receive feedback. Which tools will be used during the campaign and which mass media will be chosen to reach the target audiences should be determined. In addition, the content of the messages to be sent to each target audience will be different. The viewership rates of the mass media to be used should be determined. With the use of social media, masses can be reached quickly and cheaply.

For example: The White House opened Meta's accounts on Monday for President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris. Threads service for President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris is gaining a significant

¹⁸ Dearing, James W., Rogers, Everett M., *Agenda-Setting*, thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1996, p.67.

¹⁹ İnceoğlu, M., *Attitude, Perception, Communication*, Ankara: Verso, 1993, pp.20.

following on an app that competes with Elon Musk's X.²⁰ As seen in this news, every development in media technology gains importance for political actors. Every political actor aims to gain new sympathizers by taking part in these developments. Therefore, they adapt their political campaigns according to the latest technology. Especially the fast and easy way to reach target audiences such as Generation Z is through new communication technologies. In this context, political communication campaigns in the age of artificial intelligence are also very important for political actors to understand and grasp this age.

Political Communication Campaigns in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

Artificial intelligence is a branch of science and engineering designed to give computer systems or machines the ability to perform human-like mental processes. By trying to imitate human intelligence, artificial intelligence performs various tasks such as solving complex problems, making decisions, understanding language and perception. It usually includes subfields such as machine learning and deep learning. Machine learning allows computer systems to learn patterns and improve themselves by analyzing data, while deep learning uses more complex and multi-layered structures. Artificial intelligence has found applications in automatic translation, autonomous vehicles, voice assistants, medical diagnostic aids and many more. It continues to find.

According to Nobre, "for more than a decade, artificial intelligence has been used as persuasion machines for both political and commercial purposes".²¹

Developments in artificial intelligence, machine learning and self-programming have taken artificial communication agents (ACAs) to a new level. Such algorithms have become the machines used by political actors to conquer the masses and retain power.

In this context, when we look at artificial intelligence and political communication campaigns, information about previous campaigns or information about the target audience can be collected in the campaigns to be carried out by political actors and the strategy of the campaign can be determined according to the results of bigdata analysis. Because the results of bigdata analysis, which is one of the most important tasks of artificial intelligence, can reveal important information especially for states as political actors. In addition, in political communication, artificial intelligence can

²⁰ <https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/20/biden-joins-metas-threads-after-white-house-rebukes-elon-musk.html>, (Access07.05.2024).

²¹ Nobre, G. F., *Political communicative agents*. In: Bandyopadhyay, A. et alii. (Org.). *Proceedings of WMSCI/IMSCI/IMETI*. Orlando: International Institute of Informatics and Systemics (IIS), 2008, p.34.

improve voter segmentation and help determine communication strategies by analyzing data such as voters' preferences, attitudes and behaviors. The political communication campaign process is described below.

Identify the Target Audience: Artificial intelligence can use techniques such as deep learning and machine learning to understand the individual characteristics and behaviors of voters. In this way, political campaigns can identify the target audience and offer personalized messages while determining their communication strategies.

Social Media Analytics and Campaign Management: Artificial intelligence can monitor interactions on social media platforms, conduct emotional analysis and identify public opinion trends. This information can be used to improve the effectiveness of political campaigns and can help in the management of social media campaigns.

Natural Language Processing and Text Analytics: Using natural language processing (NLP) techniques, AI can analyze political leaders' speeches, media broadcasts, social media posts and other text-based content. In this context, valuable insights can be obtained for political communication strategies.

Offensive and Fake News Detection: AI can be used to detect the use of offensive language or fake news. This can help prevent the spread of manipulative content in political communication.

Artificial intelligence can support data-driven decision-making and more effective communication strategies in political communication. However, the use of AI also raises ethical issues. In particular, there are concerns about personal privacy and manipulation. Therefore, AI-based political communication practices should be carefully managed.

As is known, the process of political communication is directly linked to power relations. Processes such as political actors expressing themselves, being heard and seen, being respected and having their ideology accepted are the fields of activity of political communication. Therefore, political communication is an effort to prevail in both symbolic and non-symbolic fields. Both maintaining power and winning the masses show the power of political communication for political actors. According to Fogg, artificial agents have recently become capable of communicating. Artificial agent algorithms, which are a type of software, can interact and communicate as human counterparts. In this sense, such tools or media have become social actors.²² In this context, artificial agents are being used to conquer and seize power on behalf of a person or a party. This situation signals some danger.

It is a turning point in human life to communicate equally with computers,

²² Fogg, B. J., & Nass, C. (1997). Silicon sycophants: The effects of computers that flatter. *International Journal of Human-Computer Studies*, 46(5), 551–561.

to give and receive information. In this context, now that the struggle for power through computers (algorithm virtual, smartphone concrete) has begun, political communication will be used in this field. New artificial political communicators will emerge. Artificial political communicators act like an army. Robots or avatars acting on behalf of political actors fulfill the task of conquest. These robots will be able to intervene in public communication, make public speeches and take part in the election of public representatives and their execution of public policies.

AI-based machines will fulfill this task because they are equipped with journalism, public relations, advertising and propaganda software.²³ If these machines are open to learning, they will constantly improve themselves. Artificial communication (AC) is a positive or negative reality and there is an open space to explore its potential. However, some of these machines may be programmed to disrupt the social structure, distort events and upset political and economic balances. This falls within the realm of cyber threats. AI algorithms can interact like humans, provide information and pose a threat to the cornerstones of the system, such as communication, democracy, market harmony and social justice.

Likewise, bots can take part in and determine many areas such as elections, opinion formation in public tenders, public debates, stock markets, exchange rates, etc. Artificial intelligence machines can damage social relations that build social bonds in interpersonal relationships. For example, concepts that unite society such as social peace, tolerance, acceptance of differences, empathy, sympathy, solidarity, mutual assistance, cooperation, etc. are weakened and begin to disappear. Moreover, through the spread of fake news, hate messages, offensive statements, dogmatic speeches, on the contrary, such bots have rather been used to promote instability, turmoil and even chaos. Special security measures are therefore necessary.

In this context, the field of artificial intelligence is seen to be quite technical. However, the diffusion and integration of AI-based systems across society is attention to the need to regulate the use of this technology in political communication and to take necessary precautions.

²³ Nobre, G. F., Artificial Intelligence (AI) in communications: journalism, public relations, advertising, and propaganda. Preprint, ResearchGate, 2020a, pp.9.

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GLOBAL RISKS AND THEIR IMPACTS ON TÜRKİYE

Edited by
Hasret Çomak, Burak Şakir Şeker, Doğan Şafak Polat, Mesut Özel, Murat Koray

Today, the growing impact of climate change, armed conflicts, social polarization, and economic instability threatens the foundations of the global order. These challenges escalate rapidly, fuelled by technological advancements and economic uncertainties that we face on a global scale. Disinformation and misinformation stand out as critical global threats. The pressing issues of cybersecurity, geopolitical tensions, unequal opportunities, inflation, forced migration, economic downturns, and environmental degradation present urgent risks that demand immediate attention. The imbalances and inequalities in wealth and resource distribution at all levels breed instability locally, regionally, and globally, further amplifying the fragility and volatility of our global system. Beyond the immediate crises, our book delves into the potential repercussions of artificial intelligence and its implications for the geopolitical supply chain in Türkiye. It meticulously unveils how climate change and geopolitical dynamics could severely impact Türkiye's security framework, economic landscape, and business sector. In this context, Türkiye must boldly declare its commitment to fostering collaboration among nations, businesses, and civil society to effectively address these global challenges. Türkiye's pivotal role in this collective endeavour cannot be overstated, and the country should continue to lead initiatives aimed at collaboration and problem-solving. This book offers valuable insights from scholars, experts, and industry leaders, with the goal of elevating awareness and effectively managing emerging risks at every level. Together, we can navigate these turbulent times and create a more resilient global order.

